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“De rechtsorde kan niet optimaal functioneren, tenzij zij zowel inwendig, 
tussen de onderscheiden nationale en internationale normstelsels, als uit- 





Private actors such as trade associations, multinational corporations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) on the global, the European and the national level increasingly engage 
in regulatory activities across fields of law, including private law.2 European and national 
legislators also play their part in this respect by relying upon private regulators in pursuing 
policy objectives and by introducing references to private regulation in private law 
legislation.3 One result of this interaction is a large and varied number of industry codes of 
conduct – and it is this type of private regulation that is the object of study of this doctoral 
thesis.4 Industry codes of conduct cover a wide array of topics (e.g., advertising, data 
protection, e-commerce, direct selling, consumer credit, mortgage lending, food safety, 
professional ethics, competition and corporate social responsibility) and regulate business-to-
business (B2B) as well as business-to-consumer (B2C) relationships. Strikingly, however, the 
general private law debate in the Netherlands has failed to keep pace with these 
developments. A few exceptions apart,5 Dutch private law scholars appear to show little 
interest in the topic: they generally tend to disregard the phenomenon of private regulation.6 
Nor have the Dutch legislator and the Dutch judiciary engaged extensively (or at least 
unequivocally) with private regulation.7 As a result, the legal relevance of private regulation 
in Dutch private law is still surrounded by ambiguities.  
 This doctoral thesis picks up the gauntlet by addressing the legal relevance of industry 
codes of conduct in Dutch private law. The current chapter outlines how it will do so. The 
                                                
1 Enschedé 1984, p. 140. Own translation: “The legal order cannot function in the best possible way, unless it 
finds its proper place among other systems of norms, both internally, among the different national and 
international systems of norms, and externally”. 
2 See, e.g., Büthe & Mattli 2011; Cafaggi 2011a and 2011b; Calliess & Zumbansen 2010; Vogel 2010; Dilling, 
Herberg & Winter 2008; Giesen 2007, pp. 17-34; Haufler 2001; pp. 8-30. 
3 Chapter 4 discusses how this practice takes shape in European and Dutch private law with regard to codes of 
conduct. See also Menting & Vranken 2014, pp. 11-24. 
4 Working definitions will be provided in section 1.5. 
5 Prominently among them, Vytopil 2015; Akkermans 2011; Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009; Giesen 
2008 and 2007; Vranken 2005; Van Driel 1989. 
6 Cf. Menting & Vranken 2014, p. 7. Far from being exceptional, Beckers suggests, this lack of attention in 
Dutch general private law debates characterizes the general private law debate as a whole (Beckers 2016, p. 1). 
7 See section 1.2.1. 
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scene will be set by taking a closer look at the state of affairs in Dutch private law as regards 
private regulation and by discussing the need for more research into the relation between 
private regulation (industry codes of conduct) and Dutch private law (section 1.2). Next, the 
relevance of the research will be clarified (section 1.3). Subsequently, the research question 
will be introduced and the methodology used in the research will be explained (section 1.4). 
Working definitions of ‘private regulation’ and ‘industry code of conduct’ are provided in 
section 1.5. The final section (1.6) lays out the structure of the book. 
 
1.2 Private regulation and Dutch private law 
 
1.2.1 The state of affairs according to Dutch private law literature: A synopsis 
 
With the caveat that the Dutch private law literature referred to here dates from several years 
ago, the picture that emerges from this literature on the legal relevance of industry codes of 
conduct (and other forms of private regulation) is one of hesitancy and ambiguity. 
 In civil case law, this ambiguity springs from the diversity of judicial response in court 
cases that involve private regulation. Dutch private law literature touching upon the use of 
private regulation in civil case law shows that in some of these cases private rules are 
assigned legal relevance, but that they are denied such relevance in others.8 Giesen submits 
that the Dutch Supreme Court takes a more open approach in this respect than do the lower 
courts (district courts and courts of appeal). However, the Court has thus far failed to direct 
the lower courts at this point.9 The result of these diverging approaches is a lack of clarity on 
the legal relevance of private regulation, which is compounded by the absence of clear, 
detailed substantiation, and of clear assessment criteria in those cases that do assign legal 
relevance to private regulation.10 
 
The ambiguous approach of the Dutch judiciary can be illustrated by two frequently cited 
judgments of the Supreme Court: Kouwenberg/Rabo and Trombose.11 The central issue in the 
Kouwenberg/Rabo case was whether a bank had breached its duty of care towards a client 
involved in option trading. One set of rules applicable to this case were the Rules concerning 
trade on the options exchange (Reglement voor de handel op de optiebeurs, hereafter: RHO). The 
RHO, drawn up by private actors, address the relation between the options exchange and the 
securities houses trading at the exchange. These rules included a specification of the duty of care 
of banks towards clients wishing to engage in option trading. Even though this duty of care was at 
the heart of the legal dispute, the Supreme Court refrained from applying the RHO, simply 
referring to the private, non-legal nature of the rules. In the final analysis, the Supreme Court 
                                                
8 Giesen 2008; Giesen 2007; Vranken 2005; Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009. Chapter 6 surveys the 
state of play in Dutch civil case law.  
9 As Giesen observed in 2008 on the basis of a case law analysis. See Giesen 2008, pp. 790-792. 
10 Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009, pp. 119-203; Giesen 2008. Cf. Vranken 2005, pp. 91-94. 
11 HR 11 July 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7419, NJ 2005/103 (Kouwenberg/Rabo) and HR 2 March 2001, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0377, NJ 2001/649 (Trombose), para 3.3.3. Both judgments are analyzed in greater detail 
in Chapter 6 (sections 6.4.2.2.4 and 6.4.2.2.3, respectively). On these judgments, see also Vranken 2005, pp. 88-
93; Giesen 2007, pp. 47-48, 78-81; Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009, pp. 202-203. The brief description 
of the two judgments in this section is based on the English explanation provided by Vranken 2006, pp. 71-73.  
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regarded the RHO as only one of the elements relevant to determining the duty of care of the 
bank.12 In the Trombose case, by contrast, the Supreme Court did apply private rules directly. The 
Court held the accused physician liable for not complying with a hospital protocol (as a 
consequence of which a patient developed thrombosis), because the standards included in the 
protocol were based on consensus between the hospital and its physicians about proper medical 
care and because physicians may be expected to comply with these standards.13 Although the 
Court could have reasoned as it would later do in Kouwenberg/Rabo, it nonetheless based its 
decision directly on the protocol, without even referring to its private nature. This sharp contrast 
with the first case exemplifies the ambiguity that surrounds the position of private regulation in 
Dutch private law. 
 
Existing studies suggest that the Dutch legislator takes a fairly reticent attitude when it comes 
to using alternative regulatory instruments. That is to say that the legislator only very 
occasionally considers the use of regulatory alternatives in ex ante evaluations of proposed 
legislation,14 even though the use of such alternatives is one of the cornerstones of Dutch 
legislative policy.15 
 Some light is thrown on the matter by the few Dutch private law scholars that have 
addressed the binding force and permeability (doorwerking) of private regulation in Dutch 
private law. The prevailing opinion among these scholars is that private regulation can have 
legal relevance in Dutch private law.16 Even so, questions remain as to the exact legal, law-
developing status of private regulation and the need to introduce criteria that regulate the use 
of private regulation.  
 
1.2.2 Broader perspectives 
 
Going by the picture outlined by Dutch private law literature, it can be said that despite 
having assigned legal relevance to private regulation, the actors that shape and apply Dutch 
private law – i.e., the legislator, civil courts and legal scholars – do not always seem 
particularly inclined to engage with the phenomenon. At first blush, this might not come as a 
surprise. After all, as Vranken argues, thinking in Dutch private law is firmly rooted in the 
exclusive “framework of legislation and adjudication”.17 It is implicitly assumed that 
legislation and case law are the only sources of law on which private law builds. In this 
                                                
12 HR 11 July 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7419, NJ 2005/103 (Kouwenberg/Rabo), paras 3.5.3 and 3.6.3. Yet, 
as Vranken points out, the decision eventually reached by the Court on the basis of a list of viewpoints could 
have been reached more easily if the Court had applied the RHO directly. See Vranken 2005, p. 91. 
13 HR 2 March 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0377, NJ 2001/649 (Trombose), para 3.3.3. 
14 Van Gestel & Menting 2011. See also Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.3.3 and, anticipating the findings presented in 
Chapter 4, Menting & Vranken 2014, pp. 21-23. 
15 See Instructions 6, 7 and 8 of the Legislative Drafting Instructions (Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving), as 
published in the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees (Staatsblad) 1992, 230 and subsequently amended. The latest 
version (ninth amendment) dates from 2011 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2011, 6602). The approach of the 
Dutch legislator to private regulation (and industry codes of conduct in particular) is investigated more closely in 
Chapter 4 of this doctoral thesis. 
16 Particularly Akkermans 2011; Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009; Giesen 2007; Vranken 2005; Van 
Driel 1989. See also Vytopil 2015. Hartlief (2007) is critical of the phenomenon of private regulation. 
17 Vranken 2006, p. 66. 
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conceptual framework, private regulation cannot acquire legal binding force on its own 
merits, due to its private origins. It can only gain such force when conferred upon by either 
the legislator (directly or through legislation) or the courts.18 Private regulation lacking a 
clear, self-standing legal status might be one of the reasons why Dutch private law actors at 
times still exercise restraint when the legal relevance of rules drawn up by private regulators 
is at issue. However, when we look beyond this conceptual paradigm, the observations made 
in the previous section do become striking in several respects. 
 First of all, these observations do not correspond with the role private regulation could be 
presumed to play given the nature of Dutch private law. That nature, after all, is one of 
openness: Dutch private law abounds in open-ended legal standards and such standards are 
pre-eminently fit to facilitate the legal relevance of private rules. For example, private rules 
could be used to give substance to the general duties of care under private law or they could 
be considered to embody the prevailing juridical views in the Netherlands (Article 3:12 of the 
Dutch Civil Code – hereafter: DCC).19 In other words, Dutch private law would appear to be 
well-suited to accommodate a legal role for private regulation, at least to a larger extent than 
it has done so far.  
 Secondly, the state of play in Dutch private law contrasts with developments in European 
private law,20 where private regulation seems to be making more headway. Both the European 
legislator and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have addressed the issue of 
private regulation with some regularity. Several European private law directives, for instance, 
refer to or stimulate the use of industry codes of conduct,21 and the CJEU has subjected 
private regulatory arrangements to judicial scrutiny under both free movement law and 
competition law.22 As a result of the strong interrelatedness of the European and the Dutch 
legal orders (cf. the multi-layered nature of Dutch private law),23 the course taken by the 
European legislator and the CJEU in respect of private regulation inevitably impacts on (the 
role and relevance of private regulation in) Dutch private law. 
 
                                                
18 Vranken 2005, pp. 79, 82, 99, 101. For an English version of this contribution, see Vranken 2006, pp. 64-81. 
19 Giesen 2007, pp. 68-75. 
20 As Smits indicates, there is no clear definition of the concept of European private law, nor a common 
understanding of the scope of this field of law. Broadly understood, it can be described as “providing rules with 
relevance for private actors” (Smits 2012, p. 84). 
21 A case in point is the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC, OJ 2005, L 149/22), which, on 
conditions, marks non-compliance with a code of conduct under certain circumstances as an unfair commercial 
practice. More examples can be found in Chapter 4, section 4.4.1.1. 
22 For a detailed discussion, see, e.g., Mataija 2016. See also Chapter 5 of this doctoral thesis. Admittedly, the 
rules on free movement and some rules on competition are of a public law rather than a private law nature. 
However, it is private law relationships that are central to the judgments of the CJEU at this point. Hence, it can 
be argued that the rules do have private law relevance. For more detailed reflections, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.  
23 For an account of the influence of EU law on national private law in general, see Hartkamp et al. 2014a, and 
on Dutch private law in particular, see Hartkamp et al. 2014b. Cf. Van Schagen 2013 on the role of European 
and national State and non-state actors and their interdependence in the development of European private law. 
On the multi-layered nature of national private law, see, e.g., Van Gerven & Lierman 2010, pp. 21-27; Vranken 
2006, pp. 94-95. The multilevel character of EU private law is discussed by Van Schagen 2013. 
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Private regulation has also been the subject of European scholarly debates in the field of private 
law, albeit to a modest extent when compared to the public law debates on the issue.24 These 
public law debates address various issues, such as the complementary nature of the relation 
between public and private regulation,25 the legitimacy and accountability of private regulators,26 
and the role of private rules in European legal integration27.  
 
Thirdly, following on from the observations made in the introductory section of this chapter, 
the marginal legal role of private regulation in Dutch private law does not square with the 
practical regulatory relevance it has to B2B and B2C relationships. Private regulation has so 
far shown itself to be anything but a fad. Rather to the contrary, in fact: in a world strongly 
influenced and shaped by processes of globalization, the traditional regulatory landscape is 
changing with the emergence of various private regulatory regimes at the global, the 
European and the national level.28 These developments warrant the assertion that rule-making 
by private actors has become a fact of life in both the European and the national legal order.29 
 Viewed in this light, the ‘Dutch state of affairs’ that is apparent from Dutch private law 
literature is not merely striking, but can also be considered problematic, particularly in view 
of the latter two developments. As a result of the pervasive presence of private regulation in 
Dutch private law practice and the developments at the European level, (new) confrontations 
between private regulation and Dutch private law are inevitable. This is why it is a matter of 
some urgency that the legislator, civil courts and legal scholars further address the 
relationship between private regulation and Dutch private law and that these actors clarify the 
legal relevance of this type of regulation.30 This doctoral thesis has been written in response 
to that urgency. 
 
1.3 Relevance of the research: New perspectives 
 
This thesis seeks to ascertain the legal relevance of a particular type of private regulation, 
namely industry codes of conduct, in Dutch private law. As follows on from section 1.2.1, it 
is not the first to do so: other private law scholars have paved part of the way. However, the 
value of their pioneering research notwithstanding, the scope of the existing scholarly 
contributions to the debate is limited in three respects. First of all, these contributions mainly 
                                                
24 Most contributions to the debate are sourced from Cafaggi (see the references to his work throughout this 
doctoral thesis). For a discussion of the topic from a European private law (related) perspective, see, e.g., the 
different contributions in Cafaggi 2006a; Verbruggen 2014a; Janczuk-Gorywoda 2012; Schiek 2007; Huyse & 
Parmentier 1990. 
25 E.g., Cafaggi 2006c, pp. 29-33; Cafaggi 2011b, pp. 91-26. 
26 See for instance Cafaggi 2006c, pp. 29-33; Cafaggi 2011b; Schiek 2007. 
27 Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010; Cafaggi 2010. See also Janczuk-Gorywoda 2012. 
28 See the literature referred to in n 2. 
29 Hartlief (2007) differs, arguing that private regulation is a fashion fad that will disappear as soon as the 
legislator changes course and stops using this type of regulation as part of its legislative policy. It can be argued, 
however, that this interpretation of the phenomenon is too narrow: in practice, private regulatory activities also 
take place outside the confines of governmental policy and the relevance of the phenomenon therefore does not 
depend entirely on the course pursued by the legislator. 
30 As early as 1984, Enschedé appealed for a clear positioning of the Dutch legal order vis-à-vis other systems of 
norms. See Enschedé 1984, p. 140 (quoted supra n 1). 
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approach the legal relevance of private regulation from the perspective of the judiciary: the 
perspectives of private regulators and of the legislator are not taken into account 
systematically.31 Secondly, as Dutch private law scholars tend to focus almost exclusively on 
national private law, they usually do not consider European developments relevant to the 
topic.32 Thirdly, the Dutch private law debate on the legal relevance of private regulation is of 
a predominantly theoretical nature. What it generally lacks is empirical data, for instance on 
the actual use of private regulation in B2B and B2C relationships, in spite of the fact that an 
empirical perspective may well bring to the fore new insights as to the legal relevance of 
private regulatory schemes.  
 The fact that the scope of the Dutch private law debate on the legal relevance of private 
regulation has thus far remained limited implies there is room to take some steps ahead, the 
more so because the latest contributions to the debate date back several years. This doctoral 
thesis seeks to take these steps by adopting a more comprehensive approach than the ones 
hitherto taken in Dutch private law literature. In doing so, it will introduce four new 
perspectives on the topic.33 
 The empirical study presented in this thesis into the functions of industry codes of 
conduct captures two of these new perspectives. As noted above, the Dutch debate is usually 
conducted from a theoretical perspective. The empirical study aims to add some practical 
insights to this debate. The functions of industry codes, in turn, are equally unknown to 
Dutch private law research: they are not prominently brought to the fore, if at all discussed. 
Arguably, however, these functions not only reflect the role and relevance of industry codes 
of conduct in practice, but also constitute the basis for a better understanding of the possible 
relationships between these codes and private law. With the picture outlined by Dutch private 
law literature suggesting that nothing much is to be expected from either the legislator or the 
judiciary at this point, other reference points are needed to provide the necessary clarity as 
regards the legal relevance of industry codes. Therefore, this doctoral thesis envisages using 
the functions as a stepping-stone for considerations on the private law relevance of these 
codes (see section 1.4.1). 
 The third new perspective to be introduced in this thesis is that of the legislator (the 
regulatory perspective). At first sight, this perspective may appear somewhat peculiar. After 
all, previous studies have shown that the Dutch legislator rarely considers using alternative 
regulatory instruments in ex ante evaluations, despite the formal embedding of such use in 
general legislative policy.34 However, policymaking also occurs outside the confines of the 
legislative process. This might have resulted in governmental reliance on industry codes of 
conduct in the field of private law. Moreover, the European legislator has shown willing to 
use codes of conduct in pursuing its policy objectives in European private law.35 As the use of 
industry codes by the legislator can have consequences for the legal relevance of these codes, 
                                                
31 Van Driel’s doctoral thesis is an exception in this regard. See Van Driel 1989, pp. 42-82 in particular. This is 
partly different in the European private law debates, which often do seek to link up with EU legislative policy.   
32 Again, Van Driel 1989 is the exception. 
33 The next section describes how these perspectives will be given concrete shape.  
34 See Van Gestel & Menting 2011 and the brief discussion in section 1.2.1 above. 
35 See section 1.2.2. 
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it is only fitting that the approach of the European and Dutch legislators to industry codes of 
conduct be investigated – as this thesis will do. 
 Finally, as already follows from the foregoing, the fourth new perspective is the 
European one. Following the strong interrelatedness of the European and the Dutch legal 
order, the way in which industry codes are dealt with in European legislative policy, private 
law legislation and case law will inevitably affect the relationship between these codes and 
domestic private law. That being so, it stands to reason to analyze both the European and the 
Dutch legislative and judicial approaches to industry codes of conduct.36 
 
1.4 Research questions and methodology 
 
1.4.1 Research questions 
 
This doctoral thesis seeks to answer the following central research question:  
 
What is the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct in a multi-layered Dutch private 
law? 
 
This central research question is broken down into the following three sub-questions: 
 
1) What are the functions of European and Dutch industry codes of conduct from an 
empirical perspective? 
2) How do the European and the Dutch legislators approach industry codes of conduct in 
European and Dutch private law and what legal relevance do these actors assign to 
these codes? 
3) How do the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Dutch civil courts 
approach industry codes of conduct and what legal relevance do these actors assign to 
these codes? 
 
Accordingly, the doctoral thesis rests on three pillars, which reflect the four perspectives 
outlined in the previous section: i) the functions of European and Dutch industry codes of 
conduct; ii) the approach of the European and Dutch legislators to these codes; and iii) the 
approach of the CJEU and the Dutch civil courts to these codes.  
 
 Pillar I – Functions (sub-question 1) 
The functions of industry codes of conduct constitute the first pillar. These functions will be 
identified by using a purpose-built framework to analyze a large number of industry codes 
relevant to (private law) B2B and B2C relationships. Given the comparative element of the 
research, both European and Dutch industry codes will be studied.37 The functions yielded by 
the empirical study will be compared and contrasted with the functions other research has 
                                                
36 See section 1.4.2. 
37 Chapter 2 details the design of the empirical study and the research methods used. 
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ascribed to private regulation in general and to industry codes of conduct in particular. Thus, 
it is sought to gain a better, empirically founded understanding of the role of industry codes of 
conduct in B2B and B2C relationships, as a run-up to the answering of the central research 
question in which the functions are also envisaged to play a role (see below). 
 
 Pillars II and III - Approach of the European and Dutch legislators and judiciaries (sub-
questions 2 and 3) 
Under the second and the third pillars, the focus will shift to the role of industry codes of 
conduct in private law practice, that is to say, in European and Dutch legislative policies, 
private law legislation and civil case law. The approach of the European and Dutch legislators 
constitutes the second pillar. The research under this pillar comprises an analysis of how these 
legislators use industry codes of conduct as part of their respective general legislative policies 
and in private law legislation. The third pillar concerns judicial approaches to industry codes 
of conduct and comprises an analysis of the case law of the CJEU and the Dutch civil courts. 
For both pillar II and III, it will be asked how industry codes are approached and what legal 
relevance is assigned to these codes. These questions will be answered on the basis of a study 
of legislative policy, private law legislation, case law and literature. In view of the 
comparative element of the research, particular attention will be paid to the influence of the 
European approach to industry codes of conduct on the legal relevance of these codes in 
Dutch private law. In this way, the research under the second and third pillars aims to present 
the main elements of the current state of affairs as regards the legal relevance of industry 
codes of conduct in Dutch private law.  
 
 Central research question 
The findings under these three pillars will jointly lead to an answer to the central research 
question. In answering this question, account will first of all be taken of the findings 
documented for the second and third pillars. Have the Dutch legislator and the Dutch 
judiciary changed course, assigning greater relevance to industry codes of conduct, or has 
their attitude remained much the same, thus effectively maintaining the status quo? What are 
the implications of the European and the Dutch legislative and judicial approaches for the 
legal relevance of industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law? Attention will also be paid 
to differences between the European and the Dutch approaches and the European influence on 
the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law. Following this 
discussion, the functions of these codes (pillar I) will be brought into play. These functions 
are envisaged to play a role as reference points and building blocks in determining the legal 





                                                
38 See also section 1.3. 
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 The broader perspective of Chapter 7, section 7.4 
Although the central research question sets the parameters for the research conducted in this 
doctoral thesis, it does not cover section 7.4 of Chapter 7, in which the findings and 
conclusions of the research will be put into a broader perspective. More specifically, section 
7.4 will - in an exploratory fashion - shed some light on a recurrent issue within Dutch private 
law literature: the need to regulate the use of codes of conduct. In thus adding a new element 
to this thesis, section 7.4 in fact goes beyond the scope of the central research question. It 
should be noted, however, that I do not seek to provide an exhaustive answer to the question 
of the need for regulation of industry codes. Rather, my aim is to explore the implications of 
the research findings for this issue. As such, section 7.4 in fact remains closely linked to the 
central research question: on the one hand, it builds on the research findings ‘generated’ under 
this question while, on the other hand, it takes these findings one step further by using them as 
a basis to address the ‘regulation issue’ in an exploratory way. 
 
1.4.2 Methodology: An empirical and a comparative element 
 
The methodological framework of this research comprises an empirical and a comparative 
element. The study into the functions of European and Dutch industry codes of conduct is the 
empirical element. The comparative element is reflected in the fact that account will be taken 
of both European and Dutch developments. In the empirical part of the research, this 
comparative element will be given shape by studying both European and Dutch industry 
codes. Do the functions of these codes differ depending on the level at which they have been 
drawn up?39 In the discussion of the legislative and judicial approaches to industry codes, the 
comparative element is reflected in the comparison of the European and Dutch approaches 
and in the assessment of the influence of the European developments on the national level. 
 As a result of the different institutional contexts, it is difficult to facilitate a true 
comparison between the European Union and the Netherlands.40 However, as might already 
have become apparent from the foregoing, this thesis does not seek to provide a full-fledged 
comparison. Rather, the main aim of the comparison is to ascertain the (inevitable) European 
influence on Dutch private law in respect of industry codes of conduct and the consequences 
that this has for the legal relevance of these codes. Additionally, the approaches of the 
European legislator and the CJEU to such codes might serve as a source of inspiration for the 
ways in which these codes can be dealt with in Dutch private law. In other words, the word 
‘comparative’ is used with the caveat that it does not refer to comparison as it is usually 
understood in comparative law methodology. 
 
 
                                                
39 With a view to answering this question as accurately as possible, available Dutch equivalents of European 
codes of conduct were, included in the empirical study so as to better facilitate a comparison between the codes. 
For more details, see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2. 
40 Eijlander for example observes that comparing the use of private regulation in European and in national 
legislative policies is not an easy task, because EU legislation and national legislation have different functions. 
See Eijlander 2005, p. 7. 
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1.5 Working definitions 
 
The scope of this doctoral thesis is limited to private regulation by means of industry codes of 
conduct. This section provides working definitions of both private regulation and industry 
codes of conduct, without the aspiration of engaging in the lengthy, inconclusive definitional 
debates that the phenomenon of private rule-making has given rise to.  
 
1.5.1 Private regulation 
 
Scholars use different terms to refer to the phenomenon of private rule-making, with self-
regulation and co-regulation being the prevailing ones in legal discourse.41 This doctoral 
thesis, however, prefers the notion of private regulation, for two reasons.  
 First of all, the notion allows for capturing the various relationships that can exist 
between public and private regulation. Many private regulatory schemes are, to a greater or 
lesser extent, subject to some form of governmental input.42 This implies that private 
regulation and state regulation are rigidly opposed concepts only in their purest form. In this 
sense, they are two extremes of a continuum on which one can find different private 
regulatory schemes that are influenced by the state to varying degrees.43 Unlike self-
regulation and co-regulation, the notion of private regulation has a neutral connotation in 
terms of state involvement and as such it can adequately cover the different manifestations of 
private rule-making that result from interaction with the state.  
 Secondly, the term private regulation reflects the fact that in practice, private regulatory 
schemes mostly do not function in complete isolation from such external actors as consumers, 
NGOs and competitors. The regulatory effects of these schemes often affect these external 
actors and in some instances, these actors have a say in the regulatory process.44 It is through 
this external input that private regulation distinguishes itself from self-regulation, which is 
referred to as a single-stakeholder model in which the regulators and the regulated coincide.45 
Industry codes of conduct, on the other hand, are said to constitute prime examples of self-
regulation.46 Nonetheless, the regulatory effects of industry codes are most often not limited 
to the group of regulated actors: they can also affect third parties, either positively (when 
codes grant ‘rights’ to third parties) or negatively (when codes create obligations for third 
                                                
41 Janczuk-Gorywoda 2012, pp. 19-20. Verdoodt 2007, p. 3 offers an impression of the different terminologies 
used. 
42 For a discussion of the different forms of interaction that can take place between public and private regulation, 
see, e.g., Buck-Heeb & Dieckmann 2010, pp. 35-41; Verdoodt 2007, pp. 51-69; Cafaggi 2006c, pp. 21-35; 
Gunningham & Rees 1997, pp. 364-366; Black 1996, pp. 27-28; Huyse & Parmentier 1990, pp. 260-266; 
Geelhoed 1993, pp. 49-51. See also the literature referred to in n 43. 
43 See, e.g., Ogus & Carbonara 2011, p. 229; Bartle & Vass 2007, pp. 888-890; Verdoodt 2007, pp. 15-16; 
Sinclair 1997; Ogus 1995, pp. 99-100. Cf. also the literature referred to in n 42.  
44 Mataija 2016, p. 9; Janczuk-Gorywoda 2012, p. 20. 
45 On the analytical distinction between private regulation and self-regulation, see, e.g., Cafaggi 2006c, pp. 18-
19; Verbruggen 2013, pp. 4-5; Janczuk-Gorywoda 2012, p. 20. 
46 Verbruggen 2013, p. 4. See also Cafaggi 2011a, pp. 32-34. 
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parties).47 Hence, arguably, industry codes of conduct can also be perceived as a form of 
private regulation. 
 For these reasons, this doctoral thesis uses the term ‘private regulation’. Following 
Verdoodt’s approach, it was opted for a working definition that starts from the idea of private 
regulation as a graded concept (gradueel concept) so as to fully capture the possible 
relationships of interaction between public and private regulation, as well as between private 
regulation and external actors. In consequence, the private origins of the rules are the starting 
point and ‘governmental influence’ the variable that makes private regulation move along the 
regulatory continuum, the far ends of which are formed by purely private regulation and state 
regulation.48 In formulating the working definition, account was also taken of the fact that 
private regulators often operate in which Scott has called ‘complete’ regimes: not only do 
private regulators engage in rule-making activities, they also often implement and enforce 
their own rules.49 This has resulted in the following broad working definition of private 
regulation: 
 
Non-state rules set by the regulated private actors or their representatives, in cooperation with 
other actors or in any other way, which are implemented and/or enforced entirely or in part by the 
private regulators themselves.50  
 
This doctoral thesis focuses on the rule-making capacity of private regulators: their 
monitoring and enforcement activities fall outside the scope this research.51 
 
1.5.2 Industry code of conduct 
 
In general terms, codes of conduct can be described as “written documents that lay down 
standards which communicate what behaviors are (morally) required”52 that can be drawn up 
by both private and public actors. The content of these codes can vary between general rules 
of conduct, which can be both of an ethical or more concrete nature, and (ethical or concrete) 
rules concerning the activities performed by the regulated actors, such as the provision of 
                                                
47 Cf. Cafaggi 2011b, pp. 96-97. Cafaggi indicates that self-regulation can equally pursue the interests of external 
actors. The main difference, so Cafaggi asserts, between private regulation and self-regulation lies in the fact that 
the former concept denotes multi-stakeholder models in which the regulated as well as other stakeholders 
participate, while the latter concept refers to single-stakeholder models. See Cafaggi 2006c, p. 19. Still, this 
doctoral thesis uses the term private regulation, because that term is deemed to more adequately reflect both the 
possible impact of the private rules on external actors and the possible links between public and private 
regulation.   
48 Verdoodt 2007, pp. 15-18. Cf. Page 1986, p. 144: “Self-regulation is a matter of degree”. 
49 Scott 2002, p. 58: Private regulators “may set standards, monitor for compliance and carry out enforcement 
without the need for intervention from others such as government departments and courts”. See also Scott 2006, 
pp. 132-133. 
50 This definition is based on Van Driel’s definition of self-regulation: “Niet-statelijke regels die al dan niet in 
samenwerking met anderen worden vastgesteld door degenen voor wie de regels bestemd zijn respectievelijk hun 
vertegenwoordigers, en waarbij toezicht op de naleving mede door deze groepen wordt uitgeoefend” (Van Driel 
1989, p. 2). Enforcement is to be understood in a broad sense, i.e., as encompassing monitoring, dispute 
resolution and/or sanctioning. 
51 On the enforcement of transnational private regulation, see, e.g., Verbruggen 2014a; Cafaggi 2012a. 
52 Oude Vrielink, Van Montfort & Bokhorst 2011, p. 486 with further references. 
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SMS services,53 or specific topics (e.g., the processing of personal data54). Building on the 
working definition of private regulation provided in the previous section and focusing on 
codes drawn up by private actors, a code of conduct can be defined as:55 
 
A set of rules drawn up by the regulated private actors or their representatives, in cooperation 
with other actors or in any other way, which lay down standards of behavior for the regulated 
private actors towards their stakeholders, and which are implemented and/or enforced entirely or 
in part by the private regulators themselves.56 
 
Different types of codes of conduct exist. One can for instance classify codes of conduct 
according to the nature of the private regulator (e.g., trade associations, professional bodies, 
(multinational) corporations, NGOs, public actors),57 the foundations of a code 
(organizational or contractual)58 or the level on which the code has been drawn up (industry-
level or company-level)59. Given the empirical element of this doctoral thesis, it studying all 
different types of codes was unfeasible. Therefore, it was decided to limit the scope of this 
doctoral thesis to one particular type of code of conduct. In doing so, the third classification 
(level) was taken as a starting point, as this classification in effect covers, at least in part, the 
other two classifications. Thus, a choice had to be made between focusing on industry-level 
codes or on company-level codes. Existing research, legal or otherwise, mainly focuses on the 
latter type of codes: codes of conduct drawn up by (multinational) corporations have already 
been the subject of various studies (including private law research), most notably in relation 
to the topic of corporate social responsibility.60 Industry-level codes, by contrast, have 
                                                
53 See the Dutch SMS Service Provision Code of Conduct (available at <www.payinfo.nl/gedragscodes>, 
accessed 1 July 2016). 
54 See, e.g., the different privacy codes of conduct approved by the Dutch Data Protection Authority (Autoriteit 
Persoonsgegevens), which can be found at <https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/zelf-doen/gedragscodes> 
(accessed 1 July 2016). 
55 Cf. the definition of code of conduct in Article 2(f) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
(2005/29/EC, OJ 2005, L 149/22): “an agreement or set of rules not imposed by law, regulation or 
administrative provision of a Member State which defines the behaviour of traders who undertake to be bound 
by the code in relation to one or more particular commercial practices or business sectors”. 
56 It should be noted that regulatory instruments that meet this working definition are not always called codes of 
conduct. Both in practice and in legal literature, a variety of terms is used (e.g., code of practice, code of ethics, 
rules of practice, rules of ethics, guidelines, code of honor) to designate what is in essence one and the same 
phenomenon, i.e., a set of rules of conduct. See Oude Vrielink, Van Montfort & Bokhorst 2011, p. 487. See also 
Baarsma et al. 2003, p. 28 (indicating that historical traditions and strategic arguments play a role in the decision 
how to name a regulatory instrument). This implies that it is the content of a regulatory instrument rather than its 
name that will be decisive in assessing whether it meets the working definition. 
57 See, e.g., Mamic 2004, pp. 43-33 (company codes, multi-stakeholder initiatives, intergovernmental codes and 
framework agreements), Jenkins 2001, p. 20 (company codes, trade association codes, multi-stakeholder codes, 
model codes and inter-governmental codes); Kolk, Van Tulder & Welters 1999, pp. 152-153 (governments or 
international organizations, social interest groups, firms, business support groups). Cf. Cafaggi 2011a, pp. 31-38 
(an industry-driven model, a primarily organizational model led by NGOs, an expert-led model and a multi-
stakeholder model). 
58 Cafaggi 2007, pp. 171-178. 
59 Van der Heijden 2011, p. 5. 
60 The overviews compiled by Kaptein & Schwartz 2008 and Helin & Sandström 2007 reveal that empirical 
studies of corporate codes often focus on issues such as effectiveness, implementation and compliance. 
Corporate codes have only recently started to attract the attention of private law scholars. See, e.g., Beckers 
2016; Beckers 2015; Peterkova-Mitkidis 2015; Vytopil 2015; Van der Heijden 2012; Enneking 2012.  
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received relatively little academic attention. For that reason, this thesis focuses on codes of 
conduct drawn up at the industry level.61 More specifically, given the European and Dutch 
private law setting of this doctoral thesis, the research is concerned with European and Dutch 




This doctoral thesis is structured as follows.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 center on the empirical study into the functions of European and Dutch 
industry codes of conduct. Chapter 2 sets out the design of this study and explains the 
methodology used to identify those functions. The findings of the empirical study, the 
functions, are presented in Chapter 3. The first part of this Chapter is concerned with defining 
and categorizing the functions. In the second part, the functions identified on the basis of the 
empirical study are compared with the functions mentioned in the literature.  
 
Chapter 4 investigates how the European and Dutch legislators use industry codes of conduct 
in private law. To this end, it first assesses the developments concerning the place of 
alternatives to legislation in the general legislative policies of the EU and the Netherlands. 
Secondly, it takes a closer look at European and Dutch private law legislation in which it is 
referred to industry codes and it examines several cases outside legislation where the 
European and Dutch legislators rely on industry codes. Thirdly, it discusses the criteria for 
using alternatives to legislation in European and Dutch legislative policies. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the European and the Dutch judicial approaches to industry codes 
of conduct. Chapter 5 focuses on how the CJEU deals with industry codes, while Chapter 6 
examines how in civil suits Dutch lower courts (district courts and courts of appeal) and the 
Dutch Supreme Court deal with industry codes.  
 
Chapter 7, the final chapter, presents the main findings of the research and provides an 
answer to the central research question on the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct in 
a multi-layered Dutch private law. The chapter subsequently takes these findings and 
conclusions one step further by discussing their broader implications and - going beyond the 
scope of the central research question in section 7.4 - by using them to take a closer, 
exploratory look at the issue as to whether there is a need to formulate a (legal) framework for 
the use of industry codes of conduct. The Chapter closes with an outlook. 
 
The research was closed on 1 July 2016.
                                                
61 These codes are mainly authored by trade associations or professional organizations, either in cooperation with 














































The first part of this doctoral thesis is devoted to the functions of European and Dutch 
industry codes of conduct, which were identified on the basis of an empirical study. In a 
nutshell, this study consisted of a textual analysis of a selected number of industry codes, 
conducted on the basis of a purpose-built framework of analysis. In this way, I sought to 
identify the possible functions of European and Dutch industry codes as completely and 
specifically as possible.62 This chapter will describe the research design of the empirical study 
and the methodology applied to arrive at the identification of the functions, starting with some 
notes on the added value of the empirical study.63 The design of the study was finalized in 
December 2011. The information and data presented in this chapter reflect things as they 
stood at that date. The empirical study was conducted in the first half of 2012. 
 
2.2 Added value of an empirical study into the functions of industry codes of conduct 
 
The choice to conduct an empirical study was motivated by the theoretical nature of the 
European and Dutch private law debates on private regulation: generally, empirical insights 
into the actual practice of private regulation are not taken into account. Hence, an empirical 
study into the functions can be expected to add new perspectives to the existing debate. The 
choice to opt for my own, new, study might at first blush appear a bit odd, however. 
Considering that the functions of both corporate codes and industry codes have already been 
discussed by legal scholars as well as scholars from other disciplines, most notably the 
disciplines of business ethics and professional ethics,64 why not draw on the existing 
(empirical) studies into the functions, motives and objectives of codes of conduct to establish 
the functions of European and Dutch industry codes? Since a new empirical study was 
                                                
62 Thus, it was not aimed to provide an exhaustive overview of the functions of European and Dutch industry 
codes of conduct. 
63 The research design and methodology set out in this chapter are based on the exploratory empirical study into 
the functions of European and Dutch industry codes that I conducted as part of my Master’s thesis (Menting 
2011). The empirical inquiry carried out in the course of this doctoral thesis is a continuation of that study. 
64 See the literature referred to in Chapter 3, section 3.4. 
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expected to provide added value for the purposes of this thesis in several respects, I did not 
elect to link up with these studies, at least not as a basis on which to identify said functions. 
 First of all, the literature touching upon the functions, motives and objectives of private 
regulation has either a very general focus, i.e., on private regulation in general, or a fairly 
specific focus, i.e., on corporate codes or on codes of a specific industry, or a specific 
profession. Accordingly, the scope of existing studies differs from that of this doctoral thesis, 
which focuses instead on European and Dutch industry codes of conduct. This necessitated an 
empirical inquiry of my own. Secondly, literature tends to focus on global, European or 
national codes of conduct. This thesis, by contrast, takes a European and a Dutch perspective. 
Thirdly, conducting my own, new, empirical study on the basis of a comprehensive 
framework of analysis has the important advantage that the initial results will display more 
than just the functions. That is to say that the results65 will also provide insights into, for 
instance, the binding force of the codes, the nature of the private rules and the availability of 
private enforcement mechanisms. These insights can also be considered relevant with a view 
to the envisaged role of the functions as a stepping-stone towards addressing the central 
research question on the legal relevance of industry codes in Dutch private law.  
 
2.3 Research design: Composing the sample 
 
This section describes how the sample of European and Dutch industry codes of conduct was 
composed. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the aim of the study was to provide a 
general overview of the possible functions of these codes. This implies that the sample of 
European and Dutch industry codes had to be relatively large and diverse. The process 
towards obtaining this sample involved two moments of selection: a selection of industry 
sectors (section 2.3.1) and a selection of industry codes (section 2.3.2). 
 
2.3.1 Selection of the sectors 
 
2.3.1.1 Broad or limited sample? 
 
The selection of the sectors from which the European and Dutch industry codes were 
eventually to be drawn first of all involved a choice between using a broad sample, consisting 
of a small number of codes within each sector, or a limited sample, consisting of a large(r) 
number of codes within a few sectors. Both options have advantages as well as disadvantages. 
The option of using a broad sample allows for a broad overview of the functions of industry 
codes across the different sectors, making it a suitable option for composing a cross-section of 
functions. Furthermore, this option has the advantage of involving all industry sectors. This 
would rule out the danger of selection bias. Nevertheless, this method of sampling also has an 
important drawback. When the time and means for an empirical study are limited, as was the 
case with the study conducted for this doctoral thesis, opting for this approach would imply 
                                                
65 Which had to be interpreted and transformed into criteria in order to define the functions, see Chapter 3. 
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that for each sector, only a few codes of conduct could be studied. This would probably lead 
to less detailed conclusions, simply because the range of codes studied would be too diverse. 
Furthermore, the size of the sample would allow for neither generalized statements nor 
generalized conclusions. With a view to the aim of the empirical study, composing a 
comprehensive overview of the possible functions, and the comparative element of this 
research, this loss of detail was deemed undesirable. Therefore, though this first option might 
have allowed for a very broad overview of the functions, it was decided to opt for a limited 
sample comprising a sufficient number of codes within several sectors.  
 Within the context of this doctoral thesis, using a limited sample composed of a more 
‘homogenous’ set of industry codes of conduct has the important advantage that it allows for 
drawing more general conclusions. As such, it can better facilitate a comparison between the 
functions of European and Dutch industry codes. This option was therefore deemed most 
suitable to reach the goals of the empirical study. The arguments in favor of using a limited 
sample are sufficiently strong to outweigh the disadvantage that not all sectors will be 
covered and that, as a consequence, no definite conclusions can be drawn as to the functions 
of industry codes of conduct. The latter, after all, is not the aim of the empirical study; it is 
not ruled out that industry codes have more or other functions than the ones identified on the 
basis of the empirical study. Furthermore, by diversifying the selected sectors, the empirical 
study can still lead to a modest cross-section of the functions. Therefore, it was opted for a 
limited sample. 
 
2.3.1.2 Selection of the sectors 
 
The starting point in the selection of the sectors was the Dutch reference classification of 
economic activities: the 2008 Standard Industrial Classifications (Standaard Bedrijfsindeling 
2008, hereafter: SBI 2008), version of July 2008.66 The SBI 2008 is based on and corresponds 
with the international reference classification of the United Nations, the International 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Rev. 4 (2008) (ISIC Rev. 4),67 
and the European classification, the Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans 
la Communauté Européenne, Rev. 2 (2008) (NACE Rev. 2)68.69 These reference 
classifications, which are used as a tool for economic statistical analysis, comprise a 
                                                
66 The July 2008 online version of the SBI 2008 used for the empirical study is no longer available. However, the 
SBI has only been slightly altered, i.e., made more detailed, over the years; the main categories have remained 
the same. For an overview of the changes that were made, see <www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/onze-
diensten/methoden/classificaties/activiteiten/standaard-bedrijfsindeling--sbi--/sbi-2008-standaard-
bedrijfsindeling-2008> (accessed 1 July 2016). Here, one can also find later versions of the SBI 2008, starting 
with a 2012 version. 
67 Available at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/isic-4.asp> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
68 Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/index.cfm?TargetUrl=DSP_PUB_WELC> (accessed 1 July 
2016). 
69 These reference classifications are linked by a hierarchical structure. The ISIC constitutes the ‘basic’ 
classification. The NACE is the European specification of the ISIC. The SBI, in turn, is a more detailed, Dutch 
version of the NACE. For an explanation of the relations between the three systems, see the scheme on 
<www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/onze-diensten/methoden/classificaties/algemeen/relaties-tussen--inter--nationale-
standaardclassificaties> Cf. also the correspondence table between ISIC Rev. 4 and NACE Rev. 2 at 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/isic-4.asp> (websites accessed 1 July 2016).  
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hierarchical, layered division of economic activities. The usefulness of these classifications in 
designing the empirical study lies in the fact that they in effect provide an overview of the 
existing sectors: the main, highest-level groups of economic activities can be viewed as 
industry sectors.70 Hence, the classifications were taken as a starting point for the selection of 
the sectors. As will be explained below, one of the selection criteria pertains to the number of 
industry codes within a sector. With a view to this criterion, it was decided to base the 
selection of the sectors on the SBI 2008 (version July 2008):71 in being the most detailed 
reference classification, the SBI generates most queries for the search for industry codes (see 
below under 2 and section 2.3.2).  
 The SBI 2008 (version July 2008), like the ISIC and the NACE, comprises twenty-one 
main groups or sectors, coded with a letter:  
 
A) Agriculture, forestry and fishing  M) Consultancy, research and other  
B) Mining and quarrying         specialized business services 
C) Manufacturing    N) Renting and leasing of tangible goods and  
D) Electricity, gas, steam and air           other business support services 
     conditioning supply    O) Public administration, public services and 
E) Water supply; sewerage, waste          compulsory social security 
     management and remediation activities P) Education 
F) Construction     Q) Human health and social work activities 
G) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of  R) Sports, culture and recreation 
     motor vehicles and motorcycles  S) Other service activities 
H) Transportation and storage   T) Activities of households as employers; 
I) Accommodation and food services            undifferentiated goods- and service- 
J) Information and communication       producing activities of households for 
K) Financial institutions              own use 
L) Renting, buying and selling of real  U) Activities of extraterritorial organizations  
     estate           and bodies 
 
The sectors that were to be included in the empirical study were selected on the basis of three 
criteria: (1) specificity of the sector, (2) number of codes within a sector and (3) the turnover 
of each sector.72 Thus, it was sought to select those sectors in which industry codes are 
presumably of particular societal and regulatory importance for private law B2B and B2C 
relationships. 
 
1) Specificity of the sector 
As a first step in the process of selecting the sectors, sectors that did not fit the private law 
scope of this doctoral thesis or were deemed of a too specific nature were excluded from the 
                                                
70 As Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek) for instance does in its statistical information on 
enterprises.  
71 As the outlines of three classification systems correspond (see supra n 69), the connection with the 
international and the European classification was maintained. 




list of sectors. This led to the exclusion of four sectors: ‘Public administration, public 
services, compulsory social security’ (O), ‘Human health and social work activities’ (Q), 
‘Sports, culture and recreation’ (R) and ‘Activities of extraterritorial organizations and 
bodies’ (U). The public administration sector was left out because this thesis focuses on 
industry codes drawn up by private actors. Extraterritorial organizations and bodies were 
excluded for a similar reason. The health sector, in turn, was excluded with a view to the fact 
that the private regulatory ‘system’ in place in this sector has a rather specific and quite 
complex nature, due to its embedding in legislation and regulations. It is a regulatory system 
in its own, as it were. The culture, sports and recreation sector, finally, was not selected as the 
codes within this sector (at least in sports) were expected to be predominantly focused on the 
relation between an association and its members, and not so much on the B2B and B2C 
private law relationships on which this thesis focuses. This places codes of conduct in this 
sector in a somewhat different context.  
 
2) Number of codes 
The number of industry codes within each of the remaining seventeen sectors was taken as a 
second criterion, for two reasons. First of all, the number of codes within a sector might be an 
indication of the importance of private regulation by industry codes in that sector.73 Secondly 
(and more pragmatically), a sufficient number of European and Dutch codes of conduct had 
to be present in a sector in order to meet the objective of establishing the functions of 
European and Dutch codes.  
 The subsequent exercise of compiling a list of European and Dutch industry codes was 
not all plain sailing: there are no comprehensive lists that provide an overview of the industry 
codes within a sector. Literature and existing empirical studies proved of only little help at 
this point, as most research focuses on a selection of industry codes within a specific policy 
area or sector.74 This necessitated an own quick scan in order to roughly75 determine the 
number of European and Dutch industry codes within each of the remaining sectors. 
 
 Quick scan 
The quick scan was limited to industry codes that were published online. Although the main 
focus of the scan laid on codes drawn up by European and Dutch trade associations, I also 
took on the board industry-level codes drawn up by other European or Dutch private actors 
(e.g., NGOs) or as a joint effort of different industry actors (multi-stakeholder initiatives) that 
I came across during the quick scan. Thus, no selection was made on the basis of the nature of 
the authors of the codes, with the exception of (public) codes drawn up unilaterally by the 
government or (inter)governmental organizations. The only criterion that was applied in this 
respect was that the actors originated and acted at the European or Dutch industry level. 
                                                
73 A large number of codes might also increase the chance that either consumers or businesses in that sector are 
confronted with codes of conduct in private law B2B or B2C relationships. 
74 The European and Dutch industry codes of conduct referred to in the literature were added to the list compiled 
for this study. 
75 Thus, it was not aimed to compile a comprehensive list of existing codes. 
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Likewise, the name of a private regulatory initiative was not regarded as decisive.76 Initiatives 
that were not named code of conduct, but, after a very brief inspection, did appear to meet the 
working definition of ‘industry code of conduct’ provided in Chapter 1 were put on the list. 
 The quick scan was conducted on the basis of the following method. The Self- and Co-
regulation Database of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC database)77 
provided a first handle for my search for European codes of conduct. This database contains a 
large number of European self-regulatory and co-regulatory initiatives. A second handle was 
provided by the Social Dialogue texts database, which contains regulatory initiatives that 
result from the European Social Dialogue.78 However, not all European private regulatory 
initiatives are included in these databases. Moreover, the EESC database was not up-to-date at 
the time the quick scan was conducted.79 Therefore, I conducted an additional search for 
European industry codes, using the search engine Google. In conducting this search, I 
systematically used the search query ‘European code of conduct’ and synonyms of that query 
(listed in Figure 2.1). If needed, these search queries were refined by adding the [name of the 
industry sector or economic activity].80 In addition, the websites of a large number of 
European trade associations were searched for codes of conduct. On the Dutch level, no 
database with national private regulatory initiatives exists. Consequently, the quick scan at 
this point only consisted of a systematic Google search, using the composed search term [one 
of the queries listed below] + [name of the industry sector/economic activity]81 and a search 
on the websites of various Dutch trade associations.82 
 
Figure 2.1 – Overview search queries 
                                                
76 Cf. Chapter 1, n 56. 
77 The database can be found at <www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.self-and-co-regulation> (accessed 1 July 
2016).  
78 The database can be found at <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=521> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
79 For this research, the content of the databases as it stood in November 2011 was used. 
80 E.g., [European code of conduct] [advertising] or, in Dutch, [Europese gedragscode] [reclame]. 
81 E.g., [gedragscode] [makelaars] (in English: [code of conduct] [realtors]). 
82 The names and website of these trade associations were collected from Branchewijzer, a database containing 
an overview of the trade associations per sector. At the time the search was conducted, this database was 
available on the website of the Dutch Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel): 
<www.kvk.nl/ondernemen/brancheinformatie/branchewijzer/informatie-over-uw-branche/> (last accessed 11 
December 2012). At present, the database can be found at <www.ondernemersplein.nl/brancheinformatie/> 
(accessed 1 July 2016). 
Search queries EU Search queries NL 
English query Dutch query  
European code(s) of conduct Europese gedragscode(s) Gedragscode(s) 




European code(s) of practice -  
European rules of conduct Europese gedragsregels Gedragsregels 





This quick scan revealed that the sectors encompassing the most European and Dutch 
industry codes of conduct by the end of 2011 were: Manufacturing (C), Wholesale and retail 
trade (G), Information and Communication (J), Financial institutions (K), Consultancy, 
research and other specialized activities (M), and Renting and leasing of tangible goods and 
other business support services (N). 
 
3) Additional criterion: Turnover 
As mentioned before, it was sought to select those sectors in which industry codes of conduct 
are of particular societal and regulatory importance for B2B and B2C private law 
relationships. The number of codes within a sector was taken as an indication for the societal 
and regulatory importance. However, this criterion might not be very accurate in all cases. 
After all, this number might also depend on the number of trade associations present within a 
sector: jointly, multiple trade associations are likely to produce more codes of conduct than a 
single trade association covering an entire sector. Sectors that are less ‘Europeanized’ are also 
less likely to have European codes of conduct. Furthermore, the quick scan could have missed 
certain codes of conduct, for there are many. Therefore, an additional criterion was used to 
determine the expected economic and societal impact of a certain sector: the turnover of each 
sector.83 Based on the figures of Eurostat and Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek) available in December 2011, leaving out those sectors that had not been selected on 
the basis of the criteria discussed earlier, the following ranking was made. This ranking in 





















                                                
83 This criterion was based on one used in empirical studies on codes of multinational companies (MNCs). In 
some of these studies, the sample of MNCs codes is composed following international rankings of MNCs based 
on their revenue. See, e.g., Peterková Mitkidis 2015, pp. 61-64; Bondy, Matten & Moon 2008. 
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Source: Eurostat, Key figures on European business, Eurostat Pocket Books 2011, p. 3484 
 




Source: CBS Statline85 
                                                
84 Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3930297/5967534/KS-ET-11-001-EN.PDF> (accessed 1 
July 2016). 
85 In December 2011, when the research design was finalized, the data as they stood at the time could be found at 
<www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/bedrijven/cijfers/default.htm> >> ‘Bedrijfsleven; arbeids- en financiële 
gegevens, per branche, SBI 2008’ (in Dutch) and in English at <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/?LA=en> >> 
Theme >> Enterprises >> Trade and industry; employment and finance per sector, SIC 2008 (accessibility of 
these websites last checked 12 December 2012). However, this website has been changed. With the caveat that 
the time span is different, the data can now be retrieved in Dutch at <http://statline.cbs.nl> >> Zoeken op 
thema >> Bedrijven >> Financiële gegevens >> Bedrijfsleven; financiën, SBI 2008 (select: Onderwerpen > 
Bedrijfsopbrengsten – Bedrijfstakken/Branches (SBI 2008) > Bedrijfstakken 1e digit (SBI 2008) > 
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Of the sectors that were found to encompass the most European and Dutch industry codes of 
conduct, all but two are included in this table: the financial sector is missing in both the 
European and the Dutch table, while the administrative and supportive activities are missing 
in the Dutch table. This implies that turnover could not fully function as a criterion with 
regard to these sectors. However, with the administrative and supportive activities included in 
the European table and the financial sector being important in daily economic life for both 
companies and consumers, this was not considered particularly problematic.  
 On the basis of this layered selection, the following industry sectors were eventually 
selected:86 (1) Manufacturing,87 (2) Wholesale and retail trade,88 (3) Information and 
communication,89 (4) Financial institutions,90 (5) Consultancy, research and other specialized 
business services,91 and (6) Renting and leasing of tangible goods and other business support 
services92. Following the selection criteria applied, these sectors can be considered as 
covering B2B and B2C relations that are most relevant or frequent in an everyday private law 
context. It is within these sectors that the European and Dutch industry codes were selected.  
 
2.3.2 Selection of industry codes of conduct 
 
The next step in the sampling process involved the selection of the European and Dutch 
industry codes of conduct within ‘the framework’ of the selected sectors. This step was 
broken down into three sub-steps: 1) compiling the ‘full’ list of industry codes, 2) determining 




                                                                                                                                                   
Bedrijfstakken 1e digit – Perioden > 2009) and in English via <http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/?LA=en> >> 
Search by theme >> Enterprises >> Financial figures >> Trade and industry; finance, SIC 2008 (select: Topics > 
Operating returns – Sector/Branches (SIC 2008) > Branches 1st digit (SIC 2008) > Main groups 1st digit – 
Periods > 2009) (accessed 1 July 2016). 
86 As descriptions of the sectors are lacking in the SBI 2008, the descriptions in the following footnotes have 
been derived from NACE Rev. 2 (2008). 
87 NACE Rev. 2 (2008): “the physical or chemical transformation of materials, substances, or components into 
new products, although this cannot be used as the single universal criterion for defining manufacturing (see 
remark on processing of waste below). The materials, substances, or components transformed are raw materials 
that are products of agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining or quarrying as well as products of other manufacturing 
activities. Substantial alteration, renovation or reconstruction of goods is generally considered to be 
manufacturing”. 
88 NACE Rev. 2 (2008): “wholesale and retail sale (i.e. sale without transformation) of any type of goods, and 
rendering services incidental to the sale of merchandise. Wholesaling and retailing are the final steps in the 
distribution of merchandise. Also included in this section are the repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles.” 
89 NACE REV. 2 (2008): “the production and distribution of information and cultural products, the provision of 
the means to transmit or distribute these products, as well as data or communications, information technology 
activities and the processing of data and other information service activities”. 
90 NACE REV. 2 (2008): “financial service activities, including insurance, reinsurance and pension funding 
activities and activities to support financial services” as well as “the activities of holding assets, such as activities 
of holding companies and the activities of trusts, funds and similar financial entities”. 
91 NACE REV. 2 (2008): “specialised professional, scientific and technical activities. These activities require a 
high degree of training, and make specialised knowledge and skills available to users.” 
92 NACE REV. 2 (2008): “a variety of activities that support general business operations. These activities differ 
from those in section M, since their primary purpose is not the transfer of specialised knowledge”. 
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1) Compiling the ‘full’ list of European and Dutch industry codes 
Although the quick scan already yielded a list of codes long enough to necessitate a selection, 
the first step towards the final selection involved an additional search for European and Dutch 
industry codes within each sector, so as to find as many codes of conduct as possible. The 
starting point for this search was the method used to conduct the quick scan. Accordingly, the 
additional search was focused on published industry-level codes of conduct meeting the 
working definition formulated in Chapter 1. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the objective 
and private law scope of the empirical study would be best met, three additional criteria were 
applied to the codes already on the list as well as to the codes found based on the additional 
search.93 
 
(i) Working definition of ‘industry code of conduct’ 
Neither during the quick scan nor during the additional search, was a selection made 
based on the name of a private regulatory scheme. In order to be included on the list, the 
only criterion to be met by each scheme was its congruence with the working definition of 
‘industry code of conduct’ applied in this thesis. At this point in the selection process, 
however, the codes were subjected to a closer inspection. If an initiative did not prove to 
meet the working definition after all, it was removed from or not included on the list.  
 
(ii) ‘Technical’ codes  
Given the focus of this doctoral thesis on industry codes in private law B2B and B2C 
relationships, industry codes solely concerned with technical issues or technical standards 
(e.g., the product labeling) were not added to the list. 
 
(iii) Certain types of professional codes 
During the additional search, it was decide to exclude codes of conduct drawn up by 
Dutch professional organizations that are designated as a regulatory authority drawn from 
the profession (publiekrechtelijke beroepsorganisaties) as well as their European 
equivalents. After the quick scan, Dutch codes of this type and their European equivalents 
already on the list were removed. This choice was motivated by the embedding of these 
codes in public law and the specific public regulatory authority that the professional body 
acting as a private regulator has in these cases, which sets them apart from other industry 
codes.94  
 
                                                
93 Which is not to say that the list of codes compiled for the purposes of this research does not include codes that 
would have met these criteria. Some codes might have initially slipped the cracks. 
94 At present, the following professional organizations have been designated as a regulatory authority drawn 
from the profession: the Netherlands Bar Association (Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten), the Netherlands 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (Nederlandse Beroepsorganisatie van Accountants), the Dutch Maritime 
Pilot’s Association (Nederlandse Loodsencorporatie), the Royal Dutch Association of Civil-law Notaries 
(Koninklijke Notariële Beroepsorganisatie) and the Royal Professional Organizaton of Judicial Officers 
(Koninklijke Beroepsorganisatie van Gerechtsdeurwaarders). 




Finally, it should be noted that as some of the codes found through the quick scan (conducted 
fall/winter 2011) were no longer publicly accessible at the time the additional search was 
conducted (early 2012). These codes were removed from the list as well. 
 
2) Determining the sample size 
All this resulted in a list containing a total of 217 industry codes of conduct (91 European 
codes and 126 Dutch codes). 
 
It is by no means purported that all relevant codes within the selected industry sectors were 
eventually found using this method. For reasons of feasibility it was for instance not possible to 
screen all search results yielded by Google. In addition, not all relevant information is available 
online. Furthermore, it is possible that a trade association applied more codes of conduct in 
addition to the one(s) published on its website. These codes were, as already noted above, 
however not part of the research, not only because the amount of published codes was already 
large enough to compose a sample suitable for the purpose of the empirical study, but also 
because it would have taken too much time to trace these (internal) codes as well.  
 
The sample composed for the empirical study eventually came to comprise 80 industry codes 
of conduct.95 I used the method of proportional sampling to determine the total number of 
European and Dutch codes within that sample as well as the number of European and Dutch 
codes to be studied within each sector.96 This means, firstly, that the number of European and 
Dutch codes, respectively, was determined in proportion to their share in the total number of 
industry codes. Following this method, the sample came to include 34 European codes and 46 
Dutch codes.97 The number of codes to be studied within an industry sector was determined in 
a similar fashion by comparing the number of codes within each sector to the total number of 
217 codes on a pro-rata basis.98 Finally, the number of European and Dutch codes to be 
studied within each industry sector was determined in proportion to the number of codes 
selected within each sector.99 This method led to the following numbers of European and 
Dutch codes selected within each industry sector: 
 
 
                                                
95 An overview of these 80 codes can be found in Annex 1. 
96 I opted for a proportional method of sampling in order to avoid the risk of composing a one-sided sample 
consisting of many codes from only a few industry sectors. Such a one-sided sample might endanger the aim of 
comprising a comprehensive overview of the functions since the functions might differ depending on the sector 
in question. 
97 The 91 European codes formed 41,94% of the total sample of 217 codes (91/217), the 126 Dutch codes 
58,08% (126/217). Within a sample of 80 codes, this leads to a number of 34 European codes (41,94% * 80) and 
46 Dutch codes (58,08% * 80). 
98 For example, 46 codes of conduct were found within the manufacturing sector, meaning that this sector holds 
a share of 21,20% in the total sample of 217 codes (46/217). Accordingly, 17 codes from the manufacturing 
sector were included in the sample (21,20% * 80).  
99 To stick with the example of the manufacturing sector (supra n 98); the search yielded 24 European codes and 
22 Dutch codes, making up 52,17% (24/46) and 48,83% (24/46), respectively, of the total number of 46 codes 
within that sector. As set out in footnote 97, 17 codes of conduct were to be studied within the manufacturing 
sector. Proceeding by the rates just calculated, this implied that 9 European (52,17% * 17) and 8 Dutch (48,83% 
* 17) codes of conduct were to be selected. 
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3) Composing the final sample 
The final selection of 34 European and 46 Dutch industry codes to be studied was made at 
random and in a steered way. The steering element in this respect entailed the inclusion of 
industry codes studied in a previous empirical study and the selection of national equivalents. 
The inclusion of previously studied industry codes was motivated by the fact that the present 
empirical study is a continuation of the exploratory empirical study into the functions of 
European and Dutch industry codes that I conducted as part of my Master’s thesis.100 More 
specifically, as the present study was conducted on the basis of a more detailed version of the 
framework of analysis (see section 2.4.1), it was decided to include 44 of these codes in the 
current sample so as to check and, if needed, refine the results of the previous study.101 These 
‘pre-selected’ codes of conduct were supplemented by 36 ‘newly’ selected codes.102 The new 
codes were drawn from the final list of codes at random. At this point, the second steering 
element, the selection of national equivalents came into play (it also applied to the pre-
selected codes). This element implied that when the selected European codes of conduct 
turned out to have a Dutch equivalent, this national code was included in the sample.103 This 
led to the inclusion of four national equivalents.104 The aim of including these equivalents was 
to gain a grasp of the interaction between European and Dutch industry codes and to better 
facilitate a comparison between the functions on both different levels. Finally, some changes 
in the final selection were necessitated by the fact that a few codes on the list, which was 
compiled during fall/winter 2011 and early 2012, were no longer valid or publicly accessible 
in the first half of 2012 when the empirical study was conducted. If this proved to be the case, 
the place of the initially selected code was taken by another code selected at random. 
                                                
100 In this study (Menting 2011), I studied 46 Dutch and 20 European codes from different industry sectors, using 
the same method as applied in the empirical study conducted in this research. See below, section 2.4. 
101 A selection was made to prevent this empirical study from becoming a complete repetition of the previous 
one. 
102 It is indicated on the list in Annex 1 to which ‘category’ a code belongs. 
103 Provided that the two criteria set out above were met.  
104 The codes concerned are marked in Annex 1. 
Industry sector Number of industry codes 
 Total (EU/NL) Selected 
(EU/NL) 
Total number of industry codes 217 (91 / 126) 80    (34 / 46) 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
21   (13 / 8) 8     (5 / 3) 
Information and communication 18   (7 / 11) 7     (3 / 4) 
Financial institutions 49   (12 / 37) 18   (4 / 14) 
Consultancy, research and other specialized 
business services 
54   (25 / 29) 20   (9 / 11) 
Renting and leasing of tangible goods and 
other business support services 
28   (10 / 18) 10   (4 / 6) 
 
 27 
2.4 Framework of analysis 
 
2.4.1 The framework 
 
The selected European and Dutch industry codes of conduct were studied on the basis of a 
framework of analysis that was developed with the purpose of determining the functions of 
these codes. The origins of this framework lie in my Master’s thesis, where I carried out a 
more limited, exploratory empirical study into the functions of European and Dutch industry 
codes.105 In drafting the framework of analysis for that research project, I first of all drew up 
an overview of elements that I considered of possible importance for research on the functions 
of industry codes in private law. These elements were outlined in the first draft of the 
framework and, thereafter, set out in more concrete terms by means of several sub-elements 
and questions relating to the element concerned. In the course of the empirical study, it 
became evident that other elements, not included in the first version of the framework, were 
equally important for the identification of the functions. Hence, these elements were added. 
This eventually resulted in a framework consisting of seven core elements: drafters and target 
group, reason, aim, type, nature and binding force of the norms, enforcement, influence of the 
government, and accessibility.106 
 The version of the framework of analysis applied in my Master’s thesis formed the basis 
for the framework of analysis used in this doctoral thesis. The seven core elements were 
maintained, though some were made more detailed by breaking them down into more sub-
elements. This revised version of the framework was compared with similar empirical 
research frameworks applied by other scholars in empirically assessing codes of conduct. 
These frameworks not only served as a source of inspiration for a further refinement of the 
core elements of my own framework, but also as an a posteriori check that no important 
elements were missed.107 Finally, during the early stages of the empirical study, the 
framework thus developed was slightly adjusted a few times. This development process 








                                                
105 Menting 2011. 
106 Menting 2011, p. 23. 
107 The frameworks developed by De Groot-Van Leeuwen & De Groot 1998, Van Tulder & Kolk 2001 (pp. 273-
274) Tambini, Leonardi & Marsden 2008 (pp. 59-62, with reference to M.E. Price & S.G. Verhulst, Self-
Regulation and the Internet, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2005) and Van der Zeijden & Van der Horst 
2008 (pp. 63-65) were studied to this end. 
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Drafters 1. Who has drawn up the code of conduct? 
Target groups 2. Who is the target group? 
Scope 3. What is the scope of the code of conduct? 
Reason 4. What were the reasons for drawing up (and, if applicable, revising) 
the code of conduct? 
Aim 5. What is the aim of the code of conduct? 
Rules 
Type 6. What types of rules does the code of conduct contain? 
a. Rules of a concrete, substantive nature, or 
b. Rules of a moral/ethical nature, expressing aspirations 
Nature 7. What is the nature of these rules (specific or general)? 
Binding force 8. Does the code of conduct have binding force? 
Enforcement 
General 9. Does the code of conduct contain rules with respect to monitoring, 
compliance and enforcement? 
Monitoring actor 10. Is there a monitoring actor and, if so, is this actor independent? 
Complaint handling 11. Is there a system in place to handle complaints? 
Sanctions 12. In case of non-compliance, does the code of conduct provide for the 
possibility of imposing sanctions? 
13. Does the code provide an enforcement mechanism? 
Code, legislator and legislation 
Code - legislator 14. Has the European and/or the Dutch legislator influenced or been 
involved in drawing up and developing the code of conduct, i.e., 
what is/was the interaction between the legislator and the private 
actors? 
Code - legislation 15. Is there a relation/interaction between the code of conduct and 
European and/or Dutch legislation and regulations and, if so, what is 
the nature of said relation? 
Accessibility 16. Are explanatory notes provided, does the code contain provisions for 
review and amendment, is the code reviewed and revised on a 
regular basis and, if so, why, and can third parties easily access the 
code (e.g., for readability)?  
 
The questions included in the framework were answered on the basis of an analysis of both 
the content of the selected industry codes of conduct and ‘secondary’ information about these 
codes.109 Read together, the answers constituted the criteria for defining and assigning the 
functions (see Chapter 3). 
                                                
108 This version of the framework has already been published (in Dutch) in Menting & Vranken 2014 (pp. 49-
50), together with a very brief summary of the way in which the framework was applied. 
109 For a more detailed account of the sources used, see below section 2.5. 
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2.4.2 Explanatory notes to the framework110 
 
General (drafters, target groups and scope) and accessibility (questions 1, 2, 3, 16) 
The framework starts with three general questions about the drafters, target groups and scope 
of an industry code of conduct and ends with questions related to the accessibility of the code. 
In essence, these questions touch upon such issues as representativeness, level of support and 
transparency. As such, they are arguably not the most important questions when it comes to 
defining the functions of an industry code. Rather, these elements might be important factors 
as regards the extent to which codes of conduct can play a legally relevant role in private law. 
Therefore, they have not served as criteria in the definition of the functions, with the 
exception of the element of ‘accessibility’.111 Nevertheless, these elements were included in 
the framework of analysis for the sake of completeness, since I envisage the answers to the 
questions accompanying these elements playing a role in the later stages of this research when 
the question of the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law comes 
up for discussion. The foregoing implies that the core of the framework is constituted by the 
elements of ‘reason’, ‘aim’, ‘rules’, ‘enforcement’, and ‘code, legislator and legislation’. 
 
Reason (question 4) 
The reason for drawing up an industry code of conduct is a first core element that plays a role 
in defining the functions of an industry code. A code that has been drawn up as a response to 
societal pressure, for instance, is likely to have a different function than a code that is created 
to fill a regulatory gap in the absence of public regulation. 
 
Aim (question 5) 
In reflecting the objectives that the authors of an industry code are trying to attain, the aim of 
a code seems almost synonymous with its function. The question about the aim of a code 
therefore constitutes an important element of the framework. This is particularly so when the 
authors explicitly mention the objectives of their code, as my first exploratory study showed. 
If that is the case, the aim often represents one of the code’s functions.112 However, this 
implies that matters might become more complicated when the aim of an industry code is not 
explicitly stated. More specifically, if this aim has to be derived from secondary sources, an 
element of interpretation might be involved. In these cases, other elements of the framework 
will come to the fore more prominently. 
 
Rules (questions 6-8) 
Questions 6-8 concern the type, nature and binding force of the rules incorporated in a code. 
 
 
                                                
110 These notes build on the explanatory notes to the first version of the framework applied in my Master’s 
thesis. See Menting 2011, pp. 24-28. 
111 The accessibility of a code plays a role in relation to the protective function. See Chapter 3, section 3.3.1 
under 10. 
112 See Menting 2011. 
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Type of rules 
In general, two types of rules can be found in European and Dutch industry codes.113 Codes 
can contain a mix of both types. The first type that can be distinguished are rules of a 
concrete, substantive nature, i.e., rules that do not solely concern the conduct of the regulated 
actors towards other actors, such as the private regulator, fellow-regulated, competitors and 
consumers, but instead concern specific topics or activities, such as advertising and consumer 
information. 
 
An example of these types of rules can be found in the Dutch Code of Conduct for Consumers 
and Energy Suppliers (Gedragscode Consument en Energieleverancier). Article 2.3 of this Code 
provides that sales talks must be held between 9 am and 9 pm on weekdays and between 10 am 
and 4 pm on Saturdays. Sales talks outside these hours are not allowed, unless an appointment 
has been made at the consumer’s own initiative.114 
 
The second type concerns norms that are of an ethical, more aspirational nature. These norms 
set standards for behavior in accordance with what is considered appropriate from a moral, 
ethical perspective and usually include phrases such as ‘will strive for’ or ‘best endeavors’.115 
 
Article 3 under c of the IVBN Code of Ethics is an example of a provision that holds rules of an 
ethical nature. It states that “IVBN members must undertake to act professionally in their dealings 
with third parties, such as property managers, subcontractors, suppliers and other firms and 
organisations with whom they have a business relationship. As far as possible, members must 
ascertain that the companies they engage to carry out work are bona fide (sincere, reliable) and 
competent”.116 
 
Nature of the rules 
The question on the nature of the rules, which is often closely linked with the question on the 
type of rules, in effect pertains to the wordings of a code: are these rules formulated in general 
terms, leaving room for interpretation, or are the rules of a specific, more detailed nature?117 
Although the nature of the rules is closely linked with the issues that are dealt with in a code - 
some issues are easier to capture in specific rules and wordings than others - this element does 
play a relevant role when identifying the functions. If, for example, the wordings of a code are 
very general, while a more specific formulation would have been possible, the general nature 
                                                
113 See also Koelemeijer 2004, pp. 12-13. Koelemeijer draws a distinction between broadly worded streefcodes 
(aspirational codes) that name certain values and ambitions of the organization, without giving content to these 
values and ambitions, and normerende codes (prescriptive codes) that lay down norms that have binding force 
upon the target group. 
114 The Code (version 2015), authored by the Dutch trade association for energy companies active on the Dutch 
market (Energie-Nederland) can be found at <http://www.energie-nederland.nl/gedragscode-consument-en-
energieleverancier/> (accessed 15 May 2016). The translation is my own. 
115 See Keirsbilck 2011, p. 328. 
116 The Dutch version of the Code (2008), drawn up by the Association of Institutional Property Investors in The 
Netherlands (IVBN), can be found at <www.ivbn.nl/publicaties-detail/ivbn-code-of-ethics-versie-juni-2008>. 
The translation has been taken from the English version of the Code (2004), which can be found at 
<www.ivbn.nl/viewer/file.a. spx?FileInfoID=185> (websites accessed 1 July 2016). 
117 Cf. Kolk, Van Tulder & Welters 1999, p. 162. 
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of the rules might give rise to doubts as to the intention of the drafters. Is the code designed 
for actual implementation or is it a mere instance of window-dressing?118 
 
Binding force 
As regards the binding force of industry codes of conduct, the main distinction drawn was 
simply between industry codes that had binding force and industry codes that lacked such 
force. In the latter case, industry codes serve as non-binding guidelines for the target group. 
Within the category of codes having binding force upon the target group, some further 
differentiation was possible. The results of the empirical study show that the binding force of 
industry codes can follow from membership of a European or Dutch trade association that 
acts as a private regulator (the most common way when industry codes are concerned), from a 
contractual subscription to a code, or from governmental interference. In the internal relation 
between the private regulator and the regulated industry actor, binding force in these cases 
denotes legal binding force, resulting from the law of associations, contract law or the 
government conferring legally binding force.119 The binding force of an industry code can 
entail an obligation to comply with the code, but can also concern a duty to implement the 
European code into a national code or a national industry-level code in a corporate code. 
When establishing whether the rules had binding force, account was taken of the text of the 
code, the charter and bylaws of the industry association, the existence of a monitoring system 
and/or a system for resolving disputes and whether sanctions can be imposed in case of non-
compliance.120  
 
Enforcement (questions 9-13) 
Industry codes of conduct can include rules relating to its enforcement, such as rules 
establishing independent monitoring, setting up a procedure to settle complaints and disputes 
or imposing sanctions on violations of the code.121 Such enforcement mechanisms are often 
linked to a code of conduct, as is for instance the case with the Dutch Advertising Code, 
which has its own scheme for handling complaints and its own monitoring bodies (the 
                                                
118 At this point, the element of ‘Enforcement’ comes into play (see below). 
119 See Cafaggi 2012b, p. 3; Menting 2017 (forthcoming). Of the industry codes analyzed in the empirical study, 
the Privacy Code of Conduct of the private investigation agencies sector (Privacygedragscode sector 
particuliere onderzoeksbureaus) had legal binding force on the basis of Article 23a of the Private Security 
Organizations and Detective Agencies Regulations (Regeling Particuliere beveiligingsorganisaties en 
recherchebureaus), which obliges private investigation companies to draw up a code of conduct identical to this 
Privacy code. The codes of conduct for consumer credit of the Dutch Banking Association (NVB), the Dutch 
Finance Houses’ Association (VFN) and the Dutch Home Shopping Organization (NTO), are examples of codes 
that have de facto legal binding force: the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële 
Markten) has designated these codes as minimum elaborations of the open norm of responsible lending laid 
down in Article 4:34(2) of the Dutch Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het Financieel Toezicht). See 
<www.afm.nl/nl-nl/professionals/doelgroepen/kredietaanbieders/normen> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
120 It has to be noted that codes of conduct can also gain (legal) binding force by ‘external’ actions, such as their 
incorporation into a contract or in general terms and conditions. See, e.g., Peterková Mitkidis 2015, pp. 153-163; 
Beckers 2015, pp. 47-58. As this binding force does not follow directly from the code itself, it was not taken into 
account in the empirical part of this doctoral thesis. 
121 Cf. Menting 2011.  
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Advertising Code Committee and the Board of Appeal).122 In some cases, however, 
enforcement mechanisms are to be found ‘outside’ an industry code, for instance in the guise 
of an independent complaints body that is also concerned with the enforcement of certain 
industry codes.123 The presence of enforcement mechanisms as well as the comprehensiveness 
of these mechanisms plays an important role in determining the functions of an industry code. 
Codes with strong and clear enforcement mechanisms can be said to have a stronger 
regulatory function than codes without any provisions in this respect, at least on paper.124  
 
Code, legislator & legislation (questions 14 and 15) 
The sixth element of the framework concerns the possible relation and interaction between 
industry codes of conduct (private actors) and the legislator, and between industry codes and 
legislation. The legal literature is witness to the fact that in some cases there is a multifaceted 
interplay between industry codes on the one hand and the legislator and legislation on the 
other. Industry codes can for instance be used by private parties to fend off European or 
national legislation, or as instruments to complement existing legislation. The legislator, in 
turn, can leave room in its policy for private parties to draw up codes of conduct or use the 
‘threat of legislative interference’ to stimulate the development of private rules. Either way, 
the legislator actively and deliberately contributes to the development of codes of conduct.125 
 Accordingly, it can be expected that the nature of a possible interplay between private 
parties, the legislator and legislation likewise will define the functions of a code of conduct. 
As regards the relation code of conduct – legislation, it has to be noted that industry codes 
often operate against the backdrop of a general legal framework covering the topics included 
in the code. However, in answering the question on this relation, it was with a view to the 
time available for the empirical study only focused on the direct, specific relations between 
codes and legislation that followed from the sources consulted. The relation with the general 




The starting point for the application of the framework of analysis was the content of the 
industry codes of conduct. That is to say that the text of the codes was used as a main source 
                                                
122 See Dutch Advertising Code, Working Procedures of the Advertising Code Committee & the Board of 
Appeal. The document is available at <www.reclamecode.nl/nrc/>. The English version of the Code can be 
accessed at <www.reclamecode.nl> >> English (accessed 1 July 2016). 
123 E.g., the Netherlands Financial Services Complaints Tribunal for the financial sector (Klachteninstituut 
Financiële Dienstverlening). See <www.kifid.nl> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
124 As enforcement often seems to be related to the binding force of a code, this element is more or less a 
‘continuation’ of the element ‘norms – binding force’ (cf. Menting 2011). At the same time, however, 
enforcement is a separate element as not all codes of conduct with binding force contain enforcement 
mechanisms. Moreover, differences might exist with regard to the way in which enforcement mechanisms are 
implemented, as already follows from the three main sub-elements that the element ‘enforcement’ has in the 
framework of analysis: monitoring actor, complaint handling system and sanctions. 
125 On the relation between private regulation, and the legislator and legislation, see for instance Verdoodt 2007, 
pp. 36-41; Gunningham & Rees 1997, pp. 365-366; Black 1996, pp. 26-28; Huyse & Parmentier 1990, pp. 262-
263. Cf. also Geelhoed 1993, pp. 49-50. 
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in answering the questions of the framework. However, studying only the content of the code 
proved to be insufficient to fully answer these questions. Therefore, additional information 
was used. This information was derived from the website of the private regulator, often a 
trade association, and from reports issued by the actors involved in drawing up the code at 
issue. Where necessary and available, information from ‘third parties’ and relevant literature 
were also included.126 Only publicly available information was used. In searching and 
studying this ‘secondary’ information, the method of ‘snowballing’ was used in addition to 
the search strategy just outlined. As some industry codes are better documented than others, 
this method in some cases led to inequalities in information available on the codes, which 
resulted in the functions of some codes being more ‘firmly’ established than others. 
 
2.6 Limitations  
 
The empirical study comprises an intensive look at a significant number of European and 
Dutch industry codes of conduct and is aimed at making a cross-section of their possible 
functions. Although this research method can be deemed appropriate to achieve such an 
objective, the method nevertheless entails some limitations. First of all, the framework set out 
in section 2.4 had to be slightly revised during the empirical research as some sub-elements 
were missing or had to be reformulated. Regarding these revisions, it could be that there are 
still other elements, not included in the framework, that determine the functions of codes of 
conduct. Secondly, as the analysis is limited to the text of the industry codes of conduct and 
written information following on from secondary sources, the research design does not allow 
for insight into the effectiveness and sustainability of the codes of conduct in practice or into 
the actual objectives of these codes. The reality on paper may differ from the actual 
implementation and application of the code, the more so since textual analysis can involve an 
element of interpretation. Or, in the words of Jenkins, there might be a “contrast between 
rhetoric and reality”127 which cannot be discovered on the basis of desk research.128 
Therefore, the actual functions of an industry code of conduct might eventually turn out to be 
different than those assigned to it on the basis of the empirical study. Nonetheless, within 
these limitations, the empirical study can provide some valuable insights as to the functions 
that European and Dutch industry codes of conduct can have (at least in theory), which are 
new to the Dutch private law debate. 
 
 
                                                
126 For the importance of contextualizing the content of the code by additional research, see Tambini, Leonardi 
& Marsden 2008, pp. 50-51. 
127 Jenkins 2001, p. 26. 
128 See also Tambini, Leonardi & Marsden 2008, p. 51 who use a comparable research method. They point at the 
following limitations: “Code analysis cannot ascertain the effectiveness of the code, though it can identify cases 
in which a code does not contain provisions for its enforcement or is not in fact justiciable and therefore likely to 
be less effective. Even these inferences are of limited reliability, as trust, mutual observation, participation in a 
network of colleagues and/or a sense of obligation can be key mechanisms in the process of self-regulation. Nor 














































This chapter will discuss the functions of European and Dutch industry codes of conduct 
identified on the basis of the empirical study.129 It will start out by explaining the method used 
to identify and define these functions (section 3.2). Next, the different functions and the 
criteria used to assign a function to an industry code will be described. The ensuing general 
picture is transformed into a categorized overview of the functions, which reflects the 
interconnectedness of the functions (section 3.3). Subsequently, the overview will be 
compared with the functions, motives and objectives of industry-level private regulation 
mentioned by other scholars (section 3.4). An overview of the functions per industry code of 
conduct can be found in Annex 2.130 
 
3.2 How the functions were identified: A quick scan and the role of the framework of 
analysis 
 
3.2.1 Preliminary stage: A two-step quick scan 
 
Given the fact that existing research, empirical or otherwise, already touches upon possible 
motives for, and objectives and functions of private regulation (including industry codes of 
conduct), it would have been possible to compile a list of functions on the basis of a review of 
this research. However, as set out in the previous chapter (section 2.1), preference was 
nonetheless given to conducting a new empirical study. Furthermore, it was decided not to 
review the existing body of research beforehand for the following three reasons. Firstly, some 
of the existing research is conducted from a rather specific angle. This makes it less 
straightforward to use the results of this research in my empirical study, which is more 
general in nature. Secondly, the approach of not studying the existing research beforehand 
offered me the possibility to examine the selected industry codes with an open mind, i.e., 
                                                
129 Part of section 3.3.1 of this chapter has, in an earlier version, already been published (in Dutch) in Menting & 
Vranken 2014, pp. 24-30. 
130 The empirical data used to identify the functions, i.e., the answers to the questions included in the framework 
of analysis, are on file with the author and are available in digital form on request. 
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without my view being, unconsciously or otherwise, narrowed to or influenced by the 
functions of private regulation identified by others. Thirdly, this approach allows for a 
comparison between the functions identified in the empirical study and the functions 
mentioned in the literature. This comparison can tell us whether new functions have been 
discovered or whether functions have been missed.  
 Even so, the empirical study needed a starting point in the sense of some ideas as to what 
functions industry codes of conduct could have. In my Master’s thesis, I used two ‘sources of 
inspiration’ to this end: (1) the functions of legislation and (2) my own inventory of possible 
functions. At this point, as the research I conducted in my Master’s thesis constituted the basis 
for the empirical study carried out as part of this doctoral thesis, I will briefly outline how I 
went about it.131 
 
1) The functions of legislation 
The functions of legislation served as a first source of inspiration. Veerman, De Kok and 
Clement provide a particularly comprehensive overview of these functions, which is not 
restricted to the main functions or the functions usually mentioned in the literature. Rather, it 
comprises a wide range of functions, each of which is clearly defined and exemplified by the 
authors. Their overview includes: 
 
• The organizing function (ordenende functie),  
• The protective function (beschermingsfunctie), 
• The communicative function (communicatieve functie),  
• The consolidating function (consoliderende functie),  
• The function of reallocating a problem (probleemverplaatsende functie),  
• The function of legislation as the visible result of political decisiveness (epaterende functie), 
• The symbolic function (symbolische function),  
• The emancipatory function (emancipatoire functie), and  
• The value-expressive function (waarden-expressieve functie).132  
 
It is precisely the comprehensiveness of this overview that makes it a suitable reference point 
for the empirical study. Admittedly, however, legislation and industry codes of conduct differ 
in several respects. One could therefore rightly question whether the functions of legislation 
can be transposed directly to industry codes. Yet, on further consideration, the differences 
between the two might be nuanced by tracing them back to the most fundamental conceptual 
difference: the nature of the rule-setter. The fact that both forms of regulation differ primarily 
has to do with the fundamentally different nature of their respective drafters. Whereas 
legislation is enacted by the legislator, industry codes are adopted by private actors. When one 
sees through this difference, it could be argued that both legislation and industry codes are in 
                                                
131 The following description is an adapted version of the one I provided in my Master’s thesis. See Menting 
2011, pp. 30-31. 
132 Veerman, De Kok & Clement 2012, pp. 145-172. The English translations of the functions are my own. 
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essence ‘regulation’.133 Viewed from this perspective, the functions of legislation and those of 
industry codes might show some similarities after all. The essence of the functions of 
legislation might well apply to industry codes, though the specifics of the functions might 
differ. Therefore, the functions of Veerman, De Kok and Clement, complemented with the 
safeguarding function (waarborgfunctie) and the instrumental function (instrumentele functie) 
distinguished by other scholars,134 served as a first source of inspiration, which is to say that 
the content of these functions served as a point of reference during the empirical study. 
Eventually, however, the role of these functions was in most cases limited to name borrowing. 
The majority of name-wise corresponding functions were given their own content on the basis 
of the empirical study.135 
 
2) My own inventory 
My own inventory of possible functions, drawn up on the basis of a brainstorm session, 
formed the second source of inspiration. Together with the framework of analysis and the 
functions of legislation, this inventory served as a helpful tool in the final identification of the 
functions of industry codes. 
 
As a final note, it should be re-emphasized that the functions following on from this ‘two-part 
quick scan’ were not decisive as such when analyzing the results of the empirical study. 
Rather, they served as a source of inspiration when, with an open mind, I defined the possible 
functions of industry codes of conduct, detached initially from the elements making up the 
framework of analysis. Hence, the functions listed in section 3.3.1 all followed on from the 
empirical study, even though some of the functions that came to the fore in the quick scan 
were retained, whether name-wise or content-wise. 
 
3.2.2 Role of the framework of analysis 
 
The functions of the selected industry codes of conduct were identified and assigned based on 
the answers to the questions jointly constituting the framework of analysis (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.4). The process of transforming these answers into a specific function was as 
follows. As a first step, taking the framework as a basis, I analyzed the text of a code and 
relevant information about the code derived from secondary sources. This analysis resulted in 
an overview of the characteristics of each code, linked to the different elements of the 
framework. The second step involved a closer analysis of these characteristics with the aim of 
identifying similarities and patterns from which a common denominator could be inferred 
(e.g., the objective of protecting consumers, a role of the code as an alternative to legislation). 
                                                
133 Witteveen 2007, p. 25 (on the relation between legislation and private regulation). The nature of the regulator 
determines whether we speak of legislation or private regulation. See also Witteveen 2007, pp. 25-42 on the 
concepts of regulation, non-regulation, self-regulation and alternative regulation. 
134 See for example Eijlander & Voermans 1999, pp. 18-19, with further references. Veerman, De Kok and 
Clement do not refer to these functions. 




As a third step, this common denominator was subsequently turned into a specific function, 
e.g., the protective function, the function as an alternative to public regulation. Thus, the 
different elements of the framework of analysis formed the criteria for both the definition of 
the functions and, as a corollary, for assigning a particular function to an industry code. 
 
3.3 Overview of the functions: Pillars, layers and connections 
 
3.3.1 General overview 
 
This section describes the different functions identified on the basis of the empirical study and 
the criteria used to assign each function.136 As will become clear from this description, there 
are areas of overlap between the functions, which is the result of the interconnectedness of 
some elements of the framework of analysis. How this overlap leads to a further 
categorization of the functions will be explained in section 3.3.2. In the current section, the 
related functions are put together, but - given the demonstrable differences that exist between 
them, in spite of the aforementioned overlap - discussed individually. 
 
Figure 3.1 – General overview of the functions 
 
General overview functions  
1. Corporate governance function 
2. Harmonization function 
3. Framework function 
4. Code of conduct as standard 
contract term 
5. Policy instrument function 
6. Alternative to public regulation 
7. Preventive function 
8. Complementary function 
9. Compliance function 
10. Safeguarding function 
11. Signaling function  
12. Image-building function 
13. Quality control function 
14. Quality mark function 
15. CSR function 
 
Source: Own empirical study 
 
The findings of the empirical study show that none of these functions is exclusively reserved 
for European industry codes or for Dutch industry codes. In theory, an industry code can have 
any of these functions, regardless of their European or Dutch origins. Put differently, the 
functions of a code are as such not dependent on the level on which the code has been drawn 
up. As a result, it was possible to compile one general list of functions, without the need to 
differentiate between the functions of European and Dutch industry codes of conduct.  
 
Before elaborating on the functions, it should be noted that – with the adoption of codes of 
conduct always, in one way or another, involving an element of self-interest of the industry and 
                                                
136 An earlier version of the description of several of these functions (nos. 1-6, 9-11 in Figure 3.1) has already 
been published (in Dutch) in Menting & Vranken 2014, pp. 24-30. 
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given the signaling, communicative quality of industry codes (cf. the signaling function) – an 
industry code of conduct could be adopted for the purposes of mere window-dressing. However, 
as the empirical study consisted of a textual analysis of the codes (and secondary sources), the 
results do not tell us whether in practice an industry code constitutes a true regulatory effort or 
whether it is used as a mere tool for window-dressing.137 Nonetheless, what can be noted is a lack 
of effective enforcement mechanisms might be indicative of the code embodying an element of 
window-dressing. 
 
1. Corporate governance function 
Codes of conduct have a corporate governance function where, with a view to them 
containing principles of good governance, they concern how associations and corporations are 
governed. The principles included in these codes generally cover topics such as the 
organizational structure of a company, the composition and tasks of the supervisory board and 
the executive board, and remuneration.  
 
Criteria  
The corporate governance function was assigned once it had followed on from the framework 
elements of ‘reason’ and ‘aim’, and the content of a code that the code rules concerned the 
organization and governance of the regulated actors.  
 
2. Harmonization function 
Industry-level codes of conduct entail rules that, generally speaking, have to be applied 
‘industry-wide’ or ‘profession-wide’, i.e., within the group of industry actors that has 
undertaken to abide by the code. Viewed from this perspective, every industry code can have, 
to a greater or lesser extent, a standardizing or harmonizing effect, particularly when the code 
has binding force upon the regulated actors. Hence, the mere fact that an industry code 
introduces ‘industry standards’ is in itself not distinctive enough to function as a criterion for 
assigning the harmonization function to the code. Therefore, it was decided to build on two 
aspects of harmonization that can enhance the distinctive character of the harmonization 
function, namely the direction and type of harmonization.138 Before turning to a more detailed 
discussion of these aspects, it should be noted that the harmonization function was assigned to 
an industry code when this function ‘visibly’ followed from the text of the code or from the 
secondary sources consulted (see below, under ‘criteria’). However, the harmonizing effect of 
an industry code does not always result from a deliberate strategy of the private regulator; it 
can also be an unintended effect of an industry code with other main objectives.139 This 
unintended effect has not been taken into account when assigning the function. 
                                                
137 Cf. the limitations of the empirical study mentioned in Chapter 2, section 2.6. 
138 Although these aspects are presented as being distinct from one another, combinations are possible, i.e., 
maximum – vertical, maximum – horizontal, minimum – vertical, minimum – horizontal. 




 Starting with the direction of harmonization, it can be observed that harmonization can 
work horizontally as well as vertically.140 In its basic, most common form, horizontal 
harmonization occurs within the group of regulated actors. The horizontal harmonizing effect 
of an industry code can, however, also be stretched beyond this group to industry peers or 
other actors, for instance when the legislator steps in and declares the code universally 
binding or when codes are used as a standard contract term (see below, under 4). Broadly 
speaking, vertical harmonization occurs when the rules of an industry code take effect at a 
lower level, i.e., a level that is geographically or organizationally below the level at which the 
code has been drawn up. ‘Geographical vertical harmonization’ for instance takes place when 
a European code has to be implemented at the national level or, conversely, when a national 
private regulator links up with a European code in drafting a national code. ‘Organizational 
vertical harmonization’, in turn, occurs during further elaboration of industry-level codes into 
corporate codes at the company level. Additionally, in case of supply-chain responsibility 
(ketenverantwoordelijkheid), industry codes can lead to vertical harmonization, in both 
geographical and organizational terms. In such cases, the private regulator uses contractual 
mechanisms, like perpetual clauses, to spread private rules downwards through the supply 
chain, not only to first-tier suppliers but also to second-tier suppliers and beyond.141 A similar 
effect occurs, though on a more modest scale, when a company that applies an industry code 
demands its employees or representatives abide by the code. In both cases, it is generally the 
higher-ranked actor that is under an obligation to ensure subordinates comply with the code. 
 When it comes to the type of harmonization, a distinction can be drawn between 
minimum and maximum harmonization. Minimum harmonization implies that the regulated 
actors are allowed to regulate, e.g., through their own national code or corporate code, in a 
stricter fashion than the European or national ‘umbrella code’. In these cases, the umbrella 
code thus imposes minimum rules, binding or otherwise, on the regulated actors. In case of 
maximum harmonization, by contrast, the regulated actors are not allowed to deviate in any 
way from the rules imposed by the umbrella code.142 Both types of harmonization could result 
in a certain degree of convergence of the rules within an industry and thus create a minimum 
level playing field for the affiliated private actors.143 
 
Criteria 
The question on the binding force of the code played an important role when establishing 
whether an industry code had a harmonizing function. After all, with this question in essence 
touching upon the ‘obligations’ of the regulated actors, the answer to it will teach us whether 
these actors are under a duty to implement the code at the national level or at the company 
level. Additionally, I took account of the reason for and the aim of the code. These elements 
can for instance indicate that there was a need for or desire to impose uniform standards, to 
                                                
140 See also Cafaggi 2010, p. 218. 
141 Verbruggen 2014b, p. 89. See also Vytopil 2015, pp. 117-140; McBarnet & Kurkchiyan 2007. 
142 Cf. also Cafaggi 2011b, pp. 101-102 on the relation between minimum and maximum harmonization in 
European legislation and private regulation. 
143 Cf. the different ways in which private regulation contributes to European legal integration discussed by 
Janczuk-Goryworda 2012 and Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010. 
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create a level playing field or to introduce guidelines for national codes or corporate codes. 
Whether the envisaged harmonizing effect of an industry code actually materializes, depends 
on the binding nature of the umbrella code, the quality of the implementation of this code and 
the extent to which the rules are complied with in practice.144 
 
3. Framework function 
The empirical study showed that industry codes of conduct can function as a framework for 
‘lower level’ codes. European codes of conduct can function as a template for national codes, 
obliging or allowing the national industry actors to implement the European rules in their 
national code of conduct. National codes, in turn, can function as a blueprint for corporate 
codes. The ‘lower-level’ national or corporate code of conduct thus fleshes out respectively 
the ‘higher level’ European or national code. This can lead to vertical harmonization (see 
above, under 2). 
 
Criteria 
The framework function was assigned to industry codes obliging or allowing the regulated 
actors to detail the code at the national level or at the company level. Whether this was the 
case frequently depended on the answer to the question concerning the binding force of the 
industry code. 
 
4. Code of conduct as standard contract term 
Some industry codes require that compliance with the code is made part of any B2B contracts 
the regulated actors conclude. That is to say that such contracts have to include a clause or a 
reference to the industry code which obliges the other party to the contract to comply with the 
code as well. In effect, the code thus functions as a standard contract term, which results in 
the code taking regulatory effect over third parties.145 As such, the code can apply to a single 




This function was assigned once it had been explicitly stated, either in the code itself or in 
other applicable documents, that ‘third party compliance’ with the code was to be included as 





                                                
144 I have not inquired into the actual effects of industry codes. As the harmonization function denotes the 
harmonizing potential of industry codes, based on different characteristics of these codes (cf. the criteria set out 
above), the function does not indicate whether the rules actually lead to harmonization.  
145 On this practice, which is discussed in legal literature under the heading ‘governance by contract’, see, e.g., 
Verbruggen 2014b; Cafaggi 2013; McBarnet & Kurkchiyan 2007; Zumbansen 2007.  
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Relation between the harmonization function, the framework function and the function of 
codes as standard contract term 
The harmonization function, the framework function and the standard contract term function 
are interconnected, as the cross-references in their respective descriptions already suggest. 
This interconnectedness can be visualized as follows: 
 
Figure 3.2 – Relation between the harmonization function, the framework function, 









       





        
 
 
  Related functions     Related function    
  I – Framework function    Codes of conduct as standard contract term 
  II – Codes of conduct as standard contract term 
 
5. Policy instrument function (Code of conduct as a policy instrument) 
The use of private regulation as a regulatory alternative is one of the cornerstones of 
legislative policy in both the European Union and the Netherlands.146 Thus, the European and 
the Dutch legislator can use industry codes, as well as other forms of private regulation, as a 
policy instrument to attain certain policy objectives. There are different ways in which the 
legislator can proceed in this respect. Firstly, the legislator can deliberately leave room in 
legislation and regulations for the drawing up of codes of conduct that implement, supplement 
or elaborate the relevant legal provisions. Secondly, under certain, strict condictions, codes 
can be used to implement European directives at the national level.147 Thirdly, the legislator 
can opt for leaving regulation of a certain issue entirely or partially to private actors. It can in 
                                                
146 In the context of European and Dutch private law, for instance, this policy has resulted in the employment of 
industry codes of conduct as an alternative or complement to private law legislation. See Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
147 See Chapter 4, section 4.5.1.1 under 5. 
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this respect, for example, link up with an existing, well-functioning, industry code, put direct 
pressure on these actors to draw up a code of conduct, facilitate the self-regulatory process 
(e.g., by organizing a dialogue between the private actors involved), or, more indirectly, use 
the threat of legislative intervention to move the industry towards picking up the regulatory 
glove itself. Thus, from the perspective of the legislator,148 industry codes that have been 
drawn up under direct or indirect governmental ‘pressure’ can be said to have a policy 
instrument function.149 As such, industry codes can serve as an alternative to or complement 
public regulation (see below, under 6 and 7). 
 
Criteria 
Whether or not a certain code did indeed serve as a policy instrument was determined on the 
basis of an analysis of the answers to the questions captured in the framework under the 
heading ‘Code, legislator and legislation’, either in combination with the reason for and the 
aim of the code concerned, or otherwise. More specifically, the function was assigned when it 
followed on from these elements that: 
 
(1) There had been clear interaction between the legislator and private parties, such as 
pressure or dialogue, resulting in the drawing up of a code of conduct; and/or 
(2) European or national public regulation explicitly referred to the possibility of drawing 
up codes of conduct and the code in question was a response to this; and/or 
(3) The code of conduct was used as an instrument to transpose a European directive. 
 
In other words: when an industry code of conduct was drawn up at the instigation of the 
European or the Dutch legislator, the code was considered to function as a policy instrument. 
The ways in which the legislator deploys codes as a policy instrument are reflected in the 
following functions (6-9), which express the nature of the possible relations between industry 
codes as a policy instrument and legislation.150 
 
6. Alternative to public regulation 
Industry codes of conduct can be deployed instead of public regulation. Depending on 
whether one adopts the perspective of the industry actors or that of the legislator, the relation 
between public regulation and private regulation can be qualified as either ‘preventive’ 
(industry actors) or ‘alternative’ (legislator). Viewed from the perspective of the legislator, 
industry codes can function as an alternative to public regulation. These codes are often 
drawn up in response to governmental influence or pressure. This implies that the legislator 
                                                
148 The role of perspective in the definition of the functions will be discussed in section 3.3.2 of this chapter. 
149 Eijlander & Voermans 1999, p. 18 refer to the instrumental function of legislation, which entails that laws are 
seen as an instrument for policy. Veerman, De Kok & Clement 2012, pp. 147-150, by contrast, do not mention 
this function separately. Rather, they indicate that legislation in its organizing function (ordenende functie) is a 
means or instrument of policy. 
150 On the relation between private regulation and legislation, see, e.g., Verdoodt 2007, pp. 36-41; Gunningham 
& Rees 1997, pp. 365-366; Black 1996, pp. 26-28; Geelhoed 1993, pp. 49-50. Cf. also Cafaggi & Renda 2012, 
pp. 5-9. In the European private law context, see, e.g., Huyse & Parmentier 1990, pp. 262-263; Cafaggi & 
Janczuk 2010, pp. 21-26.  
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considers codes of conduct an adequate instrument to attain the policy objectives it has set. 
Thus, the function ‘alternative to public regulation’ can be seen as a specification of the 
policy instrument function.  
 
Criteria 
As follows on from the name of this function, the relation between legislation and a code of 
conduct formed an important element for labeling an industry code of conduct as a regulatory 
alternative. The presence of interaction between the legislator and the private parties 
concerned was also an important lead in this respect (cf. the relation of this function with the 
policy instrument function), as were the reason for and the aim of the code of conduct. As 
regards the latter two elements, whether the code was drawn up instead of further public 
regulatory measures, was crucial. 
 
7. Preventive function 
In their function as regulatory alternative, industry codes of conduct serve as a tool used by 
the legislator to ‘avoid’ public regulatory interference. Such a preventive element also reveals 
itself when we assume the perspective of the private actors. However, in this case ‘prevent’ is 
not understood in the sense of an ‘alternative’, but rather it has a less neutral connotation in 
the sense that it is aimed at keeping the legislator at a distance. The objective of codes with a 
preventive function is to fence off the enactment of legislation or any other form of state 
interference. As such, this function constitutes the private counterpart of the ‘public’ function 
alternative to legislation. The preventive function can be put into practice in different ways. 
An industry can for instance seek to pre-empt legislative interference as an independent 
instrument, though it can also be used to complement existing public rules so as to avoid 
further interference by the legislator (cf. the complementary function discussed below). 
 
Criteria 
The preventive function followed on from the reason for and/or aim of an industry code of 
conduct, either in combination with the element ‘Code, legislator and legislation’ or in some 
other way.151 
 
8. Complementary function 
Industry codes can also be employed as a means to complement existing legislation and 
regulations. This complementary function shows for instance when industry actors use a code 
of conduct to fill the regulatory gaps left by the legislator. Furthermore, industry codes 
function as a complement when they are used by private actors to specify general statutory 
provisions, usually by means of sector-specific rules.152 Additionally, one can conceive of a 
                                                
151 In some cases, the preamble to a code explicitly stated that the code was aimed at fencing off legislative 
interference. 
152 Private actors can do so at their own initiative, but can also respond to an ‘invite’ of the legislator in this 
regard. A prime example of such an invite can be found in the regulatory regime on the protection of personal 
data, as established by the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC, OJ 1995, L 281/31, to be replaced by the 
General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679, OJ 2016, L 119/1) which will enter into force on 25 May 2018) 
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scenario in which the legislator takes up only part of the regulatory task, deliberately leaving 
it up to the industry to regulate some issues. 
 
Criteria 
Whether an industry code functioned as a complement to public regulation was determined by 
combining three elements of the framework for analysis, namely ‘reason’, ‘aim’ and the 
nature of the interaction between the industry code and European or Dutch legislation. 
 
9. Compliance function 
The assessment of the relationship between industry codes of conduct and legislation 
(question 14 of the framework of analysis) showed that the content of some of the selected 
industry codes bears a close resemblance to the legal rules on the subject matter covered by 
the code, or even quotes some of the applicable legal rules. 
  
As the relation between industry codes and the applicable general legal framework was not 
actively researched during the empirical study conducted in the context of this doctoral thesis (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.4.2, under ‘Code, legislator and legislation’), no conclusions can be drawn as 
to the scale on which this occurs. However, in this respect it can be pointed at the findings of an 
empirical inquiry that I conducted with a colleague of the position of the vulnerable consumer in 
Dutch industry codes in the field of online shopping, IT and telecom, consumer finance and 
advertising. Some of the codes researched for that study closely mirrored the legal rules on the 
subject matter or even copied them verbatim. As we pointed out in the conclusions following on 
from that study, this seemingly superfluous practice might advantage consumers. When such 
codes include a compliant handling procedure, they provide an additional ‘private’ opportunity 
for obtaining redress in case legal rules are violated, the threshold for which will often be lower 
that the threshold for starting legal proceedings.153 
 
Other industry codes entailed a clause obliging the regulated actors to comply with existing 
legislation and regulations, either in general or with regard to a specific set of legal rules. 
These practices at first blush seem superfluous, as the law has to be complied with anyway. 
However, they can also be interpreted as creating additional awareness of the legal rules, as a 
safeguard or incentive for compliance, or perhaps even as some sort of exemption clause 
intended to cover against liability for violations of the legal rules concerned. It could thus be 
said that one of the objectives or perhaps even the main objective of these codes is to ensure 
that statutory rules are complied with. So, I was able to assign the codes concerned a 
compliance function. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
and the implementing rules in the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (Wet bescherming Persoonsgegevens). 
This regime formally allows for and encourages the detailing of the statutory provisions with sector-specific rule 
on personal data protection, laid down in codes of conduct. The regime also makes provision for the public 
approval of such codes. For a more detailed account of references to codes of conduct in EU and Dutch data 
protection regulation, see Chapter 4, section 4.4.1.1.3, under i. 
153 J.J.A. Braspenning & M. Menting ‘Consumer protection and industry codes of conduct. An exploratory 
empirical study from the perspective of consumer vulnerability’, Paper for the 15th International Conference on 




The compliance function was assigned to industry codes quoting the applicable statutory rules 
or entailing a ‘compliance clause’. Whether this function effectively materializes in practice 
arguably depends on the availability of enforcement mechanisms. If such mechanisms are 
lacking, statements that the legal rules are to be complied with might be a mere exercise in 
window-dressing, at least in the context of the industry code concerned. 
 
10. Safeguarding function 
Interests are central to the safeguarding function. That is to say that industry codes that have 
this function seek to protect certain interests.154 The protected interests can be those of the 
private regulator and the regulated actors themselves, but a code can also aim to protect the 
interests of third parties, i.e., others than the industry actors themselves, such as consumers. 
Accordingly, the safeguarding function is in fact an umbrella function that houses two 
distinct, but related functions: (1) the consolidating function or internal safeguarding function 
and (2) the protective function or external safeguarding function. Whether the function has an 
internal or an external scope depends on the type of interests a code seeks to safeguard.  
 
(1) ‘Consolidating’ function (internal safeguarding function) 
The consolidating function or internal safeguarding function was assigned to codes that 
served as a tool to maintain the status quo, or sought to secure a certain way of doing business 
or the future of the industry. In other words, it was assigned to codes that had the industry’s 
own interest as their focal point and sought to consolidate these internal interests. Such codes 
can have positive as well as negative effects. They can, for instance, establish a well-
functioning self-regulatory framework setting out high standards, or they can create entry 
barriers to the market or constitute anti-competitive agreements. 
 
Criteria 
Since safeguarding intentions were sometimes explicitly mentioned in these contexts, I took 
particular account of the reason for and objective of an industry code when assigning the 
consolidating function. The relation between the code, the legislator and legislation also 
proved to be a relevant factor, since it could follow on from this relation that the industry 
preferred to take self-regulatory measures rather than await legislative interference (cf. the 
preventive function). 
 
(2) Protective function (external safeguarding function) 
Industry codes of conduct can also be aimed at protecting the interest of third parties. In itself, 
this is not a particularly distinguishing feature: most codes, if not all, will offer – to a greater 
or lesser extent – certain safeguards, e.g., safeguards for ethical behavior or against 
                                                
154 Eijlander & Voermans 1999, p. 18 ascribe a similar function (waarborgfunctie) to legislation, which has a 
safeguarding aspect in that it protects citizens against the government. As such, the function seems the 
equivalent of the protective function (beschermingsfunctie) of Veerman, De Kok and Clement, which also 
denotes protection against the government (Veerman, De Kok & Clement 2012, pp. 150-151). 
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misleading consumer practices. Some industry codes, however, are specifically aimed at the 
protection of third parties, most often consumers.155 This group of industry codes was 
considered to have a protective or external safeguarding function.  
 
Criteria 
Whether the authors of an industry code have made the protection of third party interests into 
one of the prime goals of their code is, not surprisingly, likely to follow on from the 
objectives of and reason for the code, either in combination with its contents or otherwise. It 
should be noted, however, that these elements in effect only constitute a mere indication for 
the presence of the protective function. After all, in order for the protective function to take 
full effect in practice, the code must be enforceable. This implies that the availability of 
enforcement mechanisms as well as the possibility to impose sanctions are also relevant in the 
context of the protective function. Whether actual protection or just mere window-dressing 
takes place, likely depends on the availability and effectiveness of such mechanisms as well 
as the accessibility of the code. 
 
Perspective 
In the foregoing, the safeguarding function was discussed from the perspective of the private 
regulators. However, both the internal and the external aspect of the function can also be 
approached from a governmental perspective. As regards the external aspect or the protective 
function, this becomes apparent when considering that industry codes might be employed as a 
policy tool to implement or elaborate public policy concerning the protection of certain 
groups or interests, such as consumer policy. In these cases, the code has a protective function 
from a governmental perspective as well.156 Likewise, public policy can touch upon the 
internal aspect of the safeguarding function (the consolidating function) of industry codes. 
This is the case when industry codes are used in the context of European policy concerning 
the internal market, competition law or harmonization. Here, use can be made of the positive 
effects of the consolidating function. 
 
11. Signaling function 
As its name already indicates, the signaling function was assigned to industry codes that give 
a signal to the regulated actors (internal signaling function) or to third parties, such as 
stakeholders, consumers, the legislator or the society at large (external signaling function). In 
its internal signaling function, a code raises the awareness of the regulated actors about 
certain issues or topics. A code with an external signaling function serves as a tool to position 
the industry in a certain way, e.g., as reliable, honorable or socially responsible. A code might 
thus serve as the ‘business-card’ of an industry, profession or company.157 Likewise, codes of 
conduct can be used as a means to improve the image of the industry, thus raising the trust in 
and profile of the regulated actors. 
                                                
155 On the safeguarding function of legislation, see Veerman, De Kok & Clement 2012, p. 151. 
156 Examples of this practice can be found in Chapter 4, section 4.4. 




Several elements of the framework of analysis played a role in determining whether a code of 
conduct had a signaling function. The elements ‘reason’ and ‘aim’ constituted the most 
important criteria in this respect. At this point, the wording of a code was not always of 
overriding importance for assigning the signaling function. In this respect, the context in 
which the code was drawn up also proved a relevant factor. The empirical study showed that 
industry codes are often, but not necessarily, drawn up following external incidents affecting 
the image of the industry sector or profession, or in response to political or social pressure. 
However, codes of conduct can also be drawn up for more neutral reasons and with a more 
neutral aim, such as setting out norms for reliable and professional behavior or raising the 
quality of the services provided. These codes also transmit a signal to the outside world; they 
have the industry or profession assume a certain, positive image. Following on from that, a 
code can also communicate a message to the legislator in the sense that it signals that the 
private actors are well capable of regulating themselves and that legislative interference may 
thus be dispensed with, provided of course that the code functions well.  
 
The signaling function as umbrella function 
The description of the signaling function provided above already suggests that this function 
can take different shapes. Depending on the signal that an industry codes sends, the following 
related, yet distinct functions can be brought under the umbrella of the signaling function: the 
image-building function, the quality control function, the quality mark function and the CSR 
function.  
 
12. Image-building function 
An industry code of of conduct can be used as a tool for establishing or enhancing the 
reputation of an industry sector or profession. The drawing up of a code can, for instance, be 
motivated by the desire or necessity to raise the quality of the services provided, to introduce 
rules for ethical behavior or to further professionalize the industry or profession. In other 
words, an industry body or professional organization can have an interest in distinguishing 
itself from its competitors, for example by documenting from a social, political or competitive 
point of view desirable core values, norms and rules in an industry code of conduct. In this 
way, the industry or profession tries to attribute a certain image to the regulated actors or to 
enhance the already existing image, with the code functioning as a stage for presenting these 
actors in the desired way.  
 Private actors can also be forced to call upon the reputational effects of industry codes. 
This is the case when the introduction of a code (or a revision of an already existing code for 
that matter) is a response to incidents that damaged the image of and trust in the industry 
sector or profession. Codes then also serve as a tool to build the image of the industry, yet in 
these cases the image-building function has a less neutral connotation than in the scenarios 
sketched above.158 
                                                
158 There are areas of overlap with the quality control function, the quality mark function and CSR function 




The image-building function was assigned to a code when it followed on from the reason for 
or aim of the code, in combination with the code’s content, that the code was developed to 
introduce, maintain, enhance or improve reputation-related issues, such as social 
responsibility, integrity, professionalism, quality and image. As mentioned above, the context 
in which an industry code was drawn up is also relevant in this respect, particularly when it 
was drawn up as a result of damage incurred to reputation of the industry or the profession. 
After all, given the fact that ‘image-building’ can also create negative associations, it is 
perhaps not surprising that most codes do not explicitly indicate that they serve to improve the 
image of the industry sector or profession concerned. Nevertheless, it is plausible that codes 
introduced in response to external pressure and reputation damage directly or indirectly 
function as an image-building tool. Some codes explicitly stated that the conduct of the 
regulated actors should not be detrimental to the image of the industry or profession. 
 
13. Quality control function 
Codes of conduct can also function as a means to safeguard or raise the quality of the 
products or services offered by the regulated actors. This use of codes as an instrument for 
quality control can be closely linked to the aforementioned image-building function, 
particularly when compliance with the code is made visible through a logo, label or quality 
mark (see below, under 14).  
 
Criteria 
The quality control function followed on from the reason for and the objectives of a code. It 
was assigned when one or both elements explicitly referred to the code as a contribution to the 
control or enhancement of the quality of a product or service. 
 
14. Quality mark function 
Sometimes the image-building function and the quality control function were visually 
reinforced: parties acting in compliance with the code concerned were allowed to carry a logo 
or a label. Codes thus become a visual quality mark for a certain product or service,159 or for 
the behavior of the parties bound by the code.160 The fact that the code is complied with is 
seen as a distinctive mark of quality.161 
 
Criteria 
The wording of the code and related documents combined with the reason for it and its aim 
were relevant criteria in assigning the quality mark function. More specifically, the function 
                                                                                                                                                   
mark to the code of conduct (‘quality mark function’) or by raising the quality of its products or services 
(‘quality control function’). The reputation function can also be related to issues of corporate social 
responsibility (‘CSR function’). 
159 Baarsma et al. 2003, p. 105. 
160 Endorsing a code of conduct can also be one of the conditions for obtaining a trade-mark. These cases are not 
covered by the quality mark function as the code as such is not the distinctive feature. 
161 Cf. Baarsma et al. 2003, p. 32. 
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was assigned when this combination of elements suggested that there was a link between the 
code and the quality mark related to the code, in the sense that compliance with the code gives 
the right to carry the quality mark. The actual relevance and value of the quality mark can be 
determined by the availability and effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms and possible 
sanctions. 
 
15. CSR function 
Codes of conduct can, either as part of an industry’s corporate governance strategy or 
otherwise, include norms that concern the social responsibility of the regulated actors. 
Examples are codes of conduct that stipulate that human rights should be respected, that 
determine what norms ought to be applied with regard to responsible working conditions or 
that set out the norms for environmentally aware behavior. In doing so, codes often refer to 
the applicable international standards, such as the ILO Conventions that set out the 
fundamental principles and rights at work.162 Codes of conduct that explicitly document 
norms for corporate social responsibility (CSR) were assigned the CSR function. 
 
Criteria 
The CSR function of an industry code usually followed on from the interplay between the 
reason for drawing up a code, its objectives and its content. 
 
3.3.2 The role of perspective 
 
The previous section already hinted at the important role that ‘perspective’ played in the 
identification of the functions. Perspective proved equally important in the following step of 
listing and categorizing the functions on the basis of their interconnectedness: like the 
outcomes of the process of identifying the functions, the eventual results of this exercise 
depend on whose perspective one takes. Hence, before turning to the categorization of the 
functions (section 3.3.3), this section will briefly go into the role of perspective. 
 The importance of perspective particularly comes to the fore when the legislator has been 
involved with an industry code. Which functions can eventually be assigned to such a code 
depends on whether the code is viewed through the eyes of the private regulator or through 
those of the legislator. Or, following on from the terminology used by Oude Vrielink, Van 
Montfort and Bokhorst, whether one adopts an organizational perspective or a governance 
perspective.163 From the first perspective, industry codes are not only a regulatory tool, but 
also a tool to communicate to the regulated actors and external stakeholders what rules govern 
                                                
162 For an overview of the ILO conventions, see <www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-
labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
163 Oude Vrielink, Van Montfort & Bokhorst 2011. It should be noted, however, that the use of the notions 
‘organizational’ and ‘governance’ does not entirely concur. For the purposes of this section, both notions pertain 
to the actor, whether private regulator or legislator, whose perspective is taken. Oude Vrielink, Van Montfort and 
Bokhorst seem to use the notions to denote different strands of literature in which codes are dealt with, namely 
business ethics literature and governance literature. Nonetheless, as will become apparent from the discussion 
below, the ensuing perception of industry codes is useful for clarifying the role of perspective. 
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the behavior of the regulated actors.164 From the second perspective, by contrast, codes are a 
specific type of regulation that can be used to attain policy objectives, either as an alternative, 
or as a complement, to public regulation.165  
 
Illustrative in this respect are the divergent views on the functions of codes of conduct on the 
protection of personal data under the Dutch Data Protection Act (the forerunner of the Dutch 
Personal Data Protection Act (Wet Bescherming Persoonsgegevens). The legal regime of this Act, 
in short, entailed the possibility for industry actors to draw up an industry-level code to 
substantiate the statutory provisions and to seek its approval by the Dutch Data Protection 
Authority (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens).166 As Overkleeft-Verburg points out, the Data 
Protection Authority perceived the industry codes drawn up in the context of the Data Protection 
Act as a regulatory tool, primarily having a safeguarding function, while the private regulators 
mainly considered their codes as external commercial communication strategies and as internal 
steering instruments.167 
 
When the organizational perspective and the governance perspective are accordingly applied 
to industry codes of conduct that, in one way or another, are related to the legislator or public 
regulation, the following overview of functions emerges: 
 
Figure 3.3 – Functions from an organizational and a governance perspective 
 
Organizational perspective Governance perspective 
- Preventive function 
- Complementary function 
- Compliance function 
- Harmonization function 
- Safeguarding function 
 
- Other functions  
(not necessarily arising from the 
interaction code - 
legislator/legislation) 
- Policy instrument function 
- Alternative to public regulation 
- Complementary function 
- Harmonization function 




The discussion in the previous sections has left us with a general overview of the functions 
and two closely related recurrent themes, namely the interconnectedness of the functions and 
the role of perspective. Building on these themes, this section will develop this general 
overview into a categorized, layered one. The purpose of this exercise is to construct an 
                                                
164 Cf. Oude Vrielink, Van Montfort & Bokhorst 2011, pp. 486-488. 
165 Cf. Oude Vrielink, Van Montfort & Bokhorst 2011, pp. 487, 490-491. 
166 This possibility has continued to exist under the Personal Data Protection Act and is also reflected in the 
European legal regime on the protection of personal data. See Chapter 4, section 4.4.1.1.3, under i. 
167 Overkleeft-Verburg 1995, pp. 264-265. 
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overview that not only conforms to the findings of the empirical study, but can also serve as a 
building block for the second part of this thesis, in which I investigate the legal relevance of 
industry codes in European and Dutch legislative policies, legislation and case law. 
 
3.3.3.1 A two-way classification: Regulatory and communicative functions 
 
In my Master’s thesis, I already categorized the functions then identified, drawing a broad 
distinction between two categories of functions: regulatory functions and communicative 
functions.168 The first category includes functions that can be classified as ‘regulatory’, 
meaning that they relate to the rule-setting nature of industry codes of conduct. This category 
reflects the potential of such codes to address certain issues by means of regulatory standards, 
either in combination with public regulation or otherwise.169 The second category 
encompasses functions that relate to the communicative features of industry codes of conduct. 
Industry codes are not only used for regulatory purposes, but can also be employed as a 
means to communicate to internal and external stakeholders what rules and values guide the 
behavior of the regulated actors and, broadly speaking, what the industry or profession stands 
for. A categorization of the functions listed in section 3.3.1 on the basis of this two-way 
classification leads to the following overview. 
 
Figure 3.4 – Regulatory and communicative functions 
 
I Regulatory functions II Communicative functions 
1. Corporate governance function 
2. Harmonization function 
3. Framework function 
4. Codes as standard contract term 
5. Preventive function 
6. Complementary function 
7. Compliance function 
8. Safeguarding function 
9. Policy instrument function 
10. Alternative to public regulation 
11. Signaling function 
12. Image-building function 
13. Quality mark function 
--- 
14. Quality control function* 
15. CSR function* 
 
* These functions are in effect 
situated at the interface of 
regulation and communication. 
 
Although a distinction can be drawn between the regulatory and communicative features of an 
industry code, it already followed from the exploratory empirical study carried out as part of 
my Master’s thesis that these features are most often two sides of the same coin: the vast 
majority of industry codes studied had both regulatory and communicative functions.  
                                                
168 See Menting 2011, pp. 32-45. 
169 Cf. the regulatory function of private law as described by Cafaggi & Muir Watt 2008, p. 2: “By regulatory 
functions of private law we mean the ability of private law instruments, in particular contract, torts and property 
to address market failures”. From an organizational perspective, the notion ‘regulatory’ can be said to denote the 
steering of behavior. If one takes a governance perspective, the notion is more likely to encompass a policy 
element (‘oriented towards public goals’ or ‘policy-oriented’). 
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 Although insightful, the divide between regulatory and communicative functions cannot 
be but a first outline for two reasons. First of all, this two-way classification does not 
adequately reflect the organizational perspective and the governance perspective. As argued 
above, it is vital to take account of these perspectives as they can lead to different functions. 
With regard to the regulatory functions, more specifically, these perspectives lead to a more 
nuanced categorization. If one considers the category of regulatory functions from a 
governance perspective, the policy instrument function will come to the fore most 
prominently, while other functions are pushed to the background or even disappear out of 
sight (e.g., the preventive function and the compliance function). By the same token, when we 
look at it from the organizational perspective, the policy instrument function disappears. 
Thus, the two perspectives lead to a differentiation within the category of regulatory functions 
that is not captured by the regulatory-communicative divide. Secondly, a closer analysis of 
the connections between the functions suggested that this divide was inadequate to reflect the 
interconnectedness of the different functions, which demands their further categorization. 
Therefore, taking into account the role of perspective and the interconnectedness of the 
functions, I decided to abandon the initial regulatory-communicative divide and to compile a 
different, more detailed overview of the functions. 
 
3.3.3.2 Categorized overview of the functions: Pillars, layers and connections 
 
This new overview was compiled by analyzing the functions from a meta-perspective, that is 
to say that the general overview of functions that resulted from the empirical study (cf. Figure 
3.1) was detailed by further establishing the links between the different functions based on the 
insights gained through the empirical study (cf. the interconnectedness of the functions and 
the role of perspective).170 It consists of three main functions or pillars: 1) the regulatory 
function, 2) the governance function and 3) the signaling function. The different functions 
discussed in section 3.3.1 can all be categorized under one of these pillars. The three main 
functions thus come to serve as umbrella functions, covering several related and overlapping, 
yet demonstrably different, ‘sub-functions’. These functions are not mutually exclusive:171 the 
industry codes studied all have two or more functions. All this leads to the following, multi-









                                                
170 For that reason, the overview of the functions per industry code included in Annex 2 is not as detailed as the 
overview presented in Figure 3.5 below. See also the introductory remarks to this Annex. 
171 Cf. Tambini, Leonardi & Marsden 2008, p. 51. 
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Figure 3.5 – Multi-layered overview of the functions 
 
Overview functions: pillars, layers and connections 
1. Regulatory function  
1.1. Corporate governance function 
1.2. Harmonization function  
1.3. Framework function  
1.4. Code of conduct as standard contract term 
1.5. Preventive function172 
§ Complementary function 
§ Compliance function 
1.6. Complementary function 
1.7. Compliance function 
1.8. Safeguarding function 
§ ‘Consolidating’ function (internal safeguarding function) 
§ Protective function (external safeguarding function) 
 
2. Governance function 
2.1. Policy instrument function 
§ Alternative to public regulation 
§ Complementary function 
§ Harmonization function 
§ Safeguarding function 
o ‘Consolidating’ function (internal safeguarding function) 
o Protective function (external safeguarding function) 
 
3. Signaling function 
3.1. Image-building function 
3.2. Quality mark function 
--- 
3.3. Quality control function* 
3.4. CSR function* 
 
* Although these functions are in effect situated at the interface of regulation and 
communication, I have placed them under the signaling function, as rules relating 
to quality control and CSR are often drawn up in response to societal pressure. 
 
In terms of perspective, the first pillar, constituted by the regulatory function, covers the 
functions that can be assigned to an industry code from an organizational perspective. The 
second pillar, in turn, represents the governance perspective. From this perspective, industry 
codes of conduct relied upon by the legislator serve as a policy instrument, hence the 
designation of the policy instrument function as the overarching function. In the guise of a 
policy instrument, industry codes can be employed as an alternative or complement to public 
                                                
172 In functioning as a ‘shield’ against public regulatory interference, industry codes can complement public 
regulation or serve as a tool for (enhanced) compliance with public regulation, all with the objective of fencing 
off governmental interference with the industry.  
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regulation and as a means to implement public policy aimed at the protection of certain 
interests (the protective function). At the European level, industry codes can also have a 
harmonizing function when used by the European institutions to pursue European legal 
integration.173 Finally, the third pillar brings the functions that relate to the communicative 
side of industry codes together under the heading of the signaling function.174 
 
3.4 Functions, motives and objectives according to the literature 
 
Several scholars, legal or otherwise, have discussed the functions and objectives of, and the 
motives for industry codes of conduct and other forms of private regulation. This section will 
investigate how the functions identified on the basis of the empirical study relate to these 
functions, motives and objectives. Has the empirical study uncovered new functions or have 
important functions been missed? Given the focus of this doctoral thesis on industry codes in 
private law, this comparison will be limited to general and private law literature touching 
upon industry codes of conduct and private regulation in general.175 
 




3.4.1.1.1 Private regulation 
 
The functions of private regulation are mainly discussed against the background of the 
relation between private regulation, and the legislator and legislation. Ogus and Carbonara, 
for instance, refer to self-regulation “as a delegation of state-making powers” (cf. the policy 
instrument function) and “preemptive” self-regulation as an attempt by private actors to 
prevent the enactment of stricter public rules (cf. the preventive function).176 The latter is also 
mentioned by Verdoodt, who additionally discusses the use of self-regulation as an alternative 
or complement to legislation.177 Black, in turn, points out that the greater part of policy 
literature perceives self-regulation as “an optional strategy which governments can adopt, 
depending on the particular context”.178 This perspective on self-regulation corresponds with 
the governance perspective brought forward in section 3.3.2 and the policy instrumental 
functions that follow from it. It is also in line with the role that Black ascribes to self-
regulatory associations (SRAs). In the words of Black, these associations exert “the 
                                                
173 Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010, p. 21. See also the European examples discussed in Chapter 4 of this doctoral 
thesis. 
174 Thus, the three pillars in effect still reflect the regulation – communication dichotomy: the regulatory function 
and the governance function represent the regulatory nature of industry codes, while the signaling function 
relates to the communicative side of these codes. 
175 In reviewing this literature, I follow the terminology used in the publications referred to.  
176 Ogus & Carbonara 2011, pp. 232-237. 
177 Verdoodt 2007, pp. 36-38. 
178 Black 2001, p. 114. 
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governmental function of regulation”.179 Black in this respect refers to political and socio-
legal theory where SRAs are ascribed the role of intermediaries that act as “vital horizontal 
linkages between various sections of society”180. In particular, SRAs can play a role in the 
development, furthering and implementation of public policy.181 This role reflects some of the 
functions residing under the umbrella of the regulatory function and the governance function, 
respectively (see section 3.3.3.2). It also links up with what Vranken has called the ‘bridging 
function’ (brugfunctie) that private regulation can have in private law: in relation to both case 
law and legislation “private regulation can act as a bridge between the knowledge, experience 
and insights of those directly involved in a certain branch, market or profession in society, 
and the rule that is supposed to cover that area”, according to Vranken.182 
 
3.4.1.1.2 Private regulation in the European context 
 
Cafaggi discusses the functions of private regulation in the European (private law) context. In 
this context, Cafaggi notes, public regulation and private regulation generally function as 
complements rather than as substitutes. He defines the relationship between both types of 
regulation as one of ‘institutional complementarity’: public and private regulation do not 
function as alternatives but rather “complement each other in terms of goals, instruments and 
reinforce the overall accountability and effectiveness of the regulatory process”.183 This 
complementarity can occur vertically, i.e., when the public actor is European and the private 
actor is national or vice versa, or horizontally, i.e., when both actors are to be found at the 
European level.184 
 More specifically, Cafaggi indicates, in European contract law self-regulation can 
function as a complementary tool in the harmonization and regulation of EU contract law. In 
doing so, self-regulation can complement or substitute existing public regulatory measures 
with general or sector-specific private rules. Against this backdrop, Cafaggi draws a 
distinction between an institutional and substantive set of functions performed by self-
regulation.185 The institutional set is most relevant in the context of this chapter186 and 
comprises the following: 
 
 
                                                
179 Black 1996, p. 28. 
180 Black 1996, p. 28. 
181 Black 1996, p. 28, with reference to W. Streeck & P.C. Schmitter, ‘Community, Market State – and 
Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order’, in: W. Streeck & P.C. 
Schmitter (eds), Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State, London: Sage 1985, pp. 17, 20. 
182 Vranken 2006, p. 78. 
183 Cafaggi 2011b, p. 100.  
184 Cafaggi 2011b, p. 101. 
185 Cafaggi 2007, pp. 164-165, 168. 
186 The substantive set of functions is of a more specific nature: “from a substantive perspective it can contribute 
to the creation of SCF [standard contract forms, MM] according to different models and to their correct 
administration, to produce codes of conduct that affect (1) the content of contract, (2) the bargaining procedures, 
ensuring compliance with EU legislation, and (3) more in general economic activities of the regulated”. See 
Cafaggi 2007, p. 168. 
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 “From an institutional perspective, SR [self-regulation, MM], can complement: 
(1) Legislative functions by contributing to the definition of contractual terms, codes of 
conduct; framework contracts; 
(2) Regulatory functions by defining (a) sector specific guidelines or, more specifically in 
the area of information regulation, (b) by introducing cognitive intermediaries; 
(3) Interpretive functions by offering guidelines to individual firms when they contract 
with other firms or consumers; 
(4) Monitoring functions of European Contract Law by verifying correct implementation 
of EU law at MS [Member State, MM] level; 
(5) Enforcement by defining sanctions to their members in case of violations”187 
 
Self-regulation can thus perform standard-setting as well as monitoring functions in EU 
contract law.188 In its role as a standard-setting instrument, self-regulation can often be “an 
agent of harmonization”, Cafaggi notes.189 This observation links up with the integrating 
function of private regulation, coined by Cafaggi and Janczuk, which concerns the ability of 
private regulation to contribute to European legal integration.190 This integrating function can 
be intentionally relied upon by private actors or European institutions seeking to establish (a 
higher level of) legal harmonization, but can also come up as a side-effect when private 
regulation seeks to achieve other aims.191 The contribution of private regulation to European 
legal integration often occurs in a relationship of complementarity with public (regulatory) 
measures.192 
 
3.4.1.1.3 Codes of conduct 
 
Literature also discusses the functions of industry-level codes.193 Huyse and Parmentier infer 
these functions from the three-fold relationship that codes of conduct can have with 
legislation. First of all, codes can function as a replacement of public regulation when existing 
legislation is withdrawn as a result of an active deregulation policy and codes take its place. 
Secondly, codes can substitute for legislation when they fill regulatory gaps that legislation 
                                                
187 Cafaggi 2007, p. 168. 
188 Cafaggi 2007, pp. 164-165, who adds that the role of self-regulation can differ depending on whether it 
concerns B2B or B2C relationships.  
189 Cafaggi 2007, p. 166. 
190 Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010, p. 4. 
191 Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010, pp. 4, 18-23.  
192 Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010, p. 4. See also Cafaggi 2011b, pp. 98-103 and Cafaggi 2010, pp. 201-205, 208-209. 
This suggests that the integrating function is intertwined with the complementary function, which echoes the 
multi-layered nature of the function-overview included in section 3.3.3.2 of this chapter. For an account of the 
ways in which legal integration through private regulation can occur, see Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010, pp. 23-26. 
Private regulation can however also lead to fragmentation and dis-integration. See Cafaggi 2011b, pp. 98-100; 
Cafaggi 2010, p. 201; Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010, pp. 26-27. Cf. Cafaggi 2011a, pp. 24-25 on transnational private 
regulation. 
193 As indicated at the outset of this section, the literature review is limited to industry codes of conduct. For an 
overview of the functions of corporate codes of conduct, see, e.g. Hoff 2006, pp. 95-102; Kaptein, Klamer & 
Wieringa 2003, pp. 18-19; Kaptein 1998, p. 170. 
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would otherwise have filled. Thirdly, codes can add to legislation when they are adopted to 
top existing legislation for the want of further legislative action in the short term.194  
 De Groot-Van Leeuwen and De Groot, building on the existing body of literature on the 
topic at the time (1998), draw a distinction between internal and external functions of codes 
of conduct. The former category comprises five functions. The first internal function that 
codes can perform is the collective function, meaning that codes serve as a tool to advance 
issues such as group cohesion, pride, corporate culture and shared values. Following on from 
this function codes can, secondly, contribute to the collective benefit of the regulated group of 
actors in that they prevent strong internal competition. The third internal function is the 
platform function; codes can serve as a platform for internal ethical discussion. Fourthly, the 
function of a code of conduct can lay in the identification of malpractices and in the 
sanctioning of these practices. The fifth and last internal function concerns the role that codes 
can play in guiding individual decisions.195 De Groot-Van Leeuwen and De Groot also 
mention four external functions. The first of these four functions pertains to the capacity of 
codes to act as a ‘bridge with society’. Codes can facilitate the interaction between the 
regulated actors and society in a more structured way. Secondly, codes can function as a tool 
to improve the prestige of the regulated actors. The third external function that can be 
performed by codes of conduct is that of fencing off regulatory intervention by the state and 
shielding the market against external competitors. Fourthly, the function of a code can be to 
protect external entities, such as clients, society and the environment.196  
 Similar functions are ascribed to professional codes of ethics, which were also included 
in the empirical study - with the exception of professional codes drawn up by regulatory 
authorities drawn from the profession, such as the Netherlands Bar Association. Frankel, for 
example, lists eight functions that can be performed by codes of professional ethics. These 
codes can function as: an enabling document (a moral compass); a source of public 
evaluation; professional socialization (enhance pride and professional identity); a tool to 
further the reputation of a profession and to increase public trust; a tool to preserve 
professional values; a tool to prevent unethical behavior; a means of support in shielding the 
profession against unwanted outside intrusions; and as a basis for adjudication.197 Lindblom 
and Ruland submit that professional codes can have four general objectives. They can 
“provide a moral foundation for the profession; serve as a basis for self-policing of the 
profession; promote the self-interest of the profession; serve as public relation tools”.198 These 
objectives for a large part resemble the functions identified by Rhode, who mentions the 
function of “enhancing status and self-image”, constraining internal and external competition, 
“reconciling client, colleague and institutional interests”, and maintaining the profession’s 
autonomy.199 
 
                                                
194 Huyse & Parmentier 1990, pp. 262-263. 
195 De Groot-Van Leeuwen & De Groot 1998, pp. 160, 164-165. 
196 De Groot-Van Leeuwen & De Groot 1998, pp. 160, 165-166. 
197 Frankel 1989, pp. 110-112. 
198 Lindblom & Ruland 1997, pp. 574-576. 
199 Rhode 1981. 
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3.4.1.2 Motives and objectives 
 
The motives for and objectives of private regulation are also touched upon in the scholarly 
debates on the subject. Both issues are also included in the framework of analysis used in the 
empirical study and proved to be important criteria in defining the functions of industry 
codes. Therefore, it was considered worthwhile to take a closer look at the motives for and 
objectives of private regulation and industry-level codes mentioned in the literature.  
 
3.4.1.2.1 Private regulation 
 
A first list of possible motives for and objectives of private regulation can be found with 
Cafaggi and Renda. They mention the following causes and motivations for private 
governance schemes:  
 
• “signaling and enhancing of legitimacy;  
• controlling of the value chain;  
• efficiency, inter-firm coordination and co-opetition;  
• reducing transaction costs through standardization;  
• complementing or pre-empting public regulation;  
• quality and effectiveness;  
• collusion (hide strategic anti-competitive objectives), and  
• other incentives, including the broadening of the scope of regulatory activities and the 
achievement of competitive advantages”.200  
 
Stamhuis, in turn, points out that the motives for self-regulation can be discussed from the 
perspective of the private actors, i.e., a bottom-up perspective, or from the perspective of the 
government, i.e., a top-down perspective. From the former perspective, private interests such 
as the pre-emption of public regulation, the need to respond to demands of civil society 
organizations or commercial interests constitute the basis for self-regulation. Viewed through 
the eyes of the government, the use of self-regulation can for example be motivated by 
difficulties in aligning legislation and societal processes, the governmental strive for 
deregulation or enforcement and control issues.201 Bressers, who discusses self-regulation in 
the context of environmental business care, draws a similar distinction between motives 
arising from governmental policy and motives that follow on from corporate policy. 
Governmental policy can trigger the adoption of self-regulation through, among other things, 
financial incentives, regulations, and policy specifically aimed at environmental business 
care. Self-regulation stemming from corporate policy is based on different motives, such as 
the internal and external image of the company, consumer preferences, the demands of 
                                                
200 Cafaggi & Renda 2012, pp. 5-9. 
201 Stamhuis 2003, pp. 6-8. 
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suppliers and customers, quality assurance and idealistic motives.202 Williams also mentions 
the fact that drawing up self-regulation can be motivated by image-related issues and puts 
forward reputation as one of the three main incentives that motivate the introduction of self-
regulatory regimes. Industry self-regulation can help control malpractices and communicate 
the intentions of the regulated actors to external stakeholders. The second motive Williams 
points to is what he terms ‘legal and regulatory risks’. This motive pertains to the use of 
industry self-regulation to pre-empt public regulatory intervention or as a shield against 
possible liability claims. The first-mover advantages that self-regulation might bring (e.g., 
upgrade products and enhance an industry’s competitiveness) forms the third motive.203  
 A more implicit account of possible objectives of industry self-regulation can be found 
with Gunningham and Rees. In defining the concept of self-regulation, they submit that a 
distinction has to be drawn between economic self-regulation and social self-regulation. 
Gunningham and Rees use the term economic self-regulation to denote rules that seek to 
control different aspects of economic life, such as markets. Social self-regulation has the 
objective of protecting other interests, such as the interests of consumers or environmental 
interests.204 Hemphill indicates that self-regulation exists in case of regulatory gaps or where 
self-imposed rules can help in complying with or going beyond what is required by public 
regulation.205 Finally, it can be pointed to an empirical study on self-regulatory practices in 
the policy areas of the Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General of the European 
Commission (SANCO), conducted by Van der Zeijden and Van der Horst. From this study it 
follows that self-regulation in consumer affairs is most often aimed at enhancing and ensuring 
consumer confidence and improving the image of the regulated actors. In the policy area of 
‘public health’, self-regulation serves as a tool to support the use of certain quality standards 
and to improve the quality of products and services. The improvement of public health is the 
prime objective of self-regulation in this policy area. Self-regulation concerning food safety is 
used to improve the communication of nutrient information to consumers and to prevent, as 
far as possible, the imposition of far-reaching nutrition labeling requirements.206 
 
3.4.1.2.2 Codes of conduct 
 
An empirical study of the Oxford University Centre for Social-Legal Studies on inter alia the 
regulation of harmful content by the media industry across Europe sheds some light on the 
rationale behind the introduction of industry codes of conduct. More specifically, this study 
shows that when the media industry draws up codes it can be motivated by one or more of the 
following, not mutually-exclusive reasons: 
 
                                                
202 Bressers 1995. Cf. Verdoodt’s discussion of the internal (sense of responsibility, professionalization) and 
external motives (image-building and the pre-emption or postponement of legislation, or making legislation 
superfluous) for self-regulation (Verdoodt 2007, pp. 30-41). 
203 Williams 2004, pp. 12-13, with further references. Haufler 2001, pp. 3, 20-30, 106, refers to similar motives. 
204 Gunningham & Rees 1997, p. 365. 
205 Hemphill 1992, p. 915. 
206 Van der Zeijden & Van der Horst 2008, pp. 19, 23, 26.  
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• “As an alternative to direct statutory regulation;   
• To prevent direct statutory regulation by the state; 
• To build public trust, consumer confidence; 
• To avoid legal or user-perceived liability; 
• To protect children and other consumers; 
• To exert moral pressure on those who otherwise behave in an ‘unprofessional’ or ‘socially 
irresponsible way’; 
• To reinforce competitive advantages of a group of industry players, while potentially 
restricting market access for others; 
• As a mark of professional status; 
• To develop a set of common standards for services and products; 
• To raise the public image of their industry.”207 
 
Kolk, Van Tulder and Welters touch upon the reasons for the introduction of international 
(including European) CSR codes, drawing a distinction between codes drawn up by social 
non-profit actors (governments, international organizations or social interest groups) and 
codes authored by firms or business support groups (e.g., trade associations). While the 
former types of actors use codes to influence the behavior of firms, the latter types of actors 
employ codes as a self-regulatory tool or as a tool to influence other actors. When used to 
influence other actors, codes can, more specifically, serve as a strategic instrument to control 
business partners or as public relations tools (e.g., for improving the image of the industry or 
the corporation). Additionally, in the relationship between the government and private actors, 
the objective of a code may be to anticipate or prevent public regulation, as Van Kolk, 




How do the functions, objectives and motives mentioned in the literature relate to the function 
overview put together in this chapter (hereafter: ‘the empirical functions’)? Three conclusions 
can be drawn.  
 First of all, it can be concluded that most of the empirical functions are referred to in the 
literature, where perspective also plays a role. Legal scholars frequently focus on the 
functions that result from the interaction between the private sphere and the public sphere. 
References are made to the policy instrument function,209 the complementary function in its 
                                                
207 ‘Self-Regulation of Digital Media Converging on the Internet: Industry Codes of Conduct in Sectoral 
Analysis’, Oxford University Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 2004, pp. 17-18 (available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/content/self-regulation-digital-media-converging-internet-
industry-codes-conduct-sectoral-analysis>, accessed 1 July 2016); Tambini, Leonardi & Marsden 2008, p. 51 
with reference to R. Baldwin & M. Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1999, pp. 125-137. See, in different contexts, for instance also Oude Vrielink, Van 
Monfort & Bokhorst 2011; Patterson & Van Buren III 2012. Cf. Bondy, Matten & Moon 2008, p. 298 on the 
reasons for adopting corporate codes of conduct on CSR issues. 
208 Kolk, Van Tulder & Welters 1999, pp. 151-152. Cf. in the context of corporate governance Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra 2004 and Zattoni & Cuomo 2008, who state that both efficiency and legitimacy pressures lead 
to the adoption of codes of good governance. 
209 Ogus & Carbonara 2011, pp. 232-237; Black 2001, pp. 114-115. 
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different guises,210 and the role of codes as regulatory alternatives211. Also mentioned are the 
compliance function,212 the preventive function,213 and the protective function214. The 
signaling element of codes of conduct equally comes to the fore, particularly in the literature 
on professional codes215 and in the guise of a motive or an objective216. The framework 
function was not mentioned as such in the literature I reviewed.217 
 Secondly, it can be inferred from the discussion in this section that the motives for and 
objectives of codes of conduct are indeed a strong indication of the functions a code can be 
said to perform. Many of the motives and objectives discussed bear close resemblance to the 
empirical functions. However, they are not necessarily synonymous with these functions.218 
 
The functions of the Dutch SMS Services Provision Code of Conduct (Gedragscode SMS 
Dienstverlening) are illustrative in this respect. This code was adopted in 2003 in response to an 
appeal made by three supervisory authorities after having received a large number of complaints 
from consumers about the obscure way in which SMS services were provided. Social and political 
pressure prompted revision and tightening of the Code on several occasions.219 Regarding the 
reasons for adoption and revision, firstly, the Code can be said to have both a preventive function 
(avoid state interference, cf. political pressure) and a signaling function (response to external 
pressure). Since the aim of the Code is to safeguard legal certainty and transparency for End 
Users in the market for premium SMS Services,220 it can also be attributed with a protective 
function. However, the Code arguably performs more functions than those that follow on from 
the reasons for its adoption and its objective. The content of the Code reveals that parties that 
conclude an agreement with one of the signatories of the Code will be contractually obliged to 
comply with the Code (function of code as standard contract term).221 Furthermore, a closer look 
at the interaction between the legislator, legislation and the Code shows that on the one hand, the 
legislator gives leeway to the industry to self-regulate and to complement the general legislative 
                                                
210 Cafaggi 2011b, 2010 and 2007; Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010; Verdoodt 2007, pp. 36-38; Huyse & Parmentier 
1990, pp. 262-263. 
211 Verdoodt 2007, pp. 36-38; Huyse & Parmentier 1990, pp. 262-263. 
212 Hemphill 1992, p. 915. 
213 Ogus & Carbonara 2011, pp. 232-237; Verdoodt 2007, pp. 36-38; De Groot-Van Leeuwen & De Groot 1998, 
p. 166. The preventive function of De Groot-Van Leeuwen and De Groot also covers codes that prevent external 
competitors from entering the market. This corresponds with the internal protective function. 
214 De Groot-Van Leeuwen & De Groot 1998, pp. 160; 163-166.  
215 De Groot-Van Leeuwen & De Groot 1998, pp. 160; 163-166 and in the context of professional codes: Rhode 
1981; Frankel 1989, pp. 110-112; Lindblom & Ruland 1997, pp. 574-576. 
216 See inter alia Bressers 1995; Self-Regulation of Digital Media Converging on the Internet: Industry Codes of 
Conduct in Sectoral Analysis’, Oxford University Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 2004, pp. 17-18; Kolk, Van 
Tulder & Welters 1999, pp. 151-152. 
217 Although there is no mention made of the corporate governance function, the CSR function and the function 
of codes as standard contract term, all three are arguably reflected in the literature, albeit in a less explicit way. 
The former two functions are in effect reflected in discussions on codes in relation to corporate governance and 
CSR, respectively, while the latter function echoes through in the literature on governance by contract (see 
above, n 145). 
218 This already follows from the fact that the framework of analysis included more criteria besides reason and 
aim. 
219 See <www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/8346/Gedragscode-voor-SMS-diensten/5> and 
<www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2010/03/19/nieuwe-sms-gedragscode-voldoet-niet.html> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
220 SMS Services Provision Code of Conduct (old English version of 1 April 2014), p. 4 (available at 
<www.payinfo.nl/gedragscodes>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
221 See Article 2 of the SMS Code. 
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framework regulating SMS Service contracts, while on the other hand the private rules are also 
supported and complemented themselves by legal rules that tighten the existing regulatory 
framework.222 This leads the Code to assume a complementary function (organizational 
perspective) and a policy instrument function (governance perspective). These functions are 
likely to be missed whenever account is taken of reasons and objectives alone. 
 
 Thirdly, it can be concluded from the literature review that some of the functions that are 
referred to by other scholars were not identified on the basis of the empirical study. The first 
difference that stands out in this respect is the distinction that De Groot–Van Leeuwen and De 
Groot have drawn between internal and external functions, something that does not come to 
the fore explicitly in my overview of the functions. The internal functions listed by these 
scholars and the external bridging function are not included in the overview.223 The same goes 
for the integrating function defined by Cafaggi and Janczuk and the bridging function that 
Vranken refers to.224 Finally, the overview does not as such refer to the fact that industry 
codes can function as a shield against liability or the unwanted intrusion of outsiders.225  
 Given the goal I had in my function overview, i.e., to serve as a stepping-stone in 
determining the legal relevance of industry codes in Dutch private law, it was however not 
deemed necessary to adapt the overview to reflect these differences. The internal functions 
mentioned by De Groot-Van Leeuwen and De Groot, are arguably less relevant when it 
comes to the legal relevance of an industry code and the bridging function that they refer to in 
fact only denotes the very general role of codes in structuring relationships. The integrating 
function is closely related to the harmonization function and the policy instrument function, 
which did result from the empirical study, and is as such already reflected in the overview. A 
similar observation applies to the function of industry codes as a shield against liability or 
outsider intrusion; these functions are reflected in the compliance function and the internal 
safeguarding function, i.e., consolidating function, respectively (cf. the descriptions of these 
functions in section 3.3.1). The bridging function put forward by Vranken was not added to 
the overview either. In signaling the role of private rules as a “concrete source of information 
for the legislator and the courts”,226 this function is already indicative of the possible legal 
relevance of codes and other forms of private regulation. Thus, its significance lies at a more 
‘advanced stage’ than that of the empirical functions. 
 The brief literature review does not warrant the definite conclusion that the empirical 
study has uncovered new or other functions. However, it can be held that the study has led to 
an overview of functions that is more comprehensive than any found in the literature studied. 
Additionally, other scholars do not generally bring to the fore in their overviews the 
interconnectedness between the different functions. Viewed from this perspective, the 
function overview presented in this chapter can be deemed to constitute a solid building block 
                                                
222 Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 31 412, no. 16 and no. 21; Regulation of the Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Agriculture and Innovation of 23 February 2011, no. WJZ / 11026769, amending the Regeling universele 
dienstverlening en eindgebruikersbelangen, Government Gazette 2011, no. 3687. 
223 De Groot-Van Leeuwen & De Groot 1998, pp. 160; 163-166. 
224 Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010, p. 4; Vranken 2006, p. 78. 
225 Frankel 1989, pp. 110-112; Williams 2004, pp. 12-13. 
226 Vranken 2006, p. 78.  
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for the theoretical part of this doctoral thesis. I will return to this topic in Chapter 7 (section 
7.2.1.1). In the next three chapters – which take a closer look at the legislative and judicial 
approaches to industry codes of conduct in European and Dutch private law – the functions 
will only play a very limited role; they will only briefly pass in review in section 4.4.3 of 





















































4 Industry codes of conduct in European and Dutch  









Since the mid-1980s, the legislative policies of the European Union (hereafter: EU) and the 
Netherlands have developed and evolved along the lines of the concepts of ‘better regulation’ 
(EU) and ‘quality of legislation’ (NL).227 The use of alternatives to traditional command-and-
control regulation by the State, such as private regulation - including industry codes of 
conduct - forms an important pillar of both concepts. Accordingly, both the European and the 
Dutch legislators are under an obligation to examine whether the employment of such 
alternatives is a viable option, before deciding upon legislative intervention. In this chapter, I 
investigate how this element of European and Dutch legislative policies has played out in the 
field of private law. How do the European and the Dutch legislators employ industry codes of 
conduct in private law and what consequences does this have for the legal relevance of such 
codes?228 
 The chapter starts by defining the notions of ‘self-regulation’ and ‘co-regulation’ (section 
4.2). This then sets the scene for the three-step-approach that is adopted to address the 
aforementioned question. The first step of this approach consists of an outline of the main 
features of the general legislative policies of the EU and the Netherlands, with emphasis on 
the role alternative regulatory instruments play (section 4.3). As a second step, it is explored 
how this policy has been put into practice in European and Dutch private law by discussing 
several examples of both legislative references to industry codes and instances in which 
regulation has been, wholly or partially, left to the industry (section 4.4).229 The third step 
consists of a closer look at the criteria, conditions and recommendations respective legislators 
have formulated with respect to the use of alternative regulatory instruments (section 4.5). I 
then make a brief comparison between the European and the Dutch legislative approach to 
private regulation (section 4.6) and highlight the relationships between the spheres central to 
                                                
227 The Dutch debate thereby predates the European discussion, which only really took off in 2000. See Bokhorst 
2014, p. 165. 
228 Part of this chapter (sections 4.4 and 4.5) has, in an earlier version, already been published (in Dutch) in 
Menting & Vranken 2014. 
229 For a discussion of some of the legislative references, see Menting & Vranken 2014, pp. 8-10, 11-24. 
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this chapter, i.e., the European, the Dutch, the public and the private sphere (section 4.7). I 
will tie the various strands together in section 4.8. 
 
4.2 Definitional remarks 
 
When referring to alternative regulatory instruments, European and Dutch policy documents 
generally use the terms ‘self-regulation’ and ‘co-regulation’. In order to avoid conceptual 
mix-ups, sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 of the current chapter do not use the term ‘private 
regulation’, but instead follow the terminology of these policy documents. This necessitates a 
brief discussion of the way in which self-regulation and co-regulation are defined in the 
documents concerned. 
 
4.2.1 EU definitions 
 
Currently, EU descriptions of self-regulation and co-regulation can be found in the Better 
Regulation Toolbox 2015.230 Until recently, definitions could also be found in the 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 2003 (IIA 2003),231 which has been 
replaced by a new Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (IIA 2016), which 
entered into force on 13 April 2016.232 The definitions that the IIA 2003 provided differ from 
those included in the Better Regulation Toolbox. The IIA 2003 defined co-regulation as: 
 
“the mechanism whereby a Community legislative act entrusts the attainment of the objectives 
identified by the legislative authority to parties which are recognised in the field (such as 
economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organisations or associations). The 
mechanism may be used on the basis of criteria defined in the legislative act […]”.233 
 
Self-regulation was described as: 
 
“the possibility for economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organisations or 
associations to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves common guidelines at European 
level (particularly codes of practice or sectoral agreements)”.234 
 
 
                                                
230 This Toolbox complements the 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines for the conduct of impact assessments. On 
these documents, which were adopted in May 2015 as part of the new Better Regulation Package, see section 
4.3.1.5 below. 
231 Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making, OJ 2003 C 321/01. For a more extensive discussion of the 
concepts of self-regulation and co-regulation in the EU, see, e.g., Svilpaite 2007a, pp. 7-16. A comparative 
synopsis of both concepts, drawn up by the European Economic and Social Committee, can be found at 
<www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.self-and-co-regulation-comparative-synopsis> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
232 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the 
European Commission on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016, OJ 2016, L 123/1. 
233 IIA 2003 (OJ 2003, C 321/01), recital 18. 
234 IIA 2003 (OJ 2003, C 321/01), recital 22. 
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Both definitions have been met with criticism. Verbruggen, for instance, is critical of the fact 
that according to the EU definition, co-regulation is conceived of as a mere implementation 
mechanism in the European context. This narrow conception limits the regulatory capacity of 
private actors, Verbruggen notes.235 Svilpaite, in turn, indicates that both definitions are 
Europeanized and communitarized, which limits the number of practices captured by the IIA 
2003.236 Senden and Meuwese add that self-regulation also has a fairly specific meaning in 
the EU context: the IIA 2003 adopts a rather top-down interpretation of the concept. They 
base this qualification on paragraph 23 of the IIA 2003, which follows the definition of self-
regulation, that reads that the Commission must scrutinize self-regulation practices. This leads 
Senden and Meuwese to conclude that only those private arrangements that are monitored by 
the Commission, and not the purely self-regulatory ones, fall within the ambit of the IIA 
2003.237 Following on from that, the European conceptualization of self-regulation and co-
regulation has been criticized for being too narrow, resulting in many private regulatory 
practices falling outside the scope of the IIA 2003.238 Svilpaite, for instance, signals that the 
definitions “leave in a no-man’s land” the private regulatory practices that follow on from 
government ‘encouragement’ other than legislative acts.239 Technically, such practices would 
not fall under the IIA 2003 definition of co-regulation, as this definition refers to ‘a 
Community legislative act’.240 
 Now that the IIA 2016 has replaced the IIA 2003, the different descriptions put forward 
by the Better Regulation Toolbox come to the fore. Regarding the notion of co-regulation, 
only subtle differences exist as between the definition provided by the IIA 2003 and the 
following description in the Toolbox: 
 
“a mechanism whereby the Union legislator entrusts the attainment of specific policy objectives 
set out in legislation or other policy documents to parties which are recognized in the field (such 
as economic operators, social partners, non-governmental organizations, or associations). Under 
this ‘light’ regulatory approach, the relevant policy initiatives establish the key deadlines and 
mechanisms for implementation, the methods of monitoring the application of the legislation and 
any sanctions”.241 
 
The description of self-regulation in the Better Regulation Toolbox, by contrast, differs 
markedly from the definition included in the IIA 2003: 
 
“self-regulation is where business or industry sectors formulate codes of conduct or operating 
constraints on their own initiative for which they are responsible for enforcing”.242 
                                                
235 Verbruggen 2009, p. 429. Similarly: Van Gestel 2005, p. 106. 
236 Svilpaite 2007a, pp. 11-13; Svilpaite 2007b, p. 4.  
237 Meuwese & Senden 2009, pp. 150, 153. 
238 Svilpaite 2007a, pp. 10-11, 25-26; Van den Hoogen & Nowak 2010, pp. 356-357.  
239 Svilpaite 2007a, p. 10. 
240 Svilpaite 2007a, pp. 10-11. 
241 Better Regulation Toolbox 2015, p. 88. The Toolbox can be found at <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/guidelines/toc_tool_en.htm> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
242 Better Regulation Toolbox 2015, p. 88. 
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In being broader than the definitions set out in the IIA 2003, these descriptions are able to 
withstand some of the criticism leveled against the IIA definitions, particularly where it 
pertains to their limited scope. Furthermore, the Toolbox does not take a top-down 
interpretation of self-regulation, though it adds “pure self-regulation is uncommon and at the 
EU level it generally involves the Commission in instigating or facilitating the drawing up of 
the voluntary agreement”.243 
 
4.2.2 Dutch definitions 
 
Dutch legislative policy lacks equally ‘formal’ definitions of self-regulation and co-
regulation. In the Integrated Framework for Policy Analysis and Legislation (Integraal 
Afwegingskader beleid en regelgeving), however, one can find some clues as to how the 
Dutch legislator understands these concepts. This Framework, which includes guidelines for 
the preparation of legislation and policy, speaks of self-regulation whenever a sector in 
society drafts its own norms. Co-regulation denotes a situation in which such rule drafting is a 
joint effort of the sector and the government.244 We can find a further hint as to the meaning 
of co-regulation in the government report ‘A view on legislation’ (Zicht op Wetgeving). This 
report, more specifically, uses the term ‘statutorily structured and conditioned self-regulation’ 
(wettelijk geconditioneerde zelfregulering) to refer to situations in which the legislator limits 
its actions to setting the material or procedural framework and offering the possibility of ex 
post control. Within that framework, citizens and societal organizations are allowed to self-
regulate.245 This description suggests that the Dutch interpretation of co-regulation is broader 
than its European counterpart. Under both interpretations, co-regulation results from public 
and private actors working together. The difference between the interpretations lies in the 
nature of the relationship between these actors. By defining co-regulation as a mere 
implementation mechanism, the European interpretation leaves intact the traditional 
hierarchical relationship between public and private actors. The Dutch interpretation of co-
regulation, by contrast, does not entail any such hierarchical element and places greater 






                                                
243 Better Regulation Toolbox 2015, p. 88. 
244 Integrated Framework for Policy Analysis and Legislation, under 6.1 (Categorieën beleidsinstrumenten > Co-
regulering en zelfregulering) (available at <www.kcwj.nl/kennisbank/integraal-afwegingskader-beleid-en-
regelgeving>, accessed 1 July 2016). Bokhorst points out that the term ‘co-regulation’ is used in Dutch 
Parliamentary Papers only since 2000 and that it stems from the European debate. See Bokhorst 2014, p. 229. 
245 Parliamentary Papers II 1990/91, 21 800, no. 1-2, pp. 15, 26, indicating that whenever this form of 
regulation is concerned, it is key to “strike a balance between government regulation as the expression of 
government responsibility and self-regulation by citizens and societal organizations within that framework” (at 
p. 26, my own translation). 
246 Verbruggen 2009, p. 429; Eijlander 2005, p. 7.  
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4.3 General legislative policy 
 
With the European and Dutch interpretations of self-regulation and co-regulation clarified, 
focus can now be shifted to the ways in which the European and the Dutch legislators have 
employed these instruments. This section serves as a starter in this regard and reviews how 
the general legislative policies of the EU and the Netherlands have evolved in respect of the 
use of self-regulation and co-regulation. 
 
4.3.1 EU: Better Regulation 
 
As Senden indicates, the legislative policy of the EU rests on two main pillars. In brief, the 
first pillar represents the EU’s struggle to achieve deregulation and to improve the quality of 
European legislation. The second pillar embodies the search for a more diversified set of 
governance mechanisms, i.e., modes of governance other than legislation. Both pillars are 
founded on the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity as laid down in Article 5 of the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU).247 These principles determine both the competence of 
the EU, and the intensity and nature of its actions.248 More specifically, prior to the EU taking 
any action they require that consideration be given to (1) the necessity of public action, (2) the 
appropriate level of action (EU or Member State) and (3) the proportionality of the action vis-
à-vis its objective. 249 This also implies that consideration be given to the use of alternative 
regulatory approaches, as is reflected in the second pillar of EU legislative policy.250 It is 
along the lines of this pillar that the use of alternative regulatory instruments, such as self-
regulation and co-regulation, is promoted as part of the EU’s Better Regulation Agenda. 
 
4.3.1.1 White Paper on European Governance 
 
The legislative policy of the European Union as it stands today has its roots in the mid-1980s, 
a period which Senden marks as “a turning point with regard to the way of thinking on 
                                                
247 Senden 2005, pp. 4-9. Both principles were initially codified in the Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality to the Amsterdam Treaty (OJ 1997, C 340), added to the then EC 
Treaty. This protocol was replaced by a new Protocol (No. 2) of the same name (OJ 2008, L 115/206) when the 
Lisbon Treaty came into force. Cf. Report from the Commission on subsidiarity and proportionality (17th report 
on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2009), COM(2010) 547 final, pp. 2-4; Craig & De Búrca 2015, pp. 168-
169.  
248 European Council in Edinburgh 11-12 December 1992, Conclusions of the Presidency, p. 13; Senden 2005, p. 
8.  
249 European Commission, European Governance. A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 final, pp. 10-11; European 
Council in Edinburgh 11-12 December 1992, Conclusions of the Presidency, p. 14. 
250 Senden 2005, pp. 8-9. The conclusions of the European Council of Edinburgh in this respect inter alia read 
that “the form of action should be as simple as possible, […]. The Community should legislate only to the extent 
necessary. […]. Consideration should also be given where appropriate to the use of voluntary codes of conduct”. 
(European Council in Edinburgh 11-12 December 1992, Conclusions of the Presidency, p. 21). As Craig and De 
Búrca indicate, the EU’s better regulation policy has its roots in the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity 
adopted by the Edinburgh Council, while addressing other and more specific issues. See Craig & De Búrca 
2015, p. 174. 
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European legislation”.251 Driven by the stagnation of the internal market, the onset of policies 
of deregulation in Member States and criticism on the quantity as well as the quality of 
European legislation, the European Commission worked towards a new legislative policy.252 
What eventually followed in the 1990s was a debate on better EU governance, in which the 
use of new forms and modes of governance constituted one of the central issues.253 The 
‘newness’ of these tools denotes a shift from the ‘old’ way of governing, where preference 
was given to hierarchical instruments in the form of directives and regulations, towards an 
approach that gives preference to the use of more flexible, participatory, inclusive and soft 
measures.254 
 The reform debate eventually led to the White Paper on European Governance, adopted 
by the European Commission in July 2001.255 In this Paper, the Commission brought forward 
several suggestions to improve and ensure ‘good governance’ in the EU, many of which echo 
the aforementioned shift away from hierarchical governance.256 The starting point for these 
proposals for change was that “the Union must renew the Community method by following a 
less top-down approach and complementing its policy tools more effectively with non-
legislative instruments”.257 In the context of, in short, ‘better regulation’, this among other 
things implied that “legislation is often part of a broader solution combining formal rules with 
other non-binding tools, such as recommendations, guidelines or even self-regulation within a 
commonly agreed framework” and that “under certain conditions, implementing measures 
may be prepared within the framework of co-regulation”.258 Subsequently, all this was 
implemented in a coordinated strategy for better regulation, laid down in the Commission’s 
Action Plan for Better Regulation.259 
 
                                                
251 Senden 2005, p. 4.  
252 Senden 2005, pp. 4-5. Cf. (at a later stage) Scott & Trubek 2002, pp. 6-8 who list six factors that might 
explain the emergence of new governance in the EU.  
253 Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 163. The White Paper on European Governance defines governance as “rules, 
processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as 
regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence” (COM(2001) 428 final, p. 8, 
footnote 1). 
254 Cardwell 2011, pp. 537-538, 542; Craig & De Búrca 2015, pp. 163-165. This is however neither to say that 
the European legislator no longer relies on ‘old’ hierarchical instrument nor that the ‘new’ modes of governance 
have not been employed in the past. Rather, the ‘shift away’ indicates a shift in emphasis. See Craig & De Búrca 
2015, pp. 164-165; Cardwell 2011, pp. 544-545. For a short appraisal of the European move towards new forms 
of governance, see Craig & De Búrca 2015, pp. 163-165, with further references. For a more comprehensive 
account of new governance within the EU, see e.g. De Búrca & Scott 2006; Dawson 2011; Scott & Trubek 2002. 
255 European Commission, European Governance. A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 final.  
256 Nonetheless, as Craig and De Búrca point out, the White Paper has been criticized for proposing only a few 
concrete changes and for being an attempt by the Commission to consolidate its own position. See Craig & De 
Búrca 2015, p. 178. Cf. Cardwell 2011, p. 544. Eberlein and Kerwer admit that this can indeed be leveled at the 
White Paper but they tone down the criticism by pointing out that “one should not rush to dismiss new modes of 
governance as nothing but a convenient smokescreen for the Commission as it attempts to pursue revitalized but 
old-style regulation. Most importantly, documents such as the White Paper cannot be viewed as authoritative 
guides to the ‘real’ policy approach of key actors such as the Commission. They are notoriously political, 
ambiguous, and thus difficult to decipher. And they are not reliable guides to a complex ‘political reality’”. See 
Eberlein & Kerwer 2004, p. 124, with reference to several of the critics. 
257 COM(2001) 428 final, p. 4. 
258 COM(2001) 428 final, pp. 20-21. 
259 Senden 2005, p. 3. 
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4.3.1.2 Action Plan for Better Regulation 
 
In 2002, the European Commission issued its Action Plan ‘Simplifying and improving the 
regulatory environment’, also known as the Better Regulation Action Plan.260 In this plan, 
among other things, the Commission emphasizes that the employment of alternative 
instruments does not necessarily undermine the Treaty provisions or the prerogatives of the 
legislator.261 According to the Commission, instruments such as co-regulation, self-regulation, 
voluntary agreements, the open method of coordination, financial interventions and 
information campaigns can, in specific circumstances, “be used to achieve the objectives of 
the Treaty while simplifying lawmaking activities and legislation itself”.262 The 
considerations on the use of self-regulation and co-regulation that follow on from this 
statement are illustrative of the way in which the European legislator applies these 
instruments in its policy: 
 
“The Commission can consider it preferable not to make a legislative proposal where agreements 
of this kind already exist and can be used to achieve the objectives set out in the Treaty. It can 
also suggest, via a recommendation for example, that this type of agreements be concluded by the 
parties concerned to avoid having to use legislation, without ruling out the possibility of 
legislating if such agreements prove insufficient or inefficient. These voluntary agreements 
constitute one form of self-regulation. Voluntary agreements can also be concluded on the basis 
of a legislative act, i.e. in a more binding and formal manner in the context of co-regulation, 
thereby enabling parties concerned to implement a specific piece of legislation [...]. Within the 
framework of a legislative act, coregulation makes it possible to ensure that the objectives defined 
by the legislator can be implemented in the context of measures carried out by parties recognised 
as being active in the field concerned.”263 (emphasis added, MM) 
 
The Commission places particular emphasis on the use of co-regulation and formulates 
several criteria in this respect.264 These criteria can be traced back in the Interinstitutional 
Agreement on Better Law-Making (2003), which was concluded one year after the 
introduction of the Better Regulation Action Plan. 
 
 
                                                
260 Communication from the Commission, Action plan “Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment”, 
COM(2002) 278 final. This so-called Better Regulation Action Plan builds on the conclusions of the Mandelkern 
Group, which put emphasis on the use of alternatives to regulation. Both self-regulation and co-regulation were 
mentioned in this respect, yet the Mandelkern Report puts particular emphasis on the use of co-regulation. See 
Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, Final Report, 13 November 2001, particularly pp. 15-17 (available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_regulation/key_docs_en.htm>, accessed 1 February 2016). For an 
overview of other documents concerning the use of alternatives to legislation that preceded the Better Regulation 
Action Plan, see Holloway et al. 2002, pp. 3-19 in particular. A critical account of the EU Better Regulation 
Program can be found with, for instance, Wiener 2006. 
261 COM(2002) 278 final, p. 11.  
262 COM(2002) 278 final pp. 11. 
263 COM(2002) 278 final pp. 11-12. Cf. Chapter 3, section 3.3.2 of this doctoral thesis on the functions of 
industry codes of conduct from the perspective of the legislator. 
264 COM(2002) 278 final, p. 13. 
 
 72 
4.3.1.3 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making 2003 
 
The next step in the EU’s Better Regulation policy was taken in 2003 with the conclusion of 
the IIA 2003 between the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. The IIA 2003 reflects 
the commitment of the three institutions to “improve the quality of law-making by means of a 
series of initiatives and procedures” set out in the Agreement.265 It “establishes a global 
strategy for better lawmaking throughout the entire EU legislative process”.266 One of the key 
elements of the IIA 2003 concerns the use of alternative methods of regulation, European 
self-regulation and co-regulation in particular. In accordance with the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity, the Commission, the Parliament and the Council recognize 
the need to use alternative regulatory instruments when suitable or where a legal instrument is 
not specifically required by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).267 
Against this backdrop, the IIA 2003 provides a general framework for the use of European 
self-regulation and co-regulation. It introduces a common definition of both concepts as well 
as substantive and procedural conditions on their use in legislative policy.268 Such a general, 
comprehensive framework had been lacking up until then: before the IIA 2003 was 
concluded, the criteria for the use of self-regulation and co-regulation had the shape of sector-
specific requirements, mainly enclosed in soft law documents.269 For that reason, the IIA 
2003 signified an important milestone in the EU better regulation policy in respect of the use 
of alternative regulatory instruments. Yet, strikingly, the 2016 Inter-institutional Agreement 
on Better Law-Making, which has replaced the IIA 2003, does not refer to self-regulation and 
co-regulation. 
 
The revision of the IIA 2003 was a pending case for quite some time. Already in 2010, the 
Framework Agreement on relations between the Parliament and the Commission (2010) alluded 
to adaptation of the IIA 2003.270 After the conclusion of this Framework Agreement, the 
European Parliament repeatedly stressed the need to revise the IIA and to adapt it to the new 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty as well as to the smart regulation agenda.271 It was also 
                                                
265 IIA 2003 (OJ 2003, C 321/01), recital 1. 
266 Communication from the Commission, Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, 
COM(2005) 97 final, p. 4. 
267 IIA 2003 (OJ 2003, C 321/01), recital 16. 
268 COM(2005) 97 final, p. 4; Svilpaite 2007b, p. 4; Senden 2005, p. 3. The procedural and substantive criteria as 
formulated by the IIA 2003 are discussed in section 4.5.1.1. 
269 Svilpaite 2007b, pp. 4-5 (with references to several of these documents); Verdoodt 2007, p. 82; EESC report, 
European Self- and Co-regulation, 2013, pp. 10-12 (available at <www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.self-and-co-
regulation-literature.28949>, accessed 1 July 2016). Earlier (policy) documents listing criteria for the use of self-
regulation and co-regulation include the White Paper on European Governance (COM(2001) 428 final, p. 21), 
the Mandelkern Report (2001, p. 17) and the Better Regulation Action Plan (COM(2002) 275 final, pp. 12-13). 
270 More specifically: “The two Institutions commit to agree on key changes in preparation of future negotiations 
on adaptation of the Inter institutional Agreement on better lawmaking to the new provisions introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty, taking into account current practices and this Framework Agreement” (OJ 2010, L 304/47, recital 
52). 
271 See, e.g., European Parliament resolution of 9 February 2010 on a revised Framework Agreement between 
the European Parliament and the Commission for the next legislative term (OJ 2010, C 341 E/01), recital 3(b); 
European Parliament resolution of 9 September 2010 on better lawmaking – 15th annual report from the 
Commission pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
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recommended to adopt an eventual new agreement on the basis of Article 295 TFEU and to make 
this new agreement binding.272 In the end, this resulted in the IIA 2016. It remains unclear, 
however, whether this Agreement is of a binding nature (cf. Article 295 TFEU). 
 
4.3.1.4 Smart regulation and REFIT 
 
In the following years, the better regulation strategy was affirmed and updated on several 
occasions.273 In 2010, against the background of the Europe 2020 Strategy,274 the 
Commission decided that it was “time to “step up a gear”: with the better regulation motto 
remaining in full force, better regulation had to become smart regulation.275 Accordingly, the 
focus of the EU’s regulatory policy was shifted to smart regulation. This concept is targeted at 
designing and delivering high quality regulation that is in conformity with the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity. It is about managing the quality of regulation throughout the 
entire policy cycle from the designing to the evaluation and revision stage.276 As such, the 
smart regulation strategy not only consolidates the results of the better regulation policy, but 
also seeks to broaden and improve this policy by covering the entire policy cycle.277  
 In 2012, another addition to the Better Regulation program was presented under the 
heading of ‘Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme’ (REFIT).278 This program 
strengthens the smart regulation strategy and seeks to make the whole of EU legislation ‘fit 
for purpose’ by simplifying the regulatory framework and eliminating unnecessary regulatory 
costs.279 Thus, REFIT works along two lines: the reduction of regulatory burdens and 
simplification. The use of self-regulation and co-regulation is part of the second strand, which 
pertains to the efforts of the EU to make European laws clearer and more understandable, and 
                                                                                                                                                   
proportionality (OJ 2011, C 308 E/11), recitals 8-9; European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2012 on 
the 18th report on Better legislation - Application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (2010) (OJ 
2013, C 353 E/14) recital 4. 
272 European Parliament, Draft report on EU Regulatory Fitness and Subsidiarity and Proportionality - 19th 
report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011 (2013/2077(INI), recital 4. Article 295 TFEU offers the 
possibility to conclude binding interinstitutional agreements. See below, n 300. 
273 See COM(2005) 97 final and the strategic reviews of the Better regulation strategy in 2006, 2008 and 2009 
(COM(2006) 689 final, COM(2008) 32 final and COM(2009) 15 final, respectively). Cf. Svilpaite 2007a, p. 4, 
footnote 9. 
274 Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 
COM(2010) 2020 final. 
275 Communication from the Commission, Smart Regulation in the European Union, COM(2010) 543 final, p. 2. 
276 COM(2010) 543 final, p. 3. One of the key elements of the smart regulation strategy, for example, is the 
introduction of an ex post evaluation of legislation (COM(2010) 543 final, pp. 4-5). 
277 Voermans 2010, p. 272; EESC report, European Self- and Co-regulation, 2013, p. 5. Cf. Korkea-aho 2012, p. 
402: “Smart regulation does not deny or attempt to throw overboard the ‘core values’ of BR but rather to make 
those core values happen”.  
278 Communication from the Commission, EU Regulatory Fitness, COM(2012) 746 final. See also 
<http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/refit/index_en.htm> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
279 COM(2012) 746 final, pp. 2-3; REFIT Brochure, p. 2 (available at <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/refit/index_en.htm>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
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hence more user-friendly.280 Self-regulation and co-regulation are considered “simpler 
alternatives to imposing detailed rules in legally binding agreements”.281  
 
4.3.1.5 Better Regulation Package 2015 
 
The Better Regulation Package forms for now the latest development within the Union’s 
better regulation policy. This package, launched on 19 May 2015 and comprising several 
documents, has three key objectives: to enhance the openness and transparency of EU policy-
making, to strengthen the commitment of the Commission, the Parliament and the Council to 
the principles of better regulation, and to refresh the existing stock of EU legislation along the 
lines of a strengthened REFIT program.282 Thus, what is sought is to “work more 
transparently and inclusively to produce higher quality proposals, and ensure that existing 
rules deliver important societal goals more effectively”.283 But what does the package bring as 
regards the use of alternative regulatory instruments?284 Particularly relevant in this respect 
are three documents included in the package: the Communication ‘Better Regulation for 
Better Results’, the new Better Regulation Guidelines and the accompanying Better 
Regulation Toolbox, and what at the time was still just a proposal for a new Interinstitutional 
Agreement on Better Law-Making. 
 The part of the Communication that concerns strengthening the commitment to the better 
regulation principles also mentions the use of alternatives to regulation. More specifically, it 
states that the Commission “will consider both regulatory and well-designed non-regulatory 
means” when considering policy solutions.285 The use of alternative policy instruments, 
including self-regulation and co-regulation, is furthermore part and parcel of the new Better 
Regulation Guidelines, which guide the process of impact assessment. Like the 2009 Impact 
Assessment Guidelines,286 which have been replaced by the Better Regulation Guidelines, 
these Guidelines require that consideration is given to alternative policy instruments when 
designing policy options as part of an impact assessment.287 The Guidelines however also 
refer to ‘soft policy instruments’ (including voluntary agreements or other forms of self-
                                                
280 For the policy on the reduction of regulatory burdens, see <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/refit/admin_burden/index_en.htm>. Information on the simplification strand of REFIT can be found 
at <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/refit/simplification/index_en.htm> (websites accessed 2 February 2016). 
281 <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/refit/simplification/index_en.htm> (accessed 2 February 2016). 
282 Communication from the Commission, Better regulation for better results – An EU agenda, COM(2015) 215 
final. 
283 COM(2015) 215 final, p. 13. 
284 For a discussion of the package from a more general perspective, see, e.g., Renda 2015 and the contributions 
in the special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation on the Better Regulation Package (2015, issue 3). 
285 COM(2015) 215 final, p. 6. The notion ‘well-designed’ links up with the Principles for Better Self- and Co-
regulation developed by the Commission through open consultation (see <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/genealogy-cop>, accessed 1 July 2016). It follows on from the Better Regulation Toolbox (p. 89) that 
these principles should be reflected in every self- and co-regulatory initiative. On the Principles, see section 
4.5.2.1 below. 
286 Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009, SEC(2009) 92, pp. 29-31 and Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009: 
Annexes 1-13, pp. 24-29. Both documents can be found at <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/better_regulation/key_docs_en.htm> under ‘Impact Assessment’ (accessed 2 February 2016). 
287 For critical reflections on the place of alternative regulatory methods in EU impact assessments, see Meuwese 
& Senden 2009. 
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regulatory action and/or co-regulatory action) to be used at the implementation stage of the 
policy cycle.288 Hence, the option of seeking recourse to self- or co-regulation now has to be 
considered at the level of both impact assessment and implementation.289 However, whereas 
the foregoing suggests that the Better Regulation Package 2015 gives fresh impetus to the use 
of self-regulation and co-regulation, the IIA 2016 points in the opposite direction.290 Unlike 
its predecessor from 2003, which prominently featured self-regulation and co-regulation, the 
IIA 2016 remains entirely silent upon the use of theses instruments.291 
 
4.3.1.6 The place of self-regulation and co-regulation in EU legislative policy: Some critical 
reflections 
 
On closer scrutiny, what stands out after the discussion of the development of the EU better 
regulation strategy in the previous subsections is that there are fluctuations in the degree of 
attention paid to the use of alternative regulatory instruments. Whereas the initial stages of the 
better regulation agenda explicitly and visibly promoted the use of alternative regulatory 
methods, climaxing in the adoption of the IIA 2003, references to these methods are more 
difficult to find in the consecutive stages of the EU’s legislative strategy. The Communication 
on Smart Regulation does not mention the use of alternative instruments. It is only in the 
simplification strand of the REFIT program that references to self-regulation and co-
regulation are explicitly mentioned. This is however not to say that these tools have been 
completely out of sight during these stages. On the contrary, with the Impact Assessment 
Guidelines prescribing that the use of alternatives to legislation must be considered during the 
policymaking process, self-regulation and co-regulation retained their place in EU legislative 
policy, albeit in a less visible fashion. In 2015, the issue was aroused from relative 
‘dormancy’ with the adoption of the Better Regulation Package, in which the use of 
regulatory alternatives not only visibly featured the Commission’s Communication, but was 
also assigned a place in the implementation phase of the policy cycle. At the same time, 
however, the IIA 2016 strikes at one of the suggested roots of self-regulation and co-
regulation in EU legislative policy, namely the IIA 2003. 
 It is difficult to pinpoint what is behind these fluctuations. A possible explanation for the 
different degrees of ‘visibility’ of alternatives to legislation in the Commission documents 
setting out the Union’s policy strategy lies in changes of emphasis within this policy. An 
additional explanation may be found in the enshrinement of the use of alternative tools in the 
                                                
288 Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2015) 111 final, p. 23 (impact assessment) and p. 41 (implementation). 
See also Better Regulation Toolbox, pp. 83, 85, 87-90. 
289 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/principles-better-self-and-co-regulation-endorsed-better-
regulation-package> (accessed 2 February 2016). 
290 The only passage (remotely) hinting at the use of alternative instruments is the one on Impact Assessments, 
where we can read that Impact Assessments “should map out alternative solutions” and that “the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality should be fully respected, as should fundamental rights.” See IIA 2016, OJ 
2016, L 123/1, recital 12. 
291 In spite of the call of the European Economic and Social Committee for the future Interinstitutional 
Agreement to refine the IIA 2003 framework for self-regulation and co-regulation. See Opinion of the EESC on 
Self-regulation and co-regulation in the Community legislative framework, Brussels 22 April 2015, INT/754. 
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former Impact Assessment Guidelines. After all, it might be argued that such an enshrinement 
lessens the need to continuously put the issue to the forefront of EU legislative policy. 
Equally difficult to address is the question as to what the implications of the developments 
outlined in the previous subsections are for the use of self-regulation and co-regulation as 
alternative regulatory instruments at the European level. Nonetheless, several observations 
can be made that put into perspective the Commission’s approbation of these regulatory 
instruments. More specifically, it can be pointed to the status of the IIA 2003 and the extent to 
which the Better Regulation policy has actually translated into private regulatory initiatives. 
 
4.3.1.6.1 Status of the IIA 2003 
 
Due to a complete absence of both concepts in the IIA 2016, the replacement of the IIA 2003 
by the IIA 2016 raises questions as to the future place of self-regulation and co-regulation in 
EU policymaking. Nevertheless, it should be noted in this respect that the actual impact of the 
IIA 2003 might be nuanced. 
 The conclusion of the IIA 2003 was not all plain sailing. As Allio describes, the 
negotiation process was complicated by what he calls “institutional sensitivities and 
prerogatives” as well as by the need to maintain the existing balance between the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Council.292 Both the Parliament and the Council stand 
accused of taking an ambivalent and sometimes rather reluctant stance towards the use of 
alternatives to legislation, fearing that such use could undermine their role in the legislative 
process.293 The IIA 2003 section on alternative regulatory methods, more specifically, was of 
particular concern to the European Parliament, which was troubled by the eventual loss of 
democratic control that would result from the use of these methods as well as by the fact that 
these methods could be misused.294 Scholarly opinions are divided as to whether the final 
paragraphs on self-regulation and co-regulation in the IIA 2003 represented an adequate 
response to these concerns. Some scholars have criticized said paragraphs for failing to fully 
                                                
292 Allio 2007, p. 80. 
293 Haythornthwaite 2007, pp. 24-25; Svilpaite 2007b, p. 29; Meuwese & Senden 2009, pp. 150-154. Cf. for 
example the Commission’s report ‘Better Lawmaking 2003’, COM(2003) 770 final, p. 8 where the Commission 
indicated that “on several recent occasions, the European Parliament and/or the Council have questioned or even 
opposed Commission proposals using such alternative instruments”. In its resolutions on EU consumer policy, 
the Council has, however, repeatedly taken a positive stance to self-regulation. See OJ 1999, C 206/01, recital 8; 
OJ 2003, C 11/1, recitals 5, 15; OJ 2009, C 279E/04, recital 6. Likewise, the European Parliament resolution of 
4 September 2007 on Better Regulation in the European Union (OJ 2008, C 187E/60), recital 36, encourages the 
investigation of “alternatives to legislation with a view to improving the functioning of the internal market” as 
long as this does not impede democratic control by the European and national parliaments. Equally supportive of 
the use of alternatives is the Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on institutional and legal implications 
of the use of 'soft law' instruments (A6-0259/2007), under 3: “stresses that each EU institution, including the 
European Council, must consider both legislative and non-legislative options when deciding, on a case-by-case 
basis, what action, if any, to take”. Yet, one year later, the Parliament again expressed its doubts on the use of 
such alternatives as it could turn into a form of “legislative abstinence” and would only benefit pressure groups 
and powerful economic players. See Report on ‘Better lawmaking 2006’ pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (A6-0355/2008), under 14.  
294 Allio 2007, p. 80; Allio, Ballantine & Hudig 2004, p. 18; Svilpaite 2007b, pp. 27-29. Cf. European 




meet these concerns.295 Senden, by contrast, points to the fact that the IIA 2003 does include 
safeguards against the Commission’s uncontrolled use of self-regulation and co-regulation.296 
Furthermore, as mentioned in section 4.2.1 of this chapter, the limited scope of the IIA 2003 
provisions on self-regulation and co-regulation has been criticized for leaving a grey area 
encompassing private regulatory initiatives that formally fall outside the IIA-framework as 
they do not meet its definitions and requirements.297 Additionally, it has been argued that the 
criteria for the use of self-regulation and co-regulation laid down in the IIA 2003 limit the 
scope and flexibility of these instruments as well as the adoption of new private regulatory 
initiatives.298 The IIA 2003 has furthermore been criticized for its lack of direction in respect 
of these criteria since the Agreement does not elaborate on them.299 
 This brings to the table the question on the legal status of the IIA 2003 and what 
influence, if any, it could actually have exerted on the use of alternative regulatory 
instruments in policymaking. In this regard, it should first and foremost be noted that Article 
295 TFEU, which allows for the conclusion of binding interinstitutional agreements, did not 
exist when the IIA 2003 was adopted.300 Therefore, the question on the legal binding force of 
the IIA 2003 and other interinstitutional agreements concluded before the TFEU came into 
force depends strongly on the framing of the agreement itself.301 Senden has argued that the 
framing of the IIA 2003 warrants the conclusion that between the three institutions at least the 
Agreement has binding force.302 The first argument that she advances in this respect pertains 
to wording of the IIA 2003. The use of fairly compelling terms, such as ‘agree’ and ‘will’, 
                                                
295 Allio, Ballantine & Hudig 2004, pp. 17-18; Svilpaite 2007b, pp. 27-29; Svilpaite 2007a, p. 25. Cf. the 
statement that the paragraph on the control mechanisms of the Parliament and the Council in case of co-
regulation represented “something of a last-minute compromise between the three institutions” - quote from Lars 
Mitek Pedersen of the European Commission, derived from EESC, Summary of the hearing on the current state 
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296 Senden 2005, p. 21. 
297 Svilpaite 2007a, pp. 10-13, 25-26; Van den Hoogen & Nowak 2010, pp. 356-357. As noted in section 4.2.1, 
this flaw is partially met by the new definitions introduced by the Better Regulation Toolbox 2015. 
298 Allio, Ballantine & Hudig 2004, p. 18. 
299 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 5; Meuwese & Senden 2009, pp. 161-162, 168. See also EESC Opinion on Self-regulation 
and co-regulation in the Community legislative framework, 22 April 2015 (available at 
<www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.32859>, accessed 1 July 2016). The criteria are discussed in 
section 4.5.1.1 of this Chapter. 
300 Article 295 TFEU provides that “the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall consult 
each other and by common agreement make arrangements for their cooperation. To that end, they may, in 
compliance with the Treaties, conclude interinstitutional agreements which may be of a binding nature”. 
However, as Senden rightly points out, this provision does not make clear when an agreement is actually binding 
(Senden 2005, p. 22). 
301 Senden 2005, pp. 21-22. See also Monar 1994, pp. 696-703. Eiselt and Slominski in this respect indicate, 
more generally, that eventual legal binding force of an interinstitutional agreement can follow on from the Treaty 
provision on which it is based or from the intention of the drafting parties. If the binding force cannot be based 
on either of these elements, the agreement at issue constitutes no more than a political declaration (Eiselt & 
Slominski 2006, pp. 212-213). See also Monar 1994, pp. 697-700, who cites examples of the EC Treaty 
provisions lending legal binding force to interinstitutional agreements. 
302 Senden 2005, p. 22. Cf. Svilpaite 2007b, p. 9, considering that it is up to the CJEU to decide on the binding 
force of the IIA 2003 upon Member States and private parties involved with European self-regulation and co-
regulation. Similarly: Cafaggi 2011b, p. 99. 
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provides strong hints as to the intention of the institutions to be legally bound.303 Senden’s 
second argument is linked to the duty of sincere cooperation between the institutions as 
enshrined in Article 13 TEU. In seeking to reinforce interinstitutional cooperation, the IIA 
2003 creates a specific duty of cooperation. Combined with the aforementioned duty of 
sincere cooperation, this may result in the IIA 2003 having binding force inter pares.304 
However, it should be kept in mind that the actual impact of the IIA 2003 also depends on the 
“political willingness of the institutions to implement its provisions and monitor progress”, as 
Allio points out. 305  
 The criticism leveled at the IIA 2003 provisions on self-regulation and co-regulation and 
the limited binding force of the agreement might raise doubts as to the actual impact of the 
IIA 2003. This brings us to the issue that is central to the next subsection: to what extent has 
the ‘alternative regulatory methods’ strand of the Union’s Better Regulation policy been put 
into practice? 
 
4.3.1.6.2 Better Regulation in practice 
Have the Better Regulation program and the IIA 2003 actually led to the adoption of self- and 
co-regulatory initiatives? With the caveat that the literature and the scarce empirical data 
available at this point do not warrant a conclusive answer to this question, the overall picture 
that follows on from these sources is that the Commission has encouraged the further use of 
these instruments but that they have not been employed on a large scale.306  
 Illustrative in this respect are the references to self-regulation and co-regulation in the 
strategic reviews of the Better Regulation program and the annual reports on better 
lawmaking throughout the years (2001-2014).307 The annual reports covering the period 
shortly after the adoption of the IIA 2003 (2004-2006), explicitly mention the use of 
alternatives to legislation, even though the topic is not extensively dealt with. Nonetheless, 
these reports show that the Commission has undertaken some activities in respect of self-
regulation and co-regulation over these years, including an inventory of existing European 
practices, consultations with the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), leading 
to the EESC database, and a number of successful (and unsuccessful) attempts to use these 
instruments.308 The 2006 strategic review furthermore reads that alternatives to legislation, 
                                                
303 Senden 2005, p. 22. See also Eiselt & Slominski 2006, p. 212, who deduce from the case law of the CJEU 
that the intention to be legally bound inter pares can be assumed to be present if the wordings of the agreement 
are “clear” and “sufficiently precise and unconditional”. Monar 1994, pp. 698-699 claims that all 
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304 Senden 2005, p. 22. See also Monar 1994, pp. 700-703, with reference to case law of the CJEU. 
305 Allio 2007, p. 81. 
306 Craig & De Búrca 2015, p. 176; Haythornthwaite 2007, pp. 24-25. See also the sources mentioned in n 307-
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307 The annual reports concern the implementation of the Better Regulation Action Plan. They can be found at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_regulation/reports_en.htm> (accessed 1 July 2016). For the three 
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308 See Report from the Commission, “Better Lawmaking 2004” (12th report), COM(2005) 98 final, p. 4 and its 
Annex SEC(2005) 364, pp. 8-9; Report from the Commission, “Better Lawmaking 2005” (13th report), 
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including self-regulation and co-regulation, are “routinely examined” in the course of the 
process of impact assessment.309 Earlier, in its 2005 report, however, the Commission 
signaled that in this process greater attention needed to be paid to the identification and 
assessment of alternative policy options.310 Moreover, having stressed the Commission’s 
commitment to consider alternatives to legislation, both the 2005 and the 2006 report stated 
that “while insisting on the potential of regulatory alternatives, the Commission’s approach 
also recognises that, in many cases, regulations remain the simplest way to reach EU 
objectives”.311 Whether coincidentally or not, the following annual reports from 2007 to 2014, 
whilst in line with this statement, remain silent upon the use of such alternatives. 
 These observations correspond with the results of the empirical study conducted by Van 
den Hoogen and Nowak published in 2010.312 Their analysis of European self-regulatory and 
co-regulatory initiatives, registered in the EESC database in the period 1990-2008, shows that 
the use of such initiatives gained momentum at the early stages of the Better Regulation 
program, i.e., from the late 1990s, when the Commission started to promote the use of 
alternatives, until 2005. The proliferation of these initiatives as of the late 1990s was brought 
to an abrupt halt after 2005. Additionally, Van den Hoogen and Nowak observe that 
regulatory alternatives are only of minor importance in EU policy making when compared 
with the number of traditional methods of regulation used by the European legislator.313 This 
leads them to conclude that, in empirical terms and with the caveat that they only looked at 
registered cases, self-regulation and co-regulation have remained fairly marginal phenomena 
in the context of EU policymaking.314 
 The above is reflected in the observation of Senden and Meuwese (2009) that the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament take an ambivalent attitude towards alternative 
regulatory instruments. Despite the commitments made in the Better Regulation program and 
the IIA 2003, these institutions still seem to have a preference for traditional means of 
                                                                                                                                                   
COM(2006) 289 final, p. 5 and its Annex SEC(2006) 737, pp. 11-12; Report from the Commission, “Better 
Lawmaking 2005” (14th report), COM(2007) 286 final, p. 5 and its Annex SEC(2007) 737, pp. 7-9. The 
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309 Communication from the Commission, Strategic review of Better Regulation in the European Union, 
COM(2006) 689 final, p. 8. 
310 Annex to the Report from the Commission “Better Lawmaking 2005” (13th report), SEC(2006) 737, p. 7. 
311 COM(2006) 289 final, p. 5 and COM(2007)286 final, p. 5. Cf. Meuwese & Senden 2009, pp. 152-154 who 
refer to the Commission Communication ‘A Europe of Results – Applying Community Law’, COM(2007) 502 
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implementation of EU legislation: “The impact assessment should examine implementation options and their 
implications, as well as the choice of legal instrument with a view to best facilitating the effectiveness of the 
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312 Van den Hoogen & Nowak 2010. 
313 Van den Hoogen & Nowak 2010, p. 359. At 12 May 2016, the EESC database contained 147 of what the 
EESC labels as self-regulatory and co-regulatory initiatives, 39 of which are obsolete cases. This leaves us with 
108 registered initiatives currently in force at the European level. However, following Van den Hoogen and 
Nowak, it should be noted that a number of these initiatives are in fact EU directives, regulations or other soft 
law initiatives in which the use of regulatory alternatives is promulgated. However, not all of these cases have in 
fact resulted in the creation of private measures. See Van den Hoogen & Nowak 2010, p. 360. The initiatives in 
the EESC database have been mapped by Senden et al. 2015. 
314 Van den Hoogen & Nowak 2010, p. 361. 
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regulation.315 Overall, however, Senden and Meuwese conceive of the Better Regulation 
program as taking a favorable stance on alternatives to legislation.316  
 At this point, it should be emphasized, perhaps superfluously, that the foregoing does not 
warrant the conclusion that the European legislator never resorts to self-regulation and co-
regulation, the more since practice has continued to develop after these studies. Illustrative in 
this respect are the different examples discussed in section 4.4.1 of this chapter, which 
highlight how industry codes of conduct are employed in EU legislative policy in the field of 
private law. In addition, it can be pointed at the Community of Practice on Self-and Co-
Regulation (CoP), established on 10 December 2013, as a recent example of where the EU’s 
‘paper’ stance has translated into practice.317 The CoP has been initiated by the European 
Commission Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content & Technology (DG 
Connect) following the public consultation on the Principles for Better Self- and Co-
regulation.318 The initiative, assembling public and private ‘self-regulation and co-regulation’ 
stakeholders, advocates good practice in European self-regulation and co-regulation. More 
specifically, it seeks to further the efficiency and trustworthiness of self-regulation and co-
regulation through interaction and dialogue between these stakeholders, and to make these 
instruments a more credible and effective policy option.319  
 
4.3.1.7 Concluding remarks 
 
This section has shown that the use of self-regulation and co-regulation as alternatives to 
legislation forms an integral part of the Better Regulation policy of the EU, albeit that matters 
are not as straightforward as this statement suggests.320 Whereas the initial stages of the Better 
Regulation program suggested a bright future for self-regulation and co-regulation, several 
developments put the emphasis initially placed on these alternative methods of regulation in 
perspective. First of all, self-regulation and co-regulation have not always been visibly 
present in the main legislative policy documents. It is only with the recent Better Regulation 
Package that the instruments seem to have returned to the forefront of EU policymaking. 
Simultaneously, however, the lack of references to self-regulation and co-regulation in the IIA 
2016 raises doubts as to this, albeit that the actual impact of its predecessor, the IIA 2003, can 
also be questioned. Secondly, the paper commitments repeatedly made under the Better 
                                                
315 Meuwese & Senden 2009, pp. 152-154. Cf. the following empirical assessments of the Commission’s impact 
assessment system, which all show that, at least at the time, the consideration of alternative policy options leaves 
much to be desired in several respects: Caroline Cecot et al., An Evaluation of the Quality of Impact Assessment 
in the European Union with Lessons for the U.S. and the EU, AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 
07-09, December 2007; The Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the Commission’s Impact Assessment System, 
Richmond UK, April 2007; Andrea Renda, Impact Assessment in the EU. The State of the Art and the Art of the 
State, Centre For European Policy Studies, Brussels 2006. 
316 Meuwese & Senden 2009, p. 154. 
317 Information about the initiative can be found at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/community-practice-
better-self-and-co-regulation-0> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
318 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/genealogy-cop> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
319 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/faqs-community-of-practice>, under ‘What are the expected outcomes 
of the CoP’s work?’; ‘Is the CoP an advocate for SR/CR’ and ‘What is the expected and measured impact on EU 
policies and initiatives?’ (website accessed 1 July 2016). 
320 Cf. Meuwese & Senden 2009, pp. 152-154; Bokhorst 2014, pp. 213, 249. 
 
 81 
Regulation policy as regards the use of regulatory alternatives seem to have been put into 
practice to no more than a modest extent. This ambivalent approach makes it difficult to 
predict what the future will hold for the use of self-regulation and co-regulation as regulatory 
alternatives, the more since it has been suggested that the Commission keeps a keen eye on 
regulations and soft law.321 We will have to wait for future developments to see whether the 
renewed commitments in the 2015 Better Regulation Package at this point can give fresh 
impetus to the use of self-regulation and co-regulation at EU level.  
 
4.3.2 The Netherlands 
 
The quality and quantity of legislation have been the focal point of Dutch legislative policy 
since the 1980s. In its initial stages, this policy focused sharply on deregulation. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, however, the emphasis changed and the deregulation approach was 
absorbed into a broader approach centering upon the quality of legislation.322 The use of 
alternatives to legislation has thereby since long been enshrined in Dutch legislative policy: 
ever since the final report of the Geelhoed Committee (1984) such alternatives have been a 
recurrent theme in all major government reports on general legislative policy.323 
 
4.3.2.1 The Geelhoed Committee and the Legislative Projects Review Committee 
 
The final report of the Geelhoed Committee (Eindbericht Commissie Geelhoed), which is one 
of the landmarks within Dutch deregulation policy, concerned the reduction and simplification 
of government regulation.324 The Committee also envisaged a role for self-regulation in this 
respect. First of all, the legislator should give particular consideration to the option of self-
regulation when deciding upon the necessity and justifiability of government interference. In 
general, according to the Committee, preference should be given to self-regulation wherever 
social actors can be deemed capable of regulation.325 Secondly, if public regulatory 
intervention is deemed appropriate, an option to be considered within that framework is the 
                                                
321 See supra n 311 and accompanying text; Menting & Vranken 2014, p. 10 with reference to L. Senden, ‘Soft 
Post-Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control’ European Law Journal 2013, pp. 57-75 and 
L.A.J. Senden & A. van den Brink, Checks and balances of Soft EU rule-making, Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies – Policy Department C: Citizens Rights and Constitutional Affairs 2012. 
322 Van der Voet 2005, p. 150; Parliamentary Papers II 1990/91, 22 008, no. 1-2, pp. 19-20. I will discuss the 
developments within Dutch legislative policy only insofar relevant with regard to the use of private regulation. 
More extensive overviews can be found with, for instance, Veerman, De Kok & Clement 2012, pp. 193-197; 
Van Gestel & Hertogh 2006, pp. 27-48; Van der Voet 2005, pp. 150-176.  
323 Van Gestel & Menting 2011a, p. 452. 
324 Parliamentary Papers II 1983/84, 17 931, no. 9. See also Van der Voet 2005, pp. 157-160. 
325 Parliamentary Papers II 1983/84, 17 931, no. 9, p. 77. The Committee substantiates its advice by pointing at 
the freezing effects of government interference, at the fact that not every social problem warrants public 
interference and at the fact that, given the boundaries within which the government has to operate, the 
government cannot tackle every social problem (at pp. 77-78). 
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encouragement of self-regulatory activities.326 In other words, government intervention could 
also entail the encouragement of self-regulation.327 
 In 1987, the Legislative Projects Review Committee (Commissie voor de Toetsing van 
Wetgevingsprojecten, hereafter: CTW) was appointed to continue the work of the Geelhoed 
Committee. Under the heading, ‘as much self-regulation as possible’, the CTW assigned self-
regulation a prominent role. This implied a limited role for the legislator, who should confine 
itself to facilitating social, self-regulatory activities, setting the minimum procedural and 
substantive framework for these activities, and supervising self-regulatory actions. However, 
the CTW points out that this more indirect and interactive way of policy realization can only 
be achieved when the social interests concerned are sufficiently and equitably organized, and 
when both the government and social stakeholders are willing to call the traditional forms of 
government regulation into question.328 
 
4.3.2.2 Legislative quality: Government reports concerning Dutch legislative policy 
 
Not until the government report ‘A view on legislation’ was issued in 1990, however, did the 
use of alternatives to traditional legislation become firmly rooted in Dutch legislative 
policy.329 This landmark report, broadening the focus from quantity to quality of legislative 
policy, assigns a central role to alternatives to and in legislation.330 This role is clearly 
expressed in the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which jointly constitute one of 
the six quality standards for legislation set by the report. More specifically, the subsidiarity 
principle stipulates that as far as possible regulatory responsibilities should be conferred upon 
local and regional authorities and social organizations. In this respect, the report reiterates the 
limited role for the legislator envisaged by the CTW (cf. above, section 4.3.2.1) and states 
that the legislator should seek to support, institutionalize and, if necessary, influence the 
social, self-regulatory mechanisms.331 This implies that forms of statutorily structured and 
conditioned self-regulation should be deployed whenever possible.332  
 As Bokhorst observes, the government reports that followed ‘A view on legislation’ all 
continued along the lines (i.e., the six quality standards) set out by this report.333 Accordingly, 
                                                
326 Parliamentary Papers II 1983/84, 17 931, no. 9, p. 79. A similar duality can be found in the Dutch 
Legislative Drafting Instructions: self-regulation and co-regulation are to be considered before and after the 
decision of government intervention is taken. See below, section 4.3.2.3. 
327 Earlier on in the report, the Committee had already referred to the use of self-regulation as an alternative to 
governmental regulation in the context of undesirable market conduct and formulated preconditions for the use 
of self-regulation (Parliamentary Papers II 1983/84, 17 931, no. 9, pp. 43-44). These preconditions are 
discussed in section 4.5.2.2, under a. 
328 Parliamentary Papers II 1988/89, 20 800 VI, no. 13, p. 7. 
329 Van Gestel & Hertogh 2006, p. 35. For the report, see Parliamentary Papers II 1990/91, 21 800, no. 1-2. 
330 Parliamentary Papers II 1990/91, 21 800, no. 1-2, pp. 8, 51.  
331 Parliamentary Papers II 1990/91, 21 800, no. 1-2, p. 26. At this point, the report wordily falls back on the 
first annual report of the CTW (Parliamentary Papers II 1988/89, 20 800 VI, no. 13, p. 7). 
332 Parliamentary Papers II 1990/91, 21 800, no. 1-2, pp. 15, 26-27, 51. 
333 Bokhorst 2014, p. 178. See Parliamentary Papers II 1994/95, 24 036, no. 1 (Marktwerking, deregulering en 
wetgevingskwaliteit); Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29 279, no. 9 (Bruikbare rechtsorde) and Parliamentary 
Papers II 2008/09, 31 731, no. 1 (Vertrouwen in wetgeving). As of 2010, the Dutch legislator has stopped to 
actively pursue a general legislative policy. See Bokhorst 2014, p. 229. 
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the use of self-regulation and co-regulation as well as other alternative instruments has 
remained a central theme within the general legislative policy of the Netherlands, albeit that 
the emphasis has changed repeatedly over the years.334 In thus being part and parcel of Dutch 
legislative policy, self-regulation and co-regulation are policy tools that have to be considered 
under the Integrated Framework for Policy Analysis and Legislation (see below). However, 
Bokhorst notes, the legislator no longer actively encourages the use of these instruments.335 
 
4.3.2.3 Legislative Drafting Instructions and the Integrated Framework for Policy Analysis 
and Legislation 
 
The central place of alternatives to legislation in Dutch legislative policy is also reflected in 
the instruments that set the parameters for legislative drafting in general and the ex ante 
evaluation of legislative drafts and policy in particular: the Legislative Drafting Instructions 
and the Integrated Framework for Policy Analysis and Legislation, respectively. 
 
4.3.2.3.1 Legislative Drafting Instructions 
 
Like its European counterpart, the Dutch legislator is under an obligation to investigate the 
possibility of using alternative regulatory instruments, such as self-regulation and co-
regulation, as part of the ex ante evaluation of legislative and policy initiatives. This 
obligation follows from the Legislative Drafting Instructions (Aanwijzingen voor de 
Regelgeving, hereafter: LDI),336 which enshrine the six quality standards formulated in ‘A 
view on legislation’.337 In accordance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, 
the LDI requires deliberations on the use of self-regulation and co-regulation at two stages of 
the legislative process. More specifically, Instruction 7 stipulates that an investigation should 
be conducted as to whether the policy objectives concerned can be attained through the self-
regulatory capacity of the relevant sectors or whether this requires government intervention. 
Together with Instruction 6, in which we read that new laws and regulations can only be 
enacted when the need for this type of action is established, Instruction 7 puts self-regulation 
right at the beginning of the policy cycle: the ‘self-regulation’ option is to be considered 
                                                
334 Bokhorst 2014, pp. 198, 216, 229. See also Van Ommeren 2012, pp. 151-154. As Bokhorst indicates, this 
shift in focus has to do with the political color of the successive Ministers of Justice. Whereas liberal ministers 
seem to have a preference for deregulation, Christian Democratic ministers seem put more emphasis on self-
regulation and co-regulation. See Bokhorst 2014, p. 229. Similarly: Van Lochem 2015, p. 151. Under the latest 
government nota, ‘Trust in Legislation’ (Vertrouwen in wetgeving) emphasis was put on co-regulation rather 
than on self-regulation. See Van Lochem 2015, pp. 151-152; Bokhorst 2014, p. 230. 
335 Bokhorst 2014, pp. 229, 395-396. 
336 As published in the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1992, 230 and subsequently amended. The latest version, 
i.e, ninth amendment, dates from 2011 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2011, 6602). It follows from Instruction 4 
of the LDI that “Ministers, state secretaries and the subordinate units and persons involved with the preparation 
and adoption of regulations” have to observe the LDI (my own translation). From the explanatory notes to this 
Instruction we learn that other bodies and persons involved in this process are recommended to follow the 
instructions. See also Polak 1993, p. 1397; Borman 1993, pp. 188-189; Eijlander & Voermans 1993, pp. 171-
172, with the latter two contributions pointing out that third parties cannot invoke the LDI as the Instructions 
have no independent binding force. 
337 Bokhorst 2014, p. 178. 
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before taking any decision on public regulatory intervention. However, the role of self-
regulation and co-regulation is still not played out even when government intervention is 
opted for. On the contrary, Instruction 8 provides that even if such intervention is deemed 
necessary, the legislator should still as much as possible link up with the self-regulatory 
capacity of the relevant sectors. It follows on from the explanatory notes to Instruction 8 that 
the legislator may only interfere directly when this self-regulatory capacity, even if backed by 
supportive government measures, can be expected to generate insufficient results.338 Finally, 
it can be pointed at Instruction 212 which, in conjunction with Instruction 211, provides that 
legislative and regulatory drafts are to be accompanied by explanatory notes.339 In these notes, 
a discussion should take place as to why inter alia government intervention was needed, why 
self-regulation or co-regulation was not an option and which policy options have been 
considered.340 
 
4.3.2.3.2 Integrated Framework for Policy Analysis and Legislation 
 
The policy option of using alternative (regulatory) instruments, including self-regulation and 
co-regulation, is also laid down in the Dutch assessment framework for the ex ante analysis of 
legislative drafts and policy: the Integrated Framework for Policy Analysis and Legislation 
(Integraal Afwegingskader beleid en regelgeving, hereafter: IFPL).341 In fact, the questions as 
to the necessity of government intervention and the possibility of self-regulation form one of 
the central aspects of the Framework.342 The IFPL includes a comprehensive list of 
instruments that the legislator and policy makers can rely upon in this respect.  
 
This list also includes codes of conduct, which are described as informal instruments that can be 
of a self-regulatory as well as of a co-regulatory nature. When the government is involved with a 
code of conduct it generally holds a non-hierarchical position and operates on an equal level with 
the private actors, thus the IFPL. Codes of conduct are therefore viewed as ‘horizontal policy 
instruments’.343  
 
Furthermore, to facilitate the employment of self-regulation and co-regulation, the IFL refers 
to several empirical studies in which the conditions for successful self-regulation have been 
researched.344 Strikingly, however, within the framework of the IFPL the question on which 
policy instrument is to be deployed only comes after the question as to whether government 
                                                
338 The explanatory notes particularly refer to the instruments of standardization and certification. 
339 Ministerial regulations may be exempted from this obligation if the content of a regulation does not 
necessitate the provision of explanatory notes. See Instruction 211. 
340 Instruction 212 under b and c. Cf. Van Gestel & Menting 2011a, p. 453. 
341 For some critical reflections on the framework and a comparison between the IFPL and the method of Impact 
Assessment, see Meuwese 2012. 
342 Parliamentary Papers II 2010/11, 31 731, no. 6, pp. 2-3. 
343 Factsheet Gedragscode as included in the IFPL, under 6.1 (Beleidsinstrumenten A-Z > Gedragscode, at 
<www.kcwj.nl/kennisbank/integraal-afwegingskader-beleid-en-regelgeving/6-wat-het-beste-
instrument/61/gedragscode>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
344 IFPL, under 6.1 (Beleidsinstrumenten A-Z > Zelfregulering, at <www.kcwj.nl/kennisbank/integraal-
afwegingskader-beleid-en-regelgeving/6-wat-het-beste-instrument/61-0>, accessed 1 July 2016). I discuss these 
conditions in section 4.5.2.1 below. 
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interference is justified. At first blush, this suggests that ‘pure’ self-regulatory actions are out 
of the question. However, it follows from the IFPL that this is not necessarily the case: even 
with government intervention, self-regulation is still an option (cf. Instruction 8 LDI).345  
 
4.3.2.3.3 The LDI and the IFPL in practice 
 
Thus, in accordance with the LDI and the IFPL, the Dutch legislator is to assess the use of 
self-regulation and co-regulation as alternatives to legislation at several stages in the process 
of ex ante evaluation. However, doubts can be raised as to whether this assessment is actually 
carried out in practice. In the early stages of the Dutch policy on better regulation, the 
National Audit Office (Rekenkamer) already observed an ambiguous attitude towards the use 
of alternatives to legislation (1994).346 In spite of the introduction of the IFPL in 2010, this 
attitude does not seem to have changed much since.347 Empirical studies have found that there 
still is a lack of (explicit) attention for alternatives to regulation in the process of ex ante 
evaluation of draft legislation and regulations, as is reflected in the fact that whenever 
alternative policy options are concerned, the explanation required by Instruction 212 is often 
lacking or flawed.348 However, this warrants neither the conclusion that alternatives to 
regulation are only sporadically considered, nor that the legislator never resorts to alternative 
regulatory instruments. Alternative policy options may have been considered, yet, contrary to 
Instruction 212, this may not have been put down in writing.349 Furthermore, as the examples 
discussed in section 4.4.2 highlight, the Dutch government does seek recourse to industry 
codes of conduct. 
 
4.4 References to codes of conduct inside and outside private law legislation 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which the legislator can employ private regulation as 
a policy instrument. First of all, the legislator can decide to include an explicit reference to 
private regulation in legislation or regulations. Secondly, the legislator may choose to leave 
the task of regulation partly or entirely in the hands of private actors without any explicit 
references in the relevant public rules. In these cases, references to private regulation are more 
veiled and often have to be traced back in policy instruments concerning the topic covered by 
the private rules. The legislator can also agree informally and more tacitly with the use of 
private regulation either by refraining from regulatory intervention or by pressuring the 
industry to pick up the regulatory glove, backing this up with the threat of government 
intervention or otherwise, as the case may be. 
                                                
345 IFPL, under 6 (Wat is het beste instrument?). 
346 National Audit Office, ‘Wetgeving: organisatie, proces en product’ (1994), as included in Parliamentary 
Papers II 1993/94, 23 710, nos 1-2, p. 15. 
347 The IFPL was introduced in 2010 as a comprehensive framework for the ex ante evaluation of policy and 
regulation and as such integrates all the then existing instruments for ex ante evaluation. See Meuwese 2012, p. 
17; Parliamentary Papers II 2010/11, 29 515, no. 330. 
348 Van Gestel & Menting 2011a, the results are briefly repeated in Van Gestel & Menting 2011b (which is in 
English); Van Haeften, Junte & Grimmius 2010; Voermans & Eijlander 2002. See also Helder 2014. 
349 Cf. Van Haeften, Junte & Grimmius 2010, p. 9; Helder 2014, p. 388. 
 
 86 
 This section discusses examples of references to industry codes of conduct ‘inside’ (i.e., 
the first way) and ‘outside’ (i.e., the second way) European and Dutch private law 
legislation.350 With the discussion being limited to several examples, I by no means pretend 
that this section provides an exhaustive overview of the use of codes as a policy instrument in 
European and Dutch private law. Rather, the objective is to acquire a taste of how the paper 
reality of legislative policy translates into private law practice. How do policymakers actually 
employ codes of conduct in European and Dutch private law?351 
 
4.4.1 European private law 
 
At the European level, the employment of alternative regulatory instruments occurs in 
different settings, both inside and outside the European legal framework. Inside the legal 
framework, one can find references to self-regulation and co-regulation in the TFEU,352 
secondary legislative acts (usually directives) and in tertiary, soft law acts (e.g., Commission 
communications).353 Reliance on self-regulation and co-regulation as policy instruments can 
also occur outside the formal confines of this legal framework, as was pointed out in the 
introduction to this section. 
 
4.4.1.1 References in European private law legislation 
 
4.4.1.1.1 Consumer law 
 
Self-regulation and co-regulation have long been part of EU consumer policy. Already in its 
1999-2001 Action Plan, the Commission promoted dialogue between businesses and 
consumers leading to self-regulation agreements, which would “either lessen the need for 
legislation, complement legislation or add value to legislation”.354 In the 2002-2006 strategy 
that followed, consideration was given to the fact that the objective of a high level of 
consumer protection also implied “making better use of alternative forms of regulation”, 
                                                
350 Part of this section has, in an earlier version, already been published (in Dutch) in Menting & Vranken 2014, 
pp. 11-21. The examples stemming from references in policy documents have been taken from the empirical 
studies conducted for my Master’s thesis and for this doctoral thesis, respectively.  
351 Questions on the effectiveness and actual results of these references fall outside the ambit of this study and 
are therefore not addressed. A comprehensive list of examples of private regulation in the Community legislative 
framework (i.e., also outside the confines of EU private law) can be found in Appendix II to the Opinion of the 
EESC on Self-regulation and co-regulation in the Community legislative framework (2015) INT/754 (available 
at <www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.32859>, accessed 1 July 2016). For a recent overview of the 
initiatives in the EESC database, see Senden et al. 2015. 
352 See Articles 154 and 155 TFEU which form the Treaty basis for the European Social Dialogue. The 
initiatives resulting from this Dialogue are listed in the online Social dialogue texts database (to be found at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=521&langId=en>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
353 Senden 2005, p. 18. These references can concern private standard setting as well as private dispute 
resolution and enforcement. In line with the focus of this doctoral thesis, I will concentrate on the first category 
of references.  
354 Report from the Commission on the “Action Plan for Consumer Policy 1999-2001” and on 
the “General Framework for Community activities in favour of consumers 1999-2003”, COM(2001) 486 final, p. 
6. See also Communication from the Commission, Consumer Policy Action Plan 1999-2001, COM(98) 696 
final, p. 9. On earlier policy, see Huyse & Parmentier 1990. 
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including self-regulation and co-regulation.355 In its latest consumer policy strategy of 2012, 
the Commission promotes and supports self-regulation while seeking to enhance consumer 
knowledge.356 The discussion in this section shows that this policy has translated into 
concrete references to codes of conduct in several European consumer law directives.  
 
a. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) is a first directive where reference is 
made to codes of conduct.357 The roots of the UCPD can be traced back to the Green Paper on 
European Union consumer protection (2001).358 Following the Commission’s observation that 
the realization of a consumer internal market was hindered by fragmentation at the national 
and the European level, the Paper made a case for reform of EU consumer protection through 
greater harmonization.359 The Commission put forward two ways in which this aim could be 
achieved: a specific approach, which would build on a set of specific directives, and a mixed 
approach, consisting of a framework directive on business-to-consumer commercial practices 
which would be supplemented by more targeted regulatory means if necessary.360 Under the 
mixed approach, the Commission envisaged an important role for self-regulation and co-
regulation, and ro European codes of conduct in particular, as a potentially useful complement 
to public regulation.361 Until then, however, due to diverging national approaches to self-
regulation, a lack of clarity on both the status of the commitments made in codes of conduct 
and their enforceability, attempts to create European-wide codes of conduct had not proven 
particularly successful.362 The proposed framework directive could provide a basis for such 
European-wide codes concerning consumer protection.363 The outcomes of the consultation 
                                                
355 Communication from the Commission, Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006, COM(2002) 208 final, under 
3.1.  
356 Communication from the Commission, A European Consumer Agenda - Boosting confidence and growth, 
COM(2012) 225 final, under 4.2. In the previous strategy (2007-2013), self-regulation was placed in the context 
of enforcement. See Communication from the Commission, EU Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013. 
Empowering consumers, enhancing their welfare, effectively protecting them, COM(2007) 99 final, p. 8. Cf. on 
the role of self-regulation in enforcement within consumer policy, the Communication from the Commission on 
the enforcement of the consumer acquis, COM(2009) 330 final, pp. 3-4. 
357 Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, OJ 2005, 
L 149/22. In the Netherlands, the UCPD has been implemented in Articles 6:193a-193j DCC. The references to 
codes of conduct, more specifically, can be found in Articles 6:193c(2) and 6:193g DCC. See also Article 
3:305d DCC. Vollebregt indicates that the implementation of the UCPD provisions on codes of conduct has been 
sloppy at points, leading to differences between the Directive and the DCC provisions as regards the demands 
imposed on traders in respect of codes. See Vollebregt 2010, pp. 269-273. 
358 Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection, COM(2001) 531 final. See also Radeideh 2005, pp. 
251-253. 
359 COM(2001) 531 final, pp. 2-8. See also Communication from the Commission, Follow-up Communication to 
the Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection, COM(2002) 289 final, p. 3. For a critical assessment of the 
Commission’s arguments, see Collins 2004, pp. 8-25.  
360 COM(2001) 531 final, pp. 10-12. 
361 COM(2001) 531 final, pp. 5, 14-15; Follow-up Communication to the Green Paper on Consumer Protection, 
COM(2002) 289 final, p. 3.  
362 COM(2001) 531 final, pp. 5-6 
363 COM(2001) 531 final, pp. 11, 14. According to the Commission, one of the preconditions for making 
European self-regulation work is that “non-compliance with a voluntary commitment made by a business in 
respect of consumers” would be defined as an unfair or misleading trading practice (COM(2001) 531 final, pp. 
14). The public consultation at this point showed that businesses were in favor of the idea of using European 
codes of conduct, yet strongly opposed the idea of making the commitments binding. Conversely, consumer 
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on the proposals made in the Green Paper led the Commission to choose the option of the 
‘mixed approach’.364 This eventually resulted in 2005 in the adoption of the UCPD, which 
addresses the issue of unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices. 
 In line with the observations made in the Green Paper, the UCPD, which takes a 
maximum harmonization approach, seeks to contribute to the proper functioning of the 
internal market and to create a high level of consumer protection.365 Put in more practical 
terms, the Directive aims to provide greater clarity about consumer rights and to simplify 
cross-border trade between businesses and consumers.366 In this respect, the Directive also 
envisages a role for European and national codes of conduct, as these allow traders to 
effectively apply the principles of the Directive and to contribute to the establishment of fair 
commercial practices.367 
 There are three different contexts in which codes of conduct come to the fore in the 
UCPD. Firstly, codes are mentioned on the Directive’s black list, enclosed in Annex I.368 
Commercial practices that are on this list are in all circumstances regarded as unfair. As 
regards codes of conduct, the black list designates as ‘forbidden unfair practices’ false claims 
about subscriptions to a code – “claiming to be a signatory to a code of conduct when the 
trader is not” - and about endorsement of the code by a public or private body - “claiming that 
a code of conduct has an endorsement from a public or other body which it does not have”. 
Secondly, we can find references to codes of conduct in Article 6 UCPD, which concerns 
misleading actions. More specifically, it follows on from Article 6(2)(b) that: 
 
“2. A commercial practice shall also be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking 
account of all its features and circumstances, it causes or is likely to cause the average consumer 
to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise, and it involves […] (b) 
non-compliance by the trader with commitments contained in codes of conduct by which the 
trader has undertaken to be bound, where (i) the commitment is not aspirational but is firm and is 
capable of being verified, and (ii) the trader indicates in a commercial practice that he is bound by 
the code”369. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
groups were only cautiously positive and applauded the idea of ‘binding commitments’. Member States 
generally showed themselves supportive of using codes of conduct. See COM(2002) 289 final, p. 5-6. 
364 COM(2002) 289 final, pp. 8-12. The role that codes eventually have come to play under the UCPD differs 
markedly from the role initially envisaged by the Commission in its Green Paper and the Follow-up 
Communication, as will be discussed briefly at the end of this subsection. 
365 Directive 2005/29/EC, recitals 1-13; Commission Proposal for the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 
COM(2003) 356 final.  
366 <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/rights/archives_en.htm> (accessed 1 July 2016). At the European 
level, the issue of unfair commercial practices in B2B relations is addressed through private regulation, namely 
the ‘Vertical relationships in the Food Supply Chain: Principles of Good Practice’ (available at 
<www.supplychaininitiative.eu/about-initiative/principles-good-practice-vertical-relationships-food-supply-
chain>, accessed 1 July 2016). These Principles are briefly discussed in section 4.4.1.2 below. 
367 Directive 2005/29/EC, recital 20. See also Van Boom, Garde & Aksin 2014, p. 4; Pavillon 2014, pp. 137-138. 
Article 2(f) UCPD defines a code of conduct as “an agreement or set of rules not imposed by law, regulation or 
administrative provision of a Member State which defines the behaviour of traders who undertake to be bound 
by the code in relation to one or more particular commercial practices or business sectors”. 
368 To be read in conjunction with Article 5(5) of the Directive. 
369 Directive 2005/29/EC, Article 6(2)(b). 
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Thus, in certain circumstances, the UCPD marks “the practice of undertaking and publicly 
signalling to be bound by, while at the same time not complying with, firm commitments 
contained in a code of conduct”370 as a practice which should in certain circumstances be 
considered a misleading and therefore prohibited commercial practice.371 Thirdly, codes of 
conduct can play a role in substantiating the open-textured standard of professional diligence, 
laid down in Articles 5 and 7 UCPD (which refer to “requirements of professional 
diligence”).372 This standard is defined in Article 2(h) UCPD as “the standard of special skill 
and care which a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, 
commensurate with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the 
trader’s field of activity”. Whether or not a trader complies with a code of conduct constitutes 
an important factor in testing whether the trader has met the professional diligence standard. 
This also goes for traders who have not undertaken to adhere to the code of conduct 
concerned; in these cases also the code can serve as a yardstick in respect of the standard.373 
The wider the support for a code , the weightier compliance or non-compliance with the code 
becomes as a factor in establishing whether a trader has acted in conformity with the required 
standard of professional diligence. However, codes of conduct are not conclusive in 
determining the substance of this standard. That is to say that they do not provide a ‘safe 
harbor’ for traders: compliance with a code does not equate with meeting the requirements of 
professional diligence. Likewise, non-compliance does not per se warrant the conclusion that 
a trader has failed to meet these requirements.374 
 The UCPD also envisages a role for self-regulation in the control of unfair commercial 
practices.375 From Article 10, more specifically, it follows on that the UCPD leaves room for 
control by code owners and recourse to self-regulatory bodies in case of complaints, provided 
that judicial or administrative recourse remains possible. In other words, filing a complaint 
with a self-regulatory body cannot deprive the claimant from his right to go down the route of 
administrative or judicial enforcement. Member States may encourage such self-regulatory 
control, thus Article 10. Additionally, Article 11(1) gives Member States the discretion “to 
enable the courts or administrative authorities to require prior recourse to other established 
means of dealing with complaints”, including private control schemes.376 Article 17 seeks to 
enhance the ‘visibility’ of codes of conduct by requesting Member States “to, where 
appropriate, encourage trade owners and code owners to inform consumers of their codes of 
                                                
370 Van Boom, Garde & Aksin 2014, p. 4. 
371 The threefold rationale behind attaching legal consequences to commitments made in codes of conduct can be 
found in the Commission’s Green Paper. The introduction of such consequences could enhance consumer 
confidence in public enforcement bodies as enforcers of code commitments in last resort, provide a strong 
argument for less substantive regulation and address the problem of free riders by serving as a reference point for 
public enforcement authorities. See COM(2001) 531 final, p. 14. 
372 See Directive 2005/29/EC, recital 20. 
373 Pavillon 2014, pp. 142-144; Howells 2006b, pp. 213-214. Cf. in the Dutch context Parliamentary Papers II 
2006/07, 30 928, no. 3, p. 13. 
374 Pavillon 2014, pp. 142-144. Howells 2006b, pp. 213-215; Collins 2005, p. 423. Originally, the Commission 
did confer a presumption of conformity upon “membership of a code” (COM(2002) 289 final, p. 11), yet 
eventually dropped this idea under the final version of the UCPD. Cf. Collins 2004, pp. 30-36. 
375 Howells 2006b, p. 211. 
376 See also Directive 2005/29/EC, recital 20; Pavillon 2014, p. 144; Howells 2006b, pp. 211-212; Abbamonte 
2007, p. 29. 
 
 90 
conduct”. Finally, it can be pointed at recital 20, which – with a view to establishing a high 
level of consumer protection - states that consumer organizations could be informed of and 
involved in the drafting process of a code of conduct.377 
 Several legal scholars have shown themselves critical of the actual contribution of codes 
of conduct to the attainment of the Directive’s goals of consumer protection and 
harmonization. The references to codes of conduct eventually included in the UCPD do not 
reflect the ambitious plans as regards the role of codes of conduct that the Commission had at 
the beginning of the legislative process.378 In this respect, Pavillon concludes that the 
Directive adopts a ‘stick approach’ rather than a ‘carrot approach’ when it comes to 
stimulating the use of codes of conduct. With the UCPD failing to grant privileges to traders 
that comply with an industry code (e.g., offering a safe harbor), the stimulating effect of the 
UCPD in respect of codes will mainly lay in the threat of liability for non-compliance or in 
legislative interference in case codes cannot do the trick. In doing so, the Directive, Article 
6(2)(b) in particular, can even prove a disincentive for traders to introduce a code of conduct, 
according to Pavillon.379 Indeed, as Pavillon points out, the UCPD has not led to the 
introduction of European codes of conduct linking up to the Directive and has provided only 
limited impetus for the development of national codes of conduct.380  
 
b. Directive on Timeshare 
European regulation of ‘timeshare’ has developed along the lines of both public and private 
regulation. The public regulatory regime on timeshare has its roots in 1994, when the first 
version of the Timeshare Directive was enacted. This version was replaced in 2009 by a new, 
more up-to-date directive.381 The European trade association for timeshare businesses, the 
Resort Development Organisation (RDO) (then the Organisation for Timeshare in Europe, 
OTE), took up the regulatory glove itself in 1999 with the adoption of a Code of Ethics.382 
Noticeable is the interaction between these regimes running in parallel. 
                                                
377 Consultation of consumer organizations is thus not obligatory for private regulators. Micklitz 2006, pp. 99-
100 shows himself critical of the fact that consumer organizations lack a formal role in the drafting process, as it 
can lead to codes not taking into account consumer interests. 
378 Pavillon 2014, p. 139; Micklitz 2014, p. 119; Howells 2006a, p. 23; Wilhelmsson 2006, p. 254. See also 
Keirsbilck 2011, pp. 323-326. 
379 Pavillon 2014, pp. 140, 144-145 and 151-152. See also Collins 2005 p. 424 and Collins 2004, pp. 30-31. It 
should be noted, however, that Article 6(2)(b) initially included less stringent conditions for rendering a code 
legally binding. See Broekman 2005, p. 180; Commission Staff Working Paper, Extended Impact Assessment on 
the Directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the Internal Market (Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive), SEC(2003) 274, p. 12. 
380 Pavillon 2014, pp. 151-152. 
381 Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 1994 on the protection of 
purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable 
properties on a timeshare basis (OJ 1994, L 280/83) and Directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-
term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts (OJ 2009, L 33/10). The Dutch government has 
implemented the Directive in Articles 7:50a-50i DCC. 
382 The current, revised version of the Code came into force on 1 January 2010. The Code and the accompanying 
ADR scheme are available at <http://rdo.org/code-of-conduct/>. There is also another code of conduct in place, 
namely that of the Timeshare Association Timeshare Owners and Committees (TATOC), the European 
consumer association for timeshare owners. I do not discuss the Code here, as I have not found any indications 
of this Code standing in a similar particular relationship of interaction as the Timeshare Directive and the RDO 
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 The reason for the adoption of the RDO Code of Ethics in 1999 as a complement to the 
1994 Timeshare Directive was twofold. First of all, the Code was introduced as a response to 
the Timeshare Directive, which was deemed imperfect by the RDO because of the significant 
differences in the national implementations of this Directive. Secondly, there was a felt need 
for self-regulatory intervention because of persisting malpractices within the industry.383 
Going beyond what was required by the Directive in certain respects, the Code at points 
offered stronger consumer protection.384 Meanwhile, the timeshare market had changed 
significantly and new holiday products had entered the market. The 1994 Timeshare Directive 
did not catch these developments, resulting in distortions of competition and serious problems 
for consumers. This prompted the Commission to review the Directive.385 The consultation of 
stakeholders conducted in the course of this review process revealed, among other things, that 
whereas most Member States, consumers and other stakeholders were in favor of a revision of 
the Directive, the majority of the organized European timeshare industry was against such a 
revision. The industry thereby advanced self-regulation as one of the solutions to address the 
aforementioned problems.386 The Commission however noted that the consumer problems 
were not sufficiently addressed by the RDO Code, due to the fact that non-RDO members and 
rogue traders could not be forced to comply with it. Furthermore, there were numerous 
complaints about violations of the Code, in spite of the fact that it was generally complied 
with by RDO members.387 Against this backdrop, the policy option of ‘strengthening industry 
self-regulation’ was discarded by the Commission on the basis of the outcomes of the impact 
assessment, which showed that self-regulation would not be able to attain the objectives set 
by the Commission.388 Instead, enactment of a new Timeshare Directive was opted for, which 
- contrary to its predecessor - does refer to codes of conduct. The RDO Code of Ethics has 
been brought in line with the new regulatory framework.389 
 The most visible reference to codes of conduct in the 2009 Timeshare Directive, which 
applies to business-to-consumer transactions, can be found in Article 14 concerning 
‘consumer information and out-of-court redress’.390 The Directive in this respect first of all 
provides that Member States must encourage traders and code owners to inform consumers of 
                                                                                                                                                   
Code. The TATOC Code can be downloaded at <www.tatoc.co.uk/about-tatoc/code-of-practice>. Websites 
accessed 1 July 2016. 
383 <www.rdo.org/archived-articles/introduction-to-the-new-eu-directive-written-march-2009/>; Information on 
the RDO Code in the EESC Database (<www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.smo-database&fiche=125&item-
view=full>). Websites accessed 1 July 2016. 
384 Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of 
timeshare, long-term holiday products, resale and exchange – Impact Assessment, SEC(2007) 743 final, under 
‘OTE Code of Ethics, with regard to the 2005 revised version of the Code.  
385 Directive 2008/122/EC, recitals 1-2; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday products, resale and 
exchange, COM(2007) 303 final, p. 2. 
386 SEC(2007) 743 final, under ‘Consultation’; COM(2007) 303 final, p. 4. 
387 SEC(2007) 743 final, under ‘OTE Code of Ethics’. 
388 See SEC(2007) 743 final. 
389 See <http://rdo.org/code-of-conduct/> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
390 The definition of code of conduct in Article 2(1)(i) of the Directive is similar to the UCPD definition. See 
supra n 367. 
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their codes of conduct.391 A similar obligation is imposed on the European Commission, 
which is to encourage the provision of information on codes of conduct by traders and their 
branch organizations, where appropriate by means of a specific marking. Furthermore, the 
Directive calls upon the Commission to encourage the introduction of European codes of 
conduct seeking to facilitate its implementation, where appropriate (Article 14(1)). The 
Directive also mentions the option of informing and involving consumer organizations in the 
process of drafting a code, so as to ensure a high level of consumer protection.392 
 The Timeshare Directive also entails more hidden references to codes of conduct in its 
provisions on the pre-contractual information that a trader has to provide to a consumer. 
Article 4 obliges the trader to provide a consumer, in a clear and comprehensible way, with 
accurate and sufficient information by means of a standard information form, enclosed in four 
Annexes. The Directive provides four of such information forms, tailored to the specificities 
of the different types of contracts within the timeshare industry (i.e., timeshare contracts, 
long-term holiday product contracts, resale contracts and exchange contracts). All of these 
forms include a section on codes of conduct: the trader has to indicate whether he has signed a 
code and, if so, where it can be found. Failure to provide the information required by Article 4 
in writing is sanctioned by an extension of the 14 days withdrawal period by three months 
(Article 6(3)(b) of the Directive). For the remainder, Article 15 of the Directive leaves the 
formulation of penalties to the Member States. 
 
c. Directive on Consumer Rights 
References to codes of conduct can also be found in the Consumer Rights Directive, which 
came into force in October 2011.393 This Directive applies to business-to-consumer contracts, 
with some types of contracts excluded from its scope. Strikingly, however, it mentions codes 
of conduct only in relation to distance and off-premises contracts. Article 6(1)(n) of the 
Directive, entailing the pre-contractual information requirements for these types of contracts, 
provides that, where applicable, a trader has to provide information on the existence of 
“relevant codes of conduct” and of the way in which copies of these codes can be obtained by 
the consumer. This information must be provided in a clear and comprehensible way. The 
Directive does not leave it at that: Article 6(5) stipulates that the information “shall form an 
integral part of the distance or off-premises contract and shall not be altered unless the 
                                                
391 Article 14(1); recital 22. In discussing the transposition of the Directive to the Dutch level, the Dutch 
legislator remarked that some of the provisions of the Directive did not necessitate implementation since they 
only obliged factual conduct. According to the legislator, Article 14(1) belonged to this category. The Dutch 
legislator referred to the publication of codes of conduct on <www.consuwijzer.nl> - a website on which the 
Dutch government provides information and advice to consumers on their rights - as an example of a way to 
meet the obligation imposed by Article 14(1). See Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32 422, no. 3, p. 4. 
392 Directive 2008/122/EC, recital 22. 
393 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights 
(OJ 2011, L 304/64). The Directive replaces Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of 
distance contracts (OJ 1997, L 144/19) and Directive 85/577/EEC to protect consumers in respect of contracts 
negotiated away from business premises (OJ 1985, L 372/31). It changes Directive 1999/44/EC on certain 
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (OJ 1999, L 171/12) and Directive 93/13/EEC 
on unfair contract terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993, L 95/29). The scope of the initial proposal 
(COM(2008) 614 final) was wider and provided for a consolidation of all four Directives. The Dutch legislator 
has laid down the Directive references to codes of conduct in Articles 6:230m(n) and 6:230n(2) DCC. 
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contracting parties expressly agree otherwise”.394 However, the Directive itself does not 
provide sanctions for violations of this particular duty to inform. Article 24 leaves it up to the 
Member States to formulate penalties.395 
 
The Consumer Rights Directive furthermore leaves open what the notion of ‘relevant codes of 
conduct’ entails. With a view to the UCPD definition of a code of conduct, on which the 
Consumer Rights Directive builds, the Dutch legislator has interpreted this notion as requiring 
that a trader is only obliged to provide information on a code of conduct when he has actually 
subscribed to this code.396 According to the legislator, the word ‘relevant’ indicates that the duty 
to inform consumers about a code only concerns codes of conduct that are of importance for 
consumers, such as codes which regulate consumer complaint handling. This implies that the 
information requirements do not apply in respect of codes of conduct that do not affect the legal 
position of consumers, said the Dutch legislator, providing the example of the Code of conduct 
for journalists in the context of a subscription to a newspaper.397 
 
Finally, the Directive obliges Member States to, where appropriate, encourage traders and 
code owners to inform consumers about the codes of conduct they apply (Article 26).398 
 
For the sake of completeness, it can be pointed at the, now repealed, Directive on distance selling 
and the Commission Recommendation on codes of practice for the protection of consumers in 
respect of contracts negotiated at a distance. In the Recommendation, the Commission considers 
that the minimum consumer protection rules set by the Directive should be supplemented by 
voluntary codes of practice. The Commission therefore recommends, in short, that trade 
associations of suppliers should adopt codes of practice, which cover the points listed by the 
Commission, and should ensure that their members comply with these codes.399 The Distance 
Selling Directive in fact links up with the Recommendation at this point by stipulating that 
                                                
394 Accordingly, the information is binding upon the contracting parties, as follows from the DG Justice 
Guidance Document on the Consumer Rights Directive, (June 2014), p. 20 (available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_rights/rights-contracts/directive/index_en.htm>, accessed 1 July 
2016). Likewise, clear and comprehensible information should be provided to consumers on the possibilities for 
out-of-court redress and redress mechanisms as well as on the ways in which these avenues can be accessed. See 
Article 6(1)(t) of the Consumer Rights Directive. It follows from Article 6(8) of the Directive that the 
information requirements come in addition to those of the Services Directive and the E-Commerce Directive. 
395 The Dutch legislator has not provided for specific sanctions at this point, even though some options are 
available under Dutch private law. See Parliamentary Papers II 2012/13, 33 520, no. 7, pp. 10-11; Tigelaar 
2013. 
396 Although the legislator does not indicate on which part of the definition the interpretation is based, it seems 
obvious that the phrase “traders who undertake to be bound by the code” played a role. 
397 Parliamentary Papers II 2012/13, 33 520, no. 3, p. 34.  
398 Noteworthy in this respect is the difference in the wordings of Article 26 under the English version of the 
Directive and under the translated Dutch version. Whereas the English version speaks of “inform consumers of 
their codes of conduct”, the Dutch translation of the Article speaks of ‘inform consumers about their rights’ 
(“om consumenten over hun rechten in te lichten”). The Dutch legislator copied this formulation in the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Act implementing the Consumer Rights Directive. See Parliamentary Papers 
II 2012/13, 33 520, no. 3, p. 7. 
399 Commission Recommendation 92/295/EEC of 7 April 1992 on codes of practice for the protection of 
consumers in respect of contracts negotiated at a distance (distance selling) (OJ 1992, L 156/21). 
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Member States, where appropriate, have to encourage these associations to inform consumers 
about their codes.400 
 
d. Proposed Directive on contract rules on the supply of digital content 
The European Commission also assigns a role to codes of conduct in its proposal for a 
Directive on contract rules on the supply of digital content.401 Against the backdrop of the 
Commission’s struggle to achieve a Digital Single Market, the proposed directive is to 
introduce a fully harmonized set of EU consumer contract rules on faulty digital content.402 
The proposal refers to codes of conduct at two points. The first reference can be found in 
recital 28 and entails that suppliers should make use of, among other things, international, 
European or industry-specific codes of conduct when applying the rules of the directive. 
Furthermore, it states that in this context the Commission may consider the promotion of “the 
drawing up of codes of conduct by trade associations and other representative organisations 
that could support the uniform implementation of the Directive”.403 The second reference is 
included in Article 6 of the directive which deals with the conformity of the digital content 
with the contract. Paragraph 1 of this provision sets out the requirements that digital content 
has to meet in order to conform to the contract. In principle, these requirements are to be 
included in the contract. However, when the contract fails to do so in a clear and 
comprehensive fashion, industry codes of conduct might come into play. For, in this situation, 
the conformity of the digital content with the contract has to be assessed against the yardstick 
included in Article 6(2), according to which: 
 
“the digital content shall be fit for the purposes for which digital content of the same description 
would normally be used including its functionality, interoperability, and other performance 
features such as accessibility, continuity and security, taking into account: […] (b) where 
relevant, any existing international technical standards or, in the absence of such technical 
standards, applicable industry codes of conduct and good practices; […]”.404 
 
4.4.1.1.2 Media and advertising 
 
Self-regulation and co-regulation, including codes of conduct, also play a part in the 
audiovisual and media policy of the European Union (under e)405 as well as in the modest 
European regulatory framework on advertising (under f). 
                                                
400 Directive 97/7EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts (OJ 1997, L 144/19), recital 
19, Article 16. Cf. recital 18: “Whereas it is important for the minimum binding rules contained in this Directive 
to be supplemented where appropriate by voluntary arrangements among the traders concerned, in line with 
Commission recommendation 92/295/EEC […]”. 
401 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects concerning 
contracts for the supply of digital content, COM(2015) 634 final 
402 COM(2015) 634 final, pp. 2-3 and recitals 1-9 of the proposed Directive (COM(2015) 634 final, pp. 14-15). 
403 Recital 28 of the proposed Directive (COM(2015) 634 final, p. 19). 
404 Article 6(2)(b) of the proposed Directive (COM(2015) 634 final, p. 26). 
405 This policy is now part of the European Commission’s Digital Agenda, which is one of the pillars of the 
Europe 2020 strategy. The main goal of this Agenda is to create a digital single market. See 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/digital-agenda-europe-2020-strategy> and Communication from the 
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e. Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
The origins of the European audiovisual policy lie in the 1980s, when the EU – spurred by 
technical and market developments – started to develop its policy in this field.406 Self-
regulation and co-regulation constitute an important pillar of this policy,407 as is inter alia 
reflected in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD).408 This Directive, which 
imposes minimum rules on traditional television broadcasts and on-demand audiovisual 
media services, explicitly relies on self-regulation and co-regulation when it comes to the 
implementation of its provisions.409 Recital 44 reads: 
 
“Experience has shown that both co-regulation and self- regulation instruments, implemented in 
accordance with the different legal traditions of the Member States, can play an important role in 
delivering a high level of consumer protection. Measures aimed at achieving public interest 
objectives in the emerging audiovisual media services sector are more effective if they are taken 
with the active support of the service providers themselves. […] Member States should, in 
accordance with their different legal traditions, recognise the role which effective self-regulation 
can play as a complement to the legislative and judicial and/or administrative mechanisms in 
place and its useful contribution to the achievement of the objectives of this Directive. However, 
while self-regulation might be a complementary method of implementing certain provisions of 
this Directive, it should not constitute a substitute for the obligations of the national legislator. 
Co-regulation gives, in its minimal form, a legal link between self-regulation and the national 
legislator in accordance with the legal traditions of the Member States. Co-regulation should 
allow for the possibility of State intervention in the event of its objectives not being met. Without 
prejudice to formal obligations of the Member States regarding transposition, this Directive 
encourages the use of co-regulation and self-regulation. This should neither oblige Member States 
to set up co-regulation and/or self-regulatory regimes nor disrupt or jeopardise current co-
regulation or self-regulatory initiatives which are already in place within Member States and 
which are working effectively” .410 
                                                                                                                                                   
Commission, A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM(2010) 245 final. On EU media policies, see 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/about-media-policies>. Websites accessed 1 July 2016. 
406 See the Commission’s archived webpages on the history of the audiovisual regulatory framework: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/history/index_en.htm>; 
<http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/history/historytvwf/index_en.htm> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
407 Cf. Verdoodt 2007, pp. 289-292. 
408 Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities. A codified 
version of the Directive was published in the Official Journal in 2010 (Directive 2010/13/EU, OJ 2010, L 95/1). 
References to the AVMSD are to this consolidated version. 
409 Communication from the Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM(2015) 192 final, 
p. 11. For the role of self-regulation and co-regulation under the predecessor of the AVMSD, the Television 
Without Frontiers Directive (89/552/EEG), see Verdoodt 2007, pp. 286-289. 
410 Directive 2010/13/EU, recital 44. See also Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, 
COM(2005) 646 final, p. 9. The AVMSD has been quite successful in promoting the use of self-regulation and 
co-regulation, as follows from the Commission Staff Working Document, Ex-post REFIT evaluation of the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU, SWD(2016) 170 final, pp. 52-57 and the study on the 
“Effectiveness of self- and co-regulation in the context of implementing the AVMS Directive” (April 2016), 
carried out by Panteia and VVA Europe for the European Commission (DG for Directorate General 
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Accordingly, Article 4(7) of the AVMSD requires Member States, within the boundaries of 
their legal systems, to encourage national self-regulatory and co-regulatory initiatives in the 
fields coordinated by the Directive. The provision lays down as conditions in this respect that 
the initiatives are “broadly accepted by the main stakeholders in the Member States concerned 
and provide for effective enforcement”.411 Article 9(2), in turn, entails a more specific call. It 
obliges both the Member States and the European Commission to encourage media service 
providers to adopt codes of conduct addressing “inappropriate audiovisual commercial 
communications, accompanying or included in children’s programmes, of foods and 
beverages containing nutrients and substances with a nutritional or physiological effect, in 
particular those such as fat, trans-fatty acids, salt/sodium and sugars, excessive intakes of 
which in the overall diet are not recommended”.412  
 In its 2015 Digital Single Market strategy, the European Commission announced a 
(REFIT) review of the AVMSD, with the aim of establishing whether the regulatory 
framework is still able to adequately address the rapid technological and market developments 
in the world of audiovisual media. The review has been set for 2016.413 On 25 May 2016, the 
Commission took an important step in the review process by launching a proposal for a new 
directive, which is to amend the AVMSD.414 The proposed directive also puts significant 
emphasis on the use of self-regulation and co-regulation, yet does so in an even more explicit 
and comprehensive fashion. Below, I will outline the main changes that the proposal aspires 
to bring. 
 Like the AVMSD, the proposed directive entails a general call upon the Member States 
to promote the use of self-regulatory and co-regulatory codes of conduct (in Article 4(7))415 as 
well as an obligation for the Members States and the Commission to foster the introduction of 
codes of conduct on, in short, commercial communications concerning food and beverages 
broadcasted in or around children’s programs (Article 9(2))416. However, the proposed 
directive does not leave it at that. Firstly, the proposal envisages adding a new subsection to 
Article 9 of the AVMSD, requiring Member States and the European Commission to 
encourage the use of codes of conduct concerning audiovisual commercial communications 
                                                                                                                                                   
Communications Networks, Content & Technology). The study can be found at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/news/audiovisual-and-media-services-directive-self-and-co-regulation-study> (accessed 1 July 
2016). 
411 Directive 2010/13/EU, Article 4(7). 
412 See also <http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/advertising/codes/index_en.htm> (accessed 1 July 2016). In 
the first report on the implementation of the AVMSD, the Commission concluded that “more effort needs to be 
made to create scale, support and best practice” for these codes and that their effectiveness had to be further 
assessed. See First Report from the Commission on the application of Directive 2010/13/EU “Audiovisual 
Media Service Directive”. Audiovisual Media Services and Connected Devices: Past and Future Perspectives, 
COM(2012) 203 final, p. 11. 
413 COM(2015) 192 final, pp. 10-11, 20. See also Commission Staff Working Document, A Digital Single 
Market Strategy for Europe - Analysis and Evidence, SWD(2015) 100 final, pp. 42-45. 
414 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU on 
the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in view of changing market realities, COM(2016) 287 
final. 
415 See also COM(2016) 287 final, p. 5 and recital 12 of the proposed directive. 
416 See also COM(2016) 287 final, p. 12 and recital 10 of the proposed directive. The proposed new version of 
Article 9(2) is more comprehensive than its AVMSD equivalent. 
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for alcoholic beverages, with the objective of effectively limiting the exposure of minors to 
such communications.417 Secondly, more emphasis is put on the facilitation of self-regulatory 
and co-regulatory practices; the European Commission is called upon multiple times to 
facilitate the development of European codes of conduct.418 Furthermore, in respect of certain, 
but not all, European codes of conduct, the proposed directive stipulates that drafts and 
amendments in case of already existing codes must be submitted to the Commission, which 
may request the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) to file 
an opinion on said codes.419 Thirdly, the applicable conditions in the proposed directive for 
the use of self-regulation and co-regulation are more extensive than those of Article 4(7) of 
the AVMSD. More specifically, Article 4(7) of the proposed directive stipulates that: 
 
“Member States shall encourage co-regulation and self-regulation through codes of conduct 
adopted at national level in the fields coordinated by this Directive to the extent permitted by their 
legal systems. Those codes shall be such that they are broadly accepted by the main stakeholders 
in the Member States concerned. The codes of conduct shall clearly and unambiguously set out 
their objectives. They shall provide for regular, transparent and independent monitoring and 
evaluation of the achievement of the objectives aimed at. They shall provide for effective 
enforcement, including when appropriate effective and proportionate sanctions”.420 
 
e.1 Recommendation on the protection of minors and human dignity in audiovisual and 
information services 
Self-regulation and co-regulation also play an important role in EU audiovisual media policy 
concerning the protection of minors and human dignity.421 The provisions included in the 
AVMSD in this respect (i.e., Article 12 in the context of on-demand services and Article 27 in 
the context of television broadcasting) are complemented by two Recommendations on the 
protection of minors and human dignity in audiovisual and information services, which put 
emphasis on the use of self-regulation and co-regulation.422  
 In 1996, the Commission initiated a European debate on the protection of minors and 
human dignity in media services with a Green Paper on the topic. In this paper, the 
Commission noted that the developments on the market for audiovisual media and 
information services necessitated a more flexible regulatory framework to protect minors 
                                                
417 Article 9(3) of the proposed directive. See also recital 11 of this directive. 
418 See Articles 6a(3), 9(2), 9(4) and 28a(7) of the proposed directive. 
419 See Articles 4(7) and 28a(8) of the proposed directive. The ERGA is an advisory body, consisting of national 
independent regulatory bodies in the field of audiovisual services. See Commission Decision of 3 February 2014 
on establishing the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services, C(2014) 462 final, Articles 2 
and 4(1). 
420 Article 4(7) of the proposed directive. Recital 7 at this point refers tot the Principles for Better Self- and Co-
Regulation, which will be discussed in section 4.5.1.2 of this chapter. 
421 Verdoodt 2007, p. 291 speaks of a complementation of European economic policy with the protection of 
several crucial values of overriding public interest. 
422 Cf. Verdoodt 2007, pp. 291-294. On the use of soft law instruments, recommendations in particular, to “shape 
the processes of self-regulation and co-regulation”, see Senden 2005 pp. 21 et seq. Cf. in the context of a safer 
internet environment, Decision 854/2005/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
establishing a multiannual Community Programme on promoting safer use of the Internet and new online 
technologies (OJ 2005, L 149/1). 
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against harmful media content and to ban content affecting human dignity. Self-regulation 
was put to the fore as one of the policy options.423 The Green Paper inter alia resulted in the 
enactment of a Council Recommendation (98/560/EC) in 1998.424 This Recommendation 
represents a significant milestone in EU media policy in several respects. Not only was it the 
first legal instrument to address the content of audiovisual media and information services 
provided through all media channels including the Internet, but it was also the first instrument 
to systematically apply a self-regulatory and co-regulatory framework for the media sector.425 
The Recommendation perceives self-regulation as a useful instrument to address problems 
concerning the protection of minors and human dignity. It advocates greater use of national 
self-regulatory frameworks, developed through cooperation between the industry actors and 
other stakeholders, as a supplement to European and national public regulation. As such, self-
regulation should contribute to a quick implementation of solutions, while maintaining the 
flexibility needed to remain responsive to the rapid development of audiovisual and media 
services.426 The Recommendation calls upon the industry, the Member States and the 
Commission to take action accordingly. The industry and other stakeholders are called upon 
to cooperate in the development of codes of conduct regulating the protection of minors and 
human dignity in the context of the provision of online services. Member States, in turn, are 
recommended inter alia to promote the establishment of national frameworks for self-
regulation, supplementing the national regulatory framework, by operators of online services. 
The Commission, in short, is invited to support matters financially. Both the industry codes of 
conduct and this national framework for self-regulation should be drawn up in accordance 
with the ‘Indicative guidelines for the implementation, at national level, of a self-regulation 
framework’ set out in an Annex to the Recommendation.427 These guidelines, which seek to 
provide consistency in the development of national self-regulation and hence enhance the 
effectiveness of the self-regulatory process, cover four key components of this self-regulatory 
framework: “consultation and representativeness of the parties concerned”; “codes of 
conduct”, stating what issues the codes should cover; “national bodies facilitating cooperation 
at community level”, and “evaluation of self-regulation frameworks”.428 In 2006, the 
Recommendation was updated and supplemented by a new Recommendation (2006/952/EC). 
                                                
423 Green Paper on the protection of minors and human dignity in audiovisual and information services, 
COM(96) 483 final. See also Verdoodt 2007, p. 291. 
424 Council Recommendation 98/560/EC of 24 September 1998 on the development of the competitiveness of 
the European audiovisual and information services industry by promoting national frameworks aimed at 
achieving a comparable and effective level of protection of minors and human dignity (OJ 1998, L 270/48). On 
this Recommendation, see also Verdoodt 2007, pp. 291-294. 
425 Verdoodt 2007, pp. 291-292. 
426 Recommendation 98/560/EC, recitals 13 and 20. 
427 Recommendation 98/560/EC, under I(1), II(2), III(1). From the evaluation reports issued by the Commission 
we learn that the Recommendation has resulted in various private regulatory initiatives, including codes of 
conduct. See Evaluation report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
application of Council Recommendation of 24 September 1998 concerning the protection of minors and human 
dignity, COM(2001) 106 final and Second Evaluation Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the application of Council Recommendation of 24 September 1998 concerning the 
protection of minors and human dignity, COM(2003) 776 final. 
428 Recommendation 98/560/EC, Annex ‘Indicative guidelines for the implementation, at national level, of a 




Noting that self-regulation of the audiovisual sector has proven to be an effective, but not 
sufficient additional measure to protect minors, this Recommendation also assigns a role to 
self-regulation in the protection of minors and human dignity.429 
 
f. Advertising 
The European public regulatory framework on advertising is fairly modest: traditionally, the 
regulation of advertising has been in the hands of the industry itself.430 The Directive on 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising constitutes the main component of the European 
public regulatory framework.431 Also in this Directive, which applies to misleading and 
unlawful comparative advertising practices in B2B relations, one can find references to self-
regulation. The Directive encourages “the voluntary control exercised by self-regulatory 
bodies to eliminate misleading or unlawful comparative advertising” as it “may avoid 
recourse to administrative or judicial action”.432 A precondition for such a self-regulatory 
control system is that it comes in addition to court or administrative proceedings,433 which 
means that one should not be deprived of the right to seek recourse to these proceedings. The 




g. E-Commerce Directive 
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) started to attract the attention of the European 
Commission at the end of the 1990s because of its rapid emergence and its perceived potential 
for the European market. The Commission deemed it necessary to introduce a regulatory 
framework for e-commerce to remove the legal barriers to e-commerce so as to exploit its full 
potential.435 This framework was to be built on four principles, one of these being the 
principle “no regulation for regulation’s sake”.436 This principle entails that no Community 
action will be taken where mutual recognition of national rules or appropriate self-regulatory 
                                                
429 Recommendation 2006/952/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the 
protection of minors and human dignity and on the right of reply in relation to the competitiveness of the 
European audiovisual and on-line information services industry (OJ 2006, L 378/72), recital 12. 
430 To a greater or lesser extent, most EU Members States have in place a national self-regulatory framework. At 
the European level, the advertising industry is represented by The European Advertising Standards Alliance 
(EASA), which promotes responsible advertising by providing guidance, inter alia through standards, on 
effective advertising self-regulation. See <www.easa-alliance.org/About-EASA/Who-What-Why-
/page.aspx/110> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
431 Directive 2006/114/EG of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning 
misleading and comparative advertising (OJ 2006, L 376/21). 
432 Directive 2006/114/EG, recital 18. 
433 Directive 2006/114/EG, Article 6. 
434 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001, L 311/67), Article 97(5). 
435 Communication from the Commission, A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce, COM(97) 157, pp. 5-
6; Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in 
the internal market, COM(1998) 586 final, p. 3 (see pp. 7-10 for an overview of the issues necessitating a legal 
framework). 
436 COM(97) 157, p. 14. See also COM(1998), 586 final, p. 17. 
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codes can effectively achieve the free movement of e-commerce services.437 In the view of 
the Commission, European-level industry self-regulation in general and codes of conduct in 
particular, can also further consumer trust in e-commerce, which is essential for the creation 
of a single market for e-commerce services. Accordingly, the E-Commerce Directive came to 
include several references to codes of conduct.438 
 The E-Commerce Directive, adopted in 2000, seeks to ensure the cross-border movement 
of e-commerce services and to create a genuine internal market for such services.439 The 
Directive also assigns a role to European codes of conduct in this regard. Article 16(1), more 
specifically, first of all requires both the European Commission and the Member States to 
encourage the development of European codes designed to contribute to the implementation 
of the Directive. In doing so, as follows on from Article 16(2), these actors should also 
encourage the involvement of consumer organizations in the drafting and implementation of 
codes of conduct where these codes affect their interests. Furthermore, Article 16(1) of the 
Directive requires the Commission and the Member States to encourage: the voluntary 
transmission of draft codes to the Commission; the electronic accessibility of codes of 
conduct in the Community languages; feedback by private regulators to the Member States 
and the Commission about the application of their code and its impact on e-commerce; and 
the creation of codes of conduct concerning the protection of minors and human dignity. The 
Directive thereby stresses that the fact that the Member States and the Commission are to 
encourage the creation of codes of conduct affects neither the voluntary nature of these codes, 
nor the freedom to decide whether or not to subscribe to any such code.440 Particular attention 
is paid to codes of conduct of the regulated profession in relation to commercial 
communication. With codes of conduct being considered the instrument best suited to set the 
rules on commercial communication by the professions, the Commission and the Member 
States should encourage the drawing-up or adaptation of European-wide codes on online 
commercial communications.441  
 
The first implementation report on the application of the E-Commerce Directive of November 
2003 shows that the encouragement of codes of conduct has resulted in the introduction of several 
European codes of conduct, both by the industry and the regulated professions. At the time of the 
report, the establishment of industry codes on e-commerce was however slowing down yet 
again.442 
 
                                                
437 COM(97) 157, p. 14. Cf. Communication from the Commission, The impact of the e-economy on European 
enterprises: economic analysis and policy implications, COM(2001) 711 final, p. 17. 
438 COM(97) 157 final, p. 21; COM(1998), 586 final, pp. 5, 17-18; COM (2001) 711 final, p. 17. 
439 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (OJ 2000, L 178/1), 
recitals 3, 5, 8, Article 1(1). 
440 Directive 2000/31/EC, recital 49. 
441 Directive 2000/31/EC, recital 32, Article 8.  
442 First Report on the application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market, COM(2003) 702 final, pp. 11, 16-17. 
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Furthermore, Article 10(2) obliges Members States to ensure that, as part of the pre-
contractual information to be provided to the recipient of the service, a service provider 
“indicates any relevant codes of conduct to which he subscribes and information on how 
those codes can be consulted electronically”. “Parties who are not consumers” can derogate 
from this information requirement.443 Currently, the Commission is reviewing the E-
Commerce Directive as part of its Digital Single Market Strategy.444 
 
h. Services Directive 
The Services Directive, the origins of which date back to the beginning of this century, is yet 
another directive in which we can find references to codes of conduct.445 The legal framework 
the Directive establishes in order to eliminate barriers to cross-border provision of services, 
builds on a combination of regulatory techniques, including the use of alternative methods of 
regulation in general and codes of conduct in particular.446 More specifically, the Directive 
“limits itself to harmonising essential quality requirements and for the rest encourages 
voluntary quality enhancing measures and codes of conduct at Community level”.447 As this 
quotation already suggests, private voluntary measures and codes of conduct are considered 
important tools for reaching the Services Directive’s aim of fostering high quality services, 
including the enhancement of information and transparency as regards services providers and 
their services.448 European codes of conduct, more specifically, are deemed to have several 
beneficiary effects in this respect: not only can these codes promote high quality of services, 
but they can also facilitate the free movement of services and enhance the degree of trust in 
cross-border services.449 Against this backdrop, both Article 22(3) (relating to the quality of 
                                                
443 The Dutch legislator has implemented this obligation in Article 6:227b(1)(e) DCC. 
444 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/e-commerce-directive> (accessed 1 July 2016). See also the 
Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy, COM(2015) 192 final. 
445 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in 
the internal market (OJ 2006, L 376/36). For an extensive account of the role of codes of conduct in the field of 
services, see Delimatsis 2010. Cf. also Barnard 2008, particularly pp. 379-381. 
446 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market, 
COM(2004) 2 final/3, p. 9. 
447 Commission Staff Working Paper, Extended impact assessment of proposal for a directive on services in the 
internal market, SEC(2004) 21, p. 47. See also Services Directive (2006/123/EC), recital 7. Interestingly, part of 
the barriers in the field of services identified by the Commission were thrown up by the disparity between 
national private regulatory schemes. See Report from the Commission on the State of the Internal Market for 
Services presented under the first stage of the Internal Market Strategy for Services, COM(2002) 441 final, p. 
50. 
448 Directive 2006/123/EC, recital 113, Articles 26 and 37; Handbook on implementation of the Services 
Directive, p. 47 (available at <http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/services/services-
directive/implementation/index_en.htm>, accessed 1 July 2016); DG for Internal Market and Services, 
Enhancing the quality of services in the Internal Market: The role of European codes of conduct, European 
Communities 2007, p. 6 (available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/docs/services-
dir/codeconduct/the_role_of_european_codes_of_conduct_en.pdf>, accessed 1 July 2016); Delimatsis 2010, p. 
1055. Article 26(5) of the Directive, more specifically, promotes the development of voluntary European service 
standards. The European Commission has mandated European Standards Organizations to develop such 
standards. See European Commission, ‘Mandate Addressed to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI for the programming 
and development of horizontal service standards’, Brussels, 24 January 2013, M/517 EN (available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/mandates/index.cfm?fuseaction=search.detail&id=525>, accessed 1 
July 2016). 
449 Handbook on implementation of the Services Directive, p. 51; DG for Internal Market and Services, 
Enhancing the quality of services in the Internal Market: The role of European codes of conduct, European 
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services) and Article 37 (in the context of cross-border services) of the Directive refer to 
codes of conduct. 
 Article 22(3)(d) asks Member States to ensure that, at the recipient’s request, a service 
provider supplies information on “any codes of conduct to which the provider is subject and 
the address at which these codes may be consulted by electronic means, specifying the 
language version available”. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 22(3)(e), Member States should 
ensure that the service provider, when asked by the recipient, provides information on 
available non-judicial dispute settlement mechanisms. Article 37(1) of the Directive, in turn, 
calls upon Member States, in cooperation with the European Commission, to take measures to 
encourage the development of European-wide codes of conduct aimed at facilitating the 
cross-border provision of services or the establishment of a service provider in another 
Member State. These European codes “are intended to set minimum standards of conduct and 
are complementary to Member States’ legal requirements”.450 Accordingly, Member States 
can continue to take more stringent legal measures and national codes can still provide greater 
protection.451 The codes should be in conformity with Community law, thus Article 37(1).  
The Services Directive devotes particular attention to codes of conduct of professional 
bodies. The Directive in this respect not only asks Member States to encourage both the 
development of such codes at the European level and the implementation of these European 
codes at the national level, but also indicates what these codes should include content-wise. It 
also stipulates that the codes should comply with Community law, especially competition 
law, and the legally binding rules on professional ethics and conduct in domestic law.452 
Additionally, the Commission has indicated that when drafting a code of conduct, 
professional bodies should conform to principles of good governance such as: integration, 
transparency, responsibility, inclusiveness and accountability.453 Furthermore, Delimatsis 
indicates, as a consequence of the very broad definition of ‘requirement’ under the Services 
Directive, the self-regulatory activities of professional bodies are subjected to the rules laid 
down in the Directive.454  
 
i. Protection of personal data 
Codes of conduct are also assigned a regulatory role under the Data Protection Directive, 
which – for the time being – constitutes the main pillar of the European data protection 
                                                                                                                                                   
Communities 2007, p. 6. Cf. Delimatsis 2010, p. 1057 who in this regard speaks of a mobility-enabling function 
and a confidence-building function of European codes of conduct. 
450 Directive 2006/123/EC, recital 114. 
451 Directive 2006/123/EC, recital 114. 
452 Directive 2006/123/EC, recitals 100, 113-114. With regard to professional rules concerning commercial 
communication, the Directive requires that these are “non-discriminatory, justified by an overriding reason 
relating to the public interest and proportionate” (Article 24(2)). See also Delimatsis 2010, pp. 1058-1063. 
453 DG for Internal Market and Services, Enhancing the quality of services in the Internal Market: The role of 
European codes of conduct, European Communities 2007, p. 10; Handbook on implementation of the Services 
Directive, pp. 51-52. See also Delimatsis 2010, pp. 1065-1066. 
454 Delimatsis 2010, p. 1054. See also Article 4(7) of the Services Directive which, insofar relevant, defines 
‘requirement’ as: “any obligation, prohibition, condition or limit provided for in […], the rules of professional 
bodies, or the collective rules of professional associations or other professional organisations, adopted in the 
exercise of their legal autonomy […].” 
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regime.455 This Directive will be replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation, which 
entered into force on May 2016 and will apply from 25 May 2018.456 As the Data Protection 
Directive is currently still in force, I will discuss the role of codes under both the Directive 
and the Regulation, starting with the Directive. 
 
 Codes of conduct and the Data Protection Directive 
The Data Protection Directive views codes of conduct as an aid to facilitate its application.457 
Article 27(1) of the Directive calls upon both the Commission and the Member States to 
encourage trade associations and other representative organizations to create European or 
national codes of conduct “intended to contribute to the proper implementation of the national 
provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to this Directive, taking account of the 
specific features of the various sectors”.458 The Directive thus, in other words, encourages the 
use of codes of conduct to detail the provisions of domestic law implementing the Directive 
with industry-specific rules on data protection. Article 27 furthermore provides that European 
and national private regulators should have the opportunity to seek public approval of their 
codes of conduct, drawn up with the purpose of detailing the national data protection 
provisions. According to Article 27(2) of the Directive, national private regulators should in 
this respect be able to submit their codes to their national data protection authority, which 
should be authorized by individual Member States to assess to what extent any codes 
submitted to it conform with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive.  
 
In the Netherlands, the Data Protection Directive has been implemented in the Dutch Personal 
Data Protection Act (Wet Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, hereafter: Wbp).459 Article 25 Wbp, 
mirroring the requirements of Article 27(2) of the Directive, concerns the use of codes of conduct 
as a tool to detail the general, abstract norms of the Wbp and the approval of such codes by the 
Dutch Data Protection Authority (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, hereafter: DPA).460 In order for a 
code to gain the approval of the DPA, certain formal and substantive requirements have to be 
                                                
455 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995, L 
291/31). 
456 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (OJ 2016, L 119/1). Already in 2012, the Commission launched a proposal to 
reform the EU data protection regime by introducing inter alia a new General Data Protection Regulation. See 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final. The Regulation was eventually adopted by the Parliament on 14 April 2016. 
457 Directive 95/46/EC, recital 61. In recital 26, it is remarked that “codes of conduct within the meaning of 
Article 27 may be a useful instrument for providing guidance as to the ways in which data may be rendered 
anonymous and retained in a form in which identification of the data subject is no longer possible”. 
458 See also Directive 95/46/EC, recital 61. 
459 Act of 6 June 2000, providing for rules on the protection of personal data, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2000, 
302, as subsequently amended. 
460 The precursor of the Wbp, the Data Protection Act (Wet Persoonsregistraties), comprised a similar regime. 
The related provisions of Data Protection Directive have been based on the system set out by the Wet 
Persoonsregistraties. See Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 25 892, no. 3, pp. 16, 128-129. 
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met.461 Article 25(3) Wbp, for instance, provides that the DPA only has to assess a code if the 
parties filing the request for approval can be deemed sufficiently representative and if the code 
description of industry sectors involved is sufficiently accurate.462 Furthermore, Article 25(1) 
Wbp stipulates that, “taking account of the specific characteristics of the industry sectors 
concerned”, a code has to be a “correct elaboration of the Wbp or of other legislation concerning 
the processing of personal data”. A mere reiteration of the legal provisions is not sufficient: the 
code has to provide a sector-specific translation of the legal rules on personal data protection.463 
Additionally, Article 25(1) Wbp states that a code that provides for a dispute resolution system 
can only gain DPA approval if sufficient safeguards are offered as regards the independence of 
the system.  
 
Article 27(3) of the Directive provides that European codes of conduct can be submitted to 
the ‘Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data’ (also called the ‘Article 29 Working Party’, hereafter: Art. 29 WP), an independent 
advisory and consultative body of European supervisory authorities founded by Article 29 of 
the Directive.464 When asked to give an opinion on a code submitted to it, Art. 29 WP will not 
only determine whether the code is in accordance with the European Data Protection 
Directive and, where relevant, with domestic law implementing the Directive, but will also 
assess whether the code is of sufficient quality, internal consistency and of sufficient added 
value to the applicable legal data protection regime.465 The Commission may ensure that 
codes of conduct that received the approval of the Art. 29 WP get “appropriate publicity”, 
thus Article 27(3). Until now, however, the promotion of European codes of conduct under 
the Directive does not seem to have been particularly successful, judging by the limited 
number of codes approval has been sought for.466 
 
 Codes of conduct and the General Data Protection Regulation   
While the role of codes of conduct under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
remains essentially the same as it currently is under the Data Protection Directive, namely that 
of facilitating the proper application of the European rules, the GDPR provides a more 
                                                
461 These requirements can be found at <https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/zelf-doen/gedragscodes> 
(accessed 1 July 2016). 
462 See also Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 25 892, no. 3, p. 130. 
463 Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 25 892, no. 3, pp. 16, 129-130. 
464 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 29. For more information on the Article 29 Working Party, see 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/index_en.htm> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
465 Article 4(1) of the Working Document that the Art. 29 WP has adopted in this respect. See ‘Future work on 
codes of conduct: Working Document on the procedure for the consideration by the Working Party of 
Community codes of conduct’, adopted 10 September 1998 (WP13) (available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm>, 
accessed 1 July 2016). 
466 Report from the Commission, First report on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), 
COM(2003) 265 final, p. 26; Communication from the Commission on the follow-up of the Work Programme 
for better implementation of the Data Protection Directive, COM(2007) 87 final, p. 5. The documentation of the 
Article 29 Working Party still shows very little movement in this respect. See <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
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comprehensive and tighter framework for the use of codes of conduct.467 The GDPR will also 
lead to a European Data Protection Board replacing Art. 29 WP.468 In regulating the use of 
codes of conduct, Article 40 addresses three different groups of actors as follows. 
 Firstly, Article 40(1) aks Member States, national supervisory authorities, the European 
Data Protection Board and the Commission to encourage “associations or other bodies 
representing categories of controllers or processors”469 to draw up “codes of conduct intended 
to contribute to the proper application of this Regulation, taking account of the specific 
features of the various processing sectors and the specific needs of micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises”470.  
 Secondly, Article 40(2) provides that bodies representing categories of controllers of 
processors “may prepare codes of conduct, or amend or extend such codes, for the purpose of 
specifying the application of this Regulation” and non-exhaustively lists a number of issues 
that these codes may address.471 Pursuant to Article 40(5) these bodies are under an obligation 
(the GDPR uses the word ‘shall’) to submit their draft code, or amendment or extension of an 
existing code to the national supervisory authority, that then has gives an opinion on the 
alignment of the code with the GDPR and approves the code if it is of the opinion that it 
provides ‘sufficient appropriate safeguards’. If the code has a national scope, the authority has 
to register and publish it (Article 40(6)). However, where the code concerns processing 
activities in several Member States, the European Data Protection Board has to give its 
approval to the code: the national supervisory authority has to submit the code to the Board 
prior to approving it itself (Article 40(7)). Once the Board gives its approval, its opinion has 
to be submitted to the Commission, which may decide it has general validity within the entire 
European Union (Article 40(8-9)).472 
 Thirdly, Article 40(3) addresses controllers and processors that are not subject to the 
GDPR. It provides that these actors may also adhere to data protection codes which have been 
approved by a national supervisory authority and have been assigned general validity by the 
Commission.473 Such adherence is not without obligation: Article 40(3) obliges them to make 
“binding and enforceable commitments, via contractual or other legally binding instruments, 
to apply those appropriate safeguards including with regard to the rights of data subjects”.  
                                                
467 The provisions concerning codes of conduct in the final version of the GPDR are also more detailed than the 
provisions on the topic included in the Commission proposal of 2012. See COM(2012) 11 final, p. 14 (Article 
38). 
468 COM(2012) 11 final, p. 14. 
469 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, recital 98. When creating a new code or amending or extending an existing code, 
these bodies should consult relevant stakeholders and take account of the views expressed during these 
consultations, thus recital 99 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
470 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Article 40(1). The GDPR likewise demands these actors to encourage, 
particularly at EU level, “the establishment of data protection certification mechanisms and of data protection 
seals and marks, for the purpose of demonstrating compliance with this Regulation of processing operations by 
controllers and processors” (Article 42(1)). See also recital 100. 
471 In short, ‘controllers’ are actors who determine the purposes and means of the processing of personal data, 
whereas ‘processors’ are actors that process personal data on behalf of the controller. See Regulation (EU) 
2016/679, Article 4(7) and 4(8). 
472 Article 40(10) states that the Commission shall ensure appropriate publicity for these codes. 
473 It follows on from Article 40(3) that the rationale behind this provision is to “provide appropriate safeguards 
within the framework of personal data transfers to third countries or international organisations”. 
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 Furthermore, several provisions of the GDPR designate adherence to an approved code of 
conduct as “an element by which to demonstrate” compliance with certain obligations under 
the GDPR.474 Finally, Article 41 lays down rules for bodies monitoring approved codes of 
conduct. 
 
j. Product Safety Directive 
Under the General Product Safety Directive, codes of practice (to stick with the terminology 
of the Directive) can play a role in establishing whether a product can be deemed safe.475 It 
follows on from Article 3(2) of the Directive that the question whether a product meets the 
Directive’s generic definition of a safe product in first instance has to be answered in relation 
to the requirements imposed in this respect by European or national legislation adopted in 
accordance with EU law. In absence of such legislation, European standards or certain 
national voluntary standards transposing European standards can be resorted to. Article 3(3) 
stipulates that when none of these instruments is available, the question whether a product 
conforms to the general safety requirement has to be answered by taking into account, among 
other things, “product safety codes of good practice in force in the sector concerned”.476 
Additionally, Article 8(2) requires the national competent authorities to encourage and 
promote voluntary action by producers and distributers, including the creation of codes of 
good practice, in the context of certain measures to be taken in respect of dangerous products, 
such as a ban on the marketing of such products). The Directive also provides that the recall 
of products may take place in the context of national codes of practice on this issue (see 
Articles 5(1) and 8(2)). 
 
k. Corporate governance 
Codes of conduct are also part of the European regulatory framework for corporate 
governance. As the Commission puts it: “the EU corporate governance framework is a 
combination of legislation and soft law, namely national corporate governance codes applied 
on a 'comply or explain' basis”.477 The Directive on company reporting promotes the 
application of such corporate governance codes.478 This Directive requires listed companies to 
include a corporate governance statement in their annual report in which inter alia they have 
to refer to the applicable corporate governance codes and report on their application of these 
                                                
474 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Articles 24(3), 28(3), 35(8). See also recital 81. Article 83(1)(j) states that in 
deciding whether to impose an administrative fine and when deciding on the amount of the fine, due regard has 
to be given to, among other things, adherence to approved codes of conduct. 
475 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product 
safety (OJ 2002, L 11/4). The Dutch legislator has transposed the Directive in the Commodities Act (Warenwet). 
476 See also Directive 2001/95/EC, recital 16. 
477 Communication from the Commission, Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance - a 
modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, COM(2012) 740 final, p. 3. 
478 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial 
statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ 2013, L 182/19). In October 2014, this Directive was amended by Directive 
2014/95/EU (OJ 2014, L 330/1) which introduces disclosure requirements for certain large undertakings as 
regards their corporate social responsibility commitments: these undertakings have to prepare a non-financial 
statement containing information on certain social and environmental matters.  
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codes on a comply-or-explain basis.479 Firstly, this ‘comply-or-explain’ approach, laid down 
in Article 20(b) of the Directive, entails that in case an undertaking departs from a corporate 
governance code, it has to include in its corporate governance statement an explanation as to 
which parts of the code it departs from and the reasons for doing so. Secondly, whenever an 
undertaking decides not to refer to any provisions of a corporate governance code, it also has 
to explain in its corporate governance statement why it has not done so.480 
 Although this system of reporting enjoys the wide support of companies and investors, 
research showed that the quality of the explanations as well as the monitoring of the corporate 
governance statements left much to be desired in many Member States.481 For the 
Commission, this was one of the reasons to adopt a Green Paper on the European corporate 
governance framework, asking how to improve the effectiveness of this framework. As 
regards the issues concerning corporate governance reporting, a large majority of respondents 
were in favor of requiring companies to better explain departures from corporate governance 
codes.482 This led the Commission to announce action on this point, which in 2014 eventually 
resulted in a Commission Recommendation on the quality of corporate governance reporting. 
This recommendation seeks to improve the quality of corporate governance statements in 
general and the quality of explanations provided in case of departure from a code in 
particular. In short, it sets out in general terms what information is to be provided and 
stipulates that this information must be sufficiently clear, accurate and comprehensive.483 
 
4.4.1.2 References outside EU private law legislation 
 
Besides references to codes of conduct in European private law directives, the field of 
European private law also includes more ‘hidden’ references to these codes. 
 A first example of a reference to a code of conduct outside EU legislation can be found in 
the ‘protection of minors’ strand of the Union’s audiovisual media policy. At the European 
level, the protection of minors in the field of online and offline gaming takes places through 
PEGI (Pan-European Game Information), a private regulatory regime created by the 
Interactive Software Federation of Europe (ISFE). This regime is based on two codes of 
conduct: the PEGI Code (2003, dealing with age labelling, promotion and advertising of 
                                                
479 Green Paper, The EU corporate governance framework, COM(2011) 164 final, p. 2. See also Directive 
2013/34/EU, Article 20(1)(a-b). 
480 Dutch private law already included a provision on corporate governance codes. Article 2:391(5) DCC, ‘the 
legal basis’ for such codes, provides that if a corporate governance code is designated by order in council, listed 
companies are obligated to report on their compliance with the code in their annual report on the basis of 
‘comply or explain’. See Memelink 2010, p. 43; Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31 508, no. 3; Parliamentary 
Papers II 2003/04, 29 449, no. 1. The Corporate Governance Code, the Dutch Banking Code and the Insurer 
Governance Principles have been designated by order in council. See for the different codes 
<http://corpgov.nl/corporate-governance-code>;<www.commissiecodebanken.nl/>;<www.mcverzekeraars.nl/>, 
respectively (accessed 1 July 2016). 
481 COM(2011) 164 final, pp. 4, 18-20, with reference to the Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in 
Corporate Governance in the Member States of 23 September 2009 (available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/studies_en.htm>, accessed 20 April 2016). 
482 COM(2012) 740 final, pp. 3, 6-7. For the Green Paper, see COM(2011) 164 final. 
483 Commission Recommendation of 9 April 2014 on the quality of corporate governance reporting (‘comply or 
explain’) (OJ 2014, L 109/43). 
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interactive products) and the PEGI Online Safety Code (2007, concerning the protection of 
young people in the online gaming environment).484 The European institutions have explicitly 
encouraged the establishment of private regulatory regimes in this field. In a resolution of 
2002 pre-dating the establishment of the PEGI-regime, for example, the Council, 
“acknowledged that self-regulation is one of the adequate means, through the participation of 
all interested parties, in particular that of consumers, to support age-rating systems for 
interactive leisure software contained in video games and computer games, on its own or as a 
complement to the measures implemented by Member States in this field”.485 The 
Commission, in turn, has expressed its support for PEGI, calling it “a good example of self-
regulation in line with the better regulation agenda”.486 Thereupon, the Commission called 
upon the Member States to integrate the information and classification system set out by 
PEGI in their national systems and asked the industry to further improve the PEGI-system. 
Additionally, the industry was, among other things, called upon to create a Pan-European 
Code of conduct on the sale of games to minors within two years. This led to the introduction 
of the PEGI Retail Code, annexed to the PEGI Code.487 
 The second example stems from the advertising industry, which has a long tradition of 
private regulation. In 2010, the then European Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, Neelie 
Kroes, invited the European advertising industry to self-regulate the issue of online behavioral 
advertising, notably as a means to implement Article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive 
(2009/136/EC) concerning the use of cookies.488 The call issued by Kroes eventually led to 
the drawing-up of a European code of conduct for Online Behavioural Advertising: the IAB 
Europe EU Framework for Online Behavioural Advertising (2011).489 However, not everyone 
was equally enthusiastic about the regulatory framework initially established by the Code. 
                                                
484 The PEGI Code, which includes a code for retailers, can be found at <www.pegi.info/en/index/id/1185/>. For 
the PEGI Online Safety Code, see <www.pegionline.eu/en/index/id/235/>. Websites accessed 1 July 2016. Most 
Member States rely on the PEGI system in the protection of minors playing video games, with some domestic 
legislation even being based on PEGI. See Report from the Commission, Protecting Children in the Digital 
World, COM(2011) 556 final, p. 8 and the accompanying Commission Staff Working Paper (SEC(2011) 1043 
final), p. 22; Communication from the Commission, on the protection of consumers, in particular minors, in 
respect of the use of video games, COM(2008) 207 final, p. 9. 
485 Council Resolution of 1 March 2002 on the protection of consumers, in particular young people, through the 
labelling of certain video games and computer games according to age group (OJ 2002 C 65/2), recital 9. 
486 COM(2008) 207 final, p. 9. The European Parliament equally welcomed the PEGI system, see European 
Parliament resolution of 12 March 2009 on the protection of consumers, in particular minors, in respect of the 
use of video games (2008/2173(INI)). 
487 COM(2008) 207 final, pp. 9-10. 
488 ‘Towards more confidence and more value for European Digital Citizens European Roundtable on the 
Benefits of Online Advertising for Consumers’, speech delivered by Neelie Kroes, Brussels 17 September 2010, 
Speech/10/452 (available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-452_en.htm?locale=en>, 
accessed 1 July 2016). In this speech, Kroes indicated that the self-regulatory system must include “clear and 
simple complaint handling, reliable third-party compliance auditing and effective sanctioning mechanisms” so as 
to avoid self-regulation becoming both a fiction and a failure. See also <www.easa-alliance.org/page.aspx/386> 
(accessed 1 July 2016) and European Commission, Working Document on the Implementation of the revised 
Framework - Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive, 20 October 2010, COCOM10-34, p. 6, where the 
Commission services expressed their willingness to provide assistance to the industry. 
489 The Code can be found at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/content/iab-europe-eu-framework-
online-behavioural-advertising>. Later, the Code was complemented by an EASA Best Practice 
Recommendation, see <www.easa-alliance.org/page.aspx/386>. Websites accessed 1 July 2016. 
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The Article 29 WP for example criticized the Code for proposing inadequate solutions and for 
not leading to compliance with the e-Privacy Directive.490 
 The Principles of Good Practice in vertical relationships in the Food Supply Chain 
(2011), which seek to tackle the problem of unfair B2B trading practices in the food supply 
chain, constitute a third example.491 These Principles have been developed within the 
framework of the High Level Forum for a Better Functioning of the Food Supply Chain, set 
up by the European Commission.492 Following a request from the Commission, which sought 
to address the issue of unfair commercial trading practices, the B2B platform of the Forum 
organized a multi-stakeholder dialogue to discuss (un)fair trading practices in the food supply 
chain. This dialogue resulted in the Principles being adopted.493 A voluntary framework for 
the implementation of the Principles came into force in 2013.494 Recently, the Commission 
suggested opening up a dialogue on how to improve this so-called ‘Supply Chain Initiative’ 
and announced it would continue to closely monitor the Initiative.495 
 The European Commission can also work the other way around and wholly or partially 
overturn its decision to leave regulation to private actors. The Common Principles for Bank 
Account Switching are an example of an industry code that was eventually replaced by EU 
legislation. At the end of 2007, the Commission, as part of its policy to improve the 
competitiveness and efficiency of the European financial retail markets, invited the European 
banking industry to adopt a common set of rules on bank account switching. It did, however, 
express a reservation at the time: should the industry fail to take adequate measures, 
legislative intervention would be considered.496 The failure of the industry to consistently 
follow the rules, as a result of which consumers faced difficulties when trying to switch bank 
accounts, eventually led the Commission to carry out its ‘regulatory threat’: the enactment of 
                                                
490 See Press Release Article 29 Working Party, ‘Online behavioural advertising: industry proposed solutions 
inadequate’, 15 December 2011 (available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-
material/press-release/index_en.htm>); Letter Article 29 Working Party to IAB Europe and EASA, 3 August 
2011 (Ref. Ares(2011)849374); Letter from the Article 29 Working Party addressed to the Online Behavioural 
Advertising (OBA) Industry regarding the current approach of the Code of Conduct, 1 March 2012 (Ref. 
Ares(2012)240896). Both letters are available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/other-document/index_en.htm> (websites accessed 1 July 2016). 
491 The Principles can be found at <www.supplychaininitiative.eu/about-initiative/principles-good-practice-
vertical-relationships-food-supply-chain> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
492 The Forum is composed of national authorities responsible for the food sector at ministerial level, industry 
representatives and representatives of NGOs (<http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/food/competitiveness/supply-
chain-forum/index_en.htm>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
493 Principles of Good Practice in vertical relationships in the Food Supply Chain, Introduction. See also 
Communication from the Commission, Setting up a European retail action plan, COM(2013) 36 final, p. 11 and 
Report from the Commission on unfair business-to-business trading practices in the food supply chain, 
COM(2016) 32 final, p. 8. The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, in turn, facilitated two pilots, one within the 
agri-food industry and one within the fashion industry, in which a code of conduct was used to address the issue 
of unfair commercial practices in B2B relationships. The outcomes eventually led the Minister to decide to leave 
regulation to the industry, reserving a monitoring background role for the government. See Parliamentary 
Papers II 2015/16, 31 531, no. U. 
494 Available at <www.supplychaininitiative.eu/about-initiative/framework> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
495 COM(2016) 32 final, p. 12.  
496 Commission Staff Working Document, Initiatives In The Area Of Retail Financial Services. Accompanying 
the document to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: A single market for 21st century 
Europe, SEC(2007) 1520, p. 2. 
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the Directive on payment accounts (2014/92/EU) in 2014 put an end to the self-regulatory 
regime.497 
 In a similar fashion, the nature of the European regulatory framework for mortgages 
changed from private to public. Initially, regulatory action in this field, spurred by several 
issues hampering the establishment of a single market for mortgage credit, was left to the 
mortgage industry. This led to the drawing up of the European Voluntary Code of Conduct on 
Pre-contractual Information for Home Loans. The Code was backed by a European 
Agreement on the Code, concluded under the aegis of the Commission, and endorsed by a 
Recommendation.498 Also in this case, the Commission announced that it would issue 
legislative measures should the industry fail to satisfactorily comply with the code or when an 
insufficient part of the industry would sign up to the Code.499 As the Code failed to effectively 
address the market failures concerning the provision of pre-contractual information on home 
loans to consumers, the Commission eventually decided to replace the Code by the Directive 
on mortgage credit (2014/17/EU), which not only mirrors the Code provisions but goes even 
further.500  
 
4.4.2 Dutch private law 
 
Dutch private law also included several references to industry codes of conduct, the majority 
of which result from the European directives discussed in the previous section. Accordingly, 
it will not come as a surprise that we can find these references in statutory provisions 
concerning unfair commercial practices (Articles 6:193c(2)(b) and 6:193g DCC), distance 
selling and doorstep selling (Article 6:230m(n) DCC), e-commerce (Article 6:227b(1)(e) 
DCC), corporate governance (Article 2:391(5) DCC) and the protection of personal data 
(Article 25 Wbp). This section however concentrates on examples of references that have 




                                                
497 Directive on Payment Accounts – Frequently Asked Questions, 15 April 2014, MEMO/14/300 (available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-300_en.htm?locale=en>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
498 See Communication from the Commission, Financial services: Enhancing consumer confidence, COM(97) 
308 final, p. 10; Communication from the Commission, Implementing the framework for financial markets: 
action plan, COM(1999) 232 final; the first, second and third Financial Services Action plan Progress report 
(COM(1999)630 final p, 9; COM(2000) 336 final, p. 16; COM(2000) 692 final, p. 20, respectively, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/actionplan/index_en.htm>, accessed 1 July 2016). See also 
Commission Recommendation 2001/193/EC of 1 March 2001 on pre-contractual information to be given to 
consumers by lenders offering home loans (OJ 2001, L 69/25). 
499 European Commission press release 5 March 2001, ‘Home loans: Commission endorses guideline on prior 
information to consumers’, IP/01/305. See also Recommendation 2001/193/EC, recital 7. 
500 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements relating to 
residential property, COM(2011) 142 final, pp. 4, 10; Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment – 
Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit 
agreements relating to residential property SEC(2011) 356, p. 14; <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/content/voluntary-code-conduct-pre-contractual-information-home-loans> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
501 For more examples of private regulation in Dutch private law, not limited to codes of conduct, see Giesen 




In the Netherlands, the regulatory framework for advertising is traditionally dominated by 
rules drawn up by the advertising industry. The Dutch Advertising Code (Nederlandse 
Reclame Code, hereafter: NRC), authored by the Dutch Advertising Code Authority 
(Stichting Reclame Code, hereafter: SRC), goes back to 1963.502 There were at least two 
reasons for adopting a self-regulatory code at the time, as Van Boom et al. indicate. The first 
reason was the introduction of the Code of Advertising Practice of the International Chamber 
of Commerce in several European countries in the 1960s. The second reason lay in the 
pressure exerted on the advertising industry at the time by the Dutch government, which 
envisaged enacting legislation in order to protect consumers against advertising. With the 
successful adoption of the Advertising Code, the industry was able to pre-empt legislative 
interference.503 The NRC comprises a General Section and a Section of Special Advertising 
Codes, which apply to both B2B and B2C advertising. The relevant provisions of the UCPD, 
the Directive on misleading and comparative advertising and the AVMSD have been 
implemented in the NRC.504 In the first instance, enforcing the NRC lies with the Advertising 
Code Authority (Reclame Code Commissie) with leave to appeal to the Board of Appeal 
(College van Beroep).505 Where necessary, the Authority for Consumers & Market (Autoriteit 
Consument & Markt) and the judiciary provide additional monitoring and enforcement.506 
 
Considering the foregoing, it appears a bit odd to discuss the Dutch regulatory framework on 
advertising in the context of legislative references to codes of conduct. Yet, several provisions of 
the Media Act 2008 refer to the NRC, which warrants a discussion of the framework at this 
point.507 The Media Act, more specifically, requires both public and commercial broadcasters that 
include advertisements in their media offering to be affiliated with the NRC or with a comparable 
scheme drawn up by the SRC. It also provides that both categories of broadcasters are supervised 
by the SRC in this context.508 These requirements illustrate the significance of the private 
regulatory regime. Furthermore, the Media Act makes it possible for the Minister of Education, 
Culture and Science to take action in case, in short, the SRC fails to correctly implement the 
European rules on advertising.509 
                                                
502 Dutch Advertising Code (1 January 2015, English version), p. 4 (available at <www.reclamecode.nl> >> 
English). The private regulatory framework is completed by the Code of Conduct for Pharmaceutical 
Advertising (Gedragcode Geneesmiddelenreclame), which will not be taken into consideration at this point. 
503 Van Boom et al. 2009, p. 53.  
504 Dutch Advertising Code (1 January 2015, English version), p. 4; Van Boom et al. 2009, pp. 53-54; 
<www.reclamecode.nl/adverteerder/default.asp?nieuwsID=321> (accessed 1 July 2016). As the NRC also 
applies to B2B advertising, the implementation of the UCPD in the NRC implies that the rules of the Directive 
are given a broader scope of application. 
505 Dutch Advertising Code (1 January 2015, English version), p. 5; Van Boom et al. 2009, p. 55.  
506 Van Boom et al. 2009, p. 58. This system meets the requirements of the Directive on misleading and 
comparative advertising at this point (cf. section 4.4.1.1.2 under f). See Parliamentary Papers II 2000/01, 27 
619, no. 3, pp. 9-10. 
507 The amendments made to the Media Act 2008 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2008, 583, as subsequently 
amended) in March 2016 affect neither the references to the code discussed in this section nor the ones discussed 
under b (‘Media Act’). See Wet van 16 maart 2016 tot wijziging van de Mediawet 2008 in verband met het 
toekomstbestendig maken van de publieke mediadienst (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2016, 114) and 
Parliamentary Papers II 2014/15, 34 264, no. 3.  
508 Articles 2.92 (public broadcasters) and 3.6 (commercial broadcasters) Media Act 2008.  
509 Article 9.16 Media Act 2008. See also Menting & Vranken 2014, p. 22. 
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b. Media Act 
Article 2.3(2) of the Media Act 2008 provides that the Netherlands Public Broadcasting 
(Nederlandse Publieke Omroep, hereafter: NPO) has to draw up a code of conduct in 
furtherance of good governance and integrity within the NPO and the national public media 
institutions. Paragraph 3 of the provision sets out the essential topics the code should cover. 
The NPO has complied with this statutory demand by introducing the Gedragscode Goed 
Bestuur en Integriteit Publieke Omroep (2012).510 The report that the NPO has to file 
annually with the Dutch Media Authority and the Minister of Education, Culture and Science 
has to include a section on compliance with the code (Article 2.58(e) Media Act 2008). 
 
c. References outside legislation 
References to codes of conduct can also be found outside legislation, i.e., in policy documents 
and in ‘practice’. A first example in this respect comes from the Dutch Association of 
Insurers’ Code of conduct on informed contract extension and contract terms concerning non-
life insurance and loss-of-income insurance for private individuals (Gedragscode 
geïnformeerde verlenging en contractstermijnen particuliere schade- en 
inkomensverzekeringen). The Minister of Finance considered this Code an appropriate means 
to regulate the issue of contract terms of private insurance contracts and their tacit renewal. 
However, the Minister warned, should the Code fail to achieve the intended results, 
legislative intervention could still be considered.511  
 A more recent example can be found in the franchise sector, where persistent problems in 
the franchisor-franchisee relationship have led to a call for franchise-specific legislation to 
strengthen the position of franchisees vis-à-vis franchisors. The Minister of Economic Affairs, 
however, saw no good in legislative intervention.512 Subsequently, the attention of the 
franchise industry and the government was directed towards self-regulation, particularly 
towards a code of conduct and alternative dispute resolution.513 This led to the appointment of 
a Committee which was assigned the tasks of drafting a Franchise Code of Conduct and 
giving shape to an alternative dispute resolution process. However, the Minister did announce 
that failure to reach an agreement on a code of conduct might eventually lead to legislative 
                                                
510 Available (in Dutch) at <www.integriteitomroep.nl/gedragscode/> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
511 Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 29 507, no. 89, pp. 10-11. However, a code is not always considered a 
viable alternative to legislation, as the case of the code of conduct of the Dutch Publishers Association on the 
termination and renewal of subscriptions to newspapers and magazines illustrates. The Code has been put 
forward by the industry as a viable alternative to the then pending legislative proposal concerning the tacit 
renewal of consumer contracts, but the legislator was of a different opinion. See Parliamentary Papers 2006/07, 
30 520, no. 6; Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 30 520, no. 8. 
512 Parliamentary Papers II 2013/14, 31 113, no. 119. 
513 Parliamentary Papers II 2014/15, 31 113, no. 140. Part of the franchise industry is already regulated by a 
code of conduct: members of the Netherlands Franchise Association (Nederlandse Franchise Vereniging) have 
to abide by the European Code of Ethics for Franchising (available at <www.nfv.nl/juridisch-franchisegevers/>, 
accessed 1 July 2016). The new Franchise Code, however, would apply to the entire franchise industry. 
Interestingly, the industry also signaled the fact that the Dutch judiciary is generally not inclined to take account 
of the aforementioned European Code as applied by the Netherlands Franchise Association. The industry in this 
respect indicated a need to link the new Franchise Code to franchise agreements in such a way that the Code can 
be taken into account in legal disputes, for instance by referring to the Code in a fashion that is similar to the 
way in which general terms and conditions become applicable to an agreement. See Parliamentary Papers II 
2013/14, 31 113, no. 140, pp. 1-2. 
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intervention.514 All this eventually resulted in the Dutch Franchise Code (Nederlandse 
Franchise Code), introduced on 17 February 2016. On the same day, the Minister announced 
that he will explore the possibility of embedding the Code into legislation.515 
 Public supervisory bodies have also played their part in pressuring industry sectors to 
adopt new codes or tighten existing ones. The Code of Conduct for Consumers and Energy 
Suppliers (Gedragscode Consument en Energieleverancier), for instance, results from a call 
of the Office of Energy and Transport Regulation of the Netherlands Competition Authority 
(now the Authority for Consumers & Markets) upon energy suppliers to end the malpractices 
in customer advertising that emerged after the liberalization of the Dutch energy market in 
2001. The Office in this respect urged the industry to draw up a joint code of conduct 
concerning the main aspects of ‘switching energy supplier’ and announced that if the energy 
suppliers failed to do so, it would enact additional rules itself.516 The industry’s response to 
this call was timely and it established a self-regulatory regime that, in a revised and tighter 
form, still remains in force.517  
 The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële Markten, 
hereafter: AFM), in turn, has prompted and participated in the revision and tightening of the 
norms for consumer credit laid down in the codes of conduct on consumer credit of the Dutch 
Banking Association (Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken, hereafter: NVB), the Dutch 
Finance Houses’ Association (Vereniging van Financieringsondernemingen in Nederland, 
hereafter: VFN) and the Dutch Home Shopping Association (Nederlandse Thuiswinkel 
Organisatie, hereafter: NTO). The reason for the AFM to step in was that the then self-
regulatory norms could result in irresponsible lending.518 Furthermore, the AFM has 
designated the revised norms of these codes of conduct as the minimum standard when 
interpreting the open-textured legal standard of responsible lending enshrined in Article 4:34 
of the Dutch Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het Financieel Toezicht, hereafter: Wft). This 
implies that credit providers that are not affiliated with the NVB, the VFN or the NTO, and 
are hence not bound to the aforementioned codes, are allowed to flesh out the norm of 
responsible lending themselves, though they have to do so in a way that meets, at a minimum, 
the level of protection the codes offer against overextension of credit.519 Case law has 
endorsed this approach.520 
                                                
514 See Parliamentary Papers II 2014/15, 31 113, no. 149; Parliamentary Papers II 2015/16, 31 113, no. 153.  
515 Parliamentary Papers II 2015/16, 31 113, no. 165; <www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2016/02/17/kamp-
verkent-wettelijke-verankering-franchise-code>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
516 <www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/5185/NMa-eist-dat-energiesector-problemen-klantenwerving-
oplost/>; <www.consuwijzer.nl/nieuws/energiesector-komt-met-gedragscode-klantencontact> (accessed 1 July 
2016). 
517 The Code can be downloaded at <www.energie-nederland.nl/positionpaper/658/> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
518 Report Verantwoorde Kredietverstrekking 2006, AFM 12 January 2007, p. 5 (available at 
<www.afm.nl/~/media/files/rapport/2007/verantwoorde-kredietverstrekking-2006-120107.ashx>, accessed 18 
January 2016), pp. 5, 28-30. See also Van Poelgeest 2012, p. 60. 
519 <www.afm.nl/nl-nl/professionals/doelgroepen/kredietaanbieders/normen> (accessed 1 July 2016). See also 
Van Poelgeest 2012, pp. 60, 71-72. 
520 See Rb. Rotterdam 4 May 2011, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ3835, para 2.10, confirmed by CBb 28 
November 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:260, para 5.4. 
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 There are also industry codes of conduct that have eventually been wholly or partially 
backed or replaced by public regulation. The SMS Service Provision Code of Conduct 
(Gedragscode SMS Dienstverlening) constitutes a first example in this respect. In 2003, the 
then Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority of the Netherlands (OPTA, now 
merged into the Authority for Consumers & Markets), the Ombudsman Foundation (Stichting 
de Ombudsman) and the Consumer’s Association (Consumentenbond) appealed to the 
responsibility of SMS services providers take action against the obscure way in which SMS 
services were provided. This led to the adoption of the aforementioned Code.521 Yet, the Code 
repeatedly failed to adequately remedy the problems in the sector, despite several revisions of 
the code that the Dutch government initiated. Early 2010, the ongoing problems once again 
led the government to call for a tightening of the Code, yet this call was accompanied by a 
ministerial regulation to support the operation of the Code (Regeling universele 
dienstverlening en eindgebruikersbelangen), which entered into force in February 2011.522 
 The Code of Conduct for Mortgage Loans (Gedragscode Hypothecaire Financieringen, 
hereafter: GHF) equally lost part of its regulatory scope to public regulation. The Dutch 
regulatory regime on mortgage credit started out as an entirely self-regulatory regime, which 
was a result of the fact that the legislator gave preference to private regulation over legislative 
interference at the time (end of the 1980s).523 Over the following decades, both the AFM and 
the government became involved with the further development of the GHF, particularly with 
the code rules on how to prevent overextension of credit. Findings of the AFM that 
application of the GHF rules (still) led to poor lending practices, causing significant financial 
risks for consumers, and that elements of the Code were insufficiently complied with, has for 
instance led to pressure on the industry from the side of the government and the AFM to 
tighten the rules of the GHF at this point.524 By showing itself responsive to such pressure, the 
mortgage industry managed to avoid legislative intervention for quite some time.525 In fact, 
the GHF-norms for the assessment of the borrowing capacity of a consumer were, like the 
codes on consumer credit mentioned above, taken by the AFM as ‘a reasonable starting point’ 
in the interpretation of the legal norm of responsible lending (Article 4:34 Wft).526 Eventually, 
                                                
521 <www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/8267/OPTA-pakt-problematiek-rond-SMS-abonnementen-aan/>; 
<www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/8346/Gedragscode-voor-SMS-diensten/> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
522 Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 31 412, no. 16 and no. 21; Regeling universele dienstverlening en 
eindgebruikersbelangen, as published in Government Gazette 2011, no. 3687 (see particularly p. 5). 
523 Besluit van de directeur-generaal van de Nederlandse mededingingsautoriteit tot het gedeeltelijk verlenen en 
het gedeeltelijk afwijzen van een ontheffing als bedoeld in artikel 17 van de Mededingingswet, 1998, 
zaaknummer 235 en 1189 (available at <www.acm.nl/nl/download/bijlage/?id=464>, accessed 1 July 2016). The 
Code came into force on 1 October 1990. 
524 AFM, Kwaliteit advies en transparantie bij hypotheken. Oriëntatiepunt voor en goede adviespraktijk, 2007 
(available at <www.afm.nl/~/profmedia/files/rapporten/2007/kwaliteit-advies-transparantie-
hypotheken.ashx?la=nl-nl>); AFM, Consultatiedocument toetskader hypothecaire kredietverlening, 2009; DNB 
& AFM, Risico’s op de hypotheekmarkt voor huishoudens en hypotheekverstrekkers, 4 September 2009 
(available at <www.dnb.nl/publicatie/publicaties-dnb/incidentele-publicaties/dnb222060.jsp>). Websites 
accessed 1 July 2016. See also Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 29 507, no. 35; Mak 2015, p. 422; Van Boom 
2012, p. 271; Van Poelgeest 2012, pp. 65-66. 
525 See, e.g., Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 29 507, no. 35; Parliamentary Papers II 2010/11, 29 507, no. 94 
and no. 97; Van Boom 2012, p. 271; Van Poelgeest 2012, pp. 65-66. 
526 AFM, Kwaliteit advies en transparantie bij hypotheken. Oriëntatiepunt voor en goede adviespraktijk, 2007, 
pp. 40-41; AFM, Consultatiedocument toetskader hypothecaire kredietverlening, 2009. This approach was also 
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however, the GHF had to give way to public regulation at this point: as of 1 January 2013, the 
criteria for assessing the borrowing capacity of consumers are set by the Temporary Rules on 
mortgage credit (Tijdelijk regeling hypothecair krediet), which partly builds on the GHF-
norms.527 The Temporary Rules were enacted following the lack of clarity on the 
interpretation of some of these norms that arose due to divergent opinions of the AFM and the 
industry at this point.528 Nonetheless, the GHF did not cease to exist, as the criteria set by the 
Temporary Rules are minimum criteria which are in addition to the criteria set by the 
mortgage lenders themselves, i.e., the GHF-norms. This allows the industry to set more 
stringent rules.529 Moreover, the scope of the GHF is broader than the scope of the Temporary 
Rules, which also implies that the GHF retains added value.530 
 
4.4.3 Intermezzo: A brief return to the functions of industry codes of conduct 
 
At this point, it is worthwhile to take a brief glance at how the findings of this section relate to 
the functions identified in the previous chapter. As was set out in that chapter (Figure 3.5), 
industry codes of conduct can have one or more of the following functions from the 
perspective of the legislator: 
 




If we relate these functions to the private law examples discussed above, the following picture 
emerges. The function that comes to the fore most prominently is, not surprisingly given its 
overarching nature, the policy instrument function. Both the European and the Dutch 
legislator employ codes of conduct to attain the policy goals set for a certain field of private 
law, such as the realization of an internal market for e-commerce, the regulation of unfair 
commercial practices or consumer protection. The protective function of industry codes is 
                                                                                                                                                   
endorsed in case law, see Rb. Rotterdam 20 May 2010, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM5231, para 2.12, confirmed 
by CBb 19 July 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:69, para 5.2. 
527 Netherlands Government Gazette 2012, no. 26433, p. 6. See also <www.nvb.nl/nieuws/2012/1639/tijdelijke-
regeling-hypothecair-krediet.html> (accessed 18 January 2016). 
528 Wijzigingsbesluit financiële markten 2013, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2012, no. 695, p. 97; Tijdelijk 
regeling hypothecair krediet, Netherlands Government Gazette 2012, no. 26433, p. 6; Mak 2015, pp. 423-424. 
529 See Article 115(1) in conjunction with Article 115(4) Market Conduct Supervision Financial Institutions 
Decree (Besluit gedragstoezicht financiële ondernemingen Wft); Tijdelijk regeling hypothecair krediet, 
Netherlands Government Gazette 2012, no. 26433, p. 6. Cf. Mak 2015, p. 424. 
530 Cf. Kerste et al. 2011, p. 95. The NVB website makes clear that the GHF remains in force, albeit in a revised 
form, i.e., without the code rules now enshrined in the Temporary Rules. See 
<www.nvb.nl/nieuws/2012/1639/tijdelijke-regeling-hypothecair-krediet.html>. Websites accessed 18 January 
2016. 
Policy instrument function 
i. Alternative to public regulation 
ii. Complementary function 
iii. Harmonization function 
iv. Safeguarding function 
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also reflected in the examples discussed, most notably in the field of consumer law, media 
services and personal data protection. The harmonizing potential of industry codes is drawn 
on by European directives that promote the use of these codes as a means to facilitate their 
implementation (e.g., the Services Directive, the E-Commerce Directive, the AVMSD).  
 Codes of conduct that result from legislative references, logically, in most cases bear a 
complementary function. Prime examples of such ‘complementary’ codes are the data 
protection codes of conduct drawn up to substantiate European or national public rules on 
data protection. The complementary function however also comes to the fore in cases where 
initially independent codes have been backed by legislation, such as the Dutch Code of 
conduct on mortgage credit and the Dutch SMS Code. Such legislative interference changes 
the nature of the regime from alternative to complementary. When the legislator resorts to a 
code of conduct outside the realm of legislation, a code most often functions as an alternative 
to governmental regulation. Admittedly, codes of conduct are in effect always an alternative 
to governmental regulation since their deployment in essence always involves choosing 
whether or not to take public regulatory action. However, the previous chapter has reserved 
the label ‘alternative’ for codes of conduct that are deployed instead of (further) legislative 
intervention. Still, however, codes that are a regulatory alternative can function in a broader, 
general legislative framework. Examples in this respect that I have have reviewed in this 
chapter are the PEGI codes, the EU Code for Online Behavioural Advertising and the Dutch 




The examples discussed in this section show that both the European and the Dutch legislator 
rely upon industry codes of conduct within the field of private law in various different ways. 
At the European level, several private law directives encourage the use of European-wide and 
national codes of conduct aimed at contributing to the attainment of the goals of these 
directives and to their implementation. The European legislator has also pulled codes of 
conduct into the legal sphere in a more explicit way, most notably by imposing duties on 
traders to inform consumers about codes of conduct they adhere to, by establishing a regime 
for the formal approval of codes on data protection and by sanctioning non-compliance with a 
code as an unfair commercial practice.531 At the Dutch level, by contrast, there are practically 
no references to codes in private law legislation other than those stemming from European 
legislation. The European and the Dutch legislator have also actively initiated the drawing up 
of industry codes ‘outside’ legislation. This section has touched upon several examples in 
which regulation has been wholly or partially left to the industry, either in the course of the 
policy making process or following pressure exerted by the legislator on the industry to adopt 
a code of conduct. 
 
 
                                                




4.5 Criteria, conditions and recommendations532 
 
It follows from the above that the attention for alternative regulatory mechanisms in European 
and Dutch legislative policies has translated into several legislative references to industry 
codes of conduct and into the deployment of industry codes as a policy instrument ‘outside’ 
legislation. The choice of the legislator to resort to industry codes is, however, not a free one: 
both the European and the Dutch legislator have to operate within a framework that sets 
boundaries to their regulatory choice. These boundaries not only follow from legislation and 
general principles of law, but can also be found in policy documents discussing the use of 
alternative regulatory instruments. This section concentrates on the latter set of restraints and 
discusses the criteria for the use of self-regulation and co-regulation following on from 
European (section 4.5.1) and Dutch (section 4.5.2) legislative policy.533 
 
4.5.1 European Union 
 
Until the adoption of the IIA 2016, the IIA 2003 formed the key document when it comes to 
constraints on the deployment of alternative regulatory instruments at the European level. As 
set out above, the IIA 2003 for the first time introduced general criteria, both of a substantive 
and of a more procedural nature, for the use of self-regulation and co-regulation.534 These 
criteria to a large extent reflect the conditions formulated in policy documents concerning the 
EU Better Regulation Agenda published in the run-up to the IIA 2003.535 However, the future 
of these criteria is highly uncertain, as the IIA 2016 lacks references to self-regulation and co-
regulation.536 Given the fact that this Agreement has replaced the IIA 2003, it seems likely 
that criteria for the use of self-regulation and co-regulation from now on have to be found 
elsewhere. The Better Regulation Toolbox and the Principles for Better Self- and Co-
Regulation might jointly constitute this new source. 
 Against this background, this section starts out with a brief discussion of the old criteria 
for the use of self-regulation and co-regulation included in the IIA 2003 (section 4.5.1.1).537 
Thereupon, the conditions put forward by the Better Regulation Toolbox and the Principles 
for Better Self- and Co-regulation will be described (section 4.5.1.2).  
 
                                                
532 Part of this section has, in an earlier version, already been published (in Dutch) in Menting & Vranken 2014, 
pp. 30-40. 
533 For a brief discussion of the legal restrictions to the regulatory choice of the legislator, see Meuwese & 
Senden 2009, pp. 154-162 (EU law) and Van Heesen-Laclé & Meuwese 2007 (Dutch law). 
534 Senden 2005, p. 18; Meuwese & Senden 2009, pp. 159-162. 
535 Prior to the adoption of the IIA 2003, general conditions on the use of co-regulation could, for instance, be 
found in the Mandelkern Report (2001, p. 17), the White Paper on European Governance (COM(2001) 428 final, 
p. 21) and the Better Regulation Action Plan (COM(2002) 278 final, pp. 12-13). 
536 In its opinion on self-regulation and co-regulation, published in the run-up to the IIA 2016, the EESC 
explicitly called for the “clear and precise definition of a general set of basic principles and essential 
requirements which the self-regulation and co-regulation mechanisms must meet in order to be recognised and/or 
recommended by the EU”. It subsequently listed a number of criteria. See Opinion of the EESC on Self-
regulation and co-regulation in the Community legislative framework, Brussels 22 April 2015, INT/754, under 
5.18 (quotation) et seq. 
537 Where appropriate, references to relevant documents pre-dating the IIA 2003 will be made. 
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4.5.1.1 The Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making 2003 
 
As regards the use of alternative methods of regulation, the IIA 2003 reads as follows:  
 
“The Commission will ensure that any use of co-regulation or self-regulation is always consistent 
with Community law and that it meets the criteria of transparency (in particular the publicising of 
agreements) and representativeness of the parties involved. It must also represent added value for 
the general interest. These mechanisms will not be applicable where fundamental rights or 
important political options are at stake or in situations where the rules must be applied in a 
uniform fashion in all Member States. They must ensure swift and flexible regulation which does 
not affect the principles of competition or the unity of the internal market”.538 (emphasis added, 
MM) 
 
Under the IIA 2003, the European legislator could only resort to self-regulation or co-
regulation when these requirements were met. Co-regulatory regimes could thereby be subject 
to additional requirements imposed by the legislative act they are based on.539 The IIA 2013 
also included some control mechanisms.540 The Agreement did however not elaborate on the 
content of the criteria it put forward.541 Svilpaite has made an effort to detail these criteria, 
building on various other policy documents dealing with self-regulation and co-regulation in 
general or with specific types of self-regulation and co-regulation, such as voluntary 
environmental agreements.542 In the following, I will for a large part draw on her work, with 
the caveat that it is not clear whether ‘implementing criteria’ for one alternative regulatory 
instrument, such as environmental agreements, apply to other forms of self-regulation and co-
regulation, such as codes of conduct, as well. 
 
1) Consistent with Community law 
The first condition that the IIA 2003 imposed on the use of self-regulation and co-regulation 
is that it should always be consistent with Community law. First of all, as can be deduced 
from recital 16 of the Agreement, this implies that these instruments can only be used “where 
the Treaty does not specifically require the use of a legal instrument”.543 Furthermore, as 
Svilpaite indicates, this condition covered at least compliance with (i) Treaties and binding 
legislation, (ii) soft law and (iii) international obligations.544 
                                                
538 OJ 2003, C 321/01, recital 17. These requirements resemble those formulated in respect of the use of co-
regulation in the Mandelkern Report (2001, p. 17), the White Paper on European Governance (COM(2001) 428 
final, p. 21) and the Better Regulation Action Plan (COM(2002) 278 final, p. 13).  
539 In the words of the IIA 2003(OJ 2003, C 321/01), recital 18: “This mechanism [co-regulation, MM] may be 
used on the basis of criteria defined in the legislative act so as to enable the legislation to be adapted to the 
problems and sectors concerned, to reduce the legislative burden by concentrating on essential aspects and to 
draw on the experience of the parties concerned” (emphasis added, MM). 
540 These mechanisms will not be discussed. For an account of the control mechanisms, see, e.g., Svilpaite 
2007b, pp. 25-27, with further references. 
541 Senden & Meuwese 2009, pp. 161-162, noting that this might complicate the assessment as to whether the 
criteria have been complied with. 
542 Svilpaite 2007b.  
543 OJ 2003, C 321/01, recital 16. See also Svilpaite 2007b, p. 6. 
544 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 6.  
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i. Treaties and binding legislation 
Svilpaite ranks the rules on the internal market, including the four freedoms, the rules on 
employment and social policy and the non-discrimination principle as the most-listed Treaty 
provisions that self-regulatory and co-regulatory schemes should comply with. Special 
reference is often made to compliance with European competition law rules (see below, under 
6). Secondary EU law can also condition the use of alternative regulatory instruments.545 
 
In the discussion of examples of references to codes of conduct in EU legislation in section 
4.4.1.1, two examples of secondary EU law imposing such requirements have passed in review. 
• Article 4(7) of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive for instance stipulates that self-
regulatory and co-regulatory regimes, to be encouraged by the Member States, should enjoy 
the broad acceptance of the main stakeholders in the Member States concerned and should 
provide for effective enforcement.546 
o The proposal for a new, amended AVMSD adds that the objectives of the codes should 
be set out in a clear and unambiguous way, that “regular, transparent and independent 
monitoring and evaluation of the achievement of the objectives aimed” should be 
provided and that effective enforcement is to include “when appropriate effective and 
proportionate sanctions”.547 
• The Services Directive also conditions the use of European codes of conduct. Regarding the 
use of codes of conduct in general, the Directive provides that these codes set out minimum 
requirements and are hence complementary to public measures.548 Additionally, Article 
37(1) re-emphasizes that these codes should be in compliance with EU law. More specific 
requirements are imposed on codes of conduct of professional bodies. As was set out in 
section 4.4.1.1.3 (under h), the Directive not only indicates what these codes should include 
content-wise, but also demands compliance of these codes with Community law, 
competition law in particular, and the national legally binding rules on professional ethics 
and conduct.549 Private rule-making by professional organizations is also subject to the 
Directive itself.550 Furthermore, the Commission has indicated that professional bodies 
should meet certain principles of good governance when drawing up a code of conduct.551 
• Although I did not discuss it in section 4.4.1.1, the Universal Service Directive is also 
worthy of mention at this point. Perceiving co-regulation as a suitable way to stimulate 
better quality standards and service performance, recital 48 of this Directive reads as 
follows: “co-regulation should be guided by the same principles as formal regulation, i.e. it 
should be objective, justified, proportional, non-discriminatory and transparent”.552  
 
                                                
545 Svilpaite 2007b, pp. 6-9. 
546 Directive 2010/13/EU.  
547 Article 4(7) of the proposed directive (COM(2016) 287 final). 
548 Directive 2006/123/EC, recital 114. 
549 Directive 2006/123/EC, recitals 100, 113-114. 
550 Delimatsis 2010, p. 1054. 
551 DG for Internal Market and Services, Enhancing the quality of services in the Internal Market: The role of 
European codes of conduct, European Communities 2007, p. 10; Handbook on implementation of the Services 
Directive, pp. 51-52. 
552 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service 
and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) (OJ 
2002, L 108/51), recital 48. 
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ii. Soft law 
Constraints on the use of self-regulation and co-regulation can also be found in soft law 
documents. Going by the analysis of Svilpaite, these constraints can be both explanatory and 
complementary in nature. Whereas explanatory criteria in fact substantiate the general criteria 
formulated by the IIA 2003, complementary criteria are in addition to these general IIA 
criteria.553 Senden indicates that soft law instruments, most notably recommendations, can 
also be used to confirm or provide support for alternative regulatory instruments.554 
 
Illustrative in this respect is the 1998 Recommendation on the protection of minors and human 
dignity in audiovisual and information services which not only promotes the use of self-
regulation, but also includes guidelines for their use. The ‘Indicative Guidelines for the 
implementation, at national level, of a self-regulation framework’, annexed to the 
Recommendation, cover four key components that national self-regulation should encompass. 
Firstly, it is indicated that the relevant stakeholders should be involved in the self-regulatory 
process (under ‘consultation and representativeness of the parties concerned’). Secondly, the 
Guidelines set out what codes of conduct concerning the protection of minors and human 
dignity in audiovisual and information services should include content-wise (under ‘codes of 
conduct’). Thirdly, the Guidelines call for the setting up of national coordinating bodies (under 
‘national bodies facilitating cooperation at community level’). Fourthly, the parties concerned 
are asked to set up a national system for the evaluation of self-regulatory schemes.555 
 
iii. International obligations 
Finally, if interpreted broadly, the requirement that self-regulation and co-regulation should 
be in compliance with Community law also entails an obligation to comply with the 
international obligations of the European Union, such as those included in international trade 
agreements and WTO provisions.556 
 
2) Transparency 
The second requirement imposed by the IIA 2003, which is of a more procedural nature, is 
that the use of self-regulation or co-regulation ‘meets the criteria of transparency’. It follows 
from the IIA itself that this requirement particularly concerns the publication of a self-
regulatory or co-regulatory measure.557 From a broader perspective, Svilpaite submits, the 
                                                
553 Svilpaite 2007b, pp. 9-10. An illustration of this practice can be found in the area of environmental law, 
where the Commission actively encourages the development of voluntary European environmental agreements. 
See, e.g., Senden 2005, pp. 15-16; Van Calster & Deketelaere 2001; Orts & Deketelaere 2001; Croci 2005; 
Communication from the Commission on Environmental Agreements, COM(96) 561 final; Communication 
from the Commission, Environmental Agreements at Community Level - Within the Framework of the Action 
Plan on the Simplification and Improvement of the Regulatory Environment, COM(2002) 412 final. 
554 Senden 2005, pp. 24-27, providing a closer analysis of the link between recommendations and self-regulation. 
555 Council Recommendation 98/560/EC. See also section 4.4.1.1.2 under e.1. 
556 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 10. 
557 OJ 2003, C 321/01, recital 17. Cf. the White Paper on European Governance (COM(2001) 428 final), p. 21 
which demands in respect of co-regulation that “the rules agreed must be sufficiently visible so that people are 
aware of the rules that apply and the rights they enjoy”. A similar condition is mentioned in the Better 
Regulation Action Plan, COM(2002) 278 final, p. 13 and Annex I of the Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009 
(SEC(2009) 92), p. 27. 
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transparency requirement not only concerns publication of the measures, but “should also 
cover participation, decision making and institutional structures of private parties involved in 
self- and co-regulation”.558 This is also reflected in the White Paper on European Governance, 
which reads as follows: the organizations participating in co-regulation “must be 
representative, accountable and capable of following open procedures in formulating and 
applying agreed rules”.559 
 
3) Representativeness of the parties involved 
Thirdly, the IIA 2003 demanded that ‘the representativeness of the parties involved’ be 
ensured. The Agreement however provided neither clues as to who ‘the parties involved’ are 
nor as to when said parties could be deemed sufficiently representative. Thus, once again, 
hints as to how this requirement was to be substantiated had to be sought elsewhere. Svilpaite 
has brought together the following criteria, which “have been mentioned as indicative for the 
assessment of the representation test in various documents”560: 
 
“the representation of the vast majority of the relevant economic sector, with as few exceptions as 
possible; proportional coverage of the sector (e.g., sectoral and geographical cover), or scope of a 
measure; the consultations with the interested and affected parties and taking into account variety 
of interests; etc. In some documents and reports the requirement of representativeness is 
supplemented by the requirement to be organized and responsible, have means to ensure effective 
implementation and compliance of the agreed rules, and be accountable”.561 
 
Svilpaite also points at the criteria for assessing the eligibility of European organizations to 
take part in a ‘civil dialogue’ on policy making, formulated by the EESC in its opinion on the 
Commission’s White Paper on European Governance.562 Although such dialogues involve a 
much broader spectrum of actors, the criteria can nonetheless bear indicative force in the 
context of the IIA 2003. The EESC submits that in order for a European organization to be 
eligible to take part in a civil dialogue, it should: 
 
“1) exist permanently at Community level; 2) provide direct access to its members’ expertise and 
hence rapid and constructive consultation; 3) represent general concerns that tally with the 
interests of European society; 4) comprise bodies that are recognised at Member State level as 
representative of particular interests; 5) have member organisations in most of the EU Member 
States; 6) provide for accountability to its members; 7) have authority to represent and act at 
European level; 8) be independent and mandatory, not bound by instructions from outside bodies; 
9) be transparent especially financially and in its decision-making structures”.563 (nos added, MM) 
                                                
558 Svilpaite 2007b, pp. 20-21, with further references. 
559 COM(2001) 428 final, p. 21.  
560 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 2. 
561 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 2. The requirement of a satisfactory sectoral and geographical cover can also be found in 
the IIA 2003 (recital 23). 
562 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 23, with reference to EESC, Opinion on European Governance – A White Paper, Brussels 
20 March 2002 (CES 357/2002), OJ 2002, L 122/61. 
563 EESC, Opinion on European Governance – A White Paper, Brussels 20 March 2002 (CES 357/2002), OJ 
2002, L 122/61, pp. 5-6. 
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4) Added value for the general interest 
The fourth requirement put forward by the IIA 2003 is that the use of self-regulation or co-
regulation represents ‘added value for the general interest’. According to Svilpaite, the added 
value of these instruments in this regard can lie in their operational qualities. These qualities 
for example concern in the fact that they can be a flexible and swift form of regulation and in 
the fact that they, as such, can contribute to legal or administrative simplification.564 The 
added value of self-regulatory and co-regulatory measures should however also be reflected in 
the substance of the commitments they entail, Svilpaite submits. These commitments should 
also contribute to the general interest, for instance by setting a high standard for 
environmental protection.565 Svilpaite in this regard also quotes the EESC, which has stated 
that self-regulation and co-regulation should take place “with a desire to respect and promote 
certain fundamental values such as honesty, good faith, respect for others, openness to 
partnership, and a competitive spirit”.566 She remarks that the added value of a self-regulatory 
or co-regulatory measure is likely to lie in these features.567 This also appears to echo through 
in the White Paper on European Governance, which states that the private regulators’ 
representativeness, accountability and capability of following open procedures in adopting 
and applying the rules “will be a key factor in deciding the added value of a co-regulatory 
approach in a given case”.568 
 
5) Precluded areas 
Fifthly, the IIA 2003 precluded the use of self-regulation and co-regulation in three situations, 
namely (i) where fundamental rights or (ii) important political options are at stake, or (iii) 
where the rules have to be applied in a uniform fashion in all Member States.569 
 
i. Fundamental rights 
Not surprisingly, the IIA 2003 does not make clear why self-regulation and co-regulation 
cannot be resorted to when fundamental rights hang in the balance. Cafaggi submits that this 
might have to do with an implicit belief that only legislative acts, enacted by democratically 
legitimized bodies which can be held politically accountable and can be subjected to judicial 
review, are to curtail these rights.570 This belief can be questioned, however, as can the 
proportionality and perhaps even the sustainability of the unconditional preclusion of self-
regulation and co-regulation when fundamental rights are in play.571 The shining example 
                                                
564 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 19. Cf. IIA 2003 (OJ 2003, C 321/01), recital 17: “they [self-regulation and co-regulation, 
MM] must ensure swift and flexible regulation”; Annex I of the Impact Assessment Guidelines 2009 
(SEC(2009) 92), pp. 24, 27. 
565 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 19. She deduces this requirement from recital 23 of the IIA 2003, which provides that the 
Commission is to notify the European Parliament of self-regulation which it regards “as being satisfactorily in 
terms of […] the added value of the commitments given”. 
566 EESC report, The Current State of Co-Regulation and Self-Regulation in the Single Market, 2005, p. 19 
(available at <www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.publications.80>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
567 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 19. 
568 COM(2001) 428 final, p. 21. 
569 IIA 2003 (OJ 2003, C 321/01), recital 17. 
570 Cafaggi 2006b, p. xviii. See also Svilpaite 2007b, p. 11. 
571 Cafaggi 2006b, p. xviii; Svilpaite 2007b; Verdoodt 2007, p. 83.  
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here is the media sector, where the need to protect and balance fundamental rights is pre-
eminently present. Although regulation in this sector almost by definition interferes with 
certain fundamental rights (e.g., the freedom of speech versus the right to privacy), EU media 
policy has put particular emphasis on self-regulation and co-regulation and has encouraged its 
use to protect certain fundamental rights (e.g., the protection of minors and human dignity) 
(cf. section 4.4.1.1.2).572 Alternative regulatory mechanisms are also present in the medical 
sector and in the field of data protection, where fundamental rights can equally be at stake. 
Hence, an outright exclusion of the use of self-regulation and co-regulation when fundamental 
rights are at stake is untenable.573  
 
ii. Important policy options 
The application of self-regulation and co-regulation is likewise precluded when important 
policy options are at stake. However, neither the IIA 2003 nor other policy documents 
indicate how to establish whether a policy option qualifies as ‘important’.574 
 
iii. Uniform application EU law 
The preclusion of the use of self-regulation and co-regulation in areas where a uniform 
application of EU rules is required appears to be motivated by the concern that private 
regulation might stand in the way of such a uniform application. Instead, public regulation 
would be best suited to reach a high level of uniformity.575 Again, however, this assumption 
can be questioned. Here, Svilpaite points at the use of European directives to reach uniformity 
always bearing the risk of “inconsistant implementation and diverse application in different 
Member States”.576 Furthermore, Cafaggi notes that private regulators do not always have an 
incentive to differentiate, since their motivation to reach a harmonized level of regulation 
might be even greater than that of Member States.577 The results of the empirical study 
support this observation: codes of conduct, notably those drawn up by European industry 
associations, can have a harmonization function. Even the Commission itself, albeit 
somewhat implicitly, acknowledges the harmonizing potential of self-regulation and co-
regulation employed alongside EU directives, as the examples discussed in the previous 
section show. For that reason, it can be argued that self-regulation and co-regulation should 
not be by definition intolerable when the uniform application of EU law is to be ensured.578 
 A different, yet related issue is that of the use of alternative regulatory instruments to 
implement European directives. On this point, the IIA 2003 remained silent, which implies 
that the use of these instruments in this context is not precluded beforehand. Indeed, Article 
                                                
572 Verdoodt 2007, p. 83. Svilpaite 2007b, pp. 11-12; Cafaggi 2006b, p. xviii. 
573 Menting & Vranken 2014, p. 40. 
574 Svilpaite 2007b, pp. 13-14, interpreting this particular condition as displaying an a priori distrust of self-
regulatory and co-regulatory practices on the part of the Commission and other EU institutions. 
575 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 12; Cafaggi 2006b, p. xix.  
576 Svilpaite 2007b, p. 12. 
577 Cafaggi 2006b, pp. xix-xx. Cafaggi indicates that the rationale behind this campaign for more uniformity is 
related to the private regulators’ “incentive to monopolize the rule-making function and the production of 
network externalities” (Cafaggi 2006b, p. xx). 
578 Cf. Svilpaite 2007b, p. 13. 
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288 TFEU establishes that it is up to the national authorities to choose the form and methods 
to achieve the result intended by any directive. That is however not to say that Member States 
are entirely free in deciding which methods of implementation they use; the CJEU has limited 
their discretion in this respect by formulating a set of requirements for the transposition of EU 
directives. The starting point here is that Article 288 TFEU does not prescribe legislative 
action at the national level. The CJEU, however, has assigned a central role to the principle of 
legal certainty, which implies that “the provisions of directives must be implemented with 
unquestionable binding force, and the specificity, precision and clarity necessary to satisfy the 
requirements of legal certainty”.579 Accordingly, there is only very limited space for 
transposing directives by any means other than binding legislation, particularly because of the 
requirement of ‘unquestionable binding force’.580 Sometimes, a directive itself leaves room 
for implementation through alternative instruments. The Directive on Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising, for example, allows for self-regulatory control of misleading or 
comparative advertising as well as private complaint handling processes.581 
 
6) No distortion of the principles of competition and the unity of the internal market 
Finally, the IIA 2003 provided that self-regulation and co-regulation are only allowed when 
they do “not affect the principles of competition or the unity of the internal market”.582 As I 
will discuss in Chapter 5, the CJEU has brought private regulation within the realm of both 
the free movement rules and competition law. Within the latter context, private regulators as 
well as Member States can incur competition law liability when private regulatory schemes 
fall foul of EU competition law.583 
 
4.5.1.2 The Better Regulation Toolbox and the Principles for Better Self- and Co-regulation 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, for now it appears that when the IIA 2016 
entered into force, the general framework on the use of self-regulation and co-regulation laid 
down in the IIA 2003 ceased to exist. However, the Better Regulation Toolbox already refers 
to another set of criteria, namely the Principles for Better Self- and Co-regulation (the 
Principles). The statement that these Principles “should be reflected in all self- and co-
regulatory initiatives” suggests that they might constitute a new benchmark for assessing the 
use of self-regulation and co-regulation.584 
                                                
579 Case C-159/99 Commission v Italy (2001) ECR I-4007, para 32. See also Case C-29/84 Commission v 
Germany (1985) ECR 1661, para 23 and Lenaerts, Van Nuffel & Bray 2005, pp. 766-769 with further references 
to case law. 
580 Interdepartementale Commissie Europees recht (ICER), ‘Handleiding wetgeving en Europa. De 
voorbereiding, totstandkoming en nationale implementatie van Europese regelgeving’ (2009), p. 103 (available 
at <www.minbuza.nl/ecer/icer/handleidingen.html>, accessed 1 July 2016). See also Svilpaite 2007b, pp. 14-18. 
581 Directive 2006/114/EC, Article 6 (discussed above in section 4.4.1.1.2 under f). See also ICER, ‘Handleiding 
wetgeving en Europa’ (2009), pp. 104-106. 
582 IIA 2003 (OJ 2003, C 321/3), recital 17. 
583 See Chapter 5, section 5.5 and, more extensively, Mataija 2016. 
584 Better Regulation Toolbox 2015, p. 89. See also ‘Self- and Co-Regulation in the Better Regulation Package 
(Vade Mecum)’, 9 June 2015, p. 2: “In the Communication, the Guidelines and the Toolbox, the Principles of 
better self- and co-regulation are clearly endorsed as benchmarks for good practice of self- and co-regulatory 
 
 125 
 The Principles have their origins in the EU strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility. 
In its 2011-2014 CSR Action Plan, the Commission expressed its intention to develop a code 
of good practice for self-regulation and co-regulation together with enterprises and other 
stakeholders, aimed at improving the effectiveness of the CSR process.585 This has led to the 
adoption of the Principles, developed with the contribution of experts and through a public 
consultation process, as well as to the establishment of a ‘Community of Practice’ (CoP), a 
platform which unites stakeholders wishing to contribute to the further development of the 
Principles.586 The Principles, reflecting best practices, address the ‘conception phase’ and the 
‘implementation phase’ of self-regulatory and co-regulatory practices. The principles 
concerning the conception phase require, in brief: that the participants are as representative as 
possible; openness of both the drafting process and the actual operation of the private 
regulatory scheme; that the participants observe the principle of good faith; that the objectives 
of the private action are set out clearly and unambiguously; and that the private rules are in 
compliance with legislation and fundamental rights as laid down in EU law and in domestic 
law. The principles on the implementation phase demand that the private regulatory initiative 
is open to iterative improvements; that a sufficiently open and autonomous monitoring system 
is in place; that evaluation mechanisms are in place; that an independent dispute resolution 
scheme and sanctions are available; and that the private regulators are transparent about the 
financial support that they receive. 
 A brief comparison of these criteria with the requirements laid down in the IIA 2003 
shows that the Principles reflect the compliance requirement as well as the criteria of 
representativeness and transparency. The ‘added value requirement’ and the ‘precluded areas’ 
requirement, by contrast, do not have an equivalent in the Principles. The Better Regulation 
Toolbox suggests that the latter requirement no longer holds by providing that “the self/co-
regulation initiatives cannot a priori be excluded from any policy area”.587 The Principles 
provide more details as to the content of the criteria than does the IIA 2003.  
 Finally, it should be reiterated that it remains somewhat opaque whether the Principles 
actually take the place of the IIA 2003 framework for the use of self-regulation and co-
regulation, the more so since the Principles are proclaimed to “offer a benchmark for effective 
self- and co-regulation”, yet without being “final or comprehensive”.588 Furthermore, it has 
been indicated that the Principles are “are entirely without prejudice to the Commission’s 
right of initiative, to the exercise of legislative and regulatory discretion, notably regarding 
                                                                                                                                                   
actions” (available at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/content/self-and-co-regulation-better-
regulation-package-vade-mecum>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
585 Communication from the Commission, A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, 
COM(2011) 681 final, p. 10. 
586 See Activity Report on action #5 of the Communication ‘A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate 
Social Responsibility’, pp. 3-5 (available at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/news/principles-better-
self-and-co-regulation-and-establishment-community-practice>). On the CoP, see also section 4.3.1.6.2 above. 
The Principles can be found at <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/node/69742>. For more information 
on the Community of Practice, see <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/community-practice-better-
self-and-co-regulation-0>. Websites accessed 1 July 2016. 
587 Better Regulation Toolbox 2015, p. 89. 
588 Activity Report on action #5 of the Communication ‘A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility’, p. 4. 
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the choice of appropriate instruments for legislation or regulation, which remains to be judged 
case by case, […]”.589 On the other hand, the Commission’s proposal for a new AVMSD 
explicitly refers to the Principles, indicating that codes of conduct that concern issues that fall 
within the scope of the directive should follow the Principles.590 
 
4.5.2 The Netherlands 
 
The Dutch legislator, in contrast to its European counterpart, has adopted a more piecemeal 
approach in developing criteria for the use of self-regulation and co-regulation as alternatives 
to legislation. A general framework, like the ones set out by the now obsolete IIA 2003 and 
the Principles for Better Self- and Co-regulation, is lacking at the national level. The IFPL, 
which may be expected to be a main source in this respect, seems to be more focused on the 
factors that determine whether self-regulation and co-regulation are likely to be successful 
and entails only limited preconditions as to the use of these mechanisms (section 4.5.2.1). 
Clues as to the conditions under which the Dutch legislator sees fit the use of self-regulation 
and co-regulation have to be gathered from policy documents other than those on general 
legislative policy (section 4.5.2.2).591 
 
4.5.2.1 The IFPL 
 
Compared with the IIA 2003 and the Principles of Better Self- and Co-regulation, the IPFL 
lays down very few criteria. In fact, the Framework only mentions three preconditions any 
particular sector has to meet in order for policy makers to allow self-regulation: 1) a certain 
level of knowledge, 2) support, and 3) a ‘sufficiently’ dense organization.592 However, the 
IFPL does not explain when the required level of knowledge and degree of organization can 
be deemed present within the sectors involved. Additionally, the IFPL refers to an assessment 
framework, developed by the Research and Documentation Centre (Wetenschappelijk 
Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum) based on empirical research, which includes several 
factors that influence the success or failure of a self-regulatory regime.593 This framework 
                                                
589 Activity Report on action #5 of the Communication ‘A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility’, p. 4. 
590 Recital 7 of the proposed directive (COM(2016) 287 final). 
591 See also section 4.4.1.1.3 under i where the criteria are discussed for the official approval of data protection 
codes. 
592 IFPL, under 6.1 (Beleidsinstrumenten A-Z > Categorieën beleidsinstrumenten > Co-regulering en 
zelfregulering, at <www.kcwj.nl/kennisbank/integraal-afwegingskader-beleid-en-regelgeving/6-wat-het-beste-
instrument>, accessed 1 July 2016) 
593 More specifically, the framework refers to societal demands; density rate of organization; support; clear 
sanctioning; evaluation of self-regulation; practicability; extent and size of branch; divergence of interest; 
tradition of self-regulation; stable problem field; private interests; state support. See Van Boom et al. 2009, pp. 
18-19. A follow-up study found that both the degree of organization of a sector and support for the self-
regulatory initiative especially determine whether or not any self-regulatory initiative succeeds. More 
specifically, the researchers found that “if the interests in a given branch converge, the density rate of 
organisation is high – and vice versa – which in turn facilitates an assessment of the support in this branch for 
the policy goals underlying the self-regulatory initiative”. See Van Boom et al. 2011, p. vi. Cf. also the factors 
identified in Baarsma et al. 2003, pp. 30-31, 51-56. The IFPL also refers to this empirical study (under 6.1). 
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allows policy makers to arrive at a more balanced opinion as to the likelihood that self-
regulatory measures will be successful, thus the IFPL.594 However, as such, these factors do 
not tell us much about the limits and criteria imposed on the use of self-regulation and co-
regulation, even though they can be said to play a background role in this respect. After all, if 
these factors indicate that self-regulation is likely to be unsuccessful, the government may 
have a valid argument for not using this instrument. In this respect, they in fact do link up 
with Instruction 8 of the LDI, which provides for direct government intervention only if the 
self-regulatory capacity of the relevant sectors cannot be expected to produce the required 
results, even if backed by public measures (see section 4.3.2.3.3). 
 
4.5.2.2 Other policy documents 
 
Strikingly, government documents concerning specific policy areas shed more light on the 
matter as to when the legislator is allowed to opt for self-regulation and co-regulation. This 
‘ad hoc’ approach does however make it difficult to ascertain the actual weight and relevance 
of the criteria formulated in these documents. Is the use of private regulation always subject 
to these criteria? With this caveat in mind, this section surveys several of these policy 
documents. 
 
a. Report of the Geelhoed Committee 
The first document that can be mentioned here is the final report of the Geelhoed Committee. 
This report, which can be situated in the context of Dutch general legislative policy (see 
section 4.3.2.1), lists several criteria for ‘effective self-regulation’.595 Like government 
regulation, self-regulation must first of all meet certain minimum quality requirements, 
including the accessibility and clarity of the rules and a sufficient degree of certainty that the 
rules are indeed being complied with. Secondly, any dispute resolution scheme included in 
the self-regulatory regime must, to the greatest possible extent, meet the principles of due 
process. Thirdly, as regards the interests covered, the Committee notes that the focus of the 
self-regulatory rules may not be too one-sided, as this might lead to conflicts with competition 
law. Self-regulation may not have a negative effect on effective competition. Here the 
Committee warns that a conflict between self-regulation and competition law might prompt 





                                                
594 IFPL, under 6.1 (Beleidsinstrumenten A-Z > Zelfregulering, at <www.kcwj.nl/kennisbank/integraal-
afwegingskader-beleid-en-regelgeving/6-wat-het-beste-instrument/61-0>, accessed 1 July 2016). The IFPL 
includes a factsheet on codes of conduct, along with a list of success factors and failure factors specific to this 
instrument. See IFPL, under 6.1 (Beleidsinstrumenten A-Z > Gedragscode > Factsheet Gedragscode, at 
<www.kcwj.nl/kennisbank/integraal-afwegingskader-beleid-en-regelgeving/6-wat-het-beste-
instrument/61/gedragscode>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
595 Parliamentary Papers II 1983/84, 17 931, no. 9, p. 44. 
596 Parliamentary Papers II 1983/84, 17 931, no. 9, p. 44.  
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b. Reaction to the Green Paper on consumer protection 
A more extensive reflection on the requirements for the use of self-regulation, and the ways in 
which these requirements could be implemented, can be found in the government document 
setting out the Dutch reaction to the European Commission’s Green Paper on consumer 
protection.597 Particularly relevant in this respect is the Dutch answer to the Commission’s 
question as to whether it would be useful to lay down a basis for self-regulation in a 
framework directive. In its response, the Dutch government starts out by noting that self-
regulation is often used in the Dutch context as an alternative to or substitution for existing 
public regulation.598 According to the government, this requires the target groups of a self-
regulatory scheme to be sufficiently organized, that relevant interests are balanced equally, 
that the actors involved are sufficiently bound to the scheme and that enforcement is 
sufficiently ensured.599 Subsequently, the issue raised by the Commission is addressed: 
embedding self-regulation in legislation.600 The Dutch government is of the opinion that it can 
be appropriate to provide legislative backing to self-regulation, but that this should not occur 
through a general framework directive. Specific directives are a more suitable means in this 
respect since self-regulation differs between industries. However, the government does not 
see much in the use of obligatory forms of legislative support. It points out in this respect that 
the voluntary nature of self-regulation would not benefit from a tight regulatory framework. 
Furthermore, the wide variety of self-regulatory mechanisms within and between Member 
States might require a multiplicity of rules, which could render the use of some forms of self-
regulation impossible. Against this backdrop, the Dutch government advocates forms of 
government support that stimulate the use of self-regulation. Nonetheless, the government 
does not show itself unfavorable disposed to the formulation of minimum quality criteria.601 
Finally, in another part of the response, stress is given to the importance of stakeholder 
participation. If possible, all stakeholders, i.e., consumer as well as business organizations, 
should be involved in the self-regulatory process, thus the Dutch government.602 
 
c. Financial Services Act 
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the former Financial Services Act (Wet Financiële 
Dienstverlening) we can find further clues as to what criteria self-regulatory initiatives have 
to meet in order to function as a policy instrument.603 Although the framework set out by the 
                                                
597 Parliamentary Papers II 2001/02, 27 879, no. 3. 
598 Cf. the fact that the Dutch legislator has repeatedly expressed a clear preference for self-regulation in the 
context of consumer policy. See, e.g., Parliamentary Papers II 1992/93, 23 162, no. 1; Parliamentary Papers II 
2003/04, 27 879, no. 9; Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 27 879, no. 41. 
599 Parliamentary Papers II 2001/02, 27 879, no. 3, p. 7. 
600 The government in this respect remarks that the Dutch notion of self-regulation refers to self-imposed 
measures which in principle do not have a legal basis. It is possible, however, to lay down in legislation that self-
regulation can replace statutory provisions. See Parliamentary Papers II 2001/02, 27 879, no. 3, p. 7. 
601 Parliamentary Papers II 2001/02, 27 879, no. 3, pp. 7-8, also pointing at the development of a ‘voluntary 
European self-regulatory model’.  
602 Parliamentary Papers II 2001/02, 27 879, no. 3, p. 8. 
603 Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29 507, no. 3. The Act sought to enshrine the responsibilities of the 




Act ceased to exist after having been replaced by the Financial Supervision Act in 2007, it is 
nonetheless worthwhile looking at a bit more closely. What makes this case particularly 
interesting is that the Explanatory Memorandum, in the run-up to the formulation of such 
criteria, illustrates how the interplay between public and private regulation can take shape.  
 The Explanatory Memorandum starts out by noting that legislation would be rendered 
superfluous where effective, high quality self-regulation is in place, which is complied with 
by all market players within the financial services industry. The self-regulatory ‘web’ that 
existed at the time was woven by different industry codes of conduct concerning the relation 
between financial service providers and consumers. The legislator, however, deemed this web 
insufficient since only part of the industry had committed itself to the self-regulatory 
initiatives in force. This resulted in an unequal playing field within the industry, where market 
players complying with the codes had to compete with free riders that in turn had a negative 
impact on their reputation. However, the role of the Financial Service Act, then still in draft 
form, was not to replace or discourage the existing self-regulatory initiatives. Rather, the Act 
was to be conceived of as ‘a legal guarantee’ of those initiatives, with which it sought to link 
up.604  
 In accordance with these deliberations, the legislator explicitly left room for an industry-
wide code of conduct to implement the legal criteria for the provision of financial services 
formulated by the Financial Services Act, provided the code met certain requirements. In 
brief, these requirements concern: the content of the code (the rules should: be checked 
against the relevant public interests, be necessary and proportionate to these public interests 
and burden the regulatory addressees as little as possible); the scope of the code (it should 
cover all sectors within the financial industry); support for the code (multiple representative 
trade associations from the entire industry must approve the code in its entirety and 
unconditionally); coverage (the subscribing organizations should be able to ensure that a large 
part of the industry agrees and complies with the code within reasonable time); enforceability 
of the code; compliance with competition law (i.e., no unjustified restrictions on competition) 
and the legitimacy of the code (the code should comply with legislation, including the 
Competition Law Act).605 To ensure that the code could be truly considered an elaboration of 
the public interests covered by the Financial Service Act, the code also had to be assessed and 
approved by the Minister of Finance. Once this final hurdle had been successfully taken, the 





                                                
604 Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29 507, no. 3, p. 4. The objective of the Act, more specifically, was to raise 
the level of service provision on the side of the free riders (or ban these free riders from the market). Cf. The 
report ‘Bemiddeling in financiële diensten’ (2002) of the Dutch Social and Economic Council (SER) in which 
complete market coverage is identified as a precondition for attaining adequate consumer protection through 
self-regulation in the financial services industry (pp. 41-42, available at 
<www.ser.nl/nl/publicaties/adviezen/2000-2009/2002/b20927.aspx>, accessed 1 July 2016). 
605 Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29 507, no. 3, pp. 14-15. 
606 Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29 507, no. 3, pp. 15-16. 
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d. ‘Legislation for the electronic superhighway’ 
The government report ‘Legislation for the electronic superhighway’ (Nota Wetgeving voor 
de elektronische snelweg), dating from February 1998, lays down an assessment framework 
for the Dutch legislator to apply when drafting the regulatory framework for what the report 
metaphorically calls the ‘electronic superhighway’, i.e., the transition to the information 
society.607 In the report, the legislator voiced its preference for self-regulation, particularly in 
the short term. In the long term, government regulation might become the preferred option.608 
However, self-regulation cannot always be resorted to as an alternative to government 
regulation, as the legislator indicated. Self-regulation cannot be employed in cases where 
“values and standards that are fundamental to a democracy based on the rule of law” are at 
stake.609 Furthermore, the following four criteria have to be met: “the target groups involved 
should be sufficiently organized; the relevant societal interests should be balanced equally; all 
parties involved should be sufficiently bound; compliance with the self-regulatory 
arrangements should be sufficiently ensured”.610 It is noted in the report that these criteria do 
not differ markedly from those imposed on self-regulation outside the context of the 
‘electronic superhighway’.611 The responsibility rests with the government in assuring that 
self-regulatory initiatives adopted in the context of the ‘electronic superhighway’ meet the 
aforementioned criteria. The report lists several means that are at the disposal of the 
government in this respect, including the enactment of legislation supporting self-regulation 
and the threat of legislative intervention.612 
 
4.5.3 A brief overview 
 
The discussion in this section shows that both the European and the Dutch legislator have set 
boundaries to the use of alternative regulatory instruments. The main difference between the 
European and the Dutch approach in this respect is that at the European level, the criteria have 
been brought together in a single general framework, whereas at the Dutch level a variety of 
different policy documents has to be sifted through to deduce what the criteria are. The 
picture that emerges when all criteria are taken together is nonetheless a fairly consistent one. 
When the legislator wishes to seek recourse to self-regulation and co-regulation, both 
substantive and procedural requirements have to be met. The more procedural requirements 
are in essence principles of good governance. For instance, the drafting process has to be 
transparent and the rules should be made publicly available (EU), the actors involved should 
be representative (both) and sufficiently organized (NL), the relevant social interests should 
be balanced equally (NL) and stakeholder participation is preferred (both). Monitoring and 
enforcement should also be provided for (both). The more substantive requirements concern 
                                                
607 Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 25 880, no. 2, pp. 3-5. 
608 Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 25 880, no. 2, p. 12. 
609 Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 25 880, no. 2, pp. 12-13, 181 (my own translation). 
610 Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 25 880, no. 2, p. 181 (my own translation). The four criteria are indeed 
identical to the ones formulated in the government’s reaction to the Green Paper (supra, under b). 
611 Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 25 880, no. 2, p. 181.  
612 Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 25 880, no. 2, pp. 13, 181.  
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the compliance of self-regulation and co-regulation with European and national legislation in 
general, and competition law in particular (both). The use of these instruments should have 
added value for the general interest (EU) and cannot be deployed when fundamental rights or 
fundamental values and standards are at issue (NL). Going by the Better Regulation Toolbox, 
the EU appears to have dropped the ‘precluded area’ criterion. In sum therefore, the criteria 
for the use of self-regulatory and co-regulatory instruments are more or less the same in the 
EU and the Netherlands.613 It remains unclear, however, whether and how the conformity of 
self- and co-regulatory initiatives with these criteria is actually assessed. 
 
4.6 The approach of the European and the Dutch legislators compared 
 
So far, the approaches of the European and the Dutch legislators towards private regulation 
(self-regulation and co-regulation) have been discussed separately. In practice, obviously, 
these legislators do not operate in isolation. The strong interrelatedness of the European legal 
order and the legal orders of the Member States implies that the course pursued by the 
European legislator influences national legislative policies, and vice versa, albeit to a lesser 
extent.614 This section compares the European and the Dutch legislative approaches towards 
private regulation in general and to industry codes in the field of private law in particular.  
 
4.6.1 Common ground between EU and Dutch legislative policies 
 
The core of the legislative policies of the EU and the Netherlands is the same: both policies 
revolve around the quality of legislation, with slight changes of focus over the years.615 With 
both policies being firmly rooted in the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, the use 
of alternatives to public regulation, including self-regulation and co-regulation, has been 
drawn to the attention of the legislator at both levels. At the beginning, both the European and 
the Dutch legislator refrained from actively engaging with private regulatory initiatives. At 
the European level, emphasis initially lay on the coordination of different forms of purely 
voluntary self-regulation, while at the Dutch level, at the time of the Geelhoed Committee, 
private regulation was perceived as one of the tailpieces of the deregulation process.616 This 
perception changed over time, as Van Gestel indicates. The European legislator came to 
pursue a course of active promulgation of the use of self-regulatory and co-regulatory 
initiatives, both directly at the European level and more indirectly at Member State level.617 
Likewise, with the adoption of a legislative policy focusing on quality rather than quantity of 
legislation (cf. the report ‘A View on Legislation’), the Dutch legislator came to see private 
                                                
613 See also Menting & Vranken 2014, p. 40. 
614 Bokhorst 2014, pp. 165-166. 
615 See also Bokhorst 2014, pp. 165-234, who provides an extensive analysis of the way in which the respective 
policies have developed over the years, and Verdoodt 2007, pp. 69-76. 
616 Van Gestel 2005, pp. 103-104; Oude Vrielink 2011, p. 66. 
617 Van Gestel 2005, pp. 103-104.  
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regulation as a policy instrument that it could employ more actively.618 Thus, within both the 
European and the Dutch context a similar change of perception can be witnessed. Whereas 
self-regulation and co-regulation were initially viewed as independent regulatory tools that 
could be used to replace public regulation, they are nowadays most often perceived as 
complementary policy instruments that are part of a broader mix of regulatory tools, as 
Verdoodt indicates.619 The European and the Dutch legislative approaches to self-regulation 
and co-regulation are accordingly no longer solely one of approving existing private 
initiatives, but also one of active employment and promotion of self-regulation and co-
regulation.620  
 Along these lines, the use of self-regulation and co-regulation has developed into one of 
the cornerstones of the legislative policies of both the EU and the Netherlands. Following the 
EU Better Regulation Guidelines and the Dutch LDI and IFPL, the use of these instruments 
has to be considered as a policy option. At least, that is the reality on paper. Several empirical 
studies have put critical side notes to the extent to which this policy has actually materialized 
in practice. However, as noted before, this is not to say that the European and the Dutch 
legislators never resort to self-regulatory and co-regulatory measures, the more since the 
development of such measures is also initiated in a less ‘visible’ fashion, namely outside the 
confines of the formal legislative or policy-making processes. In European and Dutch private 
law, for instance, this policy has resulted in the legislator actively promoting the drawing-up 
of industry codes of conduct as well as actually developing codes of conduct, as the examples 
discussed in section 4.4 of this chapter show. 
 
4.6.2 Differences: Top-down versus bottom-up 
 
Although self-regulation and co-regulation are thus part and parcel of European as well as 
Dutch legislative policy, there are some marked differences between the EU and the 
Netherlands at this point. For instance, the use of alternatives to legislation was already on the 
radar of the Dutch legislator before regulatory alternatives became part of EU legislative 
policy.621 There are also differences as to the way in which the use of self-regulation and co-
regulation is eventually couched and implemented, three of which I discuss next. 
 
1) Vision on co-regulation 
The first difference lies in the interpretation of the concept of co-regulation. In essence, co-
regulation always involves a hierarchical element, as it is the government that sets the 
boundaries within which private actors can perform their regulatory activities.622 This 
hierarchical element comes to the fore more prominently, however, under the European 
                                                
618 Oude Vrielink 2011, pp. 66-67; Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, De toekomst van de 
nationale rechtsstaat, The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers 2002, pp. 125-129. 
619 Verdoodt 2007, pp. 52-53, 71. Verdoodt remarks that these two ‘tracks’ are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
exist side by side (p. 53). For broader reflections on this development, see Verdoodt 2007, pp. 70-76. 
620 Cf. Verdoodt 2007, p. 70. 
621 Bokhorst 2014, p. 165. 
622 Cf. Best 2003, p. 3. 
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conception of co-regulation than under the Dutch conception. In the EU, co-regulation is 
perceived as an implementation mechanism, which in fact presupposes a hierarchical 
relationship between the legislator and the private regulator. In the Netherlands, by contrast, 
co-regulation is perceived as entailing a clear element of cooperation: following the Dutch 
interpretation, co-regulation results from a joint effort of the government and private actors. 
So, the Netherlands has a less top-down interpretation of the concept.623  
 
2) Criteria 
The second difference concerns the way in which the criteria for the use of self-regulation and 
co-regulation have been embedded. Whereas the European criteria have been brought together 
in a single general framework (the replaced IIA 2003 and the Principles for Better Self- and 
Co-Regulation), the Dutch criteria are spread over different policy documents.  
 
3) Examples 
The third difference pertains to the ways in which the European and the Dutch legislators 
have employed industry codes of conduct in European and Dutch private law.624 The 
examples discussed in section 4.4 show that both legislators actively initiate the drawing up of 
industry codes ‘outside’ the legislative context, for instance by facilitating the drafting 
process or by using the threat of legislative intervention as a stick to move an industry 
towards self-regulation. The European legislator also makes use of legislative references to 
codes of conduct to promote the development of such codes or to embed them in private law 
(see section 4.4.1.1). The Dutch legislator, by contrast, has thus far only rarely referred to 
codes of conduct in private law legislation; the vast majority of references in Dutch private 
law legislation have their origins in European directives. Viewed from this perspective, the 
European legislator adopts a more directive role than its Dutch ‘counterpart’. This has 
resulted in a numerical dominance of references in European private law legislation over 
legislative references at the Dutch level. It should be noted, however, that quite a number of 
the European legislative references, either in an obligatory fashion or otherwise, merely call 
upon the Commission or the Member States to encourage the development of European or 
national codes of conduct. These references do not per se create private regulatory measures. 
Thus, in fact, the primacy of the European legislator remains intact: no codes of conduct are 
deployed as a policy instrument in the sense that they constitute a real alternative or 
supplement to the directive concerned. The directive constitutes the main tool and codes of 
conduct are just optional supporting measures.  
 
Considering the nature of these three differences, the terms ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ seem 
best suited to characterize the European and the Dutch legislative approaches to private 
                                                
623 Verbruggen 2009, p. 429; Eijlander 2005, p. 7. See also section 4.2 of this chapter. 
624 At this point, I should re-emphasize that the object of analysis is limited to examples of references to codes of 
conduct. Accordingly my findings cannot be extrapolated either to the use of codes in private law in general or to 
the general legislative course pursued by the European and the Dutch legislators in this regard. Nonetheless, and 
mindful of this caveat, the analysis does allow for some tentative conclusions. 
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regulation, at least in the field of private law.625 Whereas the European approach is of a more 
top-down nature, reflected in the hierarchical view on co-regulation, the general framework 
with criteria, and the legislative references to industry codes, the Dutch approach is more 
bottom-up, as follows from the ‘consensus-based’ concept of co-regulation, the ad hoc 
approach when it comes to criteria and the relative absence of legislative references in Dutch 
private law. A possible explanation for these differences can be found in the regulatory styles 
at the European and the Dutch level. In this regard, it can be noted that the functions of 
European legislation differ from national legislation. As Eijlander points out, national 
legislation pursues uniformity and equality, while European legislation has to manage 
national diversity.626 The European struggle for convergence and the elimination of national 
barriers necessitates a more directive, top-down approach. The stance of the European 
legislator, accordingly, is fairly pragmatic, as Van Schagen indicates: the use of self-
regulation and co-regulation is not an aim in itself, but is a means to attain EU policy goals, 
most notably the creation of the Internal Market. Not surprisingly, Van Schagen continues, a 
clear preference is thereby shown for European-wide codes, rather than national initiatives.627 
The Dutch regulatory style, on the other hand, is characterized by a search for consensus, to 
be reached through a process of consultation. Accordingly, societal actors have traditionally 
been involved in public decision-making processes.628 A bottom-up approach fits in with this 
regulatory style. 
 
4.7 Spheres of interaction and influence 
 
At this point, it can be noted that the four spheres that are central to this chapter, i.e., the 
European, the Dutch, the public and the private sphere, do not operate in isolation. Rather, as 
can be inferred from the discussions in the previous sections, there are several relationships of 
influence and interaction between these spheres. 
 
4.7.1 The impact of the European legislative approach on Dutch private law 
 
The first relationship in which such interaction and influence come to the fore, is between the 
European sphere and the Dutch sphere. A decision of the European legislator to rely upon 
private regulatory measures or to include references to codes of conduct in EU legislation not 
only impacts the place of codes of conduct in European private law, but also influences the 
place of these codes in national (Dutch) private law in several respects (cf. the classification 
of the European approach as top-down).629 
 First of all, the EU directives that, either in an obligatory fashion or otherwise, call upon 
Member States to encourage the development of national codes of conduct, ‘force’ Member 
                                                
625 Cf. from a different perspective Van Schagen 2013, p. 181. 
626 Eijlander 20005, pp. 7-9.  
627 Van Schagen 2013, pp. 62-64, 115-119, 174, 181, 450, 453. 
628 Bokhorst 2014, p. 251. 
629 This implies that Member States that, unlike for instance the Netherlands or the UK, are not familiar with the 
use of self-regulation and co-regulation, will in effect be forced to use such instruments.  
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States to at least think about the place of such codes in their national private law system. 
Secondly, the choice of the European legislator to wholly or partially leave regulation to 
private actors implies that national actors - public and private alike - are confronted with rules 
for private regulatory relationships that stem from a private rather than a public regulatory 
source. In this way, European private regulation enters the Dutch sphere of private law. EU 
influence, thirdly, can also be felt the other way around. This is the case when the EU enacts 
legislation in a field that at Member State level is regulated by one or more private regulatory 
schemes. As the European rules have to be implemented at the national level and with the 
possibilities of implementation through private regulation being limited, the national private 
regulatory schemes will be affected by these rules.630  
 
Worthy of mention in this regard is Cafaggi’s account of the impact of the level of harmonization 
chosen by the European legislator in directives on private regulation. When it is opted for 
minimum harmonization, private regulators are only allowed to adopt standards that either equal 
the standards laid down by the directive or go beyond these standards.631 The corresponding 
expectation would be that if a regime of maximum harmonization is in place, private regulatory 
initiatives can only specify or implement the directive; they cannot entail stricter rules.632 
However, Cafaggi submits, the fact that maximum harmonization has been chosen does not in all 
cases affect the scope and domain of private regulation. Purely self-regulatory schemes, rooted in 
the private autonomy of the regulators, can still lay down higher standards. Co-regulatory 
initiatives, on the other hand, cannot be employed by Member States to circumvent the maximum 
harmonization regime of a directive by imposing stricter standards.633 Thus in these cases, the 
regulatory power of private actors and semi-private asctors will be constrained. 
 
Fourthly, references in European directives lead to codes of conduct actively entering the 
realm of Dutch private law: most of the references to codes in Dutch private law stem from 
EU directives. As these references influence the legal relevance of codes of conduct (see 
below, section 4.8), it is at this point, arguably, that the national impact of the EU legislative 
approach to codes of conduct is most felt. 
 
4.7.2 Public-private interaction 
 
The relation between the public sphere (legislation and policy) and the private sphere 
(industry codes of conduct) in this chapter is one of mutual influence and interaction, 
particularly when this relation is given shape ‘outside legislation’.634 The examples discussed 
in section 4.4 in this respect show that the decision to use an industry code as a policy 
                                                
630 EU legislation can for instance necessitate a revision of national private regulation, as was the case with the 
Dutch Advertising Code that has to be revised following the enactment of the UCPD. See 
<www.reclamecode.nl/adverteerder/default.asp?nieuwsID=321> (accessed 1 July 2016). It can also replace 
national private regulatory initiatives. See Van Schagen 2013, pp. 168-169. 
631 Cafaggi 2011b, p. 101. 
632 Cf. Cafaggi 2011b, pp. 101-102. 
633 Cafaggi 2011b, pp. 102. 
634 Not surprisingly, the legislative references to codes of conduct are more unilateral in nature. 
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instrument is in the vast majority of cases not a matter of either public or private regulation. 
Codes can, for instance, be relied upon within the realm of an already existing legislative 
framework (cf. the complementary function). Furthermore, when the legislator decides to 
leave regulation to the industry, he retains a background role, ready to intervene if the 
regulatory results achieved by the industry are unsatisfactory.635 Put in more general terms; 
there is often a relationship of continuous interaction between the industry, wishing to 
maintain its regulatory position, and the legislator, who has the possibility of legislative 
intervention in reserve.636 This interaction can be initiated by private actors as well as public 
actors: whereas in some cases the legislator directly or indirectly calls upon private actors to 
take regulatory action, in other cases private actors take the lead themselves, with the 
legislator linking up with the ensuing private rules (e.g., by designating the rules as a formal 
substantiation of an open-textured legal standard). The intensity of the interaction is 
determined by the functioning of the industry code of conduct. The discussion in section 4.4 
has shown that inefficiency and ongoing problems can prompt action from the side of the 
legislator, leading to either a revision or a tightening of the code, or to the code being 
overturned, or wholly or partially backed by legislation. 
 
From a broader perspective, these findings tie in with the principle of institutional 
complementarity, coined by Cafaggi. Viewed from that perspective, public and private regulation 
function as complements rather than substitutes. More specifically, “public and private regulation 
complement each other in terms of goals, instruments and reinforce the overall applicability and 
effectiveness of the regulatory process”.637 As such, public and private regulatory regimes can 
stand in cooperative as well as competitive relationships with each other.638 The concept of 
institutional complementarity defined by Cafaggi comprises both a horizontal and a vertical 
dimension. Horizontal complementarity, more specifically, refers to the interaction and 
complementarity of European public and private actors. Directives encouraging the creation of 
European codes of conduct and the cases in which the European legislator threatened to intervene 
at the European level constitute examples of horizontal complementarity (cf. section 4.4.1). 
Vertical complementarity concerns instances of interaction and complementarity between 
European public actors and national private actors or vice versa, between European private actors 
and national public actors. This form of complementary for instance becomes visible when 





                                                
635 Cf. IIA 2003 (OJ 2003, C 321/01), recital 23: “It [the European Commission, MM] will, nonetheless, 
consider the possibility of putting forward a proposal for a legislative act, in particular at the request of the 
competent legislative authority or in the event of a failure to observe the above practices”. 
636 See the literature referred to in Chapter 1, n 42 and 43, and the text accompanying these footnotes. Cf. also 
Cafaggi 2011b, pp. 100-103 on what he calls the ‘institutional complementarity’ between private regulation and 
public-lawmaking on the European level. 
637 Cafaggi 2011b, p. 100. 
638 Cafaggi 2011b, pp. 100-101. 





 General observations 
This chapter has adopted a three-step approach in order to arrive at an answer to the questions 
as to how the European and Dutch legislators approach industry codes of conduct in private 
law and what consequences this approach has for the legal relevance of these codes. The first 
step in this respect showed that the use of alternatives to legislation, including industry codes, 
is one of the cornerstones of European as well as Dutch legislative policy, albeit that the 
emphasis put on the use of these alternatives in these policies contrasts sharply with the 
number of private regulatory initiatives (visibly) resulting from these policies. Both the 
European and the Dutch legislator have subjected the use of industry codes as a policy 
instrument to a set of formal criteria (third step). Although these criteria form an integrated 
part of the European and the Dutch approach, it remains opaque as to what extent the codes 
are actually tested against these criteria and how this occurs. Against this background, the 
European and Dutch legislators have brought industry codes within the realm of European 
and Dutch private law in different ways (second step). The European legislator has promoted 
the drawing up of industry codes in different private law directives, introduced legislative 
references to these codes and on several occasions resorted to codes as an alternative or 
supplement to public regulatory measures. The Dutch legislator, by contrast, has mainly 
limited itself to the use of industry codes as policy instruments in private law. As the 
examples discussed highlight, the relationship between industry codes on the one hand and 
the legislator and the public regulatory framework on the other hand that exists as a result of 
governmental reliance on industry codes is often one of continuous interaction, the formal 
labeling of industry codes as alternative regulatory instruments in EU and Dutch legislative 
policy notwithstanding.640 This interaction also echoes through in the different functions that 
industry codes can have from a governance perspective: codes not only function as a 
regulatory alternative, but also as a complement to public regulation.641 
 
 Implications for the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct 
And now for the key-question: what are the implications of these approaches for the legal 
relevance of industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law? These implications differ 
according to the way in which a code is pulled into the private law sphere. The mere 
promotion of codes of conduct in EU directives, more specifically, does not lead in itself to a 
legal role for codes: the regulatory framework is already set by the directive, codes are just 
optional supporting measures. The European and Dutch use of industry codes of conduct as 
an alternative or complement to public regulation, by contrast, does lead to a legally relevant 
regulatory role for industry codes: through such use, the codes gain legal relevance as policy 
                                                
640 See section 4.7.2. 
641 In doing so, codes can also have a protective function and a harmonization function. 
 
 138 
instruments.642 The European legislative references to codes of conduct also result in legal 
relevance, yet in a different respect. The farthest-reaching in this respect is the UCPD, which 
renders compliance with codes of conduct legally compulsory by qualifying non-compliance 
with a code as a misleading commercial practice given certain conditions. By thus attributing 
legal binding force to codes of conduct, the UCPD provides a legal basis for the judicial 
enforcement of industry codes.643 The statutory reference to corporate governance codes 
(Directive on company reporting), the statutorily enshrined possibility to get a privacy code 
formally approved (Data Protection Directive, the General Data Protection Regulation), and 
the statutory reference to codes of practice as a yardstick in establishing whether a product 
can be deemed safe (Product Safety Directive) in turn confer a certain legal status upon codes 
of conduct. These references can also serve as a reference point for judicial enforcement, 
albeit in a less direct way than the UCPD reference. Finally, pre-contractual information 
duties as regards codes of conduct, included in the Time Share Directive, the Services 
Directive, the E-Commerce Directive and the Consumer Rights Directive, pull industry codes 
out of the shadow of the law. The latter Directive is the farthest-reaching in this respect, as it 
not only imposes a duty upon a trader to provide information on relevant codes of conduct in 
the context of distance and off-premises contracts, but also stipulates that this information is 
to form an integral part of the contract.  
 
Turning the perspective around, it can also be said that through the legislative approaches, 
industry codes impact (European and) Dutch private law in several respects. First of all, when 
relied upon by the legislator as an alternative to public regulatory intervention, industry codes 
rather than public regulation constitute the prime source of rules governing the subject matter 
concerned. Secondly, codes can impact the content of legislation when copied by legislation, as 
for instance occurred in respect of the European and Dutch mortgage codes (see section 4.4.1.2 
and 4.4.2 under c, respectively). Thirdly, when the legislator designates an industry code as a 
minimum elaboration of an open-ended legal standard, private rules influence the actual 
application of this legal standard. 
 
Thus, contrary to what the lack of attention for the legislative approach to private regulation 
in the Dutch private law debate suggests (cf. Chapter 1), the way in which the European and 
the Dutch legislator perceive and use private regulation does affect the legal relevance of 
industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law. The legislative references to these codes in 
Dutch private law legislation (most notably in the DCC) particularly highlight the fact that 
this relevance might go further than hitherto assumed in Dutch private law literature, as these 
references are generally not taken into account by Dutch private law scholars discussing the 
issue.   
 
 
                                                
642 Although the policy instrument function is surrounded by a sphere of ‘publicness’, the codes that have this 
function remain private instruments unless the legislator delegates public regulatory power to the private 
regulator or otherwise confers a legal status on a code of conduct. Cf. Giesen 2007, pp. 60-62. 













5.1 Chapters 5 and 6: A preview 
 
In the following two chapters, the perspective on industry codes of conduct is changed from 
that of the legislator to that of the European and Dutch judiciaries (Chapter 5 and 6, 
respectively). Courts may be confronted with industry codes and other forms of private 
regulation in their role as enforcers, interpreters and developers of private law. These 
confrontations might lead to judicial enforcement, interpretation or even review of the private 
rules subjected to judicial scrutiny.644 Thus, judges are able to give direction to the role of 
industry codes in private law by creating possibilities for their use or by imposing restraints 
on them. In doing so, both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Dutch 
judiciary, each at their own level and from their own perspective, are faced with the same, 
pressing question, as will be shown in the next two chapters: how to deal with a phenomenon 
that poses serious challenges to the public-private divide on which both the European and the 




This chapter takes a European perspective and discusses how the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereafter: the CJEU or the Court)645 has handled confrontations with private 
regulation.646  
 
                                                
644 Cafaggi 2012c, pp. 89-95, who sees domestic courts as enforcers, reviewers and interpreters of private 
regimes. 
645 Given the focus on the CJEU, case law at the General Court will not be systematically dealt with. 
646 Other legal scholars have provided solid building blocks in this respect. See in particular Mataija 2016; 
Wendt 2013 and Heremans 2012, who both discuss the relation between professional regulation and EU law; 
Schepel 2002. Mataija (2016), most notably, has already made a rigorous assessment of the application of EU 
free movement law and competition law to private regulation, of the relation between both fields of law and of 
the ways in which private regulation has affected these fields, taking stock of the approach of both the CJEU and 
the European Commission. I have cast the net less widely in this respect by focusing solely on the approach of 
the CJEU and on the impact of this approach on private regulation. In developing a line of argument relevant to 
the purposes of this dissertation, I have drawn gratefully on the work of Mataija and other legal scholars. 
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In this chapter, I will not speak of industry codes of conduct but rather refer to the broader 
concept of private regulation.647 This is because of the fact that the Court’s case law in respect of 
private regulation has developed along the lines of categories of private regulation and other types 
of private action, as will become apparent from the discussion in this chapter. As the term 
‘industry codes of conduct’ does not adequately cover these categories, I decided to use the term 
‘private regulation’ when discussing the case law. Nonetheless, where relevant, I will indicate 
how the Court’s approach plays out in respect of industry codes.  
 
5.2.1 Private regulation and EU law: Two settings 
 
Broadly speaking, confrontations between the CJEU and private regulation can take place in 
two different settings: 1) the interpretation and application of EU legislation (directives and 
regulations) and 2) free movement law and competition law. In the first setting, the role of 
private regulation is that of a substantive argument in the Court’s line of reasoning. As such, 
as an argument, it assumes legal relevance in the application and interpretation of EU 
legislation. Until now, however, there appear to be only few cases in which private regulation 
has been assigned such a role. Instead, the vast majority of confrontations take place in the 
second setting, which comprises cases in which private regulation is on a collision course 
with the Union’s rules on free movement and competition.  
 With a view to the focus of this doctoral thesis on the legal relevance of industry codes in 
Dutch private law, at first blush this second setting appears to be the odd man out, in two 
respects. First of all, EU free movement law and a large part of EU competition law are of a 
public law nature.648 Moreover, from a traditionalist perspective, the rules on free movement 
govern the actions of Member States rather than those of private actors.649 Secondly, the free 
movement and competition law cases involving private regulation concern the compatibility 
of private regulatory arrangements with the rules on free movement and competition. Hence, 
private regulation is the direct object of scrutiny,650 rather than one of the arguments used by a 
court to reach its decision (as is the case in Dutch private law, see Chapter 6). Thus, strictly 
speaking, the analysis of the case law of the CJEU will not yield insights that pertain directly 
to the topic of this doctoral thesis, the legal relevance of industry codes in Dutch private law.  
 However, on further consideration neither observation detracts from the relevance of the 
second setting for this thesis. In respect of the first remark, this becomes apparent when we 
consider that the CJEU has extended the scope of the free movement rules to what can be 
regarded as essentially private law relationships.651 With EU competition law already 
governing the actions of private actors, the judgments of the CJEU falling within the second 
setting do thus have private law relevance. As regards the second remark, two observations 
                                                
647 The focus lies on private regulation as defined for the purposes of this doctoral thesis (see Chapter 1, section 
1.5.1). Case law concerning other types of private action is only touched upon in so far relevant to establishing 
the scope of the Court’s case law and its approach towards private regulation. 
648 See the introduction to section 5.4. 
649 See section 5.2.2. 
650 State measures relating to private regulation can also be subject to competition law scrutiny; either under 
Article 106(1) TFEU or under the ‘effet utile doctrine’. See below, section 5.5.2. 
651 As will be detailed in the introduction to section 5.4. 
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can be made at this point. First of all, the express subjection of private regulation to judicial 
scrutiny under the rules on free movement and competition implies that private regulatory 
schemes, such as industry codes of conduct, will have to comply with these rules and the 
requirements that come with it in order to avoid any breach of the law. Secondly, it has been 
claimed in legal literature that the CJEU through its approach in effect regulates the way in 
which private regulatory schemes can be employed.652 Hence, it can be argued that the 
Court’s free movement and competition law judgments do entail lessons in respect of the 
legal relevance of industry codes, albeit such lessons are of a fairly specific nature. Therefore, 
it was deemed worthwhile to take a closer look at the approach of the CJEU to private 
regulation in the free movement and competition law context as well. 
 
5.2.2 The public and the private sphere in the Treaty 
 
The application of free movement law and competition law to private regulation is by no 
means a straightforward exercise. The rules on free movement and competition are 
traditionally perceived as being based on a clear division of labor: while free movement law 
covers Member State action, competition law governs the conduct of private economic 
actors.653 The latter field of law, more specifically, is divided into two sections, namely rules 
applying to undertakings and rules on State aid, and as such has a public-private dichotomy of 
its own.654 However, practice has proven more stubborn than the division between the public 
and the private sphere established by the TFEU would at first suggest. Public and private 
modes of governance are becoming increasingly mixed. Private regulators can for instance 
pursue public interest objectives and the involvement of the State with private regulatory 
regimes, either through delegation of regulatory powers on private regulators or otherwise, 
leads to the creation of co-regulatory schemes. Such regulatory hybrids, which can equally 
hamper free movement and distort competition, blur the aforementioned public-private divide 
and pose serious challenges to both competition law and free movement law.655 Yet, in being 
addressed to private actors, the rules on competition do not square particularly well with 
private regulatory regimes that bear a public element. Free movement law, in turn, has not 
been drafted with private regulation in mind: it is addressed to the Member States or, more 
broadly, public authorities.656 Thus, the emergence of private regulation has exposed gaps in 
the application of the Treaty rules: if the public-private divide were followed strictly, private 
regulation impeding free movement would fall outside the scope of free movement law while 
                                                
652 Schepel 2002; Schepel 2005, pp. 320-338; Mataija 2016. I will discuss this issue in section 5.6 of this chapter. 
653 Mataija 2016, pp. 18-19; 44; Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 22-25; Schepel 2005, pp. 46-47; Prechal & De Vries 
2009, pp. 6, 13; Joined cases C-177/82 and C-178/82 Criminal proceedings against Jan van de Haar and 
Kaveka de Meern BV (1984) ECR 1797, paras 11-14. 
654 More specifically, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU apply to undertakings and associations of undertakings. The 
rules on State aid (Articles 107-109 TFEU) apply to public actors. Article 106 TFEU addresses both States and 
undertakings (operating services of general economic interest). See Baquero Cruz 2007, p. 552. 
655 Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 19-22; Baquero Cruz 2007, pp. 551-552; Odudu 2006, pp. 47-48; Schepel 2005, 
pp. 46-47; Prechal & De Vries 2009, pp. 6, 13. For a critical account of the assumption that there is a public-
private divide underlying the Treaty, see Mataija 2013, pp. 27-39. 
656 Mataija 2016, pp. 18-19, 44; Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 24-25; Baquero Cruz 2007, p. 552. 
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anti-competitive regulatory hybrids would not be covered by competition law.657 
Accordingly, as the EU’s goal of creating a competitive internal market was jeopardized, the 
CJEU went on a gap-closing exercise,658 intervening in the regulatory activities of private 
actors that impede free movement or distort intra-Community competition. 
 
5.2.3 Outline chapter 
 
Building on the starting points set out in the previous subsections, this chapter explores when 
and how the CJEU has brought private regulation within the realm of the EU law and 
discusses the implications of the Court’s approach.659 Section 5.3 starts out in this respect by 
analyzing the judgments in which private regulation has played a role in the interpretation and 
application of EU legislation. Subsequently, the Court’s body of case law in the field of free 
movement law and competition law involving private regulation is up for discussion (in 
sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively). The focus will thereby lie on the personal scope of these 
fields of EU law, which, from a conceptual perspective, forms the main hurdle the CJEU 
needs to take when subjecting private rules or semi-private rules to this part of the TFEU.660 
After this, I turn to the argument advanced in legal literature that the CJEU through its 
approach in the field of free movement and competition in effect conditions the employment 
of private regulation (section 5.6). Conclusions follow in section 5.7. 
 
5.3 EU legislation 
 
My search for judgments in which the CJEU has referred to private regulatory arrangements 
in the interpretation and application of EU law yielded only two results:661 the cases 
                                                
657 Odudu 2006, pp. 47-50; Baquero-Cruz 2007, p. 552; Heremans 2012, p. 122. 
658 Heremans 2012, p. 122; Van den Bogaert 2002, p. 123. Cf. Baquero-Cruz 2002, p. 85. 
659 This will be done on the basis of an analysis of the case law referred to in legal literature and a review of this 
literature. With the aim of identifying relevant judgments not yet included in the literature, I have additionally 
conducted an extensive search for European case law on private regulation, using the online case law database of 
the CJEU (<http://curia.europa.eu/>). A first search was conducted in August 2014. This search was updated 
afterwards so as to include relevant case law published up to 1 July 2016. However, the search, which I in no 
way claim to be exhaustive and definitive, did not yield results relevant to the purposes of this chapter other than 
the judgments already referred to in the literature. For the sake of completeness, the following judgments that 
were found are nonetheless worthy of mention. In Case C-429/02 Bacardi France SAS v Télévision française 1 
SA (TF1), Groupe Jean-Claude Darmon SA and Girosport SARL (2004) ECR I-6613 and Case C-262/02 
Commission v France (2004) ECR I-06569, the Court did not specifically address the applicable private rules. 
Rather, it looked into the conformity with free movement law of the overall public regulatory framework, of 
which these rules were a part. Case C-119/09 Société fiduciaire nationale d’expertise comptable v Ministre du 
Budget, des Comptes publics et de la Fonction publique (2011) ECR I-2551 revolved around the compatibility of 
a provision of the French Code of professional conduct and ethics of qualified accountants with Article 24 of the 
Services Directive. However, with the code provisions being enacted in the form of a decree by the Conseil 
d’État, the CJEU in effect ruled on national legislation (para 8). In Case T-11/03 Elizabeth Afar v European 
Central Bank (2004) FP-I-A-65;FP-II-267, delivered by the General Court, finally, the Code of Conduct of the 
European Central Bank was part of the employment law dispute between the Bank and one of its employees. 
660 As a corollary, the relationship between private regulation and the substantive scope of free movement law 
and competition law will not be addressed. On this relationship, see, e.g., Heremans 2012 and Wendt 2012 (both 
on private regulation by professional bodies) and Mataija 2016, pp. 57-61, 72-83, 89-92. 
661 A General Court judgment that is worthy of mention at this point is Case T-321/10 SA.PAR. Srl v Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (2013), ECLI:EU:T:2013:372, para 
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Commission/Luxembourg and Wilson, respectively, which were delivered on the same date.662 
In both cases, one of the points of contention was whether the Lawyer’s Establishment 
Directive663 allows host Member States to subject the establishment of lawyers from other 
Member States to a prior language test. After having established that the Directive does not 
allow for entry requirements other than those included in the Directive, the CJEU points out 
that the Directive entails other rules that in effect compensate for the exclusion of 
establishment requirements such as a prior language test.664 The Court in this respect inter 
alia refers to Articles 6 and 7 of the Directive, which stipulate that European lawyers have to 
comply with the rules of professional conduct of their home Member States as well as with 
those of the host Member State, subject to disciplinary sanctions and professional liability 
wherever this may arise. The CJEU continues by stating that: 
 
“one of the rules of professional conduct applicable to lawyers is an obligation, like that provided 
for in the Code of Conduct adopted by the Council of Bars and Law Societies of the European 
Union (CCBE), breach of which may lead to disciplinary sanctions, not to handle matters which 
the professionals concerned know or ought to know they are not competent to handle, for instance 
owing to lack of linguistic knowledge”.665 
 
Thus, as Delimatsis points out, the Court used the professional rules of conduct as a 
corroborative argument in ruling that there was no need for Member States to impose their 
own additional barriers to entry: the CCBE Code of Conduct, among other things, already 
provided the necessary safeguards.666 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
32 where the General Court referred to a provision of a code of ethics as a corroborative argument in 
establishing whether the applicant had acted in bad faith when applying for the registration of a trade mark. 
662 Case C-193/05 Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (2006) ECR I-8673 and Case C-506/04 Graham 
J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg (2006) ECR I-8643. On these cases, see, e.g., 
Heremans 2012, pp. 196-198.  
663 Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of 
the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was 
obtained (OJ 1998, L 77/36). 
664 Case C-193/05 Commission v. Luxembourg, para 41: “the exclusion […] is, however, accompanied in 
Directive 98/5 by a set of rules to ensure, […] the protection of consumers and the proper administration of 
justice […]”. Similar wordings are used in Case C-506/04 Wilson, para 71. Both judgments at this point refer to 
Case C-168/98 Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2000) 
ECR I-9131, paras 32-33 in which the CJEU had already established this. 
665 Case C-193/05 Commission v. Luxembourg, para 44; Case C-506/04 Wilson, para 74. Again, both judgments 
refer to Case C-168/98 Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council, where the Court already made mention of the 
CCBE Code. One of the claims made by Luxembourg in this case was that the Establishment Directive 
negatively affected the public interest, consumer protection in particular, “by abolishing all requirement of 
training in the law of the host Member State” (para 30). The Court was of a different opinion and in this respect 
inter alia pointed to Articles 6 and 7 of the Directive. In passing, it points out that “it should be noted that, quite 
apart from the applicable rules of professional liability, the rules of professional conduct applicable to lawyers 
generally entail, like Article 3.1.3 of the Code of Professional Conduct adopted by the Council of the Bars and 
Law Societies of the European Union (CCBE), an obligation, breach of which may incur disciplinary sanctions, 
not to handle matters which the professionals concerned know or ought to know they are not competent to 
handle” (Case C-168/98 Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council, para 42). 
666 Delimatis 2010, p. 1063. See also Mataija 2016, p. 205. 
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5.4 Free movement law 
 
With a view to the private law perspective that this doctoral thesis adopts, at first blush a 
discussion of free movement cases appears a bit odd. Since the vast majority of the rules 
embodied in the TFEU, including those on free movement and part of the competition law 
rules, are targeted at the governments of the EU Member States, they are by definition of a 
public law nature. Provisions with a private law character are hard to find, although 
present.667 Correspondingly, we might expect the Treaty to prove rather insignificant for 
private law relationships and in national private law. The opposite, however, turns out to be 
true: Community law has become much more relevant in private law than we might have 
expected,668 through legislative activity in the field of private law and decisions of the 
CJEU.669 It is of particular relevance to this doctoral thesis that the Court has attributed to 
several of the central provisions of the Treaty ‘horizontal effect’, that is to say, in the words of 
Hartkamp, that these provisions “may be directly applied to legal relationships between 
individuals, in the sense that subjective rights and obligations are created, modified, or 
extinguished between individuals”.670 The CJEU has held that the rules on free movement of 
workers, the freedom of establishment and the free movement of services produce such 
horizontal effect. The horizontality of the free movement of goods provisions has been 
repeatedly dismissed, although the Court is said to have changed course recently.671  
 This section discusses several landmark cases on the horizontal effect of free movement 
law (sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2) and, subsequently, distills the lines that follow on from these 
cases into a more general overview of the ‘private’ reach of the free movement provisions 
(section 5.4.3). It also takes account of the leeway that might be given to private regulators 
                                                
667 In fact, Hartkamp indicates, only Article 81(2) EC (now: Article 101(2) TFEU) and Article 288(2) EC 
(Article 340 TFEU) bear a private law nature. See Hartkamp 2010, p. 528. Cf. also Whish & Bailey 2012, p. 
216. 
668 Davies suggests that free movement law in effect concerns private law relationships: “If a party wishes to 
enter the market of a certain Member State, that is another way of saying that he or she wishes to conclude 
contracts with persons within that market. Sale and purchase of goods, services, labour or capital assets take 
place via contracts. Any restriction on free movement – understood to mean cross-border economic activity – is 
therefore a restriction of the formation of contracts between domestic and foreign economic actors”. See Davies 
2013, p. 53. 
669 Hartkamp 2010, p. 528. The influence exercised by the CJEU has developed along three lines. Firstly, the 
Court has influenced private law through the application of the general principles of community law, most 
notably the principle of effectiveness. A second line of influence follows on from the case law on the private law 
directives enacted by the European legislator. Thirdly, the CJEU has interpreted several of the central Treaty 
provisions as being applicable to horizontal relationships between private actors, i.e., the horizontal effect. See 
Hartkamp 2010, pp. 528-529. The third line of influence is central to this section. 
670 Hartkamp 2010, p. 529 and at p. 536: “Community law, […], has developed into a legal order that is also a 
legal order of private law, in which rights safeguarded by the Treaty to a certain extent have also obtained direct 
effect between citizens”. In legal doctrine one can find a further distinction between direct and indirect 
horizontal effect. This distinction is a contentious one: while some argue that it should not be upheld, as there is 
no difference in substance (e.g., Advocate General Maduro in his opinion in Viking (C-438/05 (2007) ECR I-
10779), para. 40, with further references), others show themselves in favor of distinguishing between both 
concepts (e.g., Hartkamp 2010, notably pp. 543-548). For the purposes of this section, the definition of 
Hartkamp quoted above applies. For a further account of the distinction, see, e.g., Hartkamp 2010, pp. 533-538; 
Asser/Hartkamp 3-I 2015/42 and 92. 
671 See section 5.4.2.3. As yet, there is no case law on the horizontality of the rules concerning the free 
movement of capital. 
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under free movement law by briefly discussing the justification defenses available to these 
regulators (section 5.4.4). Thereupon, the approach of the CJEU is characterized (section 
5.4.5). At this point, it should be noted that the Court’s case law on the horizontal 
applicability of the rules on free movement comprises instances of private regulation as well 
as other types of private action. As private regulation is the central focus of this doctoral 
thesis, the latter types of private action are touched upon only briefly.  
 
5.4.1 Free movement of workers, freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services 
 
The horizontal applicability of the rules on the free movement of workers (Article 45 TFEU), 
the freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU) and the freedom to provide services (Article 
56 TFEU) has been developed through a series of judgments. The ensuing body of case law 
has stretched the personal as well as the material scope of these provisions,672 one of the 
results being that private regulatory actions have been brought within the reach of free 
movement law. 
 
5.4.1.1 Collective rules adopted by private actors 
 
The development of the Court’s theory on the horizontal effect of the free movement rules 
concerning workers, establishment and services has been set in motion by the judgment 
delivered in the Walrave case at the end of 1974.673 Here, the Court for the first time 
attributed horizontal effect to then Articles 7, 48 and 59 of the EEC Treaty (Articles 18, 46 
and 56 TFEU). The reason for the dispute to arise was one of the provisions included in the 
rules for the medium-distance world cycling championships behind motorcycles, adopted by 
the Union Cycliste Internationale, an international sporting federation. The contested 
provision, more specifically, stipulated that the pacemaker and the stayer had to be of the 
same nationality. The CJEU was asked to rule on the compatibility of this nationality 
requirement with the Treaty provisions on the free movement of workers and on the freedom 
to provide services (Articles 45 and 56 TFEU) and, alternatively, with the non-discrimination 
principle laid down in Article 18 TFEU. The Court held that the prohibition of discrimination 
on the ground of nationality, enshrined in these Articles, “does not only apply to the action of 
public authorities but extends likewise to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating in a 
collective manner gainful employment and the provision of services”.674 With this statement, 
the Court extended the scope of Articles 45 and 56 TFEU to discriminatory collective 
private regulation. Article 49 TFEU, concerning the freedom of establishment, was declared 
horizontally applicable to private regulatory schemes in a similar fashion. In Van Ameyde the 
Court held that this provision (the then Article 52 of the EEC Treaty) applies to 
                                                
672 Karayigit 2011, p. 311. 
673 Case 36/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo (1974) ECR 1405. 
674 Case 36/74 Walrave, para 17. See also Case 13/76 Gaetano Donà v Mario Mantero (1976) ECR 1333. The 
arguments used by the Court to substantiate its decision are discussed in section 5.4.5. 
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discriminatory rules aimed at collectively governing the freedom of establishment, 
irrespective of the source of these rules.675  
 Later, the Court broadened the scope of the horizontal effect of Articles 45, 49 and 56 
TFEU from discriminatory collective regulations to restrictive collective regulations. In 
Bosman, for example, the Court ruled that Article 45 TFEU applied to transfer rules adopted 
by football associations, which hampered the free movement of workers by stipulating that a 
professional footballer whose contract has expired can only be employed by a club of another 
Member Sate when a fee is paid.676 In several other cases, the Court equally held that 
restrictive rules of sporting associations can be subjected to free movement scrutiny under 
Articles 45 and 56 TFEU.677 The application of Article 49 TFEU to restrictive private 
regulation was established in Wouters. Part of this case revolved around the question whether 
a regulation of the Netherlands Bar Association prohibiting Dutch lawyers to participate in a 
partnership with accountants was compatible with Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. In answering 
this question, the Court indicated that the Walrave formula also applies in respect of these 
Treaty provisions: “compliance with Articles 52 and 59 of the Treaty [Articles 49 and 56 
TFEU, MM] is also required in the case of rules which are not public in nature but which are 
designed to regulate, collectively, self-employment and the provision of services”.678 
 Finally, it can be pointed at Ferlini, in which the question was asked whether the scales 
of hospital fees fixed unilaterally by the Luxemburg Hospital Group, a private body uniting 
the Luxembourg hospitals, contravened today’s Articles 45 and 18 TFEU. After having 
dismissed the applicability of Article 45 TFEU, the CJEU held that the scales were 
discriminatory in nature and thus violated the general principle of non-discrimination 
enclosed in Article 18 TFEU. The fact that the scales were adopted by private actors again did 
not constitute a barrier for the Court. With reference to earlier case law on horizontal effect 
(among others Walrave and Bosman), it held that Article 18 TFEU “also applies in cases 
where a group or organisation […] exercises a certain power over individuals and is in a 
position to impose on them conditions which adversely affect the exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed under the Treaty”.679 Strikingly, the Court does not repeat the line it 
established in earlier cases, in spite of the references to previous rulings. Rather, as Mataija 
notes, it reformulates its case law in strong terms: key importance was attached to the fact that 
                                                
675 Case C-90/76 S.r.l. Ufficio Henry van Ameyde v S.r.l. Ufficio centrale italiano di assistenza assicurativa 
automobilisti in circolazione internazionale (UCI) (1977) ECR 1091, para 28. 
676 Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v Bosman and Others 
(1995) ECR I-492, paras 68-87. 
677 Article 45 TFEU: Case 176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fédération 
royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB) (2000) ECR I-2681; Case C-325/08 Olympique 
Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC (2010) ECR I-2177; Case C-379/09 Maurits Casteels v 
British Airways plc. (2011) ECR I-1379. Article 56 TFEU: Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle 
Deliège (2000) ECR I-2549. 
678 Case C-309/99 J.C.J. Wouters and others v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (2002) 
ECR I-1577, paras 120. Eventually, however, the Court did not assess the regulation, as possible restrictive 
effects were deemed a priori justified for the same reasons that justified the anticompetitive effect of the 
regulation (see para 122 of the judgment). I discuss the competition law element of this case in section 5.5.1.2.2. 
679 Case C-411/98 Angelo Ferlini v Centre hospitalier de Luxembourg (2000) ECR I-8081, para 50. On the 




the private body could exercise de facto power over individuals and could thus intrude on the 
rights that they enjoyed under free movement law.680 However, as this argument has never 
been repeated up until now, the actual significance of the judgment remains questionable. 
 In sum, after its kick off in Walrave the CJEU has settled the horizontal effect of Articles 
45, 49 and 56 TFEU in relation to private collective regulation, which includes industry codes 
of conduct. Restrictive or discriminatory collective private rules relating to the provision of 
services, employment or establishment, fall within the scope of these Treaty provisions. 
Consequently, private actors can be held liable under EU free movement law when their 
collective rule-making activities adversely affect the exercise of the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by Articles 45 (workers), 49 (establishment) and 56 (services) TFEU.681 
 
5.4.1.2 Private collective actions and individual private measures 
 
The horizontal effect of the free movement provisions has not been limited to instances of 
discriminatory or restrictive collective private regulation, as some of the Court’s more 
controversial case law shows.  
 In Viking and Laval, the CJEU declared Article 56 TFEU (Laval) and Article 49 TFEU 
(Viking) applicable to restrictive collective actions (blockades and a strike, respectively) used 
by trade unions to pressure an undertaking into signing a collective agreement.682 In Viking, 
moreover, the Court stated that its previous case law on the horizontal applicability of free 
movement law provides no indication that “could validly support the view that it applies only 
to associations or to organisations exercising a regulatory task or having quasi-legislative 
powers”.683 On the face of it, this statement clearly suggests that free movement law catches 
all private action and that the Court does away with the Walrave line of case law. However, 
earlier on in its judgment, the CJEU did appear to tie in with a collective regulatory element 
that was present in the case by noting that “collective action such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, which may be the trade unions’ last resort to ensure the success of their claim to 
regulate the work of Viking’s employees collectively, must be considered to be inextricably 
linked to the collective agreement the conclusion of which FSU is seeking”.684 This left legal 
scholars puzzled and divided as to whether Viking was to be interpreted as a ‘confirmation’ or 
a deviation from Walrave and co.685 
                                                
680 Mataija 2016, p. 35. 
681 See, e.g., Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 205-207; Karayigit 2011, p. 314; Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak in 
Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) – Technisch-
Wissenschaftlicher Verein ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, para 34. See also Case 36/74 Walrave, para 17.  
682 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet (2007) ECR I-11767; 
Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP 
and OÜ Viking Line Eesti (2007) ECR I-10779. 
683 Case C-438/05 Viking, para 65. 
684 Case C-438/05 Viking, para 36. 
685 For a taste of the discussion, see, e.g., Chalmers, Davies & Monti 2010, pp. 801-802; Schepel 2012, p. 187, 
supporting the ‘deviation’ reading, and Heremans 2012, p. 130; Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 206-207 arguing that the 
‘confirmation’ reading is correct. 
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 Earlier, the CJEU had already extended the scope of Article 45 TFEU to discriminatory 
private actions in individual contractual relations. In its decision in Angonese, the Court ruled 
that the non-discrimination principle included in Article 45 TFEU applied to the requirement 
of an Italian private banking undertaking that job applicants should be in possession of a 
language certificate proving their proficiency in both German and Italian. It based this 
decision on two main arguments. First of all, the Court noted that the non-discrimination 
principle of Article 45 TFEU does not specifically address Member States, but is rather 
drafted in general terms. Thereupon, it relied on the Walrave formula to establish that the 
prohibition of discrimination applies to public as well as private collective regulations.686 
Secondly, the CJEU referred to the Defrenne case, where it had ruled that Article 157 TFEU, 
stipulating equal pay for men and women, applies to agreements regulating paid labor 
collectively and to individual contractual relations alike. Decisive in this respect was the 
mandatory nature of the article. It made no difference that this provision was addressed to 
Member States.687 This argument was held a fortiori applicable to Article 45 TFEU as this 
provision, like Article 157 TFEU, constitutes a specific application of the general non-
discrimination principle of Article 18 TFEU. Private actors are therefore also subject to 
Article 45 TFEU’s prohibition to discriminate.688 With regard to the freedom to provide 
services (Article 56 TFEU) Haug-Adrion must be mentioned. Till now, the Court has never 
repeated the grounds it gave in this isolated case, where it held that discriminatory contractual 
provisions drafted by private actors, in this case contractual conditions included in the general 
terms and conditions of a private insurance company, could interfere with the freedom to 
provide services (Article 56 TFEU).689 
 Thus, in certain instances, restrictive collective actions and discriminatory actions in 
individual contractual relations may also fall within the scope of free movement law, albeit 
that the body of case law from which this horizontal effect follows does not seem to be as 
firmly established as the one on private regulation. Going by the scholarly debates in legal 
literature on this point, the actual implications of the aforementioned rulings for the reach of 
free movement law are not entirely clear.690 
 
 
                                                
686 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA (2000) ECR I-4139, paras 29-33.  
687 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena (1976) ECR 455, 
paras 31, 37 and 39. 
688 Case C-281/98 Angonese, paras 34-36. So far, Angonese has been confirmed in Case C-94/07 Andrea 
Raccanelli v Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV (2008) ECR I-5939 and in Case C-
172/11 Georges Erny v Daimler AG - Werk Wörth ECLI:EU:C:2012:399. In these rulings, it was reiterated that 
the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 45 TFEU “applies not only to the actions of public 
authorities, but also to all agreements intended to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts 
between individuals” (Erny, para 36). 
689 In doing so, the Court inter alia referred to the fact that Article 56 TFEU forms a substantiation of the general 
non-discrimination principle ex Article 18 TFEU (cf. Case C-281/98 Angonese). See Case 251/83 Eberhard 
Haug-Adrion v Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG (1984) ECR 925, paras 14-18. 
690 See the discussion on Viking, supra n 685. Furthermore, it has been argued that Ferlini, Haug Adrion and 
Raccanelli did entail a collective, public element and hence do not imply that free movement law also applies to 
individual private (contractual) action. See, e.g., Davies 2012; Heremans 2012, p. 129; Prechal & De Vries 2009, 
pp. 15-16; Mataija 2016, p. 37, who however shows himself more hesitant as to the decisiveness of this element. 
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5.4.2 Free movement of goods (Articles 34 and 35 TFEU) 
 
In its landmark decision in Dassonville, the CJEU ruled that “all trading rules enacted by 
Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
intra-community trade” qualify as “measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions” within the meaning of the rules on the free movement of goods.691 With this 
judgment already hinting at the scope of free movement rules on goods being limited to 
Member States, it might not come as a surprise that the CJEU is said to have thus far refrained 
from applying these rules to private actors.692 The Court has rejected the idea of horizontal 
effect on several occasions (section 5.4.2.1). This is however not to say that private action that 
impedes the free flow of goods between Member States never falls within the scope of 
Articles 34 and 35 TFEU (section 5.4.2.2). Some have even argued that the CJEU has begun 
to turn the tide in its recent Fra.bo judgment (section 5.4.2.3).  
 
5.4.2.1 No horizontal effect 
 
An important case situated early in the string of judgments on the horizontal applicability of 
the rules on the free movement of goods is Vlaamse reisbureaus. In this case, the Court held 
that “[Articles 34 and 35 TFEU, MM] concern only public measures and not the conduct of 
undertakings”.693 In Süllhofer the CJEU repeated that Articles 34 et seq. TFEU seek to ensure 
the free movement of goods and, to that end, pursue the elimination of Member State 
measures that form an obstacle in this respect. It added that agreements between undertakings 
fall within the scope of competition law, which seeks to maintain effective competition.694 
The Court confirmed its previous rulings in Sapod Audic. After having established that the 
disputed requirement arose from a contract between private parties, the Court held that the 
requirement could, accordingly, not “be regarded as a barrier to trade for the purposes of 
Article 30 of the Treaty [Article 34 TFEU, MM], since it was not imposed by a Member State 
but agreed between individuals”.695  
 These decisions of the Court have founded the prevailing view in legal doctrine that free 
movement law in the field of goods lacks direct horizontal effect.696 Private actions cannot be 
disciplined under this part of the Treaty, notwithstanding the fact that States and private actors 
                                                
691 Case C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR 837, para 5. 
692 See, e.g., Cherednychenko 2006, pp. 37-38; Oliver & Enchelmaier 2007, pp. 661-663; Van den Bogaert 2002, 
p. 133 and, while criticizing the approach of the Court, Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 207-213; Krenn 2012. A different 
position towards the difference between goods and the other freedoms is taken by Mataija 2016, pp. 41-42; 
Milner-Moore 1995, p. 5 and Davies 2012, p. 824, all arguing that this difference is not as strong as the 
aforementioned traditional positions suggest. 
693 Case 311/85 VZW Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v VZW Sociale Dienst van de Plaatselijke en 
Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten (1987) ECR 3801, para 30. 
694 Case 65/86 Bayer v Süllhofer (1988) ECR 5249, para 11. See also Joined cases C-177/82 and C-178/82 Van 
de Haar, paras 11-14. 
695 Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic v Eco-Emballages SA (2002) ECR I-5031, para 74. 
696 Oliver & Enchelmaier 2007, pp. 661-663; Hartkamp 2010, pp. 538-539; Oliver & Roth 2004, pp. 422-423; 
Van Harten & Nauta 2013, pp. 678-680; Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 207-208. The rejection of the horizontal 
applicability of Articles 34 and 35 TFEU has not always been that clear. See Krenn 2012, pp. 179-181 and 
Milner-Moore 1995, pp. 6-8 on earlier cases concerning intellectual property rights and unfair competition. 
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can be well-matched when it comes to creating obstacles to the free movement of goods. The 
rationale behind the Court’s approach at this point has been said to lay in the fact that, as the 
CJEU pointed out itself in Süllhofer, private agreements that create such obstacles can be 
assessed under competition law (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU), which thus appears to function 
as a safety net in this respect.697 Again, however, case law has not been entirely unequivocal, 
as the Dansk Supermarked case illustrates. Here, the Court considered that “it is impossible in 
any circumstances for agreements between individuals to derogate from the mandatory 
provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of goods”.698 Although this statement may be 
interpreted as lending horizontal effect to the rules on the free movement of goods,699 the 
general perception is that it is an isolated statement that the Court has “scrupulously ignored” 
in its later case law.700 
  
5.4.2.2 Private action covered by Article 34 TFEU: State responsibility and state involvement 
 
However, as Verbruggen points out, some nuance should be put on the claim that all private 
restrictions fall outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU. Two situations can be distinguished in 
this respect.701 
 
i. State responsibility 
Spanish strawberries and Schmidberger represent the first situation. In these cases, the free 
movement of goods was restricted by French farmers blocking the border between France and 
Spain, and by an environmental protection organization that blocked the Brenner motorway 
for its protest, respectively. In its judgments, the Court brought to the table the principle of 
Community loyalty, enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, which, in combination with Article 34 
TFEU, requires Member States “to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that 
that fundamental freedom [i.e., free movement of goods, MM] is respected on their 
territory”.702 As France and Austria failed to take adequate measures to remove the 
aforementioned ‘physical’ obstacles, given the circumstances of the case, they were, 
accordingly held responsible for the restrictive private actions.703 Although it was the eventual 
inaction on the side of the Member States that was held contrary to the free movement 
                                                
697 Oliver & Enchelmaier 2007, pp. 661-663; Prechal & De Vries 2009, p. 18; Verbruggen 2014c, p. 208. Krenn 
2012, p. 182 states that the fact that the CJEU draws a clear contrast between both fields of law “suggests that it 
considers the latter [i.e., competition law, MM] as the systematic counterpart of Article 34 TFEU for private 
actors”. See also Van den Bogaert 2002, p. 140. Critical of the said rationale behind the Court’s approach are 
Schepel 2012, pp. 179-180; Hartkamp 2010, pp. 539-540; Karayigit 2011, pp. 329-335; Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 
210-213; Dawes 2009. The Court’s stance is welcomed by Oliver & Enchelmaier 2007, pp. 662-664, even 
though they do not rule out the possibility that the Walrave line of case law is transposed to the field of goods. 
698 Case 58/80 Dansk Supermarked A/S v A/S Imerco (1981) ECR 181, para 17; Mataija 2016, pp. 38-39. 
699 Opinion Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-253/00 Muñoz v Frumar (2002) ECR I-7289, para 44. 
700 Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 99, footnote 8. See also Schepel 2012, p. 179; Oliver & Enchelmaier 2007, pp. 
661-663; Van den Bogaert 2002, pp. 130-131. 
701 Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 208-209. 
702 Case C-265/95 Commission v France (‘Spanish strawberries’) (1997) ECR I-6959, para 32; reiterated in Case 
C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich (2003) ECR I-
5659, para 59. 
703 Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 209-210; Schepel 2005, pp. 45-46. 
 
 151 
provisions,704 the judgments make clear that “the actions of private individuals can, under 
certain conditions, be measured against an obligation on the Member States to protect the 
guarantees of the fundamental freedoms and so, indirectly, against those fundamental 
freedoms”.705 However, neither case has altered the prevailing opinion in legal doctrine, 
namely that the free movement provisions on goods do not discipline private activities.706 
 
ii. Private action with a strong public element 
The second situation arises when the activities that constitute an obstacle to the free 
movement of goods are undertaken by a private law body that is, in one way or another, 
linked to the State. Faced with the question whether free movement law applied to the 
activities of such semi-private or semi-public bodies, the Court responded through a broad 
interpretation of the concept of ‘Member State’.707 The decisive criterion in extending this 
concept so as to capture the aforementioned types of private bodies is the degree of State 
influence. If this influence is ‘considerable’, then the activities of the private bodies can 
constitute a ‘State measure’ for the purposes of Articles 34 and 35 TFEU.708 In several 
instances, applying this yardstick, the CJEU scrutinized the activities of both organizations 
directly or indirectly controlled by the State and professional bodies on which the State has 
conferred regulatory power.709  
 An example of a case concerning the first type of organizations is Buy Irish, where the 
activities of a private law body were brought within the scope of Article 34 TFEU. This was 
because the Irish government had appointed the board of directors of the body, subsidized its 
activities, and set out the aims and broad outline of the campaigns conducted by the body.710 
The Court proceeded in a similar fashion in the cases of Apple and Pear Development 
Council and Commission v Germany. Here, the ‘considerable degree of State influence’ was 
reflected in the fact that the private law bodies concerned were established by the State 
(through a ministerial decision and the law, respectively), which had also conferred regulatory 
                                                
704 Hartkamp 2010, pp. 535, 541; Shuibhne 2012, p. 367. 
705 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak in Fra.bo, ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, para 31. Hartkamp 2010, p. 535 marks 
these cases as instances of indirect horizontal effect. Similarly, Karayigit 2011, p. 328; Dawes 2009, p. 647. 
706 Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 99, state, with reference to other examples, that “these cases result in not a great 
deal more than some tinkering at the margins”. 
707 Verbruggen 2014c, p. 209; Snell 2002, pp. 218-219. See also Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 43-45; Mataija 
2016, pp. 32-34; Heremans 2012, pp. 123-125. 
708 Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 45. This implies that the notion of ‘Member State’ “does in general not apply to 
‘purely’ private measures, i.e. measures taken by private individuals or companies” (Guide to the application of 
Treaty provisions governing the free movement of goods (2010) of the European Commission, p. 10, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/104/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/pdf>, accessed 1 July 
2016). At the same time, “a person or institution need not be formally classified as exercising official authority 
or be a public body for the measures taken by that person or institution to be classified as an action taken by a 
Member State, to which the fundamental freedoms apply” (Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak in Fra.bo, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, para 29). 
709 This distinction is drawn in the Guide to the application of Treaty provisions governing the free movement of 
goods (2010) of the European Commission, p. 10 and by Advocate General Trstenjak her Opinion in Fra.bo, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, para 29. See also Snell 2002, pp. 220-221; Heremans 2012, pp. 124-125. 
710 Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland (‘Buy Irish’) (1982) ECR 4005, para 15, 23-28. 
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authority upon these bodies.711 Furthermore, the Court held in Hennen Olie that measures 
taken by a body that, although formally not part of the State administration, is to a significant 
extent controlled and directed by public authorities, constituted a State measure within the 
meaning of Article 35 TFEU.712 It likewise subjected the professional rules of conduct to 
judicial scrutiny under the free movement rules. In Royal Pharmaceutical Society and 
Hünermund, more specifically, it was held that “measures adopted by a professional body on 
which national legislation has conferred powers”, such as enacting rules of professional 
conduct and imposing disciplinary sanctions, indeed qualify as a measure under Article 34 
TFEU when capable of affecting cross-border trade.713 Both disputes were caused by rules of 
professional conduct of a pharmacist’ association, which were eventually found to fall within 
the scope of Article 34 TFEU. In Royal Pharmaceutical Society, which involved a private law 
association recognized by legislation, the Court took account of the association’s regulatory 
powers, of the fact that it held a monopoly in granting access to the profession of pharmacist 
and of the fact that the Society statutorily enjoyed broad disciplinary powers. In Hünermund, 
the public law association in question enjoyed similar powers, with the exception of the 
power to impose the sanction of exclusion from the profession. This however did not stop the 
CJEU from bringing its rules within the ambit of Article 34 TFEU.714  
 Thus, through an extensive interpretation of the term ‘Member State’, the CJEU has 
brought semi-private bodies and their (regulatory) activities within the orbit of the rules on 
the free movement of goods. The mere fact that such bodies are of a private law nature or 
have private law features does not per se rule out the application of these rules, provided that 
the level of State involvement is considerable.715 However, no strict set of criteria defines said 
level of involvement by the State. Rather, as Sauter and Schepel indicate, the CJEU has 
approached the matter by simply accumulating “as much evidence as possible concerning the 
State’s involvement in the creation, financing and regulation of the organisations in 
question”,716 without establishing the weight of the formal and factual criteria it uses.717 If the 
required, considerable threshold of State involvement is met, the activities performed by the 
semi-private body are considered State measures and attributed to the State. Conversely, when 
the necessary link with the State is missing or not significant enough to meet the Court’s 
                                                
711 Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council v K.J. Lewis and others (1983) ECR 4083; Case C-325/00 
Commission v Germany (2002) ECR I-9977. Cf. Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 44; Mataija 2016, pp. 32-33. 
712 Case C-302/88 Hennen Olie BV v Stichting Interim Centraal Orgaan Voorraadvorming Aardolieprodukten 
and State of the Netherlands (1990) ECR I-4625, paras 13-15.  
713 Joined cases C-266/87 and C-267/87 The Queen v Royal Pharamaceutical Society of Great Britain (1989) 
ECR 1295, para 13-16 (quotation para 13); Case C-292/92 Ruth Hünermund and others v 
Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg (1993) ECR I-6787, paras 12-16 (quotation para 15). 
714 Schepel & Sauter 2009, pp. 44-45; Heremans 2012, pp. 124-125; Schepel 2005, p. 43. See also Joined cases 
C-266/87 and C-267/87 Royal Pharamaceutical Society, para 16; Case C-292/92 Hünermund, paras 14-16. 
715 Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 45; Chalmers, Davies & Monti 2010, p. 758 (“the link between state and 
organisation [should be, MM] demonstrably real”); Snell 2002, pp. 219-221. 
716 Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 44. See also Schepel 2005, pp. 42-44; Verbruggen 2014c, p. 209; Snell 2002, p. 
220.  
717 Schepel 2005, p. 43. Heremans 2012, pp. 125, 131 deduces from the Court’s case law that decisive indicators 
of the ‘public nature’ of the private law body are the presence of some degree of public law recognition of the 
body and whether the body holds certain (delegated) disciplinary and/or regulatory powers. 
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threshold, these activities continue to fall outside the reach of Articles 34 and 35 TFEU.718 
Thus using the technique of extensive interpretation, the Court has, as Heremans notes, in 
effect kept within the confines of the personal scope of these Treaty provisions, not 
attempting to horizontally expand the scope of these Treaty provisions in the sense that they 




This conclusion brings us to the case that marks the most recent development in the field of 
the free movement of goods: Fra.bo. The dispute in Fra.bo was caused by the decision of a 
German private law certification body (DVGW) to withdraw, and subsequently refuse 
extension of, the certificate for the copper fittings manufactured and sold by Fra.bo, an Italian 
company. Yet, certification by an accredited certifying body was required under German law 
when bringing products to the German market. The DVGW played a pivotal role in this 
respect as German law attributed a presumption of conformity to the certificates that it issued: 
products certified by this organization were presumed to comply with the legal requirements 
of German product safety legislation. Against this backdrop, Fra.bo claimed that the decision 
of DVGW constituted a violation of the Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods, 
referring among other things to the presumption of conformity which, according to Fra.bo, 
rendered the distribution of its products in Germany without a DVGW certificate virtually 
impossible. DVGW objected it was not bound by Articles 34 et seq. TFEU given its private 
law nature.720 
 In the first part of its judgment, the Court establishes that DVGW is a non-profit, private 
law body and that there are no indications of considerable State involvement with the 
DVGW: the German government neither financed its activities, nor did it have power to exert 
decisive influence over these activities.721 Accordingly, the matter for the CJEU to decide was 
“whether, in the light of inter alia the legislative and regulatory context in which it operates, 
the activities of a private-law body such as the DVGW has the effect of giving rise to 
restrictions on the free movement of goods in the same manner as do measures imposed by 
the State”.722 The Court answered this question in the affirmative: the certification activities 
of the DVGW did indeed have such effect. In doing so, it first of all pointed at the fact that 
German law provides that the certificates DVGW issued grant a presumption of compliance 
to the certified products. Secondly, the Court noted that the required certificate could in fact 
only be issued by DVGW. The argument of DVGW and the German government that an 
alternative certification procedure existed was dismissed: this procedure was considered too 
burdensome and too costly to constitute a viable alternative. Thirdly, the CJEU took account 
                                                
718 Karayigit 2011, p. 328; Krenn 2012, p. 201; Mataija 2016, pp. 32, 34; Verbruggen 2014c, p. 209; Heremans 
2012, p. 125. 
719 Heremans 2012, pp. 125, 138. 
720 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) – Technisch-
Wissenschaftlicher Verein (2012) ECLI:EU:C:2012:453, paras 3-14, 28. This case has a Dutch ‘equivalent’: the 
Knooble case, which is discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.4.1.3. 
721 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, paras 21-24. Cf. the case law discussed above, under 5.4.2.2. 
722 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, para 26. 
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of the view of the referring court that the lack of a DVGW certificate in practice considerably 
restricts the marketing of the products in question on the German market.723 All this led the 
Court to conclude that “in such circumstances, it is clear that a body such as the DVGW, by 
virtue of its authority to certify the products, in reality holds the power to regulate the entry 
into the German market of products such as the copper fittings at issue in the main 
proceedings”.724 Accordingly, the certification activities of DVGW were found to fall within 
the scope of the Treaty: “Article 28 EC [Article 34 TFEU, MM] must be interpreted as 
meaning that it applies to standardisation and certification activities of a private-law body, 
where the national legislation considers the products certified by that body to be compliant 
with national law and that has the effect of restricting the marketing of products which are not 
certified by that body”.725 
 By thus framing its decision in rather context-specific terms, the CJEU seem to have 
carefully moved around the issue of horizontal effect. Unlike the Advocate General,726 the 
Court, strikingly, neither mentioned the concept itself, nor referred to Walrave and progeny 
which have brought collective private regulation within the scope of the rules on free 
movement of persons, establishment and services. Rather, it explicitly focused on the effect 
and functioning of the German certification body in the applicable regulatory and legislative 
context.727 Be that as it may, the net result of the Court’s ruling is that the personal scope of 
Article 34 TFEU can under certain circumstances be extended to private law bodies that are in 
a different position than the bodies featuring the case law discussed in the previous 
subsection.728 And it is precisely at this point that the Fra.bo judgment distinguishes itself 
from earlier case law in the field of the free flow of goods. Whereas the Court has previously 
held that private activities are only caught by Articles 34 to 36 TFEU - in the guise of a ‘State 
measure’ - insofar as a considerable level of State involvement did take place, this was not a 
necessary condition in the current judgment. In fact, the Court explicitly established that no 
such involvement was present in Fra.bo. Instead, the CJEU has focused on the de facto power 
of the body to take regulatory decisions that may restrict market access, “in the same manner 
                                                
723 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, paras 26-30. As regards the third ‘circumstance’, the Court added that although the 
legal regulation from which it followed that only products “supplied in accordance with the recognised rules of 
technology” may be used “merely lays down the general sales conditions as between water supply undertakings 
and their customers, from which the parties are free to depart, it is apparent from the case-file that, in practice, 
almost all German consumers purchase copper fittings certified by the DVGW” (para 30). 
724 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, para 31. 
725 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, para 32. 
726 Advocate General Trstenjak explicitly fits the facts of the case within the framework of horizontal direct 
effect. Considering that DVGW had the de facto competence to determine, through its activities, which products 
could enter the German market, Trstenjak concludes that the activities of DVGW fell within the ambit of the 
rules on the free movement of goods. In her view, an extension of the scope of the free movement rules to 
private law associations with de facto rulemaking competence does not give rise to fundamental objections. In 
fact, the main arguments for the horizontal applicability of Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU (see section 5.4.5 
below) equally apply in the current case, Trstenjak argues. See Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak in Fra.bo, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, paras 42-50. 
727 Shuibhne 2012, p. 368; Van Harten & Nauta 2013, pp. 688-689; Van Harten & Nauta 2012, pp. 329, 332; 
Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 207-208; Schepel 2013a, pp. 189-190; Hoyer 2013, p. 342; Van Gestel & Micklitz 2013, 
pp. 158-160. Schepel explains this lack of references by arguing that the Court was in effect concerned with the 
legal regulation that encouraged DVGW certification, rather than with the activities of DVGW. See Schepel 
2013a, pp. 190-191. 
728 Van Harten & Nauta 2013, p. 689; Van Gestel & Micklitz 2013, p. 159; Schepel 2013a, p. 188. 
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as do measures imposed by the State”729.730 In doing so, the Court stepped outside the 
‘formal’ confines of Article 34 TFEU by directly applying the provision to the activities of 
DVGW. It is thus not without reason that several scholars have submitted that Fra.bo does 
represent the cutting-edge in the Court’s case law on the scope of the rules on the free 
movement of goods, but in a nuanced and case-specific way.731 And indeed, with Fra.bo the 
Court has widened the personal scope of Article 34 TFEU. However, as a corollary of its 
context-specific approach, it still has not unequivocally attributed horizontal effect to the rules 
on the free movement of goods. 
  
5.4.3 Summary of the Court’s case law in terms of types of private regulation 
 
The case law of the CJEU discussed in the previous sections displays a contentious distinction 
between the free movement rules on workers, establishment and services on the one hand and 
those on the free movement of goods on the other. Whereas the horizontality of the provisions 
concerning the first category of freedoms is settled case law,732 the latter category is 
commonly said to be denied this effect, albeit that the CJEU might have slightly changed 
course in this respect with its ruling on Fra.bo. This is however not the only distinction that 
the Court has drawn in its case law. Also within these two categories, the approach of the 
Court, which has to be deduced from a tangle of cases, varies. It is therefore with good reason 
that Krenn has labeled the Court’s theory on the horizontal applicability of free movement 
law “a jigsaw puzzle”.733 With a view to the topic of this doctoral thesis, it is worthwhile to 
put the pieces of this puzzle together following the overview drawn up by Mataija, who has 
categorized the Court’s case law on the basis of its regulatory nature.734 Besides the category 
of purely private relationships, comprising Angonese, Raccanelli, and Haug Adrion (all 
concerning discriminatory private action), the following two regulatory categories can be 
distinguished for the purposes of this doctoral thesis.735 Industry codes of conduct can fall 
                                                
729 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, para 26. Schepel argues, with a view to the fact that the wordings used in the different 
language versions of the judgments differ, that the meaning of the phrase quoted should not be taken so far as to 
apply Articles 34 to 36 TFEU to any private action that restricts the free movement of goods in a way similar to 
State measures. He deems this interpretation “highly unlikely”. See Schepel 2013a, pp. 188-189. It seems as if 
this phrase has led Van Gestel and Micklitz to argue that the Court has stressed the quasi-statutory nature of 
DVGW, thus avoiding the thorny question on the horizontal applicability of Articles 34 et seq. TFEU. See Van 
Gestel & Micklitz 2013, pp. 159-160. 
730 Van Gestel & Micklitz 2013, pp. 159-160; Van Harten & Nauta 2013, pp. 688-690; Van Harten & Nauta 
2012, p. 334; Shuibne 2012, p. 368; Mataija 2016, pp. 41, 247. Cf. Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, para 26. 
731 E.g., Van Harten & Nauta 2013; Shuibhne 2012; Van Gestel & Micklitz 2013; Mataija 2016, pp. 41-42; De 
Vries & Van Mastrigt 2013, pp. 262-263. Hoyer 2013, p. 342, by contrast, has less trouble concluding that with 
Fra.bo, the CJEU has established the horizontal applicability of Article 34 TFEU in general. 
732 Likewise, the Court has held that Articles 18 (Ferlini) and 157 (Defrenne) TFEU can be applied to private 
action. 
733 Krenn 2012, p. 178. 
734 Mataija 2016, pp. 52-62, with the remark that the distinctions between the categories “are not watertight and 
should be seen as heuristic devices only” (at p. 32). 
735 Mataija distinguishes a fourth category, within which Dansk Supermarked falls: private action based on 
restrictive legislation. According to Mataija, this is a rather specific category as in the cases falling within this 
category the Court has not, unlike in the cases in the other categories, imposed obligations on private actors 
under free movement law. Rather, it prevents private parties in question from relying on the rights ensuing from 
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within either of the two categories, depending on whether public authorities have been 
involved with the code (co-regulation) or not.   
 The first category is formed by co-regulatory schemes, such as the ones at dispute in Buy 
Irish, Apple and Pear Development Council, Commission v. Germany, Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society and Hünermund. Here, the involvement of the State with the regulatory regimes 
operated by private regulators has proven of pivotal relevance under the Treaty provisions 
concerning the free movement of goods. For, under these provisions the private nature of a 
measure has been reason for the Court to refrain from free movement scrutiny. If, by contrast, 
an explicit and considerable link can be established between the State and a private regulatory 
body, the Court has shown willing to stretch the reach of Articles 34 and 35 TFEU on the 
basis of a broad interpretation of the notion of ‘Member State’.736 In Fra.bo, the CJEU went 
down a different route, directly subjecting a private law regulatory body to the rules on the 
free movement of goods, that is to say, without fitting it into the straitjacket of a ‘Member 
State’. What matters here is whether this body, in view of inter alia the legislative context in 
which it operates, in practice holds the regulatory power to restrict market access through its 
measures.737  
 The second category comprises instances of purely private regulation or self-regulation, 
where the State is either absent or does not play a decisive role.738 It follows from Walrave 
and related judgments that discriminatory as well as non-discriminatory, restrictive private 
rules can fall within the scope of Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU when they are aimed at 
collectively regulating issues pertaining to employment, establishment or the provision of 
services. The source of the rules, private or otherwise, is irrelevant in this respect.739  
 
5.4.4 Justification defenses 
 
A public or private measure that falls within the personal scope of the free movement rules 
and involves a cross-border element only falls foul of said rules when it restricts a 
fundamental freedom. Simplified and broadly speaking, there is a ‘restriction’ within the 
meaning of the Treaty when a measure is either discriminatory or “is capable of hindering or 
rendering less attractive the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaties”740.741 States can rely upon several justification defenses to legitimize their prima 
facie restrictive measures. A necessary condition for a successful invocation of these defenses 
is that the measure at issue passes the proportionality test.742 Which defenses can be relied 
                                                                                                                                                   
legislation that restricts free movement. See Mataija 2016, pp. 38-39. On purely private relationships: Mataija 
2016, pp. 36-38. 
736 Mataija 2016, pp. 32-34, stating that this link “is the reason why horizontal direct effect in this group of cases 
has traditionally been the easiest to accept” (at p. 32). 
737 See in this respect Case C-171/11 Fra.bo, paras 26 and 31. 
738 Mataija 2016, p. 34. 
739 Mataija 2016, pp. 34-36.  
740 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak in Fra.bo, ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, para 36. 
741 For a more detailed account, see, e.g., Barnard 2013 pp. 71-107 (goods) and 234-270 (other freedoms).  
742 This test consists of two prongs: an assessment of the suitability of the measure to reach the goals set and an 
assessment as to whether the measure is the least restrictive means that can be employed in this respect. See 
Heremans 2012, p. 169, with further references. 
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upon depends on the nature of the restriction. When discriminatory measures are concerned, 
States can only benefit from the written grounds of justification listed by the free movement 
provision in question. In case of non-discriminatory restrictive measures, States can also rely 
upon these written grounds, but can alternatively seek recourse to the open-ended category of 
unwritten justifications formulated by the CJEU.743 For the latter to succeed, the measures in 
question have to meet the following four conditions: “they must be applied in a 
nondiscriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general 
interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; 
and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it”.744  
 With a view to the horizontal effect of the free movement provisions, the question arises 
whether private actors whose measures qualify as barriers to free movement can equally seek 
recourse to these written and unwritten justification defenses. At first sight, it appears rather 
unlikely that this question is to be answered in the affirmative, since these defenses have been 
developed to justify the conduct of Member States.745 But then again, the fact that the free 
movement provisions have originally been drafted to cover Member State conduct has not 
withheld the CJEU from extending the scope of these provisions to private conduct. The 
Court shed light on the matter in its ruling in the Bosman case, from which it follows that 
private actors can rely on the justifications listed in the Treaty as well as on the unwritten 
justification defenses.746  
 As several legal scholars have pointed out, since both types of justification require a link 
between the conduct in question and the public interest,747 we can question whether private 
actors will be able to successfully invoke them as a defense. After all, private actors generally 
pursue objectives related to their own private interests, rather than to the public interest.748 
                                                
743 Asser/Hartkamp 3-I 2015/64; Schepel 2013b, pp. 1215-1216.  
744 Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano (1995) ECR 
I-4165, para 37. The origins of this rule of reason exceptions lie in the field of the free movement of goods, 
where the Court in Cassis de Dijon spoke of “mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness 
of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of 
the consumer”. See Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (1979) ECR 
649, para 8. The exceptions include general interests of a non-economic nature, such as consumer protection, 
environmental protection, protection of culture, the improvement of working conditions and protection of the 
plurality of the media. See Asser/Hartkamp 3-I 2015/64; Roth & Oliver 2004, p. 435, with references to the 
Court’s case law. 
745 Asser/Hartkamp 3-I 2015/64; Hartkamp 2010, p. 547; Cherednychenko 2006, p. 42; Oliver & Roth 2004, p. 
427; Snell 2002, pp. 231-232; Heremans 2012, pp. 142-143. 
746 More specifically, the Court held that “there is nothing to preclude individuals from relying on justifications 
on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Neither the scope nor the content of those grounds 
of justification is in any way affected by the public or private nature of the rules in question” (Case C-415/93 
Bosman, para 86, repeated in Case C-350/96 Clean Car Autoservice GesmbH v Landeshauptmann von Wien 
(1998) ECR I-2521, para 24). In Bosman itself, unwritten justifications were invoked (see paras 105-114 of the 
judgment). See also Schepel 2013b, pp. 1215-1216; Mataija 2016, pp. 61-62. 
747 In fact, the CJEU has ruled that grounds of an economic nature cannot be accepted as ‘imperative 
requirements in the general interest’ that justify the restriction of a fundamental freedom. See Case C-260/04 
Commission v Italy (2005) ECR-I 7083, para 35. 
748 See, e.g., Cherednychenko 2006, pp. 42-43; Schepel 2013b, pp. 1215-1216; Hartkamp 2010, pp. 547-548; 
Roth & Oliver 2004, p. 429; Snell 2002, pp. 231-232; Van Leuken 2015, pp. 165-168. See also Schepel 2012, p. 
196. Cf. on the official authority exception of Articles 51 and 62 TFEU, Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium (1974) 
ECR 631, where CJEU interpreted this exception very strictly and held that “the most typical activities” of 
lawyers “cannot be considered as connected with the exercise of official authority” (para 52). With respect to 
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However, where collective private regulation is concerned, it is not inconceivable that public 
interest goals are pursued (cf. the functions identified in Chapter 3). This would allow the 
private regulator to benefit from the written or unwritten justification defenses.749 In fact, 
Schepel submits, the CJEU has shown itself rather generous in this regard and has accepted 
different ‘public interest defenses’ to justify restrictive private regulations.750 Mataija even 
suggests that the CJEU tends to take a more deferential stance towards private regulators; the 
Court has allowed them to justify restrictions that Member States would not have been able to 
justify.751 Van Leuken, on the other hand, states that the deference shown by the Court at this 
point has not led to a substantial ‘private law’ expansion of the grounds of justification.752 
 Against this backdrop, the Court’s decision to permit private regulators to benefit (solely) 
from the existing ‘public interest justifications’ has given rise to scholarly pleas for the 
creation of new avenues for justification, tailored to the private (law) nature of the measures 
concerned.753 In her Opinion in Fra.bo, Advocate General Trstenjak suggests that private 
regulators might invoke grounds of justification other than the prevalent written and unwritten 
grounds and advances three alternative justification defenses.754 First of all, a private regulator 
might argue that the restrictive effects of its regulatory scheme are justified on the basis of 
‘special grounds in the private interest’. The CJEU has shown itself receptive to such pleas in 
previous cases, provided that the principle of proportionality was met.755 Secondly, there is 
the notion of ‘objective factors’, to which the CJEU has referred in Angonese. In this case, the 
Court held that the restriction of the free movement of workers by private individuals “could 
                                                                                                                                                   
notaries, see, e.g., Case C-47/08 European Commission v Belgium (2011) ECR I- 4105. On these rulings, see 
Heremans 2012, pp. 158-164. 
749 Schepel 2013b, p. 1216; Schepel 2012, p. 197; Krenn 2012, p. 212. 
750 Schepel 2013b, p. 1216 and Schepel 2012, p. 197, footnote 125. See also Mataija 2016, pp. 61-62. 
751 Mataija 2016, pp. 61-66. 
752 Van Leuken 2015, pp. 168-171. 
753 See for instance Hartkamp 2010, pp. 547-548; Schepel 2012, pp. 197-199; Schepel 2013b. Roth & Oliver 
2004, pp. 427-429 advocate that an entirely different approach to the horizontal effect issue is needed. The fact 
that private actors cannot put up the principle of private autonomy as a shield against liability under free 
movement law is considered particularly troublesome in this respect (see, e.g., Cherednychenko 2006, pp. 41-43; 
Roth & Oliver 2004, pp. 423, 427). At the same time, however, as Van Leuken (2015, p. 165) indicates, the 
practical relevance of the horizontal effect of free movement law would cease to exist if the principle of party 
autonomy could a priori justify infringements of the free movement rules. In the same vein, Cherednychenko 
points out that in order to attain the objective of free movement law, i.e., the protection and furthering of private 
autonomy with a cross-border element, a certain restriction of private autonomy through horizontal effect is 
necessary. Accordingly, the problem does not so much lie in the restriction of private autonomy per se, but rather 
in the “unlimited binding effect of the fundamental freedoms on private parties” which results from the 
limitation of the justifications to ‘public interest one’, Cherednychenko argues (2006, pp. 41-43). Mataija at this 
point coins the concept of ‘regulatory autonomy’, which “involves deferring to private regulators by granting 
them a wide margin of discretion […] to pursue a legitimate policy by means of their own choosing”. The 
granting of such autonomy however comes at the expense of the private autonomy argument losing force at the 
justification stage (Mataija 2016, p. 63). Cf. also Mataija 2016, pp. 48-50 and Krenn 2012, pp. 213-214. 
754 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak in Fra.bo, ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, paras 38, 56 and 57. On the three 
routes, see also De Vries & Van Mastrigt 2013, pp. 270-272 and Van Harten & Nauta 2012, pp. 334-335. 
755 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak in Fra.bo, ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, para 38 and footnote 26, with 
reference to Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC (2010) ECR I-
2177 and Case C-415/93 Bosman. In the former case, the encouragement of the recruitment and training of 
young football players was considered a legitimate objective of the restrictive private rule (see para 37 of the 
judgment). In the latter case, the Court accepted as legitimate the “aims of maintaining a balance between clubs 
by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and 
training of young players” (para 106). 
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be justified only if it were based on objective factors unrelated to the nationality of the 
persons concerned and if it were in proportion to the aim legitimately pursued”.756 However, 
Trstenjak concedes, it remains unclear whether this justification also applies to collective 
private regulation restricting free movement.757 Thirdly, a private regulator might, given its 
private law nature, seek recourse to the fundamental rights protected by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental rights. In applying the principle of proportionality, a fair balance would have to 
be struck between free movement law and these fundamental rights, Trstenjak points out. A 
private regulator attempting to evade liability under the free movement rules would thus have 
to provide evidence that there is a clash between these rules and one or more fundamental 
rights in its particular case.758 At present, all this is however for a large part still in the future; 
it remains to be seen whether the CJEU will actually show itself willing to go down these 
paths.759 
 
5.4.5 The approach of the CJEU 
 
As was already noted at the outset of this chapter, free movement law is formally intended to 
cover the actions of Member States, while private action falls within the scope of the rules on 
competition. Practice has challenged this traditional public-private divide through private 
regulation and regulatory hybrids, and therewith induced the CJEU to decide upon the 
boundaries of this divide. If the conventional division between the public and the private 
sphere of the Treaty would be taken as a starting point in this respect, the nature of the actor 
performing the contested activities (public or private) would function as an entry criterion for 
judicial scrutiny under free movement law (and competition law). Given the private or semi-
private nature of the actors that featured in the case law discussed above, this criterion 
arguably would have led the CJEU to an a priori rejection of judicial scrutiny of the activities 
of these actors in the vast majority of cases, because of the private or semi-private nature of 
the parties in question. Indeed, in the context of the free movement of goods the CJEU has 
clung on quite firmly to this formal approach, with only the recent Fra.bo ruling displaying a 
cautious move in a different direction. In the field of workers, services and establishment, by 
contrast, the CJEU went down another route, gradually evolving its case law along the lines 
of the developments in practice.760 But how exactly did the CJEU go about the free movement 
cases concerning private regulation? 
 
                                                
756 Case C-281/98 Angonese, para 42.  
757 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak in Fra.bo, ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, paras 39, 56. 
758 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak in Fra.bo, ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, para 56. Cf. Krenn 2012, pp. 212-123, 
pointing at Schmidberger (freedom of expression and freedom of assembly), and Viking and Laval (right of 
collective action). For a more extensive discussion, see Van Leuken 2015, pp. 171-197. 
759 Van Harten & Nauta 2012, pp. 334-335. As Hartkamp notes, the Court usually only establishes the horizontal 
effect of the free movement rules in respect of the private measure concerned, without expressing its opinion on 
the consequences. It seems that the Court considers this to be a matter for national law, Hartkamp indicates. 
However, it is clear that a violation of EU free movement law can lead to nullity of a private measure. See 
Asser/Hartkamp 3-I 2015/61. 
760 Mataija 2016, pp. 5-12, 18-19, 27-31; Semmelmann 2012, p. 55; Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 2, 22-25; 
Hatzopoulos 2013, p. 467. 
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i. Workers, establishment and services 
Case law shows that the reasons are threefold for attributing horizontal effect to Articles 45, 
49 and 56 TFEU.761 The first reason pertains to the effectiveness or effet utile of EU law. 
Considering that private measures can also raise an obstacle to free movement, the CJEU has 
pointed out that free movement law would fail to reach its objective of market integration by 
removing barriers to the free movement of workers, establishment and services, if the reach of 
Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU would be limited to impediments to the fundamental freedoms 
caused by Member States.762 Put differently, the aforementioned Treaty provisions would fail 
to reach full effect when States would be prohibited from obstructing free movement, while 
equally restrictive private measures would be allowed.763 The second rationale behind the 
horizontal applicability of this part of free movement law lies in the uniform application of 
Community law.764 Whereas some Member States employ legislation or other forms of public 
regulation to govern issues related to cross-border workers, services and establishment, other 
Member States leave this to private actors. Accordingly, a limitation of the prohibition to 
impede free movement to acts of public actors would lead to the risk of creating inequality in 
the application of free movement law.765 The third reason is formed by the general wording of 
Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU, which neither refer to nor exclude private actors.766 In fact, 
these provisions lack a specific addressee.767 With respect to Article 56 TFEU, more 
specifically, the Court has indicated that its wordings are general in nature and that as such, it 
does not draw a distinction between public or private restrictions.768 In a similar vein, it held 
that the non-discrimination principle enshrined in Article 45 TFEU “is worded in general 
terms and is not addressed specifically to the Member States or to bodies governed by public 
law”.769  
 These three rationales reflect the concern that the aim of removing barriers to free 
movement law and the ultimate goal of creating an internal market (cf. Article 3(3) TEU) 
could be undermined if restrictive or discriminatory private actions would fall outside the 
scope of free movement law. This has led the Court to gear its approach towards this goal, 
                                                
761 Karayigit 2011, pp. 317-318 additionally refers to the mandatory nature of the fundamental freedoms. De 
Vries & Van Mastrigt 2013, pp. 264-266 likewise mention this argument and also refer to the power that private 
organizations can exercise over other individuals. Schepel 2004, p. 664 shows himself more wary of the idea of 
the mandatory nature of the Treaty provisions as an argument for their horizontal applicability. 
762 Case 36/74 Walrave, para 18. See also Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 101; Mataija 2016, p. 29; Karayigit 2011, p. 
318; Van Leuken 2015, pp. 110-114. The Court has repeated this argument on several occasions, see, e.g., Case 
C-415/93 Bosman, para 83; Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 120; Case C-281/98 Angonese, para 32; Case C-94/07 
Raccanelli, para 44; Case C-341/05 Laval, para 98; Case C-438/05 Viking, para 57. 
763 De Vries & Van Mastrigt 2013, p. 264; Karayigit 2011, p. 318; Prechal & De Vries 2009, pp. 13-14. 
764 Karayigit 2011, pp. 320-322; Caro de Sousa 2013, p. 483. 
765 Case 36/74 Walrave, para 19, reiterated by the Court in Case C-415/93 Bosman, para 84; Case C-281/98 
Angonese, para 33; Case C-438/05 Viking, para 34. Mataija refers to this as the ‘anti-circumvention argument’: 
Member States are not allowed to circumvent the application of free movement law by delegating its activities to 
private actors (Mataija 2016, p. 29). 
766 Karayigit 2011, pp. 317-318; Caro de Sousa 2013, p. 483; Van Leuken 2015, p. 109. 
767 Van Leuken 2015, p. 109. 
768 See Case 36/74 Walrave, para 20. 
769 Case C-94/07 Raccanelli, para 42. See also Case C-281/98 Angonese, para 30. In the latter case, the CJEU 
also referred to the fact, as established in Defrenne in relation to Article 157 TFEU, that “certain provisions of 
the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member States does not prevent rights from being conferred at the same 
time on any individual who has an interest in the performance of the duties thus laid down” (Defrenne, para 31). 
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rather than to follow the traditional interpretation of free movement law as encompassing the 
public sphere only. Building on the aforementioned rationales, the CJEU has extended the 
scope of free movement law to restrictive and discriminatory instances of private collective 
regulation (Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU), discriminatory actions in contractual relations 
(Article 45 TFEU) and restrictive collective actions (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU). As already 
follows from the foregoing, the Court’s reference point in attributing horizontal effect to these 
Treaty provisions has not been the nature of the source of the contested measure. Rather, the 
Court has adopted an approach that has been labeled in legal literature as ‘functional’.770 That 
is to say that it first and foremost looks beyond the formal legal status of the actor in question 
to the contested measure itself and assesses whether this measure constitutes a restriction of a 
fundamental freedom or whether it violates the non-discrimination principle.771 As Prechal 
and De Vries submit, the CJEU is developing its case law into a direction where the “question 
of whether there is an obstacle to free movement or a discriminatory act contrary to the Treaty 
is separated from the question of whether the actor at the origins of the restriction is a person 
bound by the relevant Treaty prohibitions”.772 In determining whether there is an impediment 
to free movement, it is apparently deemed irrelevant who is at the source of this impediment, 
Prechal and De Vries note.773 As Heremans puts it: “the Court shifted its focus from the type 
of actor to the nature of the action”.774 
 As regards collective regulation by private bodies, more specifically, it has been 
suggested that the Court’s readiness to bring this type of private action within the scope of 
free movement law has been motivated by the resemblance that it bears to State regulation, 
because of its collective, regulatory nature.775 In the words of Schepel: “it could be argued 
that the Court is entertaining a functional understanding of ‘collective regulation’: what seems 
to matter here is the naked fact of regulatory power, not the source it derives from. The idea is 
clearly one of functional equivalence to public regulatory authority, the realisation that large 
chunks of modern economic life are regulated by private governance regimes of various 
descriptions such as, indeed, trade unions, bar associations and sporting federations”.776 At 
                                                
770 See, e.g., Sauter & Schepel 2009; Mataija 2016, p. 28; Verbruggen 2014c, p. 216; Odudu 2010, p. 131. See 
also Schepel 2012, p. 185. 
771 Mataija 2016, pp. 28, 54-55; Schepel 2013b, p. 1214; Snell 2002, p. 226; Karayigit 2011, p. 326; Schepel 
2012, p. 185. Some scholars in this respect argue that the CJEU seems to be concerned with whether private 
actors are capable of effectively impeding free movement, i.e., with the effect of the contested measure. See, e.g., 
Schepel 2013b, p. 1214 (with the caveat that his assessment is not based on a clear positive statement of the 
Court); Schepel 2012, p. 187, 200; Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 102; Mataija 2016, pp. 54-67; Snell 2002, p. 226; 
Caro de Sousa 2013, pp. 498-499. That is however not to say that the CJEU has adopted a full-fledged effects-
based approach, as already follows on from the restraint that the CJEU seems to exercise in attributing horizontal 
effect to free movement law outside the context of private regulation. See in this respect Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 
206-207, 216; Davies 2012, pp. 813-821; Opinion Advocate General Trstjenak in Fra.bo, ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, 
para 34; Heremans 2012, p. 130. 
772 Prechal & De Vries 2009, p. 7, with the caveat that the case law of the Court does show some inconsistencies. 
See also De Vries & Van Mastrigt 2013, p. 252; Odudu 2010, p. 830. 
773 Prechal & De Vries 2009, p. 9. See also De Vries & Van Mastrigt 2013, p. 254; Case 36/74 Walrave, para 20.  
774 Heremans 2012, p. 122. Similarly: Odudu 2006, p. 48.  
775 E.g., Schepel 2004, p. 665 (more nuanced: Schepel 2012, pp. 185-187); Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 206-207; 
Odudu 2010, p. 834; De Vries & Van Mastrigt 2013, pp. 259-260; Davies 2012, p. 812; Roth & Oliver 2004, p. 
425; Van den Bogaert 2002, pp. 125-126. 
776 Schepel 2012, p. 185. 
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the same time, however, the extension of the reach of the free movement rules to other types 
of private action together with the Court’s statement in Viking777 has led some legal scholars 
to doubt as to whether this State-like, collective regulatory nature is decisive in subjecting 
private action to free movement scrutiny.778 Be that as it may, for the purposes of this doctoral 
thesis it is relevant that the CJEU has, through its functional approach, lent full horizontal 
effect to Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU in relation to private regulation: it is by now settled 
case law that private collective regulatory measures, which include industry codes of conduct, 
that are of a discriminatory nature or impede free movement fall within the scope of these 
Treaty provisions.779 Or, as Van den Bogaert has phrased it: “public and private regulation are 
put on the same footing by the Court of Justice”.780 
 
ii. Goods 
In the context of the free movement of goods, by contrast, the CJEU has shown far more 
reluctant to extend the scope of Articles 34 and 35 TFEU to private action. In fact, in the case 
law predating the Fra.bo ruling, the Court expressly rejected all arguments pertaining to the 
horizontality of these provisions with reference to the public scope of these provisions. Here, 
thus, the private origins of a measure still do constitute a barrier for free movement scrutiny, 
reflecting the Court’s formal approach as to this part of the Treaty. In search for the rationales 
behind this approach, there is very little to build on: in this respect, the CJEU has only pointed 
at the strict division of labor between the rules on the free movement of goods and 
competition law. Private action that creates obstacles to the free flow of goods falls within the 
orbit of the latter.781  
 However, with a view to the relation between Articles 34 and 35 TFEU and private 
regulation, two observations can be made that qualify the statement private action is not 
caught by the rules on the free movement of goods.782 First of all, the Court has not been held 
back by its formal approach in stretching the notion of ‘Member State’ as to encompass 
                                                
777 I.e., that its previous case law on the horizontal effect of the fundamental freedoms provides no indication 
that “could validly support the view that it applies only to associations or to organisations exercising a regulatory 
task or having quasi-legislative powers” (Case C-438/05 Viking, para 65). 
778 Schepel 2012, pp. 186-187, arguing that it is an indication “of what the court is really looking for: the ability 
to obstruct free movement” (p. 187). See also Schepel 2013b, p. 1214; Sauter & Schepel 2009, p 102. Snell 
2002, p. 226 submits that the Court’s use of the words ‘rules’ and ‘regulating’ does have “a quasi-Statal ring”, 
but is nonetheless to be considered “a red herring and should not be given weight”. Differently: Verbruggen 
2014c, p. 207 (“the regulatory dimension of activities governed by private law remains pivotal”); Opinion 
Advocate General Trstenjak in Fra.bo, ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, para 34 (“As, however, the horizontal effect 
concerns private individuals only in the context of a well-defined rule-making activity, it is limited in its 
impact”); Davies 2012, pp. 813-821. Cf. also the discussion touched upon in n 685 above. 
779 Mataija 2016, pp. 54-55; Davies 2012, p. 821. As has been discussed in section 5.4.1.2 above, the horizontal 
scope of these provisions less unequivocal when it comes to other types of private action. For some reflections 
on the future development of the Court’s case law on the horizontal effect of free movement law, see Van 
Leuken 2015, pp. 118-121, 137-141. 
780 Van den Bogaert 2002, p. 125. 
781 Case C- 65/86 Süllhofer, para 11; Case 311/85 Vlaamse Reisbureaus, para 30. 
782 Outside the regulatory context, it can in this regard be pointed at the Court’s rulings Schmidberger and 
Spanish Strawberries. See Verbruggen 2014c, pp. 209-210. 
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private law regulatory bodies that meet a considerable threshold of public involvement.783 As 
a result of this extensive interpretation, what does fall within the scope of Articles 34 and 35 
TFEU are semi-private regulatory schemes involving a strong public element. Industry codes 
of conduct might qualify as such. Conversely, once the involvement of the State is not 
considerable enough to meet the required threshold, there is sufficient reason for the Court to 
return to its formal approach and to preclude what it now perceives as private bodies from 
scrutiny under these provisions. So, this functional approach still holds formal elements, 
namely the decisive force that is attributed to the involvement of the State and the fact that it 
is ultimately the State that is held responsible. It is therefore, in the words of Sauter and 
Schepel, best qualified as a “limited functionalist approach”.784 Secondly, it has been 
submitted that the ruling of the Court in Fra.bo has shed a new light on the prevailing opinion 
on the horizontal scope of application of Article 34 TFEU, albeit in a rather case-specific 
way. Despite the absence of considerable State involvement and contrary to the ‘public 
threshold’ line of case law just mentioned, the Court held that Article 34 TFEU was directly 
applicable to the activities of the regulatory body, focusing on the de facto power to restrict 
the free movement of goods in a State-like way. Herewith, the CJEU has adopted a more 
functional approach under the free movement of goods, which possibly signifies a first, yet 
cautious step towards a horizontal extension of this part of EU free movement law in relation 
to private regulatory activities, including industry codes of conduct. 
  
5.5 Competition law 
 
Private regulatory schemes may have adverse effects on intra-Community competition. The 
regulatory nature of a measure can be indicative of a degree of market power that warrants 
competition law scrutiny. As a result, instances of private regulation could qualify as 
agreements caught by the cartel prohibition of Article 101 TFEU.785 Additionally, private 
regulators holding a dominant position could fall foul of Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits 
the abuse of such a position.786 This section discusses how the CJEU has brought private 
regulation within the scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.787 Following the approach taken 
by Mataija, a distinction will be drawn according to the actor that is challenged: the private 
regulator itself or the State.788 Accordingly, section 5.5.1 investigates how the Court responds 
when private regulators are called to account under EU competition law. Section 5.5.2, in 
turn, focuses on the approach adopted by the Court when the State is challenged in relation to 
restrictive private regulation. Again, the discussion is limited to several landmark cases 
marking the Court’s overall approach.  
 
                                                
783 Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 45; Verbruggen 2014c, p. 209; Snell 2002, pp. 219-221; Heremans 2012, pp. 123-
125. 
784 This qualification is used by Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 98. 
785 Maher 2011, pp. 122, 132 submits that the fact that cartels are prone to competition law does not mean that 
they cannot perform important regulatory functions themselves. 
786 Mataija 2016, pp. 89-92. 
787 The Treaty provisions on State aid (Articles 107, 108 and 109 TFEU) will not be considered. 
788 Mataija 2016, p. 84, stating that this is the more conventional distinction. 
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5.5.1 Private regulators and EU competition law 
 
5.5.1.1 Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU - Personal scope I: Undertakings 
 
The first hurdle that the Court has to take when faced with a case of allegedly anti-
competitive private regulation is the personal scope of Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU, which 
is limited to “agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices” (Article 101 TFEU) and undertakings holding a dominant position 
(Article 102 TFEU), respectively. Accordingly, in order to fall within the personal scope of 
these Treaty provisions, a private regulator would have to be classified as an ‘undertaking’ 
(Article 101 and 102 TFEU) or as an ‘association of undertakings’ (Article 101 TFEU).789 
With the Treaty remaining silent as to the definition of both concepts, for the answer to the 
question of what exactly constitutes an ‘undertaking’ and an ‘association of undertakings’, 
respectively, the case law of the CJEU has to be searched through.  
 It has been well established that “every legal entity engaged in an economic activity 
regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed”790 qualifies as 
an undertaking, whereby ‘economic activity’ denotes the activity of offering goods and 
services on a market791. As the notion of ‘undertaking’ is thus founded on the exercise of an 
economic activity, the national legal status and classification of an entity are irrelevant in 
deciding whether it qualifies as an undertaking. What matters is the nature of the activities 
performed by the entity concerned: activities that classify as economic are covered by 
competition rules, public interest tasks are not. As a corollary of this again functional 
approach, provided that their activities are economic in nature, both private (non-State) and 
public (State) bodies may constitute an undertaking within the meaning of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU.792  
 Two categories of activities are excluded from the definition of ‘economic activity’. The 
first category comprises the activities of actors that perform an exclusively social function, 
based on the principle of solidarity and subjected to State supervision. These activities do not 
belong to the sphere of economic activities. Consequently, the actors performing them are not 
considered undertakings within the meaning of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and are thus 
sheltered against antitrust scrutiny.793 The second category includes activities that are “by 
                                                
789 The meaning of the notion of ‘undertaking’ is the same under Article 101 TFEU and Article 102 TFEU. See 
Jones & Sufrin 2014, p. 127. 
790 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elsner v Macroton (1991) ECR I-1979, para 21. 
791 Case 118/85 Commission v Italy (1987) ECR I-2599, para 7; Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy (CNSD) 
(1998) ECR I-3851, para 36. The fact that the nature of a body is non-profit as well as the fact that it pursues 
non-economic objectives are irrelevant in this respect, the Court held in Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v 
Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (1999) ECR I-5751, paras 79 and 85. 
792 Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 75-79; Chalmers, Davies & Monti 2010, p. 964; Jones & Sufrin 2014, pp. 127-
129; Wendt 2013, pp. 90-91, 394; Mataija 2016, pp. 85-86. See also Case 123/83 Bureau national 
interprofessionnel du cognac (BNIC) v Guy Clair (1985) ECR 391, para 17. A wide array of actors, ranging 
from individuals to collecting societies, has already been held to constitute an undertaking under EU competition 
law. See, with further references, Jones & Sufrin 2014, p. 128. 
793 Joined Cases C-159 and 160/91 Christian Poucet v Assurances Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle 
Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon (1993) ECR I-637, paras 18-19; Case C-350/07 Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v 
Maschinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft (2009) ECR I-1513, paras 43-68; Case C-437/09 AG2R 
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their nature, their aim and the rules to which they are subject” connected with the exercise of 
powers that “are typically those of public authority”.794 Actors engaging in such activities can 
be considered to perform public authority functions in the public interest rather than economic 
activities.795 However, the fact that an actor is held to exercise government prerogatives does 
not always entirely disqualify it from competition law scrutiny. On the contrary, as AG 
Jacobs notes, “the notion of ‘undertaking’ is a relative concept in the sense that a given entity 
might be regarded as an undertaking for one part of its activities while the rest fall outside the 
competition rules”.796 This implies that EU competition law continues to govern the activities 
of the actor concerned that “can be severed from those in which it engages as a public 
authority”797. Hence, each activity has to be assessed and classified individually. 
Consequently, an entity may act as an undertaking in some of its activities and not in 
others.798 Yet, if the economic and public authority activities are deemed to be inseparable, all 
activities are qualified as ‘public authority’ and as such all fall outside the scope of the 
competition rules.799 
 A pertinent question when it comes to the relation between private regulators and EU 
competition law is whether the mere setting of rules constitutes an economic activity. In itself, 
arguably, it will not.800 What does this imply for industry-level associations (e.g., trade 
associations and professional bodies), the type of private regulator that this doctoral thesis is 
concerned with? An industry association limiting itself to regulation, without performing any 
economic activities, would not meet the Court’s definition of an undertaking.801 This would 
immediately sideline Article 102 TFEU, since the scope of this provision is limited to 
undertakings.802 Article 101(1) TFEU, by contrast, has a broader scope and also applies to 
                                                                                                                                                   
Prévoyance v Beaudout Père et Fils SARL (2011) ECR I-937, paras 53-65; Jones & Sufrin 2014, pp. 131-133; 
Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 85-90. The mere fact that the aim of the contested activity is social is insufficient to 
exempt this activity from competition law scrutiny. See Semmelmann 2008, p. 24; Jones & Sufrin 2014, p. 133. 
794 Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v Eurocontrol (1994) ECR I-43, para 30. See also case C-343/95 
Diego Calì & Figli Srl v Servizi ecologici porto di Genova SpA (1997) ECR I-1547, para 22; Monti 2007a, p. 
486. 
795 Monti 2007a, p. 486; Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 83-90; Mataija 2016, pp. 87-88. Again, it is the nature of 
the activity that is decisive in this respect and not the status of the actor. 
796 Opinion Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz (2001) 
ECR I-8089, para 72. 
797 Case T-128/98 Aéroports de Paris v Commission of the European Communities (2000) ECR II-3929, para 
108, affirmed in Case T-155/04 SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission, (2006) ECR II-4797, para 54; Case 
C-82/01 P Aéroports de Paris v Commission (2002) ECR I-9297, para 74; Case C-49/07 Motosykletistiki 
Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio (2008) ECR I-4863, paras 24-25; Case C-138/11 
Compass-Datenbank GmbH v Republik Österreich, ECLI:EU:C:2012:449, para 37. 
798 Monti 2007a, p. 486; Maduro 2010, p. 3; Mataija 2016, p. 86; Jones & Sufrin 2014, pp. 136-137. 
799 Case T-155/04 SELEX, para 54; Case C-138/11 Compass-Datenbank, para 38; Case C-82/01 P Aéroports de 
Paris v Commission, paras 74-75; Case C-49/07 MOTOE, paras 24-25. See also Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 79-
80. 
800 Wendt 2013, pp. 152-153; Odudu 2006, pp. 30-33. However, as Sauter and Schepel note, there can be an 
economic aspect to a regulatory task: “where the entity involved combines certain regulatory powers with the 
offering of related goods and services on the market, the exercise of such regulatory powers may in itself 
constitute a business activity”. Then the antitrust rules do apply. See Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 93-94. 
801 Mataija 2016, p. 86, footnote 103; Wendt, pp. 152-153. 
802 Article 102 TFEU however remains applicable when a private regulatory body that limits itself to regulatory 
activities, and hence is not an economic operator itself, can be considered the “emanation” of its members and 
“therefore operates on this market through its members”, the General Court found in Case T-193/02 Laurent 
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associations of undertakings. When an industry-level private regulator qualifies as such, its 
private regulatory measures can be caught by Article 101(1) TFEU in the guise of a decision 
by an association of undertakings, even if the private regulator does not perform economic 
activities itself.803 After all, the CJEU has held that when the rules set by a private regulator 
have an economic impact or influence the economic conduct of its members, these rules fall 
within the sphere of economic activity covered by Article 101(1) TFEU.804 This brings to the 
table the question as to when a private regulator qualifies as an association of undertakings.  
 





Neither the Treaty nor the CJEU have provided a definition of ‘associations of undertakings’. 
Advocate General Léger in this respect indicates that “as a general rule an association consists 
of undertakings of the same general type and makes itself responsible for representing and 
defending their common interests vis-à-vis other economic operators, government bodies and 
the public in general”.805 In establishing whether a private regulatory body qualifies as an 
association within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, two steps have to be taken.806 First, it 
has to be established whether the members or actors represented by the body concerned can 
be considered undertakings.807 If so, it has to be ascertained, as a second step, whether the 
private regulatory body can be regarded as an association of undertakings. Like the notion of 
an undertaking, this concept is a relative one: a private regulator may qualify as an association 
of undertakings with respect to some of its activities, but not with respect to others.808 For the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Piau v Commission (2005) ECR II-209, para 116. On the application of Article 102 TFEU to professional rules 
of conduct, see Wendt 2013, pp. 318-390. 
803 Delimatsis 2010, p. 1081; Wendt 2013, pp. 152-153.  
804 Case C-309/99 Wouters, paras 63; Joined Cases C-96/82 to 102/82, C-104/82, C-105/82, C-108/82 and C-
110/82 IAZ International Belgium and Others v Commission (1983) ECR 3369, para 20; Case C-71/74, 
Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Fruit- en Groentenimporthandel, Nederlandse Bond van Grossiers in 
zuidvruchten en ander geimporteerd fruit (Frubo) v Commission (1975) ECR-563, para 30 and Joined Cases C-
209/78 to 215/78 and C-218/78 Heintz van Landewyck SARL and Others v Commission (1980) ECR 3125, para 
88. See also Whish & Bailey 2012, p. 91; Wendt 2013, pp. 186, 191-193; Cafaggi 2007, pp. 186-189; Delimatsis 
2010, p. 1081; Vossestein 2002, pp. 853-854.  
805 Opinion Advocate General Léger in Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 61, with reference to M. Waelbroek & A. 
Frignani, Commentaire J. Megret, Le Droit de la CE, Vol 4, Concurrence, Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 
Bruxelles, 1997, 2nd ed., para. 128. 
806 As follows from, for example, Case C-309/99 Wouters, paras 45 and 50. 
807 See section 5.5.1.1. It suffices that a number of members classifies as an undertaking, as follows from Case 
T-23/09 Conseil national de l’Ordre des pharmaciens (CNOP) v Conseil central de la section G de l’Ordre 
national des pharmaciens (CCG) (2010) ECR II-5291, paras 74-78. Customs agents (CNSD); medical specialists 
(Pavlov), lawyers (Wouters), football clubs (Piau) and chartered accountants (OTOC) have for instance been 
held to be undertakings. The fact that entities perform regulated activities of a complex and technical nature does 
not derogate from this qualification (see, e.g., Joined Cases C-180 to 184/98 Pavel Pavlov And Others v 
Stichting Pensioenfonds Medisch Specialisten (2000) ECR I-6451, para 77 and Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 
49). Associations that are composed of associations of undertakings also fall within the scope of Article 101(1) 
TFEU (Wendt 2013, pp. 190-191). 
808 See Wendt 2013, p. 185; Whish & Bailey 2012, p. 92; Vossestein 2002, p. 853; Van de Gronden & 
Mortelmans 2002, pp. 454-455. Cf. Joined Cases C-209/78 to 215/78 and C-218/78 Van Landewyck, para 88. 
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purposes of this doctoral thesis, it is particularly relevant whether a private regulatory body 
falls within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU when performing its regulatory activities. The 
CJEU has adopted a functional starting point in this respect: the legal framework within 
which a private regulator operates and the national classification given to that framework are 
irrelevant for the application of Article 101(1) TFEU. Accordingly, an eventual public law 
status of a regulatory body does not render the provision inapplicable.809 Rather, as indicated 
at the end of section 5.5.1.1, what matters is whether the regulatory activities influence or are 
intended to influence the market behavior of the body’s economically active members.810 That 
is to say, as Wendt points out, that these activities not only concern the economic activities of 
these members, but also determine the market conduct of these members.811 Wherever this 
occurs, the private regulator is considered an association of undertakings.  
 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that - as a final step in establishing the 
applicability of Article 101(1) TFEU - it subsequently has to be ascertained whether the private 
regulatory activities qualify as a decision by an association of undertakings. This occurs on the 
basis of a broad interpretation of the notion of ‘decision’, as Advocate General Mengozzi points 
out: it “covers any measure, even if it is not binding, which, regardless of what its precise legal 
status may be, constitutes the faithful reflection of the association’s resolve to coordinate the 
conduct of its members”.812 
 
5.5.1.2.2 State involvement 
 
When purely private regulation is concerned, the CJEU will usually not have to go to 
extraordinary lengths in qualifying the private regulator as an association of undertakings.813 
However, when the State is in some way involved with the regulatory scheme at issue, as is 
for instance the case when the State confers regulatory powers upon a private law body and 
entrusts it with certain public interest tasks, the qualification exercise becomes more 
                                                
809 Case C-35/96 CNSD, para 40, with reference to Case 123/83 BNIC/Clair, para 17.  
810 Wendt 2013, pp. 193-197. 
811 Wendt 2013, pp. 193-194. Accordingly, rules that concern the non-economic activities of the members are 
not caught by Article 101(1) TFEU, thus Wendt 2013, p. 193. However, as the Court held in OTOC, the fact that 
private rules “do not have any direct effect on the economic activity of the members of that professional 
association does not affect the application of Article 101 TFEU, where the infringement of which that 
professional association is accused concerns a market on which it itself carries on an economic activity” (Case 
C-1/12 Ordem dos Tecnicos Oficiais de Contas (OTOC) v Autoridade da Concorrênci (2013) 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:127, para 59). This has led Van Cleynenbreugel to conclude that “a mere alignment of 
interests” between the professional association and its members “suffices presumably to place decisions by that 
association within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU”. See Van Cleynenbreugel 2014, p. 1404 who in this 
context also refers to Case T-111/08 MasterCard and Others v Commission (2012) ECLI:EU:T:2012:260. On 
this case, see Van Cleynenbreugel 2014, pp. 1401-1403. 
812 Opinion Advocate General Mengozzi in Case C-382/12 P MasterCard and Others v Commission (2014) 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:42, para 33. Cf. Case C-136/12 Consiglio nazionale dei geologi v Autorità garante della 
concorrenza e del mercato and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato v Consiglio nazionale dei 
geologi (CNG) (2013) ECLI:EU:C:2013:489, para 47: “the fact that the Code of Conduct is binding on 
geologists and that it is possible to impose penalties on them in the event of non-compliance with that code must 
lead to the conclusion that the rules laid down therein constitute a decision under Article 101 TFEU”. For a 
detailed analysis of the notion of decision in relation to professional regulation, see Wendt 2013, pp. 193-17. 
813 Cf. Mataija 2016, p. 84. 
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complicated. Often, such bodies not only represent the collective interests of their members, 
but also pursue public interest goals.814 The ensuing hybrid nature of the regulatory body and 
its regulatory activities challenge the private scope of Article 101(1) TFEU, giving rise to the 
question whether the private or semi-private regulator should be perceived as an association 
of undertakings when adopting regulation or rather as a public body falling outside the scope 
of Article 101(1) TFEU.815 The CJEU first shed light on the matter in its judgment in the 
Wouters case, which formed the blueprint for its later judgments in OTOC and, to a lesser 
extent, in CNG.816 The setting of these cases is similar: all are concerned with the 
applicability of Article 101(1) TFEU to a professional regulatory body with regulatory 
powers that has links with the State, and in all three cases the professional body itself was 
called to account.817 Given that Wouters constitutes the leading case here, this section 
concentrates on this case, making references to OTOC and CNG where appropriate. 
 
 The Wouters case 
Wouters revolved around the allegedly anti-competitive Regulation on Joint Professional 
Activity 1993, adopted by the Netherlands Bar Association, which prohibited 
multidisciplinary partnerships between lawyers and accountants. The CJEU takes several 
steps in order to arrive at an answer to the question whether the Netherlands Bar Association 
qualified as an association of undertakings when it adopted the disputed Regulation. First of 
all, the Court turns to its line of case law on ‘exclusively social functions’ and ‘governmental 
prerogatives’ and applied it to the notion of ‘association of undertakings’,818 concluding that 
the Netherlands Bar Association when adopting its Regulation neither fulfilled an exclusively 
social function nor exercised governmental prerogatives.819 Rather, it acted as “the regulatory 
body of a profession, the practice of which constitutes an economic activity”.820  
 Secondly, the Court brings into play two criteria stemming from the body of case law on 
the liability of Member States in respect of restrictive private regulation (the effet utile 
doctrine): the composition of the regulatory body and the legal obligation to observe public 
                                                
814 Opinion Advocate General Mengozzi in MasterCard, ECLI:EU:C:2014:42, paras 34-35. See also Wendt 
2013, pp. 211-212. 
815 Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 56; Verschuur 2010, pp. 69-70; Heremans 2012, p. 255; Wendt 2013, pp. 199, 
211-212, Schepel 2002, p. 31.  
816 Case C-309/99 Wouters; Case C-1/12 OTOC and Case C-136/12 CNG. 
817 Wouters concerned the Regulation on Joint Professional Activity 1993 of the Bar of the Netherlands, OTOC 
was about the Training Credits Regulation of the Portuguese Order of Chartered Accountants and CNG revolved 
around the code of conduct of the Italian National Association of Geologists. When co-regulatory schemes are 
concerned, both the private regulator and the Member State can be held responsible. The way in which the CJEU 
proceeds when the application of EU law to a Member State is at issue (effet utile doctrine) is described in 
section 5.5.2.  
818 Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 57: “the Treaty rules on competition do not apply to activity which, by its 
nature, its aim and the rules to which it is subject does not belong to the sphere of economic activity […] or 
which is connected with the exercise of the powers of a public authority”. See also Case C-1/12 OTOC, para 40 
and Case C-136/12 CNG, paras 41-44. Thus, the applicability of this line of case law is not limited to the notion 
of undertaking. See Whish & Bailey 2012, pp. 140-141; Heremans 2012, p. 254; Van de Gronden & Mortelmans 
2002, p. 453. Cf. Wendt 2013, pp. 201-211. 
819 Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 56 
820 Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 56. In OTOC and CNG, the Court likewise refrained from applying these 
exceptions to the professional body in question. See Case C-1/12 OTOC, para 46; Case C-136/12 CNG, para 44.  
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interest criteria.821 These criteria entail that a body does not qualify as an association of 
undertakings within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU “where, on the one hand, it is 
composed of a majority of representatives of the public authorities and, on the other, it is 
required by national legislation to observe various public-interest criteria when taking its 
decisions”.822 The rationale behind this approach lies in the public interest, coupled with the 
private scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. When the two criteria are met, a body can be 
considered to act in the public interest, rather than in the interest of the economic actors that it 
represents.823 With competition law being concerned with private, economic interests, this 
would carry the regulations adopted by this body into the realm of the State and outside the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.824 Accordingly, competition law liability can be evaded.  
 
Before taking a closer look at how the two criteria played out for the Netherlands Bar 
Association, it should be noted that their scope of application is limited. The criteria have been 
developed with respect to bodies that have been invested with public regulatory authority or 
pursue public interest objectives, such as the Netherlands Bar Association, and can, accordingly, 
only be applied to bodies that operate in such a context “of a mixture between public and private 
interests and powers”825.826 Since these criteria have been developed in cases concerning State 
liability, I will elaborate on them in section 5.5.2.2. 
 
For the Netherlands Bar Association, the criteria were of no avail. As regards the composition 
requirement, the CJEU pointed out that “the governing bodies of the Bar are composed 
exclusively of members of the Bar elected solely by members of the profession” and that the 
Dutch government did not have a say in these appointments.827 Furthermore, the CJEU 
established that the Netherlands Bar Association was not under a legal obligation to observe 
public interest criteria when adopting measures such as the disputed Regulation.828 As a final 
remark, it is noted that the Regulation “does not fall outside the sphere of economic activity”, 
                                                
821 Case C-309/99 Wouters, paras 60-62. These criteria have as such been formulated in Case C-35/96 CNSD, 
paras 39-44 (repeated in Joined Cases C-180 to 184/98 Pavlov, para 37), where the Court deduced them from 
previous ‘effet utile case law’. See also Wendt 2013, pp. 211-212; Schepel 2002, pp. 44-45, Sauter & Schepel 
2009, p. 114; Opinion Advocate General Léger for Case C-309/99 Wouters, paras 61-70. In OTOC, the Court 
also applied these criteria (Case C-1/12, paras 49-55). In CNG, by contrast, the Court based its argument that the 
professional body was an association of undertakings solely on the ‘exclusively social functions’ and 
‘governmental prerogatives’ line of case law. See Case C-136/12, paras 42-45. 
822 Opinion Advocate General Léger for Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 70, with reference to Case C-35/96 
CNSD. See also Wendt 2012, p. 212 and the effet utile judgments referred to in section 5.5.2.2. 
823 Wendt 2013, pp. 212-213, 216. 
824 Wendt 2013, pp. 211-212, 216, 221; Heremans 2012, p. 255. Cf. Schepel 2002, p. 44. 
825 Opinion Advocate General Mengozzi in MasterCard, ECLI:EU:C:2014:42, para 35. 
826 Opinion Advocate General Mengozzi in MasterCard, ECLI:EU:C:2014:42, para 34 stressing that it cannot be 
inferred from the Court’s case law at this point “that the two criteria referred to below are intended to apply 
irrespective of the body in question”. Cf. Case C-382/12 P MasterCard and others v Commission (2014) 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2201, para 75. The cases in which these criteria have been applied by the Court involved 
regulatory bodies with public ties, i.e., bodies “that are involved in the process of adopting rules, alongside the 
competent public authorities, to regulated certain aspect of various sectors of the economy” (Wendt 2013, p. 
211), such as certain professional bodies and tariff committees. Castillo de la Torre 2005, p. 426 speaks of 
“institutionalized settings”, with the framework for the public-private cooperation provided by law. 
827 Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 61. Similarly: Case C-1/12 OTOC, para 47. 
828 The law only stipulated that the regulations were to be “in the interest of the proper practice of the 
profession”. See Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 62. See also Case C-1/12 OTOC, paras 49-52. 
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given its influence on the conduct of the members of the Bar.829 These findings led the CJEU 
to qualify the Netherlands Bar Association as an association of undertakings within the 
meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.830 The Court brings to mind that this is not altered by the 
fact that the Bar operates on a public law basis: neither (the national classification given to) 
the legal framework within which a private regulator carries out its regulatory tasks nor an 
eventual public law status of the regulator preclude the application of Article 101(1) TFEU.831  
 
Thus, with the caveat that Wouters (and OTOC) concerned professional regulatory bodies, it 
can be concluded that the CJEU takes the public interest as its yardstick when tackling the 
‘qualification issue’ that arises from the co-regulatory nature of a regulatory regime. In other 
words, when a regulatory body acts or can be deemed to act in the public interest, competition 
law liability under Article 101(1) TFEU can be evaded.832 
 
5.5.1.3 Justification defenses 
 
The previous section has shown that private regulators, when exercising their regulatory 
activities, in principle fall within the orbit of Article 101(1) TFEU as ‘undertakings of 
associations’. Consequently, a private regulator can be held liable under Article 101(1) TFEU 
when its regulations restrict intra-Community competition.833 However, the fact that private 
regulation is found restrictive or distortive of competition does not necessarily imply that it is 
prohibited under EU competition law. As will follow from the brief discussion in this section, 
private regulators have several grounds for justification at their disposal.834 A pertinent 
question in the context of this doctoral thesis is whether these shields against competition law 
liability take account of the regulatory nature of private regulation and the fact that this aspect 
                                                
829 Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 63. See also case C-1/12 OTOC, paras 40-45. 
830 Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 64. The same conclusion was reached in Case C-1/12 OTOC, para 59. 
831 Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 66, with reference to Case 123/83 BNIC/Clair, para 17 and Case C-35/96 
CNSD, para 40. See also Case C-1/12 OTOC, para 48. 
832 Wendt 2013, pp. 211-212, 216, 221; Heremans 2012, p. 255; Schepel 202, p. 44. Cf. section 5.5.2.2 with 
regard to the effect utile doctrine. Noticable in this respect is the distinction drawn by the CJEU in Wouters 
between two approaches: “The first is that a Member State, when it grants regulatory powers to a professional 
association, is careful to define the public-interest criteria and the essential principles with which its rules must 
comply and also retains its power to adopt decisions in the last resort. In that case the rules adopted by the 
professional association remain State measures and are not covered by the Treaty rules applicable to 
undertakings. The second approach is that the rules adopted by the professional association are attributable to it 
alone” (Case C-309/99 Wouters, paras 68-69). In the latter case, Article 101(1) TFEU can be applied. 
833 For an illustrated explanation of how private rules may be found to restrict competition, see Wendt 2013, pp. 
280-292 (on professional regulations). See also Mataija 2016, pp. 89-92. 
834 An exemption is also in place when the anti-competitive actions are not attributable to the private entities 
performing them. As this defense relates to the topic of antitrust liability of the State, I will discuss it below in 
section 5.3.2.3. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the CJEU has excluded collective 
bargaining agreements, aimed at improving the conditions of work and employment, from the scope of EU 
competition law (see Case C-67/96 Albany; Joined cases C-115, 116, 118, and 119/97 Brentjens' 
Handelsonderneming BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen (1999) ECR I-
6025; Case C-219/97 Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en 
Havenbedrijven (1999) ECR I-6121 and Case C-222/98 Hendrik van de Woude v Stichting Beatrixoord (2000) 
ECR I-7111). The argument for doing so was found in a teleological interpretation of the Treaty. In Pavlov, the 
Court has applied a de minimis threshold in order to exclude the pension scheme set up by medical specialists 
from competition law scrutiny. See Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 90-91, 116-19. 
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is not always necessarily coupled with considerations of economic efficiency. Private 
regulation can also seek to attain public interest objectives, especially, but not necessarily, 
when hybrid, co-regulatory schemes are concerned.835 Does this shelter a private regulator 
from competition law scuritiny? 
 
5.5.1.3.1 Article 101(3) TFEU, the objective justification under Article 102 TFEU and 
Article 106(2) TFEU 
 
In case of an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU, private regulators might seek recourse to 
Article 101(3) TFEU. The conditions for exemption listed in this provision are linked with 
pro-competitive aims, such as efficiency and the correction of market failure.836 Non-
competition arguments, which might be of prime relevance when private regulation is 
concerned, can only be taken into account when they relate to efficiency and other economic 
interests. As such, Article 101(3) TFEU is not overly receptive to the justification of measures 
that do not have pro-competitive aims or do not show efficiency gains.837 
 When compliance with Article 102 TFEU is at stake, private actors might rely on the 
objective justification test, developed by the CJEU. This test, in the words of Mataija, 
exonerates conduct that “can be explained by the ‘legitimate business interests’ of the 
dominant undertaking, as long as the restraint is proportionate to them”.838 However, like 
Article 101(3) TFEU, this test does not allow much room for public-policy based arguments 
pertaining to non-economic interests.839  
 Private regulation that qualifies as a ‘service of general interest’ might benefit from 
Article 106(2) TFEU, which stipulates that competition law can only be applied to 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic “in so far as the 
application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular 
tasks assigned to them”.840 However, the scope of the Treaty provision is limited to public 
undertakings and private undertakings that have been entrusted with the provision of such 
                                                
835 Semmelmann 2008, p. 30 refers to Wouters as an example of private regulation having “both a competition-
related element (the proper functioning of a profession for the benefit of the consumer) and a noncompetition 
element (the sound administration of justice)”. 
836 Article 101(3) lists four cumulative conditions that have to be met in order for anti-competitive conduct to be 
exempted from Article 101(1) TFEU: the conduct (1) should contribute “to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress”, (2) “while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit”, (3) it should not “impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives” and (4) it should not “afford such undertakings the 
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question”. See also 
Mataija 2016, p. 97. 
837 Mataija 2016, pp. 97-100; Monti 2002, pp. 1077-1078; Buttigieg 2009, pp. 134-136; Schweitzer 2007, pp. 5-
13; Schepel 2002, p. 38. Cf. Communication from the Commission, Commission guidelines on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ 2004/C 101/97, para 42. 
838 Mataija 2016, p. 100 (with further references). 
839 Mataija 2016, p. 100, who nonetheless speculatively remarks that “it may be, however, that a case dealing 
with private regulation pursuing a legitimate public policy objective in a proportionate way – whether as part of 
a co-regulatory scheme or not – could lead the Court to soften its approach” (at p. 119). 
840 However, “the development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the 
interests of the Union”, as the last sentence of Article 106(2) TFEU provides. 
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services by the State.841 Taking into account that the proportionality test that constitutes a 
prerequisite for applying the exemption is rather strict, it becomes apparent that Article 106(2) 
TFEU will be of avail only to certain co-regulatory schemes.842  
 
5.5.1.3.2 The Wouters test 
 
Private regulators might also profit from the peculiar, and rather controversial, test that the 
CJEU developed in its judgment in Wouters to prevent their restrictive rules from falling 
under the cartel prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU. In this case, the Court found that the 
contested Regulation on Joint Professional Activity 1993 of the Netherlands Bar Association, 
prohibiting lawyers affiliated with the Bar Association to engage in multi-disciplinary 
partnerships, had a restrictive effect on trade between Member States. However, this did not 
automatically render the Bar Association liable under Article 101(1) TFEU: 
 
“not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings 
which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the 
prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) of the Treaty [Article 101(1) TFEU, MM]. For the 
purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of 
the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces 
its effects. More particularly, account must be taken of its objectives, […]. It has then to be 
considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit 
of those objectives.”843 
 
This assessment led to CJEU to conclude that the Regulation in question could “reasonably 
be considered to be necessary in order to ensure the proper practice of the legal profession, 
as it is organised in the Member State concerned” and that “the objectives pursued by the 
1993 Regulation cannot […] be attained by less restrictive means”.844 Therefore, the anti-
competitive effects of the Regulation did not appear to “go beyond what is necessary in 
order to ensure the proper practice of the legal profession”, the Court held.845 
Consequently, the Regulation was not held to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU. The inherent 
restriction test846 or public interest test847 that the Court has thus formulated in Wouters, 
and repeated and clarified in its subsequent rulings in Meca Medina, OTOC and CNG,848 
                                                
841 Case 127/73 Belgische Radio en Televisie and société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs v SV 
SABAM and NV Fonior (1974) ECR 313, para 20; Case C-49/07 MOTOE, para 45. See also Sauter & Schepel 
2009, pp. 187-189; Mataija 2016, p. 101. 
842 Mataija 2016, pp. 101-102. For a more detailed account, see for instance Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 164-
192. On the relation between the three grounds for justification mentioned in this section, see Mataija 2016, pp. 
102-103. 
843 Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 97. 
844 Case C-309/99 Wouters, paras 107-108. 
845 Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 109.  
846 Mataija 2016, p. 92; Sauter 2014, p. 329. 
847 Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 91-93. 
848 Case C-519/04 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission (2006) ECR I-6991, paras 42-55; Case 
C-1/12 OTOC, paras 93-108; Case C-136/12 CNG, paras 53-57. In ONP, the activities of the professional body 
in question (the Ordre national des pharmaciens, ONP) were found to have failed the Wouters test. See Case T-
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consists of three stages. A regulation with anti-competitive effects can be justified when 
(1) it pursues legitimate objectives,849 (2) the restrictive effects that it produces are inherent 
in the pursuit of these objectives and (3) the restrictions imposed by the regulation are 
proportionate, i.e., do not go beyond what is necessary to ensure the pursuit of these 
objectives.850  
 The Wouters test has been and still is open to quite some scholarly debate. Thus far, legal 
scholars have failed to reach agreement on the actual meaning of the test.851 Arguably, 
however, what the Court’s case law does show is that non-economic interests can play a role 
in the context of Article 101(1) TFEU, namely in the guise of legitimate public interest 
objectives pursued by private regulators. Even more so, these public, non-economic interests 
may justify private regulatory measures with anticompetitive effects, provided that the criteria 
of the Wouters exception are met. In such cases, public interest considerations may take 
precedence over the purely economic interests covered by Article 101 TFEU and accordingly 
sideline the cartel prohibition.852 By thus conditionally giving leeway to regulatory 
restrictions in the public interest,853 the Court can be said, as Van de Gronden submits, to 
acknowledge the role that private regulators play in attaining certain public interest goals.854 It 
is unclear, however, whether all forms of private regulation could benefit from the test. The 
fact that Wouters, OTOC and CNG all concerned professional regulations, adopted by a body 
that had been vested with regulatory powers by national legislation suggests that the 
boundaries of the scope of application of the test have to be drawn with professional 
                                                                                                                                                   
90/11 Ordre national des pharmaciens (ONP) and Others v Commission (2014) ECLI:EU:T:2014:1049, paras 
343-350. 
849 The Court does not define which objectives can be considered as such. According to Davies “it is hardly 
controversial to suggest that it is public interest objectives that it has in mind, rather than objectives serving the 
interests of the undertakings in question” (Davies 2009, p. 567). This indeed seems to be the prevailing opinion 
in legal literature. See, e.g., Mataija 2016, pp. 92-96; Rousseva 2005, pp. 40-41; Monti 2002, pp. 1086-1090; 
Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 92-93. Cf. Opinion Advocate General Mazák in Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre 
Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence and Ministre de l’Économie, de l’Industrie 
et de l’Emploi (2011) ECR I-9419, para 35. 
850 Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 92-93; Mataija 2016, pp. 92-94; Rousseva 2005, pp. 40-41; Monti 2007a, pp. 
113-115; Sauter 2014, p. 329. 
851 Monti argues that the Court has introduced a ‘European rule of reason’ in Wouters (Monti 2002, pp. 1086-
1090). O’Loughlin 2003, pp. 67-69 also submits that the Court takes a certain rule of reason approach. See in 
this respect also Callery 2011; Semmelmann 2008, p. 30. Similarly, Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 92-93. Other 
scholars point, in a more or less similar vein, at the fact that the Court has balanced the negative effects on 
competition against non-economic interests (Van de Gronden & Mortelmans 2002, pp. 458-459) and pro-
competitive effects (Nazzini 2006, pp. 525-526). Loozen, by contrast, has forcefully rejected the ‘rule of reason 
interpretation’ of the Wouters case (Loozen 2010, pp. 175-211; Loozen 2007; Loozen 2006). In response to 
Loozen 2007, Houdijk speaks in favor of a public interest rule of reason (Houdijk 2008). The General Court has 
rejected the existence of a rule of reason under Article 101(1) TFEU in Case T-112/99 Métropole télévision (M6) 
and Others v Commission (2001) ECR II-2459, para 72. Cf. Whish & Bailey 2012, pp. 135-136, submitting that 
the General Court rejected the ‘US-style rule of reason’. For an overview of possible interpretations of the 
Wouters test, see Heremans 2012, pp. 318-329.  
852 See Rousseva 2005, pp. 41-42; Opinion Advocate General Mazák in Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre, para 35; 
Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 119; Monti 2007a, p. 113; Dashwood et al. 2011, p. 750 (“This balancing is not a 
purely competition-led inquiry”); Whish & Bailey 2012, p. 131. As Rousseva rightly remarks, this will only be 
the case in more exceptional instances where the principle of proportionality will have to be applied strictly 
(Rousseva 2005, p. 42).  
853 See in this respect also Van de Gronden 2006, p. 127; Mataija 2016, pp. 95-96; Callery 2011, pp. 48-49. 
854 Van de Gronden 2006, pp. 119-120. Likewise: O’Loughlin 2003, pp. 68-69. 
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regulation, encompassing a public element. However, in Meca Medina the Court subjected 
the restrictive anti-doping rules of the International Swimming Federation (FINA) to the 
Wouters test, which they passed.855 These rules are of a different nature than professional 
rules of conduct, yet also in this case the rules entailed a public interest element. With a view 
to said element, which was present in all four cases in which the test has thus far been 
applied, it is questionable whether purely private regulatory regimes, lacking such an element, 
could successfully resort to the test.856 
 As a final note, it can be observed that matters are further complicated by the fact that the 
Court in API referred to the Wouters test with regard to the question as to whether a national 
legislative measure could be exempted form Article 101(1) TFEU (cf. section 5.5.2.2 on the 
effet utile doctrine). However, the CJEU explicitly refrained from applying the test, indicating 
that there was no need to consider whether case law in which the test was formulated 
(references are made to Meca Medina and CNG) applied to the legislation at issue.857 
 
5.5.2 States, State measures and private regulation under EU competition law 
 
As a result of the functional approach set out in section 5.5.1, the presence of a public element 
in a private regulatory scheme does not a priori keeps this scheme out of the reach of the 
competition rules for a lack of fit with the definitions of an ‘undertaking’ and an ‘association 
of undertakings’. In these cases, private regulators can still be held liable for violating these 
rules, as the previous section has shown. Conversely, Member States can also fall foul of 
competition law when adopting anticompetitive measures; the public origins of a measure do 
not deprive it from its effect on competition.858 On several occasions, States have been 
challenged under competition law for effectively contributing to restrictive activities of 
private actors. As these cases in effect center upon State measures rather than private 
regulation, it appears a bit odd to be taking closer look at the responsibilities of the State for 
restrictive private regulation under EU competition law. Yet, it is relevant for the purposes of 
this doctoral thesis for two reasons.  
 First of all, as Chapter 4 has set out, private regulation has become part and parcel of 
European and national legislative policies.859 The Court’s case law in this respect contains 
valuable lessons on how legislators should proceed when leaving regulation to economic 
operators in order to avoid collision with competition law. Following on from that, the second 
reason why it is worthwhile to explore this topic further lies in that part of the body of case 
law concerning the useful effect doctrine (discussed in section 5.5.2.2 below). From the 
judgments at this point we learn that public regulation only falls within the orbit of Articles 
                                                
855 See Case C-519/04 Meca Medina, paras 40-60. 
856 Whish & Bailey 2012, pp. 132-13. Semmelmann 2008, pp. 46-47 argues that Wouters was an exceptional 
case that should not serve as an example in other fields. This implies, with a view to matters of accountability, 
that private actors cannot invoke non-competition goals to justify restrictive action. Public interest exceptions are 
valid only to the extent that they translate into efficiency gains, Semmelmann submits. 
857 See Joined Cases C-184/13-C-187/13, C-194/13, C-195/13 and C-208/13 API and Others (2014) 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2147, paras 48-49. See also Mataija 2016, pp. 107-108. 
858 Wendt 2013, p. 394. 
859 In the context of competition law: Baquero Cruz 2007, p. 552. 
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101 or 102 TFEU when the restrictive actions on the side of undertakings provoked by it are 
‘private’ enough. The interesting point of view then arises when the issue is reversed. Then 
the question is, as Schepel has pointed out, under which conditions “private parties can be 
considered ‘public’ enough to merit immunity from competition law”.860 I explore this 
perspective further in section 5.6. This section, as a starter, focuses on how State measures 
that are linked with a private or semi-private regulatory scheme, can be challenged under 
Article 106(1) TFEU (section 5.5.2.1) and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (section 5.5.2.2).  
 
5.5.2.1 Obligations under Article 106(1) TFEU 
 
The first source of competition law liability of a State can be found in Article 106(1) TFEU, 
which covers State measures concerning “public undertakings and undertakings to which 
Member States grant special or exclusive rights”. The provision directly addresses Member 
States by providing that in case of the aforementioned types of undertakings “Member States 
shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in the 
Treaties, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109”.861 In 
the case law of the CJEU, Article 106(1) TFEU is mostly combined with Article 102 TFEU, 
thus covering instances in which a State has adopted a measure that leads to the creation or 
reinforcement of a dominant position of the type of undertakings covered by the provision.862 
In this respect, the Court has held in its Höfner judgment that “the simple fact of creating a 
dominant position […] by granting an exclusive right within the meaning of Article 90(1) 
[Article 106(1) TFEU, MM] is as such not incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty [Article 
106 TFEU, MM]”.863 What is needed for an infringement of Articles 106(1) and 102 TFEU is 
that the mere exercise of the rights granted to an undertaking leads to the abuse of the 
undertaking’s dominant position or where these rights create an environment that triggers 
such abuse.864 
 An interesting argument has in this respect been made in the literature with regard to the 
Court’s decision in MOTOE. In this case, the Greek Road Traffic Code was found to have 
infringed Articles 102 and 106(1) TFEU for granting the Greek Motorcycling Federation 
(ELPA) the right to decide upon applications for authorization to organize motorcycling 
events. This created a situation of conflict of interest: ELPA itself also organized and 
commercially exploited the very same events for which it was granted the right to authorize 
the organization. The CJEU held that the granting of the aforementioned right to ELPA 
                                                
860 Schepel 2002, p. 31. 
861 Although its wordings suggests otherwise, the scope of Article 106(1) TFEU is not limited to infringements 
of competition law, but extends to the rules on the free movement of goods, workers, services and establishment. 
See Whish & Bailey 2012, p. 223; Wendt 2013, p. 404. 
862 Whish & Bailey 2012, p. 227. 
863 Case C-41/90 Höfner, para 29. 
864 Case C-49/07 MOTOE, para 49. Cf. Case C-260/89, ERT v DEP (1991) ECR I-2925, paras 36-37; Case C-
179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova SpA v Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA (1991) ECR I-5889, para 17; Case 
C-323/93 Société Civile Agricole du Centre d'Insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative d'Elevage et 
d'Insémination Artificielle du Département de la Mayenne (1994) ECR I-5077, para 18. For a categorization and 
a more detailed account of the circumstances under which a Member State may be held liable under Article 
106(1) TFEU, see, e.g., Whish & Bailey 2012, pp. 229-235, with further references. 
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without restricting that right in any way, i.e., “without that power being made subject to 
restrictions, obligations and review”, could lead to a distortion of competition.865 The Court’s 
reference to the lack of ‘restrictions, obligations and review’ has been taken as an argument 
that a Member State may use an escape route: liability under Articles 102 and 106(1) TFEU 
might be avoided when the rights granted are made subject to control mechanisms.866  
 
5.5.2.2 Effet Utile Doctrine 
 
With the scope of Article 106(1) TFEU confined to ‘public undertakings or undertakings to 
which Member States grant special or exclusive rights’, the foregoing leaves us with the 
question whether State measures concerning ordinary undertakings that have a negative 
impact on the competition process can also be subjected to competition law. By raising this 
question, we once again enter the context of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Unlike Article 
106(1) TFEU, these sections are directed towards undertakings rather than the Member State 
itself. Yet, do they also entail obligations for Member States? The answer lies in the principle 
of Community loyalty enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, which inter alia stipulates that 
Members State should “refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of 
the Union’s objectives”. In the context of competition law, more specifically, the CJEU has 
held in INNO v ATAB that this principle involves Members States refraining from “adopting 
or maintaining in force measures that could deprive [the competition rules of their, MM] 
effectiveness”.867 When coupled with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, this obligation not to 
divest these competition rules from their useful effect implies, in the words of Wendt, “that 
Member States may not enable private undertakings to escape from the application of these 
two prohibitions”.868 A decade later, the Court specified its effet utile doctrine in Van Eycke 
by setting out how Article 101 TFEU can be stripped of its useful effect: 
 
“It must be pointed out in that regard that Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty [101 and 102 TFEU, 
MM] per se are concerned only with the conduct of undertakings and not with national 
legislation. The Court has consistently held, however, that Articles 85 and 86 [Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, MM] of the Treaty, in conjunction with Article 5 [Article 4(3) TEU, MM], require the 
Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a legislative nature, which 
may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings. Such would be the case, 
                                                
865 Case C-49/07 MOTOE, para 53, The Court however fails to substantiate what exactly qualifies as 
‘restrictions, obligations and review’. 
866 Mataija 2016, pp. 109-111; Miettinen 2009, pp. 147-149. Cf. Whish & Bailey 2012, p. 232-233, who with 
reference to Case C-67/96 Albany (paras 116-121) state that “the Court would be less likely to find an 
infringement of Article 106(1) where provisions exists for judicial review of the decisions made by an 
apparently conflicted undertaking”. Mataija submits that the Court’s reference at this point is reflective of the 
fact that the institutional design and governance criteria of the co-regulatory scheme mattered for the Court, as it 
could have prevented the conflict of interest. See Mataija 2016, pp. 110-111 and section 5.6 below. Similarly: 
Miettinen 2009, pp. 147-149; Whish & Bailey 2012, pp. 232-233. 
867 Case C-13/77 SA G.B.-INNO-B.M. v Association des détaillants en tabac (ATAB) (1977) ECR 2115, para 31 
(in the context of Article 101 TFEU). See also Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 104. 
868 Wendt 2013, p. 396. She describes the relation between the principle of Community loyalty and Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU as follows: “Article 4(3) TEU is the correct legal basis, while Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are the 
yardstick to ascertain the concrete content of the general negative integration duty of Member States” (at p. 403). 
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the Court has held, if a Member State were to require or favour the adoption of agreements, 
decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 85 [Article 101 TFEU, MM] or to reinforce 
their effects, or to deprive its own legislation of its official character by delegating to private 
traders responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere.”869 (emphasis added, 
MM) 
 
Thus, there are three situations in which a Member State, intertwining public and private 
governance, can fall foul of its obligations under Article 4(3) TEU in conjunction with Article 
101 TFEU870.871 First of all, States are not allowed to require or favor anti-competitive 
conduct of an undertaking or association of undertakings. In establishing whether a State 
measure indeed initiates a violation of the competition rules, it is essential that the measure 
concerned was “intended to require or favour the adoption of new restrictive agreements or 
the implementation of new practices”.872 Likewise, States should refrain from adopting 
measures intended to reinforce the effects of the anti-competitive conduct of economic 
actors. The CJEU has ruled in this respect that “legislation may be regarded as intended to 
reinforce the effects of pre-existing agreements, decisions or concerted practices only if it 
incorporates either wholly or in part the terms of agreements concluded between undertakings 
and requires or encourages compliance on the part of those undertaking”.873 This description 
pertains to situations in which a State merely rubberstamps the content of private rules, for 
instance by declaring the rules universally binding or by including this content in public 
regulation, thus lending the private rules an official appearance.874 Thirdly, Member States are 
                                                
869 Case C-267/86 Pascal Van Eycke v ASPA NV (1988) ECR 4769, para 16. The useful effect doctrine has been 
further developed through a string of cases, predominantly in relation to Article 101 TFEU (Whish & Bailey 
2012, p. 217), constituting a fiercely discussed body of case law. For the purposes of this section, I will not go 
into the details of the doctrine, but rather limit myself to a very brief overview of the main elements of the 
doctrine as it stands today. For a taste of the discussion, see, e.g., Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 104-128; Schepel 
2002; Wendt 2013, pp. 394-434; Verschuur 2010; Baquero Cruz 2007, pp. 580-585, all with further references. 
870 As Wendt indicates, the Van Eycke formula only concerns Article 101 TFEU. The yardstick for assessing 
State measures under Article 102 TFEU has been set out in Spediporto (Case C-96/94 Centro Servizi Spediporto 
Srl v Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo Sr (1995) ECR I-2883) and is not entirely congruent with the standard 
formulated in Van Eycke. See Wendt 2013, pp. 410-416. For the sake of simplicity, I will however confine 
myself to Article 101 TFEU, the more so since the Court has thus far not held a State liable under Article 102 
TFEU (Wendt 2013, p. 416). 
871 Wendt 2013, p. 407 notes that these three prongs “describe a distinguishable type of situation”.  
872 Case C-267/86 Van Eycke, para 17. See also Wendt 2013, p. 408; Heremans 2012, pp. 269-270. 
873 Case C-267/86 Van Eycke, para 17. See also Wendt 2013, p. 408. In effect, the distinction between the first 
and the second prong boils down to the moment at which the contested State measure is enacted: the first prong 
concerns instances in which undertakings or associations of undertakings are induced or compelled by the 
measure to engage in anti-competitive behavior, while under the second prong, this behavior pre-existed the 
measure. See Wendt 2013, p. 400; Verschuur 2010, p. 63; Neergaard 1999, pp. 387-388. 
874 Verschuur 2010, pp. 75-96 (with examples from case law); Wendt 2013, p. 408; Heremans 2012, p. 268; Case 
C-35/96 CNSD, para 59. An example in this respect is Vlaamse Reisbureaus. In this case, the Belgian legislator 
in a Royal Decree incorporated the Code of Conduct of the Union of Belgian Travel Agents, which was binding 
on the members of the Union. One of the Code’s provisions prohibited travel agents to pass on some of the 
commission that they received to their customers. The CJEU established that this prohibition was ‘implemented’ 
in practice through a system of agreements amongst travel agents and between travel agents and tour operators 
entailing the prohibition. This practice prevented competition on prices and was therefore contrary to Article 
101(1) TFEU. By turning the Code of Conduct into a legislative provision, the Royal Decree was found to 
reinforce the effect of these agreements as it had granted them a permanent character and rendered it impossible 
for the parties to rescind the contested rule. 
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not allowed to deprive their legislation of its official nature by delegating regulatory authority 
to private traders to take decisions that affect the economic sphere. In these cases, the 
legislator “allows economic operators to assume the Member State’s responsibility of public 
authority to interfere with the functioning of markets”.875  
 So, how then does the Court go about establishing whether one of these three scenarios 
applies? Initially, the assessment deployed in this respect consisted of two stages: an anti-trust 
analysis and a delegation test.876 
 
1) Antitrust analysis 
As at least the first and the second prong of the Van Eycke test require a direct link between 
the contested State measure and the anti-competitive conduct of the economic actors,877 the 
first stage concerns an anti-trust analysis under Article 101 TFEU. That is to say that it needs 
to be established whether the private or hybrid regulatory body acts as an association of 
undertakings when adopting the restrictive measures. As already briefly set out in section 
5.5.1.2.2, the Court has developed two criteria in this respect, building on the rationale that 
measures pursuing the public interest should be shielded from competition law scrutiny:878 the 
composition of the regulatory body and the existence of a legal obligation to observe public 
interest criteria.  
 
i. Composition of the regulatory body 
The rationale behind the composition requirement relates to the assumption that regulatory 
bodies dominated by representatives of undertakings in the sector directly or indirectly further 
the private interests of these economic operators, rather than the public interest. This 
assumption can be refuted when the bodies are composed of a majority of members that can 
be presumed to act in the public interest.879 It follows from the Court’s case law that a strong 
argument can be made in this respect when the body consists of independent experts (as in 
Reiff), of a majority of representatives of public authorities (Spediporto) or when the 
                                                
875 Wendt 2013, p. 409.  
876 Case C-185/91 Bundesanstalt für den Güterfernverkehr v Gebrüder Reiff GmbH & Co. KG (1993) ECR I-
5801; Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 114-115; Schepel 2002. 
877 Here, we arrive at a rather contentious issue: the reach of the effet utile doctrine. The discussion revolves 
around the question whether a direct link between the State measure and the anti-competitive conduct of the 
undertaking or association of undertakings was needed for the doctrine to apply or whether it would suffice that 
the measure itself divested Article 101 TFEU from its useful effect. In Meng, the CJEU established that Articles 
4(3) TEU and Article 101 TFEU “do not, in the absence of any link with conduct on the part of undertakings of 
the kind referred to in Article 85(1) [Article 101(1) TFEU, MM] of the Treaty, preclude State rules which 
prohibit […]” (Case C-2/91, Criminal proceedings against Wolf W. Meng (1993) ECR I- 5751, para 22). See 
also C-245/91, Criminal proceedings against Ohra Schadeverzekeringen NV (1993) ECR I-5851. With this 
ruling, the Court however clarified only part of the issue: the judgment is considered to require such a direct link 
under the first and second prong of the Van Eycke test, yet obscurity still exists as to whether the third prong, the 
delegation test, also requires such a link. This lack of clarity is caused by the fact that the CJEU in Meng and 
Ohra held that there was no anti-competitive conduct, yet still applied the delegation test. This suggests that 
under the third prong no link is required (Schepel 2002; Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 104-109; Verschuren 2010, 
pp. 97-101). However, the Court has never found delegation if there was no anti-competitive private conduct. 
See Schepel 2002, p. 48, arguing that is impossible for the CJEU to do so; Heremans 2012, p. 270; Sauter & 
Schepel 2009, p. 113. 
878 Wendt 2013, pp. 211-212, 216, 221; Heremans 2012, p. 255; Schepel 2002, p. 44. See also section 5.5.1.2.2. 
879 Wendt 2013, pp. 212-213. See also Heremans 2012, pp. 259-260, 272. Cf. Odudu 2006, pp. 46-52. 
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economic operators whose interests are furthered are in the minority (DIP).880 Conversely, 
professional associations whose governing bodies were solely composed of representatives of 
the profession, without the government having a say in their appointment, have been held not 
to meet the composition requirement.881 In Librandi, the CJEU however clarified that the 
composition requirement is not essential and only holds indicative force. Necessary and 
sufficient for shielding the body from Article 101(1) TFEU scrutiny is the fact that it must 
observe public interest criteria defined by law.882 The CJEU thereby clarified that ‘public 
interest’ denotes that “the interests of the collectivity had to prevail over the private interests 
of individual operators”.883 
 
ii. Legal obligation to observe public interest criteria 
This brings us to the second and, following on from Librandi, the seemingly main criterion, 
namely that when taking decisions and adopting regulatory measures, the regulatory body 
should be under the obligation to observe public interest criteria defined by law.884 These 
criteria should be precise enough to ensure that the body does in fact operate in the public 
interest.885 Then, the body is again presumed to be acting in the public interest, rather than in 
the interest of the economic actors it represents.886 In CNSD, for instance, the Court held that 
the national legal rules in question lacked a rule “obliging, or even encouraging” the 
regulatory professional body “to take into account public-interest criteria”. Thus, “nothing in 
the national legislation concerned prevents the CNSD from acting in the exclusive interest of 
the profession”.887 In a similar vein, in API the Court held that the national legislation in 
question entailed neither guiding principles to be observed by the regulatory body, nor 
                                                
880 See Case C-185/91 Reiff, para 17; Case C-96/94 Spediporto, para 23; Joined cases C-140, 141 and 142/94 
DIP SpA v Comune di Bassano del Grappa, LIDL Italia Srl v Comune di Chioggia and Lingral Srl v Comune di 
Chiogga (1995) ECR I-3257, para 17. For a more detailed assessment and critical reflections on this sometimes 
little realistic stance of the CJEU, see, e.g., Wendt 2013, pp. 212-261; Schepel 2002, pp. 44-47. 
881 See Case C-35/96 CNSD, para 42 (Italian National Council of Customs Agents). Cf. Case C-309/99 Wouters, 
para 61 (the Netherlands Bar Association), Case C-1/12 OTOC, para 47 (Portuguese Order of Chartered 
Accountants). 
882 Case C-38/97 Autotrasporti Librandi Snc di Librandi F. & C. v Cuttica spedizioni e servizi internationali Srl 
(1998) ECR I-5955, para 34. See also Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 114-115; Schepel 2002, pp. 44-47; Wendt 
2013, pp. 215-216; Szoboszlai 2006, pp. 78-79. Nevertheless, as Schepel notes, when arguments pertaining to 
the composition requirement are present, the CJEU readily seizes the opportunity to refer to them (Schepel 2002, 
p. 46). Heremans and Castillo de la Torre note that in Pavlov the Court again seem to suggest that both criteria 
continue to apply cumulatively (Heremans 2012, p. 273; Castillo de la Torre 2005, p. 427). However, in its 
recent API ruling, the Court again followed the Librandi line of case law. See API, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2147, paras 
31 and 34. 
883 Case C-38/97 Librandi, para 40. 
884 E.g., Case C-96/94 Spediporto, para 24; Case C-35/96 CNSD, para 43; Case C-38/97 Librandi, para 34. See 
also Wendt 2013, pp. 216-220, pointing out (at p. 220) that a mere legal reference to ‘the general interest’ will 
not suffice in this respect. 
885 See API, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2147, para 41; Heremans 2012, p. 272. 
886 Wendt 2013, p. 216. 
887 Case C-35/96 CNSD, paras 43 and 41, respectively. Also in Wouters, the national legislation for lawyers was 
held to fall short in this respect, as it only required that the regulations adopted by the Bar of the Netherlands 
“should be in the interest of the proper practice of the profession”. See Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 62. Cf. also 
Case C-1/12 OTOC, paras 49-52, where the CJEU added that the private regulatory body was granted “a wide 
discretion as to the principles, the conditions and methods which the compulsory training scheme for chartered 
accountants must follow” (para 50) and that the regulation had been adopted without input of the State. 
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provisions that could prevent its members from acting in their own interests. Furthermore, it 
was found that only vague legal references were made to the public interest (in casu the 
protection of road safety) and that the law left “a very large margin of discretion and 
independence” to the members of the regulatory body in performing their activities.888 
Accordingly, the Court held that “in those circumstances, the national legislation at issue in 
the main proceedings does not contain either procedural arrangements or substantive 
requirements capable of ensuring, that, when establishing minimum operating costs, the 
Osservatorio [the regulatory body in question, MM] conducts itself like an arm of the State 
working in the public interest”.889 
 
Thus, the CJEU uses the public interest as a yardstick in assessing whether semi-private 
regulators can be considered an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 
101(1) TFEU. When the regulatory activities of the regulator are at least subjected to legally 
enshrined public interest criteria, the regulator can be deemed to act in the public interest and 
hence falls outside the personal scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.890 As a corollary, the scenarios 
as outlined by the first and the second prong of the Van Eycke test cannot materialize.  
 
2) Delegation test 
The delegation test (the third prong of the Van Eycke test) forms the second stage, which 
essentially asks whether the State has retained the power to reject, amend, approve or review 
the measures taken891.892 Noticeable in this respect is the judgment of the Court in Arduino. 
Here, the CJEU first found that neither the composition requirement nor the public interest 
criteria requirement were met. Still, however, the Court held that it did not appear “that the 
Italian State has waived its power to make decisions of last resort or to review implementation 
of the tariff”.893 Therefore, the Court held that the Italian legislator had neither delegated 
regulatory power to the private body, nor required, encouraged or reinforced the private anti-
                                                
888 API, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2147, paras 35-37 (quotation para 37). 
889 API, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2147, para 38. 
890 Wendt 2013, pp. 211-212, 216, 221; Heremans 2012, p. 255; Schepel 2002, p. 44-47. See also section 
5.5.1.2.2 
891 Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 114-115; Schepel 2002, p. 48; Szoboszlai 2006, pp. 76-77; Mataija 2016, pp. 
106-107; Maduro 2010, pp. 7-8. In CNSD (Case C-35/96), the Italian legislator was found to have delegated 
regulatory power to the tariff board, as it was responsible for the supervision of the board, yet had no powers to 
intervene in the appointment either of the members of the tariff board, or the members of the Departmental 
Councils supervising the activities of the custom agents. In a similar fashion, the CJEU found in API 
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:2147) that there was a case of delegation since there was neither public oversight nor 
consultation of other bodies or public associations before the measures came into effect. 
892 However, Schepel argues, this does not imply that the CJEU will shield all measures that are formally 
approved by the State from competition law scrutiny. Like the anti-trust analysis, which encompasses the first 
and the second prong of the Van Eycke standard, the delegation test requires an element of public interest. See 
Schepel 2012, p. 48. 
893 Case C-35/99 Criminal proceedings against Manuele Arduino, third parties: Diego Dessi, Giovanni 
Bertolotto and Compagnia Assicuratrice RAS SpA (2002) ECR I-1529, para 39. Cf. Joined Cases C-94/04 and 
202/04 Federico Cipolla v Rosaria Fazari, née Portolese (C-94/04) and Stefano Macrino and Claudia 
Capoparte v Roberto Meloni (C-202/04) (2006) ECR I-11421, para 49. In brief, the Italian State had to approve 
the draft tariff and it was open to judicial review.  
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competitive conduct.894 The formulation used in this judgment suggests that CJEU is satisfied 
that a State has lived up to its obligations under the effet utile doctrine, i.e., under all three 
prongs of the Van Ecyke test, when it retains the power to supervise and control the activities 




Once a Member State is found to have fallen foul of its obligations under the effet utile 
doctrine, it is bound to disapply the contested legal rule that caused this breach. Yet, the State 
will not be held liable for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU resulting from the 
anticompetitive private activities. With these provisions being directed at undertakings or 
associations of undertakings, it are the private economic operators that face liability for the 
restrictive effects of their activities.896 However, this is not by definition the case. Private 
undertakings are freed from competition law scrutiny if the legislative measure concerned 
rules out the possibility for these undertakings to act autonomously. More specifically, the 
CJEU has decided in Ladbroke that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU “apply only to anti-
competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings at their own initiative”. If the anti-
competitive actions are “required of undertakings by national legislation or if the latter creates 
a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their 
part”, the undertakings concerned do not fall within the scope of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.897 The same holds when “the conduct was unilaterally imposed on them by the 
national authorities through the exercise of irresistible pressure”.898 Thus, when such a strong 
link between restrictive private conduct and public regulation can be established, the decisive 
yardstick for exemption is the room for maneuver that private actors enjoy within the legal 
framework set by the State: are they still able to compete or restrict competition at their own 
initiative or does the framework compel them to perform their tasks in an anti-competitive 
                                                
894 Case C-35/99 Arduino, para 43. See also Joined Cases C-94/04 and 202/04 Cipollla, para 52; Case 250/03 
Giorgio Emanuele Mauri v Ministero della Giustizia and Commissione per gli esami di avvocato presso la Corte 
d'appello di Milano (2005) ECR I-1267, paras 30-38. Cf. Case C-225/09 Edyta Joanna Jakubowska v 
Alessandro Maneggia (2010) ECR I-12329. At issue was a statutory obligation on the Italian Bar Councils to 
remove lawyers from their register in certain circumstances. The CJEU held that there was no delegation 
because the bar councils had “no influence over the automatic adoption, prescribed by the law, of the decisions 
to remove from the register” (para 50). Thereupon, it established that “for similar reasons” the first and the 
second prong of the Van Eycke test did not materialize either (para 51).  
895 See, e.g., Mataija 2016, p. 107; Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 114-115; Szoboszlai 2006, pp. 76-78; Baquero 
Cruz 2007, p. 576. For critical remarks, see, e.g., Verschuur 2010, p. 111; Wendt 2013, pp. 423-435, 442-443.  
896 Neergaard 1999, pp. 388-389; Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato (2001) ECR I-8055, paras 48-49, 56, 58. 
897 Joined cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P Commission v Ladbroke Racing Ltd (1997) ECR I-6265, paras 33-
34 (quotation para 33). Conversely: “if a national law merely encourages, or makes it easier for undertakings to 
engage in autonomous anti-competitive conduct, those undertakings remain subject to Articles 81 EC and 82 EC 
and may incur penalties” (Case C-198/01 CIF, para 56). 
898 Case T-387/94 Asia Motor France and others v Commission (1996) ECR II-961, para 65. 
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fashion?899 However, invocations of this defense are not likely to succeed: with the defense 
being “narrowly applied”, they “almost invariably fail”, according to Whish and Bailey.900 
 
5.5.3 The approach of the CJEU 
 
Private regulation, including industry codes of conduct, can be as restrictive and distortive of 
intra-Community competition as the economic activities of private actors that are traditionally 
caught by EU competition law. Not surprisingly, private regulatory arrangements have been 
subject to judicial scrutiny in EU competition law cases. However, the subjection of private 
regulatory arrangements to the rules on competition is not as straightforward as the foregoing 
perhaps suggest. First of all, these rules are concerned with economic activities, whereas 
regulation is not in and of itself economic in nature.901 Secondly, private regulation is not 
always solely concerned with economic interests; it can also pursue public interest objectives. 
Thirdly, not all private regulatory schemes are entirely private in nature. Schemes can also 
bear a hybrid character, due to a certain degree of public influence. As a consequence of these 
regulatory, hybrid features, not all private regulations square well with the personal scope of 
Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU. Hence, the CJEU was confronted with a problem similar to 
the one it faced under free movement law: what approach to adopt? Under a formal approach, 
based on a strict public-private distinction, competition law scrutiny might not even be an 
option, notwithstanding the anti-competitive effects of the rules at dispute. However, as 
follows from this section, the Court steered a different course and, as in the free movement 
context, adopted a functional approach with formal elements. 
 The functional nature of the Court’s approach under EU competition law is reflected in 
the definition of the concepts ‘undertaking’ and ‘associations of undertaking’, which mark the 
personal scope of Articles 101 (both concepts) and 102 (undertaking) TFEU.902 The concept 
of ‘undertaking’ centers upon the performance of economic activities, while the notion of 
‘association of undertakings’, building on the concept of an undertaking, generally focuses on 
the impact of the (regulatory) measures on the economic conduct of the members of the 
association.903 In defining these concepts, the national legal status and classifications of an 
entity are entirely immaterial.904 For the industry-level private regulators on which this 
doctoral thesis focuses, such a functional approach implies that they can be subjected to 
competition law scrutiny under Article 101(1) TFEU as ‘associations of undertakings’, even 
though regulation is not an economic activity per se.  
                                                
899 Whish & Bailey 2012, pp. 137-138; Neergaard 1999, pp. 389-390; Verschuur 2010, pp. 64-69; Sauter & 
Schepel 2009, pp. 120-124, 128; Wendt 2013, pp. 435-439. 
900 Whish & Bailey 2012, p. 137. See also Wendt 2013, pp. 435-436. 
901 Wendt 2013, pp. 152-153; Odudu 2006, pp. 30-33; Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 93-94. 
902 Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 76-77; Odudu 2006, pp. 33, 45-52. 
903 E.g., Wendt 2013, pp. 193-197; Case C-1/12 OTOC, para 59. 
904 Case 123/83 BNIC v Clair, para 18. Cf. Case C-309/99 Wouters, para 66 and Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 77. 
The Court has extended this functional approach with its decision that the different activities performed by a 
single entity need to be assessed on their own merits. The fact that some of its activities involve the exercise of 
public power does not free the remaining activities that can be decoupled from the ‘public activities’ from 
competition law scrutiny. See Case T-128/98 Aéroports de Paris, para 108; Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 79. 
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 However, State involvement with a ‘private’ regulatory scheme can carry the scheme 
outside the reach of EU competition law. Here, the formal elements in the Court’s approach, 
which do build on the traditional public-private divide, become visible. In cases where the 
private or semi-private regulator itself is called into account, these formal elements are first of 
all reflected in the fact that entities performing an exclusively social function or exercising 
activities that belong to the prerogatives of the State, are shielded against competition law 
scrutiny.905 Secondly, the rulings of the CJEU in Wouters and progeny show that competition 
law leeway can be given to professional private regulatory regimes influenced by the State 
when these regimes can be deemed to operate in the public interest.906 Thirdly, the Wouters 
test also adds a formal element to the Court’s approach in offering an escape-route for prima 
facie restrictive or distortive regulatory measures which pursue legitimate public interest 
objectives. By the same token, formal elements play an important part in the effet utile cases 
revolving around the accountability of the State. Also in these cases, the answer to the 
question whether restrictive private or semi-private measures fall within the scope of EU 
competition law depends on whether the certain public interest related criteria are met (i.e., 
composition of the regulatory body, presence of legal public interest requirements, State 
control in last resort).907 
Thus, on the one hand, the Court has stretched the scope of EU competition law by 
delineating the personal scope of Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU in functional terms, taking 
account of the nature of activities rather than the status of the actor performing them.908 
Consequently, neither instances of purely private regulation, nor hybrid regulatory 
arrangements are a priori excluded from competition law scrutiny. On the other hand, the 
Court’s approach still embodies a formal element in that, broadly speaking, State involvement 
as well as the presence of a public interest dimension can make private regulation fall outside 
the realm of EU competition law. The CJEU has thus not stretched its functional approach, 





                                                
905 See with respect to the notion of ‘undertaking’ Joined Cases C-159 and 160/91 Poucet, paras 17-18 and Case 
C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft, para 30 and with respect to the concept of ‘association of undertakings’ Case C-
309/99 Wouters, para 57, Case C-1/12 OTOC, para 40 and Case C-136/12 CNG, paras 41-44. 
906 See section 5.5.1.2.2. 
907 See section 5.5.2.2. 
908 Cf. Odudu 2006, p. 48. 
909 Sauter & Schepel 2009, pp. 128, 215; Odudu 2006, p. 33, noting that “whilst the question of whether an 
activity is regulatory remains functional, there is increased reliance on institutional factors to assist in the 
determination”. With the notion of ‘institutional factors’, Odudu refers to the criteria developed under the effet 
utile doctrine. 
910 It follows from Case C-309/99 Wouters (paras 66-70) that (one of) the rationale(s) behind this approach lies 
in the principle of national institutional autonomy. This principle entails that “Community law respects the 
institutional structure of the Member States. In other words, unless (secondary) Community law provides 
otherwise, it is for the Member States themselves to determine how they fulfil their Community obligations, 
which organs will be made responsible for the implementation and application of Community law (directly or 
otherwise), and what procedures will be followed” (Jans et al. 2007, p. 18). See also Wendt 2013, p. 220. 
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5.6 Regulation of private regulation through the Court’s case law 
 
The Court’s functional approach has enabled judicial scrutiny of the rule-making activities of 
private actors under EU free movement and competition law, which can result in private law 
sanctions in case infringements are found. Under Dutch private law, an infringement of a 
fundamental freedom may for instance lead to an obligation to pay damages911 and may 
constitute a basis for claims for undue payment or unjustified enrichment.912 Legal acts 
contravening a fundamental freedom would be null and void (Article 3:40 DCC).913 In the 
competition law context, it can in this respect be pointed at Article 101(2) TFEU, which 
declares agreements or decisions that fall foul of the cartel prohibition null and void. 
Moreover, the Court has held that “any individual can claim damages for loss caused to him 
by contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition”, provided that there is “a 
causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited” under Article 
101 TFEU.914 Furthermore, infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can lead to liability 
arising from a wrongful act.915 
 However, as already indicated in the introduction to this chapter, strictly speaking, 
nothing much can be inferred from the free movement and competition law cases as regards 
the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct and other forms of private regulation in 
European (private) law. Rather, the cases are relevant in another respect: the approach of the 
Court in effect determines the latitude for private regulation. First of all, this is visible in the 
net result of the approach. Falling into the realm of free movement and competition law, 
private regulators have to ensure that their regulatory arrangements neither hamper nor 
obstruct the free flow of persons, services and goods nor must they distort competition, in 
                                                
911 Hartkamp 2010, p 530; Cherednychenko 2006, p. 37; Hoyer 2013, pp. 343-344. At least, in theory since the 
Court has thus far not provided for remedies for private actors under free movement law (De Vries & Van 
Mastrigt 2013, p. 267). See in the competition law context case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan 
(2001) ECR I-6297; Cases C-295/04-298/04, Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico (2006) ECR I-6619. However, Hoyer 
argues, the arguments that the CJEU advanced in opening up the possibility to claim damages for the 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU (see Case C-453/99, Courage v Crehan, paras 26 and 27; Cases C-295/04-
298/04 Manfredi, paras 60, 90-91) also go for free movement law. See Hoyer 2013, p. 344. In Dutch law, this 
right to damages can be derived from Article 6:162 DCC on unlawful acts. For more details, see Hoyer 2013, pp. 
344-345. 
912 Hartkamp 2010, pp. 531-532. Since the CJEU has until now not ruled on such consequences, it appears that it 
is up to the courts of the Member States to deliver a judgment in this respect. See Hoyer 2012, p. 343. Cf. 
Hartkamp 2010, p. 530, remarking that it is unclear whether these consequences follow on from EU law or from 
national law. 
913 Hartkamp 2010, p 530; Cherednychenko 2006, p. 37; Hoyer 2013, pp. 343-344. 
914 Case C-295/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA (2006) ECR I-6619, paras 58-61 
(quotation paras 60-61, with reference to Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v 
Courage Ltd and Others (2001) ECR I-6297, para 26). See also Asser/Hartkamp 3-I 2015/45. See also Directive 
2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member 
States and of the European Union (OJ 2014, L 349/1), which concerns the possibility to claim damages for 
infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Directive has to be implemented by the end of 2016. In the 
Netherlands, the Directive will be implemented in Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code (in (new) Articles 6:193k-
6:193t) and in the Code of Civil Procedure (inter alia in (new) Articles 844-850).  
915 Asser/Hartkamp 3-I 2015/48 and 74 et seq. See also Van Leuken 2015, pp. 27-35. 
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order to avoid liability for violation of free movement and competition law.916 Secondly, the 
‘regulatory’ element of the approach of the CJEU is reflected in the arguments that the Court 
has advanced to keep certain private regulatory schemes, namely those which entailed an 
element of State involvement, out of the reach of the rules on competition. It has been 
submitted in legal literature that these arguments in effect constitute (procedural) good 
governance criteria that private regulatory schemes have to meet in order to fall outside the 
scope of these rules. As a result, the Court, either deliberately or as an unwitting consequence 
of its general approach, implicitly ‘regulates’ the use of private regulation.917  
 Schepel has made this argument in the context of the effet utile doctrine, analyzing “the 
conditions under which private parties can be considered “public” enough to merit immunity 
from competition law”.918 Key in this respect is the ‘public interest’, understood in the 
definition of the CJEU in Librandi.919 That is to say that private regulatory arrangements are 
“to be protected from antitrust if they can make a plausible claim to put the “public interest” 
over narrow private interests”.920 According to Schepel, the antitrust analysis as well as the 
delegation test that the CJEU applies under the effet utile doctrine in effect center upon this 
key element, whereby both tests locate the public interest in procedural elements. Under the 
antitrust analysis, more specifically, the Court since Librandi focuses on the existence of the 
procedural obligation to observe public interest criteria, whereby it uses the composition 
requirement as a supplementary argument.921 According to Schepel, this process requirement 
“transforms antitrust into a kind of administrative law for private regulation. And what 
antitrust protects here is not a competitive market; what antitrust protects is democratic 
governance”.922 As regards the delegation test, Schepel argues that the public interest likewise 
forms the rationale behind the Court’s quest for final responsibility of the State for the 
measure in question. State bodies can be assumed to act in the public interest and, hence, a 
measure can be shielded from competition law scrutiny if the State has retained the power to 
supervise and control the activities of the semi-private or semi-public regulatory body in the 
final instance. Yet, a mere stamp of public approval is insufficient in this respect.923 Building 
on the notion of public interest as defined in Librandi, Schepel claims that deference will only 
                                                
916 See Van Driel 1989, pp. 196-196, 230-231. See in this respect also the 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement on 
Better lawmaking OJ 2003, C 321/01, recital 17, stipulating that self-regulation and co-regulation “must ensure 
swift and flexible regulation which does not affect the principles of competition or the unity of the internal 
market”. 
917 Schepel 2005, pp. 320-338; Schepel 2002; Mataija 2016. 
918 Schepel 2002, p. 31. See also Schepel 2005, pp. 320-336, where the argument made in 2002 is repeated. 
919 As already cited above in section 5.5.2.2: “the interests of the collectivity had to prevail over the private 
interests of individual operators” (Case C-38/97 Librandi para 40). 
920 Schepel 2002, p. 50. Cf. the rationale behind the antitrust analysis, discussed in section 5.5.1.2.2 above and 
Odudu 2006, p. 50: “Competition is protected in the public interest and Article 81 EC [101 TFEU, MM] operates 
to ensure that those pursuing a private interest do not harm the public interest”. 
921 Schepel 2002, pp. 45-46, noting that “the Court is in effect putting its faith in the idea that procedural 
guarantees can discipline financially interested parties to serve the public interest” (p. 46). See also Wendt 2013, 
p. 216. 
922 Schepel 2002, p. 46. 
923 Schepel 2002, pp. 48-49. 
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be given to “decisions taken in the advancement of the collective good”.924 Against this 
backdrop, he submits that the delegation test “locates the “public interest” not in public 
institutions but in procedures that ensure democratic governance”.925 All this eventually leads 
Schepel to conclude that the Court in effect applies one single procedural public interest test 
to assess the compatibility of regulatory measures with EU competition law. With this test, 
the Court in effect regulates the use of private regulation.926 In my understanding of Schepel’s 
argument, this implies that the assessment under the effect utile doctrine in fact boils down to 
the question whether there are procedural requirements or safeguards (i.e., a legal obligation 
to observe public interest criteria, supplemented with the composition requirement, and State 
supervision and control in last resort) to ensure that the regulatory body pursues the public 
interest, rather than its own private interests.927 If this question is answered in the affirmative, 
private regulation passes the public interest test.928 As a result, the semi-private or semi-public 
regulator, together with the State, escapes competition law liability. Herewith, the CJEU in 
effect imposes certain good governance criteria upon private regulatory schemes deployed by 
the State (co-regulatory schemes). In the words of Schepel: “albeit very implicitly, the Court 
has fashioned a public interest test that transforms Community law into a rudimentary set of 
procedural norms of good governance for private regulation”.929 
 Mataija in a similar vein argues that the CJEU tends to concentrate on institutional and 
procedural characteristics when assessing a private regulatory scheme under EU competition 
law.930 He states that the Court has thus adopted a “relatively light touch approach”931: 
through its broad interpretation of the personal scope of the competition rules, the CJEU has 
shown willing to bring private regulation within the realm of competition law, yet at the same 
time has focused its assessment on institutional and procedural characteristics, lending 
considerable leeway to private regulatory arrangements that respect these criteria of good 
governance.932 Mataija, whose study on the relation between private regulation and EU free 
movement law and competition law has a broader scope than the study conducted in this 
                                                
924 Schepel 2002, p. 48, adding that “the appropriate demand is for “public-regarding” regulation, not for public 
regulation”. 
925 Schepel 2002, p. 49. 
926 Schepel 2002, pp. 33, 50-51; Schepel 2005, p. 321. Schepel thereby highlights the contradictory relationship 
between the antitrust analysis and the delegation test. See also Sauter 2015, p. 11. Baquero Cruz opposes the 
claim that the CJEU fashions a procedural test, even though, instead of the current tests, he would be in favor of 
the Court applying such a test under the effet utile doctrine. See Baquero Cruz 2007, pp. 558-590. 
927 Cf. Heremans 2012, pp. 260-261, who also indicates that this means that the Court does not engage in a 
substantive assessment of whether the contested measure serves the public interest. Rather, she notes with 
Schepel, the assessment focuses on the question whether sufficient procedural safeguards are present to ensure 
that “the state can be seen as the ultimate author of the resulting measures” (Heremans 2012, p. 261). 
928 Wendt 2013, pp. 223-226 notes that the CJEU does not delve into the actual effectiveness of the public 
safeguards. Cf. also Schepel 2002, pp. 44-47. What does follow from the Court’s case law in this respect is that 
mere rubber-stamping does not suffice as such a safeguard. See section 5.5.2.2 
929 Schepel 2002, p. 51, adding that “it is a set of norms that recognizes that the legitimacy of economic self-
regulation depends on the procedures that ensure the meaningful participation of all concerned parties rather than 
on hierarchical structures of formal political accountability”. See also Schepel 2005, pp. 335-338 (at p. 335: 
“there is now in EC competition law a set of procedural public interest criteria, however rudimentary, that 
provides at least a normative framework for the public regulation of private governance regimes”). 
930 Mataija 2016, pp. 92, 113, 261.  
931 Mataija 2016, p. 261. 
932 Mataija 2016, pp. 260-261. 
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chapter, signals the same development under free movement law. Here, the Court equally 
focuses on procedural issues, such as the composition of the decision-making bodies and 
transparency, when assessing the proportionality of the disputed regulation in the context of 
its justifiability.933 More generally, Mataija finds that “broadly speaking, if some benchmark 
of procedural fairness is achieved, it is less likely that the Court of Justice would enter into a 
substantive re-assessment of the private regulator’s decision”.934 Against the backdrop of 
these observations, Mataija concludes that the CJEU and the European Commission can use 
and have used competition law and free movement law as tools of re-regulation or meta-
regulation of private regulation. This influences the ways in which private regulators fulfill 
their regulatory roles, and the organization and structure of their regulatory schemes.935 In 
conceptual terms, these practices lead to what Mataija calls a shift from private autonomy to 
“regulatory autonomy”. This concept “involves deferring to private regulators by granting 
them a wide margin of discretion […] to pursue a legitimate policy by means of their own 
choosing”.936 This means that the CJEU will generally not engage with the substance of the 
private measures: at that point, private regulators are, to a large extent, granted deference as 
long as they meet the required standards of good governance and fair procedure.937 However, 
the price to be paid for this deference is that there are only few instances in which private 
regulatory measures will be fully excluded from EU free movement law and competition law, 
Mataija indicates.938 
 Although it is difficult to ascertain whether one can speak of a strategy of the CJEU,939 
case law does suggest that the Court attaches significance to the question whether private 
regulatory schemes meet certain good governance standards and can hence be considered to 
act in the public interest, rather than the private interest. This is relevant in several respects. 
First of all, it entails valuable lessons for States wishing to rely upon private regulation in 
pursuit of their policy objectives. After all, the effet utile doctrine in EU competition law 
makes clear that in order for States to escape competition law liability, it is essential that such 
co-regulatory schemes meet the governance requirements of the CJEU. Vice versa, private 
regulators are equally freed from competition law scrutiny if these requirements are met. 
Secondly, following on from the approach of the Court, the imposition of good governance 
criteria can contribute to the democratic legitimacy of private regulatory arrangements, as 
Schepel and Mataija submit.940 At this point, the Wouters test may also be recalled. With the 
caveat that the actual scope of the test remains rather opaque, the deference shown by the 
CJEU to restrictive private regulatory measures adopted in the pursuit of legitimate public 
                                                
933 Mataija 2016, p. 64. 
934 Mataija 2016, p. 65. 
935 Mataija 2016, pp. 18, 260. Mataija uses the definition of Coglianese and Mendelson to describe what meta-
regulation refers to: “ways that outside regulators … seek to induce targets to develop their own internal, self-
regulatory responses to public problems”. See Mataija 2016, p. 18, with reference to C. Coglianese & E. 
Mendelson, ‘Meta-regulation and self-regulation’, in: M. Cave, R. Baldwin & M. Lodge (eds), The Oxford 
handbook of regulation, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, p. 150. 
936 Mataija 2016, p. 63. 
937 Mataija 2016, pp. 260-261. 
938 Mataija 2016, pp. 63, 260. 
939 Schepel 2002, p. 51 indicates that the CJEU has “very implicitly” applied a public interest test. 
940 Schepel 2002, p. 32; Mataija 2016, p. 17. 
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interests might stimulate private regulators to start operating in the public interest, rather than 
in their own private interests. The same observation applies as regards the free movement 
grounds of justifications, which equally entail an element of public interest. 
 In sum, the partially functional approach of the CJEU has led to the creation of a legal 
framework for the use of private regulation. Broadly speaking, this framework consists of the 
free movement rules and competition rules, the requirements of which private regulators will 
have to meet in order to be shielded against liability. More specifically, this framework 
imposes certain good governance criteria on private regulation, particularly on co-regulatory 
schemes operating in a closely interwoven public-private environment (cf. the criteria 
formulated in Wouters and under the effet utile doctrine). In this chapter, this meta-regulatory 
approach most visibly comes to the fore in the context of competition law. Mataija has argued 
that a similar approach is visible under free movement law.941 This meta-regulatory legal 
framework might have both positive and negative effects, as Mataija notes. While it might 
deter private regulators from adopting regulatory measures, at the same time it imposes 
checks and balances on private regulation. As such, EU competition law and free movement 
law not only protect the market against distortions or restrictions caused by private regulation, 
but may also address some of the drawbacks of private regulation, such as its legitimacy and 
its effectiveness in attaining public interest goals, Mataija argues.942  
 
5.7 Concluding remarks 
 
Thus far, the vast majority of European judicial confrontations with private regulation have 
occurred in the context of free movement law and competition law. From a conceptual 
perspective, these are not obvious routes for the CJEU to go down in respect of private 
regulatory schemes. This is because, as I set out in the introductory section to this chapter, in 
many ways such schemes do not always readily fit the public-private divide on which the 
Treaty is conventionally said to rest. In order to bring private regulation within the ambit of 
free movement law and competition law, the CJEU adopted a functional approach, adapting 
the Treaty rules to the practice of private regulation.943 This has resulted in a “privatization of 
free movement law” and a “publicization of competition law”.944 Put in the more concrete 
context of this doctoral thesis, the Court’s functional approach has brought collective private 
regulation, which includes industry codes of conduct, within the realm of EU free movement 
law, and private regulation in general and co-regulation in particular within the realm of EU 
competition law. However, the formal boundaries have not ceased to exist: the Court’s 
                                                
941 Mataija 2016, pp. 64-65. 
942 Mataija 2016, pp. 4-5, 17, 264. As regards the effectiveness of private regulation in attaining public interest 
goals, it can be pointed to the suggestion of Monti to use Article 101 TFEU as a tool to encourage self-regulatory 
measures by traders in the consumer interest. See Monti 2007b, pp. 310-312. 
943 Mataija 2016, p. 17.  
944 Baquero-Cruz 2002, p. 87 and Mataija 2016, p. 18, both with reference to Waelbroeck, ‘Les rapports entre les 
règles sur la libre circulation des marchandises et les règles de concurrence applicables aux entreprises dans la 
CEE’, in: F. Caportorti et al. (eds), Du droit international au droit de l’intégration: liber amicorum Pierre 
Pescatore, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1987. 
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approach in both fields of law still holds some formal elements.945 Mataija puts it as follows: 
“Insofar as EU law accepts a public-private distinction, it is a functional one. It is not so much 
about ex ante classifications of actors as public or private in an abstract, ‘objective’ sense, but 
rather a form of ex post justification for limiting the reach of its disciplines on a case by case 
basis”.946 
 The key question in the context of this doctoral thesis is how the approach of the CJEU 
impacts industry codes of conduct. As noted at the outset of this chapter, strictly speaking, the 
approach does not tell us much about the legal relevance of industry codes as such, since it is 
the restrictive potential of this type of regulation that is central to the free movement law and 
competition law cases. Nonetheless, the approach of the Court has important consequences 
for industry codes of conduct and other forms of collective private regulation: it has resulted 
in a European legal framework for private regulation. First of all, as a result of the CJEU’s 
functional approach, free movement law and competition law demarcate private regulators’ 
intra-Community room for maneuver. Their regulatory activities are to remain within the 
limits of these fields of law, subject to liability under national civil law. Secondly, the 
approach of the Court has led to the ‘imposition’ of certain good governance requirements in 
the sense that private regulators can escape free movement law and competition law scrutiny 
when these requirements are met. Although present under both free movement law and 
competition law,947 in this chapter the approach was most visible in the discussion of the 
rulings of the CJEU in competition law cases.948 More specifically, in line with the arguments 
of Schepel and Mataija,949 the discussion of this case law showed that where co-regulatory 
regimes are concerned, private regulators (i.e., at least professional organizations following 
Wouters and related judgments) and States (following the effet utile doctrine) can escape 
competition law liability when certain procedural good governance requirements (most 
notably pertaining to the composition of the regulatory body, a legal obligation to observe 








                                                
945 Sauter & Schepel 2009, p. 128.  
946 Mataija 2016, p. 17. 
947 Mataija 2016. 
948 For an account of this practice under EU free movement law, see Mataija 2016. 
949 Schepel 2002; Mataija 2016. 















































Like the CJEU, Dutch civil courts951 have been confronted with industry codes and other 
forms of private regulation. These confrontations have provoked different judicial 
responses.952 A small case law analysis that Giesen conducted in 2008953 suggests that the 
approach of district courts and courts of appeal in this respect is more hesitant than that of the 
Supreme Court. Whereas some lower courts do refer to private regulation in reaching their 
decision, other courts disregard the private rules invoked by the litigants. By employing it 
more generously than in the past, the Supreme Court, by contrast, as Giesen observes, appears 
to have given a clear field for the use of private regulation. Subsequently, Giesen concludes 
that the approach of the Supreme Court ‘unmistakably’ implies that judges can make use of 
industry codes of conduct and other forms of private regulation, albeit the Court has not yet 
explicitly stated that this is the case.954  
 In this chapter, I will pick up where Giesen left off in 2008, implicitly asking whether the 
observations he made still reflect the current state of affairs. How does the Dutch judiciary 
deal with industry codes of conduct in civil law cases and what (legal) relevance do judges 
attach to these codes?955 These questions will be answered on the basis of a comprehensive 
analysis of the Dutch judicial responses to industry codes of conduct. The design of the search 
for relevant case law will be set out in section 6.2. After this, the results of the case law 
analysis will be presented, starting with a discussion of decisions of the lower courts (section 
6.3). This discussion will be followed by an analysis of the judgments of the Supreme Court 
(section 6.4).956 Conclusions are drawn in section 6.5. 
 
                                                
951 I.e., the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), courts of appeal (gerechtshoven) and district 
courts (rechtbanken). 
952 See Giesen 2008, p. 785; Giesen 2007, especially Chapters 3 and 4; Vranken 2005, pp. 87-94. 
953 The analysis covers the period 1 February 2007 – May 2008 and includes 15 judgments (of which 6 have 
been delivered by a district court, 3 by a court of appeal and 6 by the Supreme Court).  
954 Giesen 2008, pp. 785-787, 790-791. 
955 In line with the focus of this doctoral thesis, this chapter concentrates on private law. Other fields of law as 
well as disciplinary proceedings embodied under either private or public law have been left out. 




Again, like in Chapters 4 and 5, I need to make some remarks about the terminology applied in 
this chapter. The case law discussed in this chapter involves a wide array of private regulatory 
measures. Although not all of these measures go by the name of ‘industry code of conduct’, many 
of them can be subsumed under the definition of industry codes that this doctoral thesis applies 
(see Chapter 1, section 1.5.2), since they encompass rules of conduct. However, a few measures 
may (partially) fall outside the scope of this definition. Nonetheless, since it is possible to speak of 
industry codes without obscuring the scope of Dutch civil case law, I will use the term industry 
codes of conduct. Yet, the observations made in this chapter apply equally to other forms of 
private regulation. 
 
6.2 Design case law search 
 
The starting point for the case law analysis, which comprises judgments of both the lower 
courts (district courts and courts of appeal) and the Supreme Court, are the different 
judgments discussed in private law literature. However, the analysis could not be built solely 
on a literature review, since the case law analyses conducted by other private law scholars are 
limited, both time-wise and scope-wise. The latest, more general analysis of case law is the 
one conducted by Giesen, which stems from 2008 and covers only a short time-span.957 
Furthermore, the existing analyses tend to focus on the case law of the Supreme Court.958 The 
limited nature of the case law analyses present in Dutch private law literature necessitated an 
additional search for relevant case law. With a view to the time span already covered by the 
literature, this search focused on judgments published between 1 May 2008 and 1 July 
2016.959 This combination of a review of the judgments referred to in Dutch private law 
literature (including judgments delivered before 1 May 2008) and my own search for relevant 
case law eventually resulted in 30 Supreme Court rulings, 43 court of appeal rulings and 112 
district court decisions analyzed or referred to in this chapter. In line with the focus of this 
doctoral thesis on industry codes of conduct, I took as the focal point of the search judgments 
concerning this form of private regulation. However, by involving literature concerning other 
types of industry-level private regulation and by using several broad search queries, I cast the 
net wider.960 Corporate codes of conduct, codes adopted by the government and codes of 
conduct enacted as a regulation by regulatory authorities drawn from the profession pursuant 
                                                
957 Giesen 2008, who stresses that his overview is by no means a fully-fledged sample survey. 
958 Cf. Giesen 2007; Vranken 2005; Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009. Giesen 2008 forms an exception 
in this regard. 
959 The initial search covered the period 1 May 2008 – 31 October 2014. It was updated afterwards so as to 
include relevant case law published until 1 July 2016. The choice for 1 May 2008 was motivated by the fact that 
Giesen’s analysis, which is the latest general review of Dutch civil case law at this point, covers case law until 
May 2008. 
960 The search was limited to cases published in the online database of the Netherlands Judiciary 
(<http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/>), with the caveat that not all judgments are published in this database. 
Judgments which only made mention of private rules, i.e., without the court going into their relevance or 
applying the rules, were not included in the sample. The following search queries were used: gedragscode(s); 
gedragsregel(s); beroepscode(s); beroepsregel(s); ethisch (encompassing: ethische (gedrags)code(s); ethische 
(gedrags)regel(s)); zelfregulering; 79 RO; private regulering; private regelgeving; private regel(s); alternatieve 
regelgeving; alternatieve regulering; conduct (encompassing: code(s) of conduct and rule(s) of conduct); ethics 




to their public regulatory power, such as the Accountants Code of Conduct Regulation 
(Verordening gedrags- en beroepsregels accountants), were left out of the case law search. 
 It should be emphasized that this chapter by no means provides an exhaustive overview 
of the use of industry codes in Dutch civil case law. Even though I sought to conduct a search 
as systematic and thorough as possible, relevant cases might have slipped through the cracks. 
Nonetheless, by combining a literature review with an analysis of my own inventory of case 
law from both the Supreme Court and the lower courts,961 this chapter provides a broader 
overview and analysis of Dutch civil case law involving industry codes of conduct than the 
analyses hitherto conducted in Dutch private law literature. 
 
6.3 District courts and courts of appeal 
 
This section describes how district courts and courts of appeal deal with industry codes, 
drawing a distinction between judgments in which these codes were relied upon by the courts 
(section 6.3.1) and judgments where they were disregarded in part or in whole (section 6.3.2). 
 
6.3.1 Judicial application of industry codes of conduct 
 
For reasons of clarity, the case law discussed in this section has been arranged loosely into 




A first judgment that can be mentioned is the Batco case, where private regulation was one of 
the viewpoints on which the court founded its decision. In this case, the parent company of 
the corporation under scrutiny accepted as a guideline for its business policy the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The Enterprise Division of the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal took account of the relevant norms of the OECD Guidelines in classifying the 
contested corporate decision as a case of mismanagement, stating that the aforementioned 
acceptance of the OECD Guidelines “was not without meaning”.962 In a similar vein, the 
North-Netherlands District Court referred to the Good Manufacturers Practice (GMP) rules 
applicable in the animal food industry. Whereas the claimant had argued that the question 
whether these rules had been violated was irrelevant to the assessment of his conduct, the 
district court held a different view: “although the GMP regulation does not include legal rules, 
                                                
961 Where applicable, references will be made to publications in which the judgment concerned is discussed. 
962 Hof Amsterdam (Enterprise Division) 21 June 1979, NJ 1980/71 (Batco), para 6. See also Giesen 2007, p. 72. 
Earlier in its ruling (under d), the court referred to the following statement of the chairman of BAT industries 
(quotation derived from the judgment): “The standards they [OECD Guidelines, MM] set are very much in line 
with our own established policies in these matters and we certainly support their efforts to have them applied 
widely”. Eijsbouts argues that the scope of this ruling extends beyond the area of company law as the Guidelines 
can play a similar role in elaborating the standard of due care in Article 6:162 DCC. See Eijsbouts 2010, p. 90. 
Cf. for the financial sector Rb. Limburg 10 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2014:7819, para 3.14 where a 
violation of the Code of Conduct of the Belgian trade association for the financial sector (Febelfin) constituted 
one of the reasons for the court to decide that the contested behavior of the bank was unlawful. 
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it has nonetheless significance in being a self-regulatory system adopted by and applying to 
the industry. It can, as is the case here, be used as a point of reference in elaborating the 
standards of due care for feed producers”963.  
 Another example of a case in which an industry code of conduct was deployed in relation 
to the standard of due care can be found in a ruling of the Arnhem Court of Appeal involving 
the Code of Conduct for real estate agents affiliated with VBO Makelaar, a trade association 
for real estate agents and appraisers. In this case, the appellants claimed that the real estate 
agents involved were guilty of a conflict of interest and therefore acted negligently and 
unlawfully. In substantiating their claim, the appellants called upon a provision of the Code 
that concerned conflicts of interest. The court commenced its assessment of the claim by 
establishing that the real estate agents had not contested the fact that they were bound to the 
Code. Thereupon, it scrutinized the behavior of the real estate agents on the basis of the Code. 
Whereas the real estate agents in this respect advocated a restrictive interpretation of the 
applicable rules, the court was of the opinion that the present case was also covered by the 
Code. It concluded that there was an undesirable conflict of interest. Since the real estate 
agents had not adapted their behavior accordingly, the disputed conduct was negligent to such 
an extent that it should be qualified as unlawful, the court concluded, thus founding its 
decision on the Code.964 The Arnhem Court of Appeal adopted a similar approach in another 
case involving private rules. The cause of this lawsuit was the damage that the plaintiff had 
suffered as a result of a car tire that exploded while being inflated by a car mechanic. The 
plaintiff sued the garage employing the mechanic and claimed that it had committed an 
unlawful act by disregarding the safety rules. The plaintiff in this respect referred to a 
brochure of the industry association, which set out the dangers of inflating a car tire and the 
precautionary measures to be taken in that regard. Considering the defendant had disputed 
neither the contents of the brochure nor his familiarity with its contents, the court took 
account of said brochure in establishing whether there was a case of hazardous negligence 
(gevaarzetting).965  
 The Code of Conduct for claim organizations (Claimcode), in turn, has been used by 
courts in establishing whether a claim organization is entitled to initiate a collective action on 
the basis of Article 3:305a DCC. Article 3:305a(2) DCC, more specifically, stipulates that in 
order for a claim organization to be entitled, the legal claim brought by the organization 
should sufficiently safeguard the interests of the persons to whose benefit the claim is brought 
to court. With reference to the fact that the Dutch legislator has indicated that the Claimcode 
constitutes a relevant viewpoint in assessing whether this is the case,966 courts have relied 
upon the principles of this code of conduct to establish the entitlement of a claim 
organization. The East-Brabant District Court in this respect, for instance, considered that 
even though the Claimcode is not a legal precondition for the entitlement of a claim 
                                                
963 Rb. Noord-Holland 23 April 2014, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2014:3627, para 4.24. Identical: Rb. Noord-Holland 20 
May 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2015:11544, para 4.14. 
964 Hof Arnhem 11 August 2009, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2009:BJ5405, paras 18, 21.  
965 Hof Arnhem 7 February 2009, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2009:BK4834, notably paras 4.4-4.5, 4.7-4.9. See also 
Jansen GS Onrechtmatige daad, artikel 6:162 BW, no. 85.4, referring to this judgment. 
966 See Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 33 126, no. 3, pp. 12-13. 
 
 195 
organization to bring a claim, the aforementioned reference of the legislator has given the 
Code an indirect legal basis in Article 3:305a(2) DCC. The court furthermore noted that the 
Code is broadly supported. Accordingly, the court took account of the Code as an important 
viewpoint in establishing whether the interests are sufficiently safeguarded of the persons to 
whose benefit the claim is brought to court.967 These considerations contrast sharply with the, 
in view of the Dutch legislator’s reference to the Code remarkable decision of the Gelderland 
District Court to not take account of the Claimcode since it was not a universally binding 
provision (een ieder bindende bepaling).968 
 Equally noticeable is a case brought before the District Court of The Hague concerning, 
in short, the rejection of an application to extend a residence permit for study purposes. In this 
case, it is the district court itself that brings up the code of conduct in some ‘superfluous 
remarks’. After having validated the aforementioned rejection, the district court noted that the 
claimant was caught up in a vicious circle: whereas the residence permit was not granted as 
the claimant had no enrollment certificate from the educational institution, the educational 
institution refused to grant the certificate because the claimant had no permit. The court seeks 
to help the claimant out by indicating that a solution could be offered by the Code of Conduct 
International Student Higher Education, which supplements the legal framework and contains 
the conditions for admission to a higher educational institute. Considering that the education 
institute concerned had joined the Code, the court suggested the claimant bring the relevant 
Code rules to the attention of the education institute.969 
 For the sake of completeness, it can also be pointed at the role that codes of conduct can 
play in employment relationships. Codes of conduct may be part of or linked to an 
employment contract. As a vast body of case law shows, there are various ways in which 
failure from the side of the employee to abide by these rules can constitute one of the factors 
that justifies termination of contract.970 
 
6.3.1.2 SMS Services  
 
The SMS Service Provision Code of Conduct has been central to several judgments, which all 
centered on the question whether a consumer was bound to pay the excessive costs for an 
                                                
967 Rb. Oost-Brabant 29 June 2016, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2016:3383, paras 5.20-5.21. See also Rb. Noord-
Nederland 2 September 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2015:4185. 
968 Rb. Gelderland 3 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2014:5645, para 5.7. 
969 Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 6 March 2009, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BH8906, para 7. 
970 Some more recent examples include Rb. Maastricht 28 March 2011, ECLI:NL:RBMAA:2011:BP9762; Rb. 
Zeeland-West-Brabant 14 January 2013, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2013:BY983; Rb. Oost-Nederland 21 March 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBONE:2013:BZ5412; Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 21 May 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:CA2662; 
Rb. Midden-Nederland 21 August 2014, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2014:3653; Rb. Gelderland 9 September 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2014:6306. Cf., slightly different, Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 26 February 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2014:313 (where it was held that in violating the code of conduct of his employer, the 
employee had acted unlawfully); Rb. Alkmaar 6 May 2010, ECLI:NL:RBALK:2010:BN1637 (where the court 
dismissed the claim that the employee had violated the employer’s code of conduct) and Rb. Zutphen 14 July 
2009, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2009:BJ2559 (according to the court, the code of conduct did not play a self-standing 
role). See also HR 2 May 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1056, NJ 2014/250 (ABN Amro/J.) concerning the refusal of 
a bank to hand a former employee a declaration of integrity on the basis of the Integrity Code for banks of the 
Dutch Banking Association. 
 
 196 
SMS service, which rose very shortly after the consumer had registered for the SMS service 
concerned. A noticeable example is a judgment delivered by the Arnhem District Court, 
where the court took the SMS Code as the focal point of its line of argument. The court 
started out by stating that the Code is an agreement and that the operator and the SMS service 
provider in question are parties to that agreement. Thereupon, it considered whether 
provisions of the Code could be regarded as third-party beneficiary clauses incorporated in 
the legal relation between consumer and provider. After having applied the criteria stipulated 
by Article 6:253(4) DCC, the court held that the eligible Code provisions should indeed be 
classified as such. Accordingly, the yardstick for assessing whether the provider has lived up 
to the requirements of the Code is to be found in the principle of good faith that both parties 
have to observe in their contractual relationship. Following this principle, the provider has to 
use the provisions of the Code to the benefit of the consumer, the court held. The subsequent 
assessment of the requirements of the Code led the court to conclude that the provider had not 
acted in good faith. The provider’s argument that the consumer had registered for the SMS 
service and thus had himself to blame for the excessive costs for the SMS service was 
dismissed with reference to the fact that the provider had voluntarily subscribed to the Code, 
which, precisely to avoid overburdening credulous consumers financially, aims to prevent 
such situations from arising.971 
 Whereas the Arnhem District Court employed the Code by linking it to the legal concept 
of the ‘third-party beneficiary clause’, the Dordrecht District Court used the principles of 
reasonableness and fairness to assign legal relevance to the SMS Code. After having held that 
the applicability of the Code was established between the parties to the proceedings, the 
district court found that the provider had not followed the procedure for handling complaints 
set out in the Code. Taking account of this finding and with regard to another provision of the 
Code, the court concluded that it would be unacceptable according to the principles of 
reasonableness and fairness to charge the consumer with costs for the SMS service.972 
 The Leeuwarden District Court, in turn, founded its decision directly on the Code. The 
point of contention was, again, whether a consumer could be held liable for excessive costs 
for a text message service. According to the court, the consumer’s defense, which included an 
email with the SMS Code, denoted an explicit reliance on the contents and purpose of this 
code of conduct. The court hereby remarked that the Code is “by now well known in social 
and economic life, and broadly accessible, that is at least via Internet”973 and that the 
applicability of the Code to the relation between the operator and the provider of the text 
message service, both of which had joined the Code, had not been contested. Thereupon, the 
district court reviewed the facts of the case in the light of the applicable Code provisions. 
More specifically, the court found that the SMS service provider failed to comply with the 
                                                
971 Rb. Arnhem 26 March 2008, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2008:BC8904. See also Vzr. Rb. Utrecht 16 July 2008, 
ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2008:BF8825, where a consumer, with reference to the Arnhem District Court’s decision, 
could invoke the provisions of the SMS Code in his capacity as a third party. The court thereby remarks that the 
operator did not contest, when asked, that he was bound by the Code. The fact that the consumer could rely upon 
the Code remained undisputed as well (cf. para 4.2 of the judgment). 
972 Rb. Dordrecht 27 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:2012:BY8127. 
973 Rb. Leeuwarden 11 February 2009, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2009:BH2709, paras 3.4. 
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Code and that with a view to the Code and the ensuing protection of the consumer, it would 
have been logical for the operator to check dubious SMS services practices at this point.974 
This led the court to disallow the claim for payment.975  
 
6.3.1.3 Rules of conduct for lawyers 
 
A first case in which the Rules of Professional Conduct 1992 of the Netherlands Bar 
Association (Gedragsregels Advocatuur 1992) played a role is one brought before the District 
Court of The Hague. After having concluded that the parties to the proceedings consented on 
the content of the Rules, the court marked the Rules as a custom of the profession within the 
meaning of Article 6:248 DCC.976 Since the parties did not make an arrangement to the 
contrary, the court declared the Rules applicable to the agreement concerned. The claim of the 
plaintiff was awarded on the basis of the professional rules. The defendant’s argument that a 
violation of the professional rules only leads to liability under disciplinary law, and not under 
civil law, was herewith dismissed.977 Thus, the Rules of Professional Conduct had their effect 
through the doctrine of Article 6:248 DCC.978 In another case, the applicability of the Code of 
Conduct for European Lawyers, drawn up by the Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe (CCBE), on the relationship between a Dutch lawyer and his German colleague was 
also beyond dispute. The Dutch lawyer (the plaintiff) founded its claim that the German 
lawyer (the defendant) had to pay the Dutch lawyer’s fee notes on the Code, which contained 
rules at this point. The German lawyer, in his turn, invoked the same rules in his defense, 
stating that he had explicitly disclaimed (future) liability at this point, as was allowed by the 
Code. The court held that the Code reflects the rules that govern the relation between lawyers 
acting in their professional capacity. Accordingly, the court assessed the Dutch lawyer’s claim 
on the basis of the Code, which led to a conclusion in favor of the defendant.979 
 Judges have also used the rules of conduct for lawyers as a yardstick in assessing the 
legal permissibility of the conduct of lawyers. The first case that can be mentioned in this 
respect centered upon the question whether a lawyer had correctly applied one of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct 1992. After having established that, as a starting point, the legal 
relationship between the parties to the proceedings was covered by this rule, the court of 
appeal found that the lawyer had fallen short at this point and accordingly failed to fulfill its 
obligations towards his client.980 In a second case, the plaintiff (a law firm) contested the 
decision of the subdistrict court to link up with the Rules of Professional Conduct in 
ascertaining whether there was a case of undue influence. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 
however, was of the opinion that the Rules could be applied as a criterion in this regard, 
remarking that this was not altered by the fact that only a disciplinary court is authorized to 
                                                
974 Rb. Leeuwarden 11 February 2009, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2009:BH2709, para 3.7. 
975 Rb. Leeuwarden 11 February 2009, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2009:BH2709, paras 3.4-3.8. 
976 Article 6:248 DCC stipulates, inter alia, that an agreement also has the legal effects that follow on from 
custom. 
977 Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 10 July 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BA9210, paras 4.2, 4.4. Cf. Giesen 2008, p. 786.  
978 Giesen 2008, p. 786. 
979 Rb. ’s-Hertogenbosch 18 August 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSHE:2010:BN4531, paras 4.3-4.5. 
980 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 11 August 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:5952, paras 4.2-4.3, 4.5-4.6. 
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impose disciplinary measures in case of infringements of these Rules.981 It found that the law 
firm “should be deemed to be familiar with” the applicable rule, “or at least should have been 
familiar with it”.982 The subsequent assessment of the conduct of the law firm on the basis of 
the Rules led to the dismissal of the complaint concerning the use of the Rules by the 
subdistrict court.983 
 Equally noticeable is a judgment of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, where it was found 
that the mere fact that the law firm had acted in contravention of the relevant Rules of 
Professional Conduct would in itself not warrant the conclusion that the firm was in breach of 
contract in respect of its clients and liable for damage.984 The court drew a similar conclusion 
with regard to the claim that by contravening the Rules of Conduct, the law firm had 
committed an unlawful act vis-à-vis third parties, given that the Rules applied to the 
contractual relationship between the firm and its clients.985 By the same token, the Court of 
Appeal of Arnhem-Leeuwarden held that “under circumstances, mere compliance with the 
Rules of Professional Conduct is not sufficient to flesh out the duty of care [of a lawyer 




Private regulation can also play a role in disputes between franchisors and franchisees, as the 
judgments discussed in this subsection show. The European Code of Ethics for Franchising 
(Europese Erecode Inzake Franchising), as applied by the Netherlands Franchise Association 
(Nederlandse Franchise Vereniging), for instance proved relevant to the decision of the 
District Court of The Hague concerning the termination of a franchise agreement. The Code 
had been declared applicable to this agreement by the franchisor. The franchisee claimed that 
he rightfully terminated the franchise agreement since the franchisor, inter alia, failed to 
comply with the obligation, in short, to provide a financial forecast, as imposed on him by the 
Code. The court, however, rejected this argument on the basis of an interpretation of the Code 
provision relied upon by the franchisee. By declaring the Code applicable to the agreement, 
the franchisor was indeed obliged to provide such a forecast, but not in the way the franchisee 
claimed.987 Likewise, the Franchise Code proved relevant for the interpretation of a franchise 
agreement clause in a case brought before the Utrecht District Court. The court held that in 
interpreting this agreement, the franchisee could also attach significance to the fact that the 
franchisor was bound by this Code and, particularly, to the rules concerning the obligation of 
the franchisor to provide future franchisees with full and correct information. The disputed 
clause of the franchise agreement could be viewed as a specification of this norm, which “is 
                                                
981 Hof Amsterdam 3 June 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:2410, para 3.7. 
982 Hof Amsterdam 3 June 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:2410, para 3.8.  
983 Hof Amsterdam 3 June 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:2410, paras 3.8-3.9. In Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 29 May 
2012, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BW7211, concerning a comparable dispute, a similar line of argument was 
applied. 
984 Hof Amsterdam 23 February 2016, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:635, para 3.11. 
985 Hof Amsterdam 23 February 2016, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:635, para 3.15. 
986 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 12 April 2016, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2016:2876, para 2.4. 
987 Rb. Den Haag 23 October 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:14241, paras 4.2-4.4. 
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endorsed by franchisors in the Netherlands”988. The franchisor, in turn, did not challenge the 
fact that the Code had significance, but did contest the alleged violation of its rules. This plea 
was however to no avail.989  
 To conclude this subsection, it can be pointed at a decision of the Arnhem District Court. 
Unlike the previous two judgments, this decision does not concern private rules governing 
franchise relations. The code of conduct that played a role here contained a rule on the use of 
the intranet and the email facilities of the franchisor. Central to the dispute was the 
franchisor’s allegation that one of his franchisees had violated the aforementioned code. 
According to the franchisor, the franchisee’s obligation to abide by this code followed on 
from the franchise agreement. The fact that the franchisee had failed to live up to this 
obligation constituted one of the reasons for the franchisor to terminate the franchise 
agreement. The court, however, disagreed. It was of the opinion that the termination was 





Yet another example of a private regulatory arrangement that has been applied directly in civil 
case law is the general Code of Conduct for Insurers (Gedragscode Verzekeraars) of the 
Dutch Association of Insurers (Verbond van Verzekeraars). One of the issues in the judgment 
involving the Code was whether the unilateral cancellation of an insurance contract by the 
insurance company, with the argument of increased financial risks, was in breach of the Code. 
The insurance company itself contested the alleged violation of the Code. The court in this 
respect already ruled that the insurer (the defendant in this case) was allowed to terminate the 
contract on the basis of the law. This was not altered by the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Code. 
The court hereby remarked the Code “does not purport to assign insured parties more rights in 
their relation to insurance companies than granted to these parties by law, jurisprudence and 
policy conditions”.991 By terminating the agreement, the insurance company, with a view to 
the aforementioned financial risks, had shown itself responsible towards all insured persons. 
Herewith, it had acted mindful of the Code, which constitutes the framework for insurers 
when they strive for a socially responsible business operation, the court held.992 
 Another private regulatory scheme of the Dutch Association of Insurers that has been 
applied by the Dutch judiciary is the Code of Conduct on Personal Inquiry (Gedragscode 
Persoonlijk Onderzoek, hereafter: GPO). A personal inquiry into the actions of an insured 
party is a sensitive issue as it can infringe the insured party’s right to privacy. Such an 
                                                
988 Rb. Utrecht 12 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2012:BY6869, para 2.32. 
989 Rb. Utrecht 12 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2012:BY6869, paras 2.32-2.33. 
990 Vzr. Rb. Arnhem 2 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2012:BV5455, paras 4.4 and 4.9. 
991 Rb. Gelderland 3 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2014:5645, para 5.17. 
992 Rb. Gelderland 3 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2014:5645, para 5.17, also pointing at the self-
regulatory nature of the Code. Cf. in the context of insurance agreements also Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 18 
September 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BX7795 (where the defendant’s claim that the insurer had violated 




infringement is in principle unlawful, unless there is a ground for justification (Article 
6:162(1) DCC). With the GPO laying down the rules and conditions for holding personal 
inquiries, it may perhaps not come as a surprise that the Code has been frequently referred to 
in cases revolving around the question whether an insurance company has committed an 
unlawful act by holding a personal inquiry. The judgments follow a more or less set pattern in 
this respect. The insured party claims that the GPO has been violated, whereupon the court - 
sometimes after having established that the insurer was bound to the code993 - assesses 
whether the insurance company abided by the general principles of the GPO.994 In case of 
compliance with these principles, the infringement of the right to privacy is deemed justified 
and the personal inquiry is held lawful. Thus, courts deploy the GPO as a self-standing 
touchstone when answering the question whether an insurer had rightfully decided to conduct 
a personal inquiry.995 
 The Sectoral Regulations (Bedrijfsregelingen) of the Association of Insurers have also 
been referred to in various judgments. The Fire Insurance (Right of Recourse) Sectoral 
Regulations (Bedrijfsregeling Brandregres) and the Innocent Third Party Sectoral 
Regulations (Bedrijfsregeling Schuldloze derde) are most often brought to the fore by parties 
to the proceedings. In these cases, courts apply the relevant provisions, without further ado.996 
Courts have also considered the way in which the Fire Insurance (Right of Recourse) Sectoral 
Regulations must be interpreted.997 Their judgments can be traced back to a Supreme Court 
ruling dating from 2003. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the aforementioned 
Regulations are a “regulation of a general nature, aimed at restricting the recourse of fire 
insurers, which extends to third parties that have not been involved in the drafting process”. 
                                                
993 The fact that an insurance company has to abide by the GPO, or acknowledges that he is bound to the GPO, is 
not always explicitly referred to. However, the fact that an insurer does not contest the reliance of the insured 
party on the GPO arguably implies that he consents to the application of the Code. 
994 I.e., the decision to conduct the inquiry should be based on one of the two reasons set out by the GPO and the 
inquiry should meet the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. In some judgments, these principles are 
clearly visible, while in others they are applied in more guarded terms. 
995 Some more recent examples of cases in which the GPO has been used as a (central) touchstone include: Rb. 
Den Haag 25 May 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:5695; Rb. Noord-Nederland 26 November 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2014:6661; Rb. Rotterdam 17 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:7637; Rb. Noord-
Holland 26 June 2014, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2014:5555; Rb. Den Haag 5 March 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:3581; Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 4 March 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:1698; Rb. 
Amsterdam 2 January 2014, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:10; Hof Arnhem 18 December 2012, 
ECLI:NL:GHARN:2012:BY6523; Rb. Arnhem 11 April 2012, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2012:BW3674; Rb. Zwolle-
Lelystad 4 May 2011, ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2011:BV6594. Earlier: Rb. Assen 25 July 2007, 
ECLI:NL:RBASS:2007:BH6215 and Rb. Arnhem 17 May 2006, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2006:AY0882. Cf. also Rb. 
Rotterdam 28 May 2014, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:6171. 
996 See, e.g., Rb. Midden-Nederland 12 June 2013, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2013:CA3498; Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 9 
February 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV7111; Rb. Utrecht 25 August 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2010:BO1767. Cf. also Hof Amsterdam 24 July 2012, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BX9813; Rb. 
Rotterdam, 9 July 2014, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5378; Rb. Rotterdam 31 March 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM0821; Rb. Zwolle-Lelystad 19 August 2009, ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2009:BJ9081. See 
also Rb. Zutphen 7 November 2007, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2007:BB8032 (briefly referred to by Giesen 2008, p. 
786) and Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 26 June 2013, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2013:7313. 
997 E.g., Hof Amsterdam 23 February 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BM9488; Hof ’s-Gravenhage 11 
November 2008, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2008:BG8142; Rb. Noord-Holland 5 March 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2014:1519; Rb. Rotterdam 15 February 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BV9671; Rb. Assen 




Such a general regulation, the Court continued, “has to be interpreted according to objective, 
customary criteria. The intentions of the parties involved in the drafting process do not play a 
role insofar as they are not apparent from the text of the regulation or from sources that can be 
accessed by third parties”.998 The considerations of the Supreme Court concerning the general 
nature of the Fire Insurance (Right of Recourse) Sectoral Regulations also played a role in a 
ruling of the Court of Appeal of The Hague in which the Regulations’ scope of application 
was in dispute. The insurer was of the opinion that private (insured) actors could not invoke 
the Regulations since the rules only covered the relationship between insurance companies. 
However, with a view to the aforementioned Supreme Court ruling, the court held that the 
Regulations do apply to the relation between an insurance company seeking recourse and the 
insured third party that is held liable.999 
 Noticeable with a view to the possible radiating effect (‘uitstralingseffect’) of private 
regulation is a judgment delivered by the Amsterdam District Court. One of the central issues 
of this case was whether an insurance company was bound by the Fire Insurance (Right of 
Recourse) Sectoral Regulations. The court of first instance had already held that this question 
had to be answered in the negative: the Regulations apply only to members of the Dutch 
Associations of Insurers and the insurer in question was, at the time, not affiliated with the 
Association. The appellant, however, contended that the insurer was nonetheless obliged to 
follow the Regulations and should accordingly have waived its right of recourse. He put 
forward several arguments to substantiate his point of view. First of all, the appellant referred 
to the statement on the insurance company’s website reading that the company was a member 
of the Association, upon which he reasonably relied. The court of appeal rejected this 
argument, whereby it indicated that the fact that a large number of fire insurers does abide by 
the Regulations does not warrant such reliance either.1000 Secondly, the appellant argued that, 
given the circumstances of the case, the principle of reasonableness and fairness compelled 
the insurance company to follow the Regulations. Again, however, the court of appeal 
disagreed with the appellant. Even though the Regulations most certainly carry weight, they 
do not bear such significance that a non-affiliated insurer has a social, legally enforceable, 
duty to comply with the rules.1001 Thirdly, the appellant submitted that the insurance company 
could not take recourse as this would lead to an abuse of its right to do so. This argument was 
dismissed in a more or less similar vein as to the previous one. Considering that the number 
of fire insurers without an ‘Association of Insurers-membership’ is “not unsubstantial”, the 
court held that “one cannot say that the view that one should not seek ‘fire recourse’ to private 
individuals enjoys such wide support” that doing so in the dispute at hand would lead to an 
                                                
998 HR 16 May 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF4621, NJ 2003, 470, para 3.3.2. 
999 Hof ’s-Gravenhage 28 October 2008, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2008:BG2213, paras 5-6. 
1000 Hof Amsterdam 2 March 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BN1316, paras 4.3-4.4. The fact that the 
Regulations are broadly supported was significant in a judgment of the Rotterdam District Court. Here, the fact 
that the Regulations had been drafted following consensus of the insurance industry on the fact that insurers 
should exercise strict restraint in invoking their right of recourse towards private individuals pleaded against the 
insurance company to which the Regulations applied. See Rb. Rotterdam 3 November 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BO9900, para 4.7. 
1001 Hof Amsterdam 2 March 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BN1316, para 4.5. Similarly: Hof Arnhem-
Leeuwarden 10 December 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:9404, paras 4.13-4.14. 
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abuse of the right of recourse.1002 Fourthly, the appellant claimed that it is a rule of trade 
usage that insurers do not exercise their right of recourse against private individuals. The 
court of appeal in this respect, again, pointed at the fact that the Regulations are not generally 
accepted within the insurance industry and that an insurance company can opt to subscribe to 
the Regulations. The court established that, for that reason, it could hardly be maintained that 
that the rules have become customary law within the industry. As a result, the insurance 
company was not under an obligation to comply with the Regulations.1003 This implies, as the 
Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal makes explicit in a later judgment, that one has to fall 
back on the legal rules on recourse.1004 Conversely, if a claim is solely founded on the 
Regulations, there is no need to consider the legal rules, as the Amsterdam District Court held 
in a case concerning the Innocent Third Party Sectoral Regulations.1005 
 Finally, it can be pointed at the considerations of the Rotterdam District Court as regards 
the legal relevance of the Code of Conduct on the Handling of Personal Injury Claims 
(Gedragscode Behandeling Letselschade, referred to by the court as the ‘GBL’): “the plaintiff 
has founded its request on rule of conduct 10 of the GBL. Such a code of conduct does not 
qualify as law within the meaning of Article 79 of the Judiciary Organization Act. However, 
HDI-Gerling [the insurer, MM] has not contested the fact that it has undertaken to abide by 




As I already set out in Chapter 4, private regulation can play a regulatory role in the field of 
privacy. Industry associations, more specifically, can specify the Wbp through tailor-made 
codes of conduct. These codes can be filed with the Dutch DPA for formal approval (cf. 
Article 25 Wbp). The Dutch legislator has declared that such an official ‘stamp’ implies that 
the DPA is of the opinion that compliance with the code denotes compliance with the law.1007 
                                                
1002 Hof Amsterdam 2 March 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BN1316, para 4.6. 
1003 Hof Amsterdam 2 March 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BN1316, para 4.7. Cf. Rb. Dordrecht 24 February 
2010, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:2010:BL6070, paras 5.6-5.7, where the court held the fact that the majority of the 
Dutch insurance companies is a member of the Dutch Association of Insurers does not alter the fact that an 
insurer that is not a member is not bound to the Regulations. Herewith, it dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that 
since 80 percent of Dutch insurance companies endorses the Regulations, the rules should be taken as a yardstick 
in establishing an insurance company’s duty of care. See also Rb. Den Haag 24 July 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:9259, paras 5.33-5.34, 5.37-5.38. The fact that the Regulations applied only to those 
insures subscribing to them, either through membership or otherwise, was not in dispute in this case. The court, 
after having reiterated the judgment of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, pointed at the purpose of customary 
law: providing legal certainty when it is unclear which members of a group do and which members do not abide 
by the unwritten rules that the vast majority of the group perceive as binding. Since this is not the case when it 
comes to the Regulations, one cannot compel the minority to comply with the rules followed by the majority by 
referring to customary law (para 5.38). 
1004 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 10 December 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:9404, para 4.14. 
1005 Rb. Amsterdam 8 January 2009, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2009:BH0255, para 6. 
1006 Rb. Rotterdam 11 April 2016, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2802, para 4.2. 
1007 Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 25 892, no. 3, p. 132. See in this respect also Giesen 2007, pp. 61-62, who 
argues that this declaration not only renders the correctness of the private rules beyond dispute, but also 
strengthens the influence of these rules as regards the specification of the statutory provisions of the Wbp. 
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Indeed, several ‘DPA-approved’ privacy codes have played a legally relevant role in privacy-
related disputes, as the following examples show. 
 The Code of Conduct on the Processing of Personal Data by Financial Institutions 
(Gedragscode Verwerking Persoonsgegevens Financiële Instellingen) for instance proved of 
relevance in a case brought before the Utrecht District Court. Central question in this dispute 
between an insured person and his insurance company was whether the advice given by the 
medical advisor of the insurer should be made available to insured party on the basis of 
Article 35 Wbp or the aforementioned Privacy Code. The court dismissed the insurance 
company’s claim that the insured person had relied upon an outdated version of the Code: the 
new Code contained similar rules. However, having interpreted the Code, the court held that it 
cannot be derived from the private rules that the insured party should be allowed to inspect 
the advice of the medical advisor.1008 In another case, again revolving around the scope of an 
insured party’s right of inspection, the Privacy Code was brought to the fore by the plaintiff. 
Even though the declaration of approval of the DPA had expired at the time, the court 
deduced from the insurance company’s statements that it still considered itself bound to the 
Code. Accordingly, the court took account of the Privacy Code, considering that “since the 
scope of the right of the person involved to receive from the party responsible an overview of 
the personal data processed is partly dependent upon what the Code of Conduct stipulates in 
this respect, the court will also take the rules set out by this Code of Conduct into 
consideration […]”.1009 
 Another code of conduct that has played a role in civil law proceedings is the Privacy 
Code of Conduct of the private investigation agencies sector (Privacygedragscode sector 
particuliere onderzoeksbureaus). Besides being approved by the DPA, this Code forms the 
formal template for the industry: Article 23a of the Private Security Organizations and 
Detective Agencies Regulations (Regeling particuliere beveiligingsorganisaties en 
recherchebureaus) obliges private investigation companies to draw up and abide by a code of 
conduct identical to the Privacy Code. A first judgment in which the Code played a role is one 
delivered by the Haarlem District Court. The dispute at hand was caused by the plaintiff’s 
former spouse who had commissioned a detective agency to carry out surveillance on the 
plaintiff in order to discover whether he was in an affectionate relationship with the person 
together with whom he was living. The plaintiff lodged a complaint with the court about this 
surveillance on him and his living environment, which took place with high regularity during 
a period of over ten months. More specifically, the plaintiff held the surveillance constituted 
an unjustified and hence unlawful infringement of his constitutional right to respect for 
privacy as it contravened the aforementioned Privacy Code. According to the plaintiff, the 
agency was legally bound to this Code on the basis of the Private Security Organizations and 
Detective Agencies Regulations. The agency contested the allegation, stating that it had acted 
in accordance with the conditions and norms applicable to the industry. The Haarlem District 
Court first and foremost stated that the conduct of private investigating agencies should be in 
                                                
1008 Rb. Utrecht 17 November 2010, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2010:BO5222, para 4.9. 
1009 Rb. Zutphen 8 October 2009, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2009:BK4206, para 5.7. Cf. Rb. Rotterdam 20 May 2005, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2005:AT8525, para 4.5.7, where the Code also played a role. 
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compliance with “what can be expected from a private research agency in social and 
economic life”1010, whereby one may expect an agency to exercise a high degree of care. The 
court observed that this conduct is governed by an amalgam of general and specific, public 
and private norms: the general duty of care enclosed in Article 6:162 DCC (unlawful act), the 
Wbp and the aforementioned Privacy Code, as been laid down in the Private Security 
Organizations and Detective Agencies Regulations. The court subsequently builds on the 
relevant Code provisions to reach its preliminary decision, namely that the intrusion on the 
plaintiff’s privacy was indeed inadmissible.1011 A similar line of argument was employed by 
the District Court East-Brabant in a case again revolving around the question whether a 
private investigation company had infringed the privacy of the plaintiff and hence acted 
unlawfully. The plaintiff argued that the company had infringed the applicable legal rules as 
well as the Privacy Code of the industry. The court started out with the same general 
statement as the Haarlem District Court in the above case. Thereupon, it turned to the 
assessment of the disputed conduct, taking the relevant Code provisions as its norm. The 
court went on to rule that, by violating the Privacy Code, the company had acted 
unlawfully.1012 Compliance with the Privacy Code, however, does not shelter from legal 
liability, as a judgment of the Zutphen District Court shows. In this case, the defendants, 
accused of having acted unlawfully, claimed in their defense that they had acted in 
accordance with the Code. The court dismissed their stance. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
Code does regulate the actions of private security organizations, compliance with its rules 
does not per se equate to lawful behavior, in other words, actions that are in conformity with 
the Code can still be unlawful. This is true especially when the conduct can be qualified as a 
criminal offence, the court held. The opposite, however, does hold true: actions that 
contravene the Privacy Code are, regarding the purpose of the Code, in principle unlawful. 
The court further remarked that the law does not allow private actors to use GPS tracking 
systems and that these actors cannot derive the authority to do so from the Code of Conduct 
either. For, “the Code is neither an Act of Parliament nor subordinate legislation that could 
derogate from” a criminal-law principle.1013 From a more general perspective, this judgment 
contrasts with a later judgment of the Amsterdam District Court. Here, the court stated that 
the conduct at dispute could not be held unlawful for the sole reason that the ICOM Code of 
Ethics for museums had been infringed.1014 
 A last example that I mention at this point concerns the recording of personal data in the 
so-called ‘incidents register’ (incidentenregister). This register has been set up by Dutch 
financial institutions to record the personal data of persons abusing the services these 
                                                
1010 Vzr. Rb. Haarlem 16 July 2009, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2009:BJ3060, para 4.4. 
1011 Vzr. Rb. Haarlem 16 July 2009, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2009:BJ3060, notably paras 3.2, 3.3, 4.4, 4.7. For 
another example of a judgment involving this code of conduct, see Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 4 February 2014, 
ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:753, where a combined action of the code of conduct, of which the applicability was 
beyond dispute, and the Wbp eventually led the court of appeal to a decision. Twice, the court referred to the 
code of conduct as ‘self-imposed’. 
1012 Rb. Oost-Brabant 22 May 2014, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2014:2701, paras 3.2, 4.2-4.6. See also Rb. Zutphen 9 
May 2007, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2007:BB1491. 
1013 Rb. Zutphen 12 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2012:BY6138, paras 5.4, 5.6 (quotation para 5.6). 
1014 Rb. Amsterdam 8 January 2014, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:9, para 4.9. 
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institutions provide. The conditions for recording the data are included in the Protocol 
Incidentenwaarschuwingssysteem financiële instellingen. The Protocol played a role in an 
appeal lodged with the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. In assessing the recording of personal 
data in the incidents register by a bank, the court of first instance used the Wbp as a yardstick, 
wrongly, according to the bank, which had filed the appeal. Since the DPA had declared that 
the Protocol provided sufficient safeguards for recording personal data in a lawful manner, 
the court should have based its assessment on the Protocol. The court of appeal endorsed this 
viewpoint and held that the Protocol forms “a regulation that provides sufficient safeguards 
for processing personal data in a way the Wbp prescribes”. Accordingly, the court assessed 
the actions of the bank on the basis of the Protocol.1015 
 
6.3.1.7 Debt settlement 
 
The Code of Conduct for Debt Settlement (Gedragscode Schuldregeling) of the Dutch 
Association of Municipal Money-Lending and Debt Counseling Institutions (Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor Volkskrediet, hereafter: NVVK) on several occasions has also been attributed 
a more self-standing role. This was for instance the case in a judgment of the Rotterdam 
District Court. Starting points in this case were the fact that the Code was part of the contract 
concluded between one of the defendants (a bank) and the plaintiff as well as the fact that the 
Code had binding force upon both defendants (the bank and a municipality) since they were 
both members of the NVVK. Against this background, the district court held that by acting 
contrary to, inter alia, the Code the bank had failed culpably in his dealings with the plaintiff 
while the municipality had acted unlawfully towards the plaintiff. The defense subsequently 
put up by the bank and the municipality was dismissed with reference to the objective of the 
Code.1016 Whereas in this case, the NVVK Code was brought to the attention of the judge as 
part of the agreement central to the dispute and the affiliation of both defendants to the 
NVVK, there are also judgments in which such an explicit reference to the Code was lacking, 
or at least did not follow on from the text of the judgment. Yet, even without the parties to the 
dispute referring to the Code of Conduct, courts have taken account of the norms adopted by 
the NVVK, seemingly at their own initiative. This is for instance visible in cases where 
courts, referring to the fact that it follows on from Article 11.1 of the Code that the Code has 
binding force upon NVVK members, have employed the time frames enclosed in the Code in 
assessing whether the debt assistance organization had made a sufficient effort to come to a 
settlement of the debts with the creditors, so that the debt management regulation could be 
                                                
1015 Hof Amsterdam 18 January 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:BA5933, para 3.5-3.7 (quotation para 3.6). The 
Protocol also formed the central framework for assessment in Rb. Arnhem 16 February 2011, 
ECLI:NL:RBARN:2011:BP6166 (upheld on appeal, see Hof Arnhem 27 March 2012, 
ECLI:NL:GHARN:2012:BW0559); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 1 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV9587; Rb. ’s-
Gravenhage 31 May 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BX1743; Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 13 August 2012, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BX7262; Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 22 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BU3540. 
1016 Rb. Rotterdam 18 January 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BV1966. Cf. also Rb. Rotterdam 24 October 2012, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BY3650, para 2.12, where the judge used the Code as one of the building blocks for its 
line of argument. 
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declared applicable.1017 Illustrative in this respect is a case brought before the Arnhem-
Leeuwarden Court of Appeal. The court started its line of argument by considering that the 
concrete duties of a proper budget manager are to be determined on the basis of what is 
customary within that branch of industry. In this respect, it dug up the NVVK Code, which is, 
as the court pointed out, widely accepted in the budget-management sector. The Code is 
published on the NVVK website and referred to on the defendant’s website. Thereupon, the 
court took account of the rules of the Code and held that the budget manager had not acted 
reasonably.1018 Yet, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had invoked the Code of Conduct. 
In the end, however, there was no need for the parties to the proceedings to express their 
opinion of the Code, since the causal connection was missing as between the budget 
manager’s negligence and claimant’s eviction from the rented house, thus the court.1019 
 
6.3.1.8 Industry codes of conduct and the open norm of responsible lending 
 
A somewhat different example of private regulation being used as an elaboration of blanket 
clauses can be found in the area of financial regulation. Article 4:34(2) Wft entails a 
prohibition on overextension of credit, also known as the norm of responsible lending. The 
Dutch legislator has not specified this norm. As set out in Chapter 4 (section 4.4.2) of this 
doctoral thesis, the AFM has designated several codes of consumer credit adopted by the 
financial industry as an elaboration of the norm of responsible lending. Accordingly, the AFM 
takes the rules included in these codes as minimum standards when assessing whether Article 
4:34(2) Wft has been complied with.1020 Case law has endorsed this approach.1021  
 Outside this supervisory context, the aforementioned codes of conduct can also be used to 
specify the duty of care of credit providers, as a decision of the Gelderland District Court 
illustrates. One of the questions to be answered by the court was whether the bank had failed 
to fulfill its duty of care. The court stated first and foremost that the norm of responsible 
lending enshrined in Article 4:34(2) Wft is detailed by the GHF and the Code of Conduct on 
Consumer Credit. Considering that the bank had complied with the former code in assessing 
the application for financing, the court held that the bank had fulfilled its obligation to 
                                                
1017 E.g., Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 20 July 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2010:BN2040; Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 20 July 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BR0796.  
1018 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 19 March 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:BZ4776, paras 6.5-6.10 (quotation para 
6.10).  
1019 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 19 March 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:BZ4776, paras 6.10-6.11. 
1020 The codes concerned are: the codes of conduct on consumer credit of the VFN (Dutch Finance Houses’ 
Association), the NVB (Dutch Banking Association) and the NTO (Dutch Home Shopping Organization). 
Initially, the GHF played a similar role. However, things changed with the enactment of the Temporary rules on 
mortgage credit (Tijdelijke regeling hypothecair krediet) on 1 January 2013. See Chapter 4, section 4.4.2 of this 
doctoral thesis. 
1021 See Rb. Rotterdam 4 May 2011, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ3835, para 2.10 (where a violation of the VFN 
code of conduct led to an infringement of Article 4:34(2) Wft), confirmed as regards the considerations on code 
in CBb 28 November 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:260, para 5.4 (“the representative trade associations with the 
involvement of the AFM, have drawn up a code of conduct laying down, rules to prevent overextension of 
credit”). Cf. with regard to the GHF, with the caveat that this practice ceased to exist after the enactment of the 
Temporary rules on mortgage credit (see supra n 1020), Rb. Rotterdam 20 May 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM5231, para 2.12 and CBb 19 July 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:69, para 5.2.  
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provide information and to investigate, and that there was no case of overextension of credit. 
As such, (compliance with) the GHF constituted one of the arguments on which the court 
eventually based its decision that the bank has not violated its duty of care under civil law.1022 
The Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal, in turn, after having established that the parties to 
the proceedings agreed upon the applicability of the code of conduct to their legal 
relationship, founded its decision that a bank had failed to live up to its pre-contractual duty 
of care towards its client directly on the Code of Conduct on Consumer Credit of the VFN.1023 
 Equally worthy of mention is the following ruling of the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of 
Appeal. In dispute was whether three financial service providers had been in breach of their 
duty of care to prevent the overextension of credit towards their clients (the appellants). The 
clients brought forward the norms for responsible lending enclosed in the Code of Conduct of 
the VFN and the NVB, respectively, as well as those included in the GHF. The argument of 
the court relevant for the purposes of this chapter concentrates on the applicability of the GHF 
to the conduct of two of the financial services providers. The clients, more specifically, 
founded their claim on a report based solely on infringements of the GHF-norm.1024 Both 
financial service providers had already contested the applicability of the GHF, with one of 
them also arguing that he was not bound by the Code. The GHF only applies to mortgage 
lenders that have entered into the agreement for the self-regulation of a mortgage loan. The 
court stated it had remained undisputed that the financial service providers had not done so, 
hence the GHF was inapplicable.1025 While this statement suggests that the GHF has binding 
force only upon mortgage lenders having signed the aforementioned agreement, the second 
part of the court’s consideration suggests that this is not necessarily the case. After all, the 
court considers, the appellants have failed to reason in a timely and adequate fashion that “the 
GHF-norm colors the norm of Article 4:34 Wft and the standard of a reasonably competent 
financial services provider, acting reasonably, in such a way that even when the GHF-code 
was inapplicable, […], the mere violation of the GHF-norm leads to the conclusion that 
irresponsible lending has occurred”.1026 Arguably, when interpreted a contrario, this 
statement is suggestive of the possible radiating effect of the GHF through the open-ended 
legal standards referred to by the court of appeal, provided that the argument in this respect is 
made timely and contains an adequate statement of reasons.1027 In this case, however, the 
Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal did not or could not take account of the GHF-norm. 
However, the role of private regulation was not yet played out. After having dismissed the 
argument regarding the GHF, the court turned to the VFN Code of Conduct and addressed the 
                                                
1022 Rb. Gelderland 10 June 2016, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2015:5231, paras 3.39-3.41, 3.45. 
1023 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 26 May 2016, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:3705, paras 4.5, 4.7, 4.9. 
1024 The GHF-norm denotes the criteria set out in the GHF to determine the borrowing capacity of a consumer. 
1025 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2 September 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:6792, para 4.15. 
1026 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2 September 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:6792, para 4.15. 
1027 Cf. Hof Amsterdam 13 May 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:1690, para 7.6.1 which reads: “the 
overextension of credit has been defined as the amount of credit provided by DSB Bank exceeding the maximum 
amount of credit that was allowed regarding, on the one hand, the personal financial situation of the client at the 
time of the loan and, on the other hand, the then applicable norms (Code of conduct for mortgage loans/Code of 
conduct of the Dutch Finance Houses’ Association). This definition already encompasses the violation of the 
duty of care by DSB Bank”. This statement of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal is suggestive of the relevance of 
private regulation in elaborating the duty of care of a bank towards its clients. 
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question whether the financial service providers had been in breach of their duty of care in the 
light of the norm set by the Code. The court thereby referred inter alia to the fact that the 
legislator has deliberately left to the industry the elaboration of the norm of responsible 
lending.1028  
 A last example that can be mentioned in this respect is a judgment of the Amsterdam 
District Court, where the open norm of Article 4:34 Wft has been fleshed out by (the NVB 
Code of Conduct on Consumer Credit enclosed in) a circular letter for members of the NVB. 
The plaintiff already came away empty-handed from his recourse to the Financial Services 
Complaints Tribunal (Klachtinstituut Financiële Dienstverlening, hereafter: Kifid). The 
decision of Kifid was challenged before the Amsterdam District Court. The plaintiff hereby 
explicitly contested Kifid’s view that the aforementioned private rules specify the open norm 
of Article 4:34 Wft, with one of the arguments being that the professional group had itself 
drafted the rules. The court, however, was of the opinion that Kifid could have reasonably 
reached this decision. The open norm of Article 4:34 Wft needs to be fleshed out and since 
the Dutch banks, together with the AFM, have bound themselves to the private rules, Kifid’s 
choice to seek a link with the circular letter in substantiating Article 4:34 Wft was obvious 
and justified.1029 
 
6.3.1.9 Unfair commercial practices 
 
As has been described in the previous chapter, the issue of unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices has triggered EU regulatory intervention, whereby codes of conduct 
have been attributed a role in establishing what constitutes an unfair or misleading 
commercial practice. It will therefore not come as a surprise that since the implementation of 
the Unfair Commercial Practice Directive in Articles 6:193a et seq. DCC, several ‘unfair 
commercial practices cases’ involving codes of conduct have been brought before the Dutch 
courts. With the Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM) being the primary supervisor of 
the legal rules, these cases have thus far concerned decisions of the ACM to fine offenders of 
Articles 6:193a et seq. DCC. As such, the judicial assessment takes place in proceedings 
under administrative law. However, given the essentially private law nature of the dispute, it 
is worthwhile to take a closer look at how the role of codes of conduct plays out exactly under 
Dutch private law. This will be done on the basis of the Celldorado case, considered to best 
exemplify the situation.1030  
                                                
1028 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2 September 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:6792, para 4.15 in conjunction with 
para 4.10. 
1029 Rb. Amsterdam 31 December 2014, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:9091, paras 2.5, 3.2, 4.7. 
1030 Similar cases include: Rb. Rotterdam 13 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BY6184; Rb. Rotterdam 
25 April 2013, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:BZ8775 (both on the Code of Conduct for Consumers and Energy 
Suppliers). Cf. also Rb. Rotterdam 6 January 2010, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK9798; Rb. Rotterdam 14 April 
2011, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ1281 (where the general terms and conditions adopted by an industry 
organization were marked as a code of conduct for the purposes of Article 6:193c DCC). See also Rb. Rotterdam 
26 November 2015, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:8642 (where the Advertising code for travel offers 2014 was 




 The cause of the law suit was a decision of the ACM to fine a provider of SMS services 
for infringing, inter alia, Article 6:193c(2)(b) DCC, which marks non-compliance with a code 
of conduct as a misleading commercial practice, and Article 6:193b(2)(b) DCC which renders 
actions contrary to the requirements of professional diligence ‘unfair’. The provider 
challenged this decision before the Rotterdam District Court. Before turning to the contested 
decision, the court established that the provider has, undisputedly, indicated that he was 
bound by the applicable codes of conduct (the SMS Service Provision Code of Conduct and 
the SMS Advertising Code, which is part of the former code). It added that the obligations 
that follow on from these codes are firm and recognizable, as Article 6:193c(2)(b) DCC 
demands.1031 With respect to the alleged breach of Article 6:193c(2)(b) DCC, the district 
court held that “when an entrepreneur has declared that he will comply with a code of 
conduct, the average consumer should be able to rely upon that statement. Failure to comply 
with the requirements of the code of conduct, even if it is only a minor failure, in itself 
influences or can influence consumer transactional decisions. Therefore, specific obligations 
set out by a code of conduct should be strictly fulfilled. Contrary to what the plaintiffs have 
posited, the fact that the intentions of the code provisions have materialized does not suffice 
in this respect”.1032 The court adds that “the average consumer perceives the SMS Code of 
Conduct as an expression of what is considered to be a common trade practice in the sector at 
hand. A consumer knowing that a trader has subscribed to the SMS Code of Conduct, will 
attune its decision-making to that fact”.1033 Against this backdrop, the court eventually 
reached the conclusion that by infringing the SMS Code of Conduct, the provider was in 
breach of Article 6:193c(2)(b) DCC.1034 Thus, an explicit and public ‘declaration of 
compliance’1035 entails an obligation to live up to specific requirements of a code of 
conduct.1036 However, the considerations on the influence of non-compliance with the SMS 
Code of Conduct on the average consumer were not upheld on appeal.1037 
 Additionally, in line with the intention of the European legislator, Celldorado shows that 
a code of conduct can be viewed as one of the facts and circumstances of a case that flesh out 
the requirement of professional diligence enclosed in Article 6:193b(2)(b) DCC. More 
specifically, the court held that “with the rules laid down in the SMS Code of Conduct, the 
industry has provided a concrete interpretation of the requirement of professional diligence. 
The SMS Code of Conduct can be perceived as an expression of what the industry considers 
                                                
1031 Rb. Rotterdam 19 April 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BW3358 (Celldorado), para 8.5. 
1032 Celldorado, para 8.8. 
1033 Celldorado, para 8.8. 
1034 Celldorado, para 8.9. 
1035 In the current case, the provider had explicitly stated its subscription to the SMS Code of Conduct on the 
Internet (Celldorado, para 8.3). 
1036 The court hereby endorsed the opinion of the ACM that a violation of Article 6:193c(2)(b) DCC is a very 
serious one since “non-compliance with a code of conduct affects the very foundations of self-regulation”. The 
ACM deemed compliance with codes of conduct of great importance as it “inspires confidence not only in 
relation to consumers and their interest groups, but also in relation to supervisory authorities such as the 
defendants and traders and companies within the industry”. See Celldorado, paras 27.6-27.7. Similar 
considerations on the importance of compliance with codes of conduct can be found in Rb. Rotterdam 14 April 
2011, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ1281.  
1037 CBb 25 August 2015, ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:285, paras 7.4-7.8. 
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to be the standard level of special expertise and care”.1038 Consequently, non-compliance with 
the provisions of the SMS Code can lead to the conclusion that a trader has acted contrary to 
these requirements. This part of the district court’s decision was upheld on appeal.1039 Finally, 
it can be pointed at the statement of the district court that generally, compliance with the 
aforementioned codes of conduct does not by definition equate meeting the other legal 
requirements that follow on from the Consumer Protection (Enforcement) Act (Wet 
handhaving consumentenbescherming).1040 
 
6.3.1.10  Private regulation and sports 
 
Rules of sporting associations have also played a role on several occasions. The ’s-
Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal, for instance, took account of such rules of conduct (referred 
to by one of the litigants) in determining whether the personal integrity of a minor athlete had 
been violated. In referring to these rules, the court of appeal pointed out that they came into 
force at the end of the nineties, that they have the objective of preventing sexual harassment 
and that the appellant could be expected to have knowledge of these rules.1041 Private 
regulation was also used in a case concerning the liability for an accident during an ‘eventing 
match’, a discipline within equestrian sports. During the cross-country game, one of the riders 
crashed against the final obstacle, a portable fence, which consequently toppled over. The 
horse fall that followed injured both the horseman and the horse, whereby the latter suffered 
such severe injuries that it had to be put down. The case was brought before the Breda District 
Court. One of the points of contention was whether the obstacle concerned had been 
sufficiently anchored in accordance with the applicable international and national rules and 
regulations of the equestrian sport.1042 The court took account of these rules, the available 
knowledge and the research done within the equestrian world with respect to the safety of 
portable fences. The safety requirements that follow on from this framework had not been met 
in the case at hand. The court concluded that there had been a violation of a norm that aims to 
prevent a specific danger with respect to the inception of loss. Accordingly, the causal link 
between the violation and the damage was established, subject to proof to the contrary.1043 
Also worth noticing is a decision of the Roermond District Court in which it was established 
that both the plaintiff and the defendant (both divers) were to blame for a diving accident. The 
                                                
1038 Celldorado, para 21.5. 
1039 CBb 25 August 2015, ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:285, paras 10.1-10.5. 
1040 Celldorado, para 23.3, adding that these legal demands do not necessarily correspond with the requirements 
set out by the code of conduct at hand. This leads Pavillon to conclude, in her critical assessment of the 
Celldorado case, that the standard of professional diligence laid down in a code of conduct amounts to no more 
than a minimum standard (Pavillon 2013, p. 68). 
1041 Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 1 May 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BW4879, para 4.9. This judgment is discussed 
by Westhoff 2013, p. 73.  
1042 The private rules concerned are the General Competition Regulations and the Code of Conduct concerning 
the well-being of the horse included in these Regulations, the Disciplinary Regulations Eventing, the Rules of 
Eventing of the Féderation Equestre Internationale and the Guidelines for constructors and designers of cross 
country tracks. See Rb. Breda 7 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2012:BV8015, paras 3.1.6-3.1.10. Cf. Westhoff 
2013, pp. 73-74, where this judgment is discussed. 
1043 Rb. Breda 7 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2012:BV8015, para 3.5. This is the doctrine of the rule of 
reversal of the burden of proof (omkeringsregel). 
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safety rules prescribed by the sporting association both parties were affiliated with as well as 
those of the Egyptian Diving Federation, brought to the fore by the plaintiff, played an 
important part in this respect. According to the court, both parties had violated these rules, 
whilst they bore knowledge of these rules, or at least should have borne such knowledge, 
given their level of diving education and their diving experience.1044 In yet another case, the 
Leeuwarden Court of Appeal used the Rules for the Conduct of Skiers and Snowboarders 
adopted by International Ski Federation (FIS) to color the standard of due care included in 
Article 6:162 DCC. The court found, as the appellant had argued and the court of first 
instance affirmed,1045 that the FIS rules do indeed fill out the standard of due care for skiers. 
However, the skiing accident around which the case revolved occurred in a sports and games 
setting (sport en spel situatie), which, according to the Supreme Court line of case law, 
requires a different assessment of the conduct in dispute, as the court noted. With a view to 
that, the mere fact that the FIS rules had been infringed did not render the conduct of the 
wrongdoer negligent. Rather, the alleged violation of the FIS rules constituted one of the 
arguments that the court had to take into account.1046  
 
6.3.1.11  Advertising 
 
In the field of advertising, industry codes of conduct have been used to specify open-ended 
legal standards. Illustrative is the following decision of the District Court of The Hague. In 
this case, the defendant had argued that the private rules on pharmaceutical advertising, 
drafted by the Foundation for the Code for Pharmaceutical Advertising (Stichting Code 
Geneesmiddelenreclame, hereafter: SCGR), could not be considered standard practice. He 
also argued that he was not bound by these rules since he was not affiliated with the trade 
association that had subscribed to the rules. The district court, however, dismissed his 
argument. It started out by stating that both the civil judge and the SCGR have consistently 
applied the rules in question, which warrants the conclusion that one could speak of standard 
practice. Thereupon, the court pointed out that case law indicates that the rules drafted by the 
SCGR, laid down inter alia in the Code of Conduct for Pharmaceutical Advertising, 
constitute a further specification of several general legal criteria, such as those included in 
Article 6:194 DCC on false advertising. Civil courts have applied these rules on several 
occasions and their validity has been generally accepted in case law. The court added the 
defendant “had not disputed that almost the entire pharmaceutical industry is bound to the 
Code of Conduct and the decisions of the SCGR”1047. Considering the foregoing, the court 
reached the conclusion that, notwithstanding the fact he was not a member of the trade 
                                                
1044 Rb. Roermond 23 November 2011, ECLI:NL:RBROE:2011:BU5452, paras 4.18-4.19. The judgment is 
discussed by Westhoff 2013, pp. 73-74.  
1045 Herewith, the court of first instance dismissed the plea of the defendant that the FIS Rules contain practical 
advices rather than decisive rules of priority. See Hof Leeuwarden 26 June 2012, 
ECLI:NL:GHLEE:2012:BW9768, para 2. 
1046 Hof Leeuwarden 26 June 2012, ECLI:NL:GHLEE:2012:BW9768, paras 7-10. Westhoff 2013, pp. 73-74 
discusses this case. 
1047 Vzr. Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 24 July 2004, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2004:AQ5353, para 3.3. 
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association, the defendant had to abide by the rules.1048 This implies that the private rules 
have to be followed by not only the signatories to the rules or by the members of a trade 
association that has joined the scheme, but also by other actors, i.e., third parties.1049 In a 
similar vein, the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal held that the Code of Conduct on 
Pharmaceutical Advertising can be a reference point in establishing whether certain 
advertisements are unlawful within the meaning of Article 6:162 DCC. More specifically, the 
court of appeal argued, since the Code is widely supported, it can be used to flesh out the 
open norm of “a rule of unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct”.1050 
 
6.3.1.12  Medical liability cases 
 
To close this subsection, a few words on the use of private regulation in medical liability 
cases.1051 In these cases, private rules have first of all been used to specify the general norm of 
‘proper care’ that providers of care must observe (Article 7:453 DCC).1052 In a case 
concerning wrongful life and wrongful birth, for instance, the district court held that the 
norms generally accepted by the profession concerned, in this case the profession of 
midwives, are to be taken as a starting point in assessing whether the norm of Article 7:453 
DCC has been observed. Accordingly, the court founded its decision that the defendant had 
not acted unlawfully directly on the applicable professional rules, which both parties 
considered to reflect the generally accepted standards.1053 In a case brought before the North-
Holland District Court, the professional code of conduct for psychiatrists was used in 
establishing that the psychiatrist, who had violated the code, had acted in breach of Article 
7:453 DCC. The district court in this respect held that a psychiatrist is expected to comply 
with the private rules of his profession concerning responsible medical conduct and that he 
can deviate from the rules only if desirable in the interests of proper patient care.1054 
 Medical protocols can also play a role in case law in a different respect, as a judgment of 
the Roermond District Court shows. Here, the conformity of an expert report with the 
Guidelines of the Dutch Society of Neurology was considered a strong point of that report. 
Conversely, the slight deviation of the conclusions of the other expert from these Guidelines 
                                                
1048 Vzr. Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 24 July 2004, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2004:AQ5353, para 3.3. The case is discussed by 
Giesen 2007, p. 73. 
1049 Giesen 2007, p. 73. Cf. Hof Amsterdam 14 December 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:5228, para 4.5.1. In 
this criminal law case the court stated that professional guidelines, in this case the professional code for 
naturopathic therapists, “substantiate the current professional standard in that profession, regardless of whether 
or not the care provider is a member of the professional association”. 
1050 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 24 December 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:9929, para 3.11. Cf. in first instance 
Rb. Zwolle-Lelystad 29 August 2012, ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2012:1648, paras 4.4.3-4.4.7. 
1051 I will limit the discussion to some examples. More case law can be found in, for instance, Van Reijsen 1999. 
1052 Article 7:453 DCC, more specifically, obliges care providers to observe this standard. In doing so, they 
should act in conformity with the responsibilities imposed on them by the professional standard for providers of 
care. 
1053 Rb. Utrecht 10 January 2010, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2007:AZ6197, paras 4.1 et seq. (discussed by Giesen 2008, 
p. 786). 
1054 Rb. Noord-Holland 22 January 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2015:876, paras 4.5-4.6. Cf. HR 2 March 2001, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0377, NJ 2001/649 (Trombose), para 3.3.3 where the Supreme Court already formulated 
a similar general starting point as regards the application of a hospital protocol. See below, section 6.4.2.2.2.3. 
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was considered a weak point of his report. After all, the court argued, even though they are 
not undisputed, the Guidelines should be considered as the most authoritative. It hereby 
remarked that “not taking account of these Guidelines would immediately prompt the 
question as to what standards one should then take as an assessment criterion and to what 
extent these standards are supported by the medical world”.1055 In another case, the 
Guidelines of the Dutch Society of Neurology concerning the diagnosis and treatment of 
whiplash were considered to be a “sufficiently manageable and acceptable touchstone” for a 
factual diagnosis of whiplash-related complaints, the more so since a certain degree of 
objectification, provided by these Guidelines, was deemed necessary.1056 Another way of 
using private regulation can be found in the decision of the District Court of Zeeland-West 
Brabant. Here, a rule of conduct adopted by the Royal Dutch Medical Association 
(Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij ter bevordering der Geneeskunst) was used as one 
of the arguments in establishing whether, in short, a treatment with acupuncture performed by 
a physician fell within the scope of the area of expertise as defined in the Individual 
Healthcare Professions Act (Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg). The 
court deduced from the rule of conduct that this was indeed the case.1057  
 
6.3.2 A dismissive attitude 
 
The sample of cases composed on the basis of the case law search also includes judgments in 
which the lower courts disregard the code of conduct relied upon by parties to the 
proceedings. Two categories of judgments can be distinguished in this respect: judgments in 
which the dismissive attitude of the court could have been anticipated, at least at first blush, 
(section 6.3.2.1) and judgments in which the disregarding of the private rules invoked was 
more remarkable (section 6.3.2.2). 
 
6.3.2.1 ‘Straightforward’ dismissals 
 
As a first case within this category, the judgment of the Amsterdam District Court concerning 
the Fire Insurance (Right of Recourse) Sectoral Regulations can be recalled. The plaintiff’s 
argument that the insurance company was bound to the Regulations was dismissed since the 
company was not a member of the Dutch Association of Insurers and the court ruled that the 
Regulations did not have radiating effect.1058 Another example can be found in a decision of 
the District Court of The Hague. The court held that the BOVAG Code of Conduct was not 
applicable to the reparation contract between a consumer and a car business as it had neither 
been argued, nor had it become evident that the code formed part of the contract. Moreover, 
there was no evidence of the car business having accepted the applicability of the Code of 
                                                
1055 Rb. Roermond 1 September 2004, NJF 2004, 578, paras 5.2, 5.3.2 (quotation para 5.3.2). Giesen 2007, pp. 
24, 32, 106 also discusses this case. 
1056 Rb. Amsterdam 13 December 2006, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2006:AZ5732, para 5.5. On this case, see also 
Giesen 2008, p. 786 
1057 Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 16 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2014:6382, para 4.4. 
1058 Hof Amsterdam 2 March 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BN1316 (discussed in section 6.3.1.5). 
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Conduct or of circumstances suggesting that the Code of Conduct was applicable.1059 The ’s-
Hertogenbosch District Court employed a similar reasoning with respect to the Code on the 
Returns and Risks of Investment (Code Rendement en Risico). It follows from the judgment 
that this Code, drawn up by the Dutch Association of Insurers, only applied to insurance 
companies that had explicitly subscribed to it. Since the insurance company in the case at 
hand had not done so and as the Code was not referred to in the insurance policy, the plaintiff 
could not base its claim on the Code.1060 
 With a view to the Supreme Court’s line of case law on the legal value of decisions of 
disciplinary bodies and disciplinary or professional rules (cf. section 6.3.3.2 below), it can 
also be pointed at the following judgment of the Amsterdam District Court. In this case, the 
plaintiff argued that the publication of his full name instead of his initials was unlawful. The 
Netherlands Press Council (Raad voor de Journalistiek) had already decided in the plaintiff’s 
favor. However, the court thought differently and, following the aforementioned line of case 
law, held that this was not altered by the decision of the Press Council. The court thereby also 
referred to the Guidebook for Journalistic Behavior (Leidraad voor de journalistiek), stating 
that “the violation of a journalistic agreement to only publish the initials of persons subjected 
to a criminal law investigation (as laid down in the Guidebook for Journalistic Behavior) 
cannot be equated with breach of a statutory provision”.1061 Moreover, it had remained 
undisputed that the defendant was not bound to the Guidebook, the court noted.1062  
 These judicial decisions appear rather straightforward, since the private rules concerned 
either lacked binding force upon the private actor involved or were not applicable to the case 
at hand. As such, these decisions will probably not raise any pressing questions. However, it 
should be noted that case law equally suggests that legal relevance can be assigned to industry 
codes of conduct when the code lacks binding force upon the private actors concerned (see 
below, section 6.3.3.3, under ‘radiating effect’). This adds an element of uncertainty to the 
approach of the lower courts at this point.  
 
6.3.2.2 More remarkable dismissals 
 
Several judgments can be mentioned in which the dismissive attitude of the courts can be 
deemed more remarkable, in several respects.  
 
6.3.2.2.1 Same code, different decisions 
 
The first category of ‘remarkable dismissals’ is constituted by cases in which different courts 
ruled differently upon the legal relevance of one and the same industry code of conduct. The 
Breda District Court, for example, rejected the argument that a bank had failed to live up to its 
                                                
1059 Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 23 March 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BP9631, para 4.8.  
1060 Rb. ’s-Hertogenbosch 17 July 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSHE:2012:BX3136, para 4.4.2.2. Cf. Hof ’s-
Hertogenbosch 21 September 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2010:BN9270, para 4.17 where the court found that since 
it did not cover the contested actions, the plaintiff could not rely upon the Code.  
1061 Rb. Amsterdam 7 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2012:BV9330, para 4.7. 
1062 Rb. Amsterdam 7 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2012:BV9330, para 4.7. 
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duty of care since it had, inter alia, infringed the standards for responsible lending included in 
the Wft and the GHF. The court held that neither of the two regulatory schemes “played a role 
in determining the content of the bank’s obligations towards its clients. Both regulations 
entail norms relevant only within the framework of banking supervision”. Instead, a general 
duty of care applies.1063 When compared with the judgments discussed in section 6.3.1.8 and 
considering the fact that the Code precisely concerns responsible lending, this decision can be 
deemed remarkable.1064  
 The Groningen District Court, in turn, decided to disregard the medical guideline in 
question, first and foremost because it was not in force at the time the disputed behavior was 
performed, as the defendants had argued. However, it remains to be seen whether the 
guideline would have carried any weight had it been in force. After all, the court adds that a 
guideline amounts to no more than a guiding principle for medical conduct. It does not set 
forth obligatory rules of conduct for individual cases. Against this backdrop, the court takes 
as a yardstick the legal duty to observe proper care (Article 7:453 DCC).1065 Giesen submits 
that this is a striking decision when set against the background of the Supreme Court case law 
on medical protocols.1066 Indeed, the general wordings in which the court rejects the use of 
‘guiding’ medical rules can be considered remarkable. However, it should be noted that there 
is a wide array of private rules for the medical profession, the nature of which varies. From 
this perspective, guidelines cannot be equated with protocols, as Giesen appears to do, since 
the latter can be of a binding nature.1067  
 In another case, the journalistic rules adopted by the Netherlands Press Council were 
denied legal relevance, seemingly because of the private, non-legal nature of the rules. The 
plaintiffs in this case had argued that the journalistic rules were violated, which implied that 
the actions performed by the defendant were inadmissible. The court responded very briefly 
by stating that the rules are rules of conduct of the profession and not legal rules.1068 Without 
going into the issue any further, the court subsequently disregarded the professional rules 
altogether, seemingly because of their non-legal nature. The Limburg District Court was less 
abrupt in a case involving the Guidebook for Journalistic Behavior of the Netherlands Press 
Council. The court noted that “even though the Guidebook is not applicable law, the litigants 
agree upon the fact that it is a set of rules formulated by professional colleagues, more or less 
comparable to disciplinary regulations and codes of conduct”.1069 It continued by indicating 
that a violation of the Guidebook “does not automatically imply that one has acted unlawfully 
within the meaning of private law, yet can be an indication in that respect”.1070 Herewith, 
                                                
1063 Rb. Breda 7 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2011:BT7273, para 3.5. 
1064 Similarly: C.W.M. Lieverse, case note to Rb. Breda 7 September 2011, JOR 2012/267, under 5. See in this 
respect also Rb. Gelderland 11 March 2015, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2015:2208, para 4.31-33, where the Code was 
deemed relevant in ascertaining whether the bank had failed to observe its duty of care. 
1065 Rb. Groningen 4 May 2006, ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2007:BA7177, para 2.5. Cf. Giesen 2008, p. 786. 
1066 Giesen 2008, p. 786, footnote 16. 
1067 See F.C.B. van Wijmen, case note to HR 2 March 2001, NJ 2001/649 (Trombose), under 2.1. 
1068 Vzr. Rb. Amsterdam 11 April 2013, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:BZ7028, para 4.7 
1069 Rb. Limburg 3 September 2015, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2015:7621, para 4.3. 
1070 Rb. Limburg 3 September 2015, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2015:7621, para 4.3. See also Rb. Amsterdam 15 
December 2015, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:8976, para 4.4: “even though these journalistic guidelines are not 
 
 216 
although it frames its decision differently, the court in effect links up with the ruling of the 
Supreme Court in Pretium/Tros, yet without referring to the ruling.1071 
 Finally, it can be pointed at two judgments in which the application of the European Code 
of Ethics for Franchising, as applied by the Netherlands Franchise Association, was 
dismissed. In the first case, one of the points of contention was whether the franchisor had 
been in breach of his contractual obligations. Here, the question as to whether the franchisor 
was legally bound to the Code was brought to the fore by the litigants (a franchisor and a 
franchisee). While the franchisee argued that the franchisor had to abide by the Code, the 
franchisor not only contested that he was bound to the Code, but also disputed the 
applicability of the Code. The North-Netherlands District Court in this respect considers that 
the Code, to which franchisors affiliated with the Dutch Franchising Association have 
subscribed, “sets forth a guideline for a fair and reasonable set-up of the franchise relation, 
whereby account is taken of the interests of both the franchisor and the franchisee”.1072 
However, it does not include legally enforceable (in rechte afdwingbare) obligations. “Insofar 
as its status amounts to a standard of decency at the most”, thus the court.1073 Therefore, the 
court disregarded the Code in addressing the aforementioned question.1074 Two years later, the 
Overijssel District Court adopted a similar stance on the legal relevance of the Code, using 
almost identical wordings to pass over the defendant’s reliance on the Code.1075 The 
dismissive stance of the district courts appears to have been motivated by the private nature of 
the Franchise Code: both courts explicitly point at the fact that the Code does not include 
legally enforceable obligations. Considering the fact that the very same Franchise Code was 
assigned legal relevance in other rulings (see section 6.3.1.4), this is a remarkable decision. 
Why has the non-legal nature of the rules been brought to the table in the present judgments 
and not in the other rulings? An answer may be found in the fact that the applicability and 
binding force of the Franchise Code was beyond dispute in these other rulings, whereas the 
binding force as well as the applicability of the Code were a (visible) point of contention in at 
least the judgment of the North-Netherlands District Court. Perhaps the court would have 





                                                                                                                                                   
criteria that have to be applied as a matter of law, they do constitute standards that carry weight as a 
circumstance that has to be taken into consideration”. 
1071 HR 8 April 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP6165, NJ 2011/449 (Pretium/Tros). See below, section 6.4.2.2.6. 
1072 Rb. Noord-Nederland 29 November 2013, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2013:7307, para 5.15. 
1073 Rb. Noord-Nederland 29 November 2013, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2013:7307, para 5.15. 
1074 Rb. Noord-Nederland 29 November 2013, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2013:7307, para 5.15. Cf. Houben, Sterk & 
Devilee 2014, p. 248, who note that in Rb. Limburg 26 February 2014, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2014:2557, the court 
disregarded the fact that the franchisor, as a member of the Dutch Franchise Association, was bound to the Code. 
See also J.B.M. Vranken, case note to HR 25 January 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD7329, NJ 2003/31 
(Paalman/Lampenier), under 4, stating that the judgment failed to take into account the three important private 
transnational regulations concerning franchise, amongst which the aforementioned code of conduct. Vranken 
sees this as a missed opportunity. 
1075 Rb. Overijssel 13 November 2015, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2015:5020, para 5.5. 
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6.3.2.2.2 District court versus court of appeal 
 
The second category is formed by a case in which the district court and the court of appeal 
held different opinions on the legal relevance of the private rules concerned. Citing their 
advisory nature, the Amsterdam District Court rejected the applicability of the 
Recommendations of the OSB - the employers’ organization for cleaning and business 
services (Organisatie voor Schoonmaak- en Bedrijfsdiensten). The court pointed out that the 
Recommendations are targeted at companies that are an OSB member. Thereupon, it states 
that “a recommendation does not equate with a safety standard that the company in question 
has to abide by, let alone that it constitutes a norm that a third party, such as the plaintiff, can 
invoke. For that reason, non-compliance with the recommendation cannot warrant the 
conclusion that the conduct of the defendant towards the plaintiff is thus unlawful”1076. 
Subsequently, disregarding the Recommendation, the court put the circumstances of the case 
central to its assessment of the contested behavior.1077 Interestingly, however, the decision on 
appeal turned out differently: the Amsterdam Court of Appeal did deem the 
Recommendations relevant in assessing whether the cleaning company had acted negligently. 
The court, more specifically, considered that it can be assumed that cleaning companies are 
aware of the risk of accidents on a wet floor since this risk is set out in the Recommendations. 
Furthermore, the court held, which actions have to be taken after a floor has been mopped 
follows on from the Recommendations. Since these norms are generally known within the 
cleaning industry, it can be said to be common and not too inconvenient to take measures to 
prevent accidents.1078 Thus, the court partly founded its argument on the Recommendations. 
This approach contrasts sharply with that adopted by the court of first instance.  
 
6.3.2.2.3 No legal relevance, or rather, a little 
 
The third ‘category’ is formed by a ruling of the Arnhem Court of Apppeal, in which private 
rules that were initially denied legal relevance in the end turned out to have little legal 
significance after all. Central to this ruling were the Rules for bankruptcy trustees 
(Praktijkregels voor curatoren), adopted by the Dutch Association of Insolvency Practitioners 
(Vereniging Insolventierecht Advocaten, hereafter: Insolad).1079 The appellant complained 
about, among other things, the opinion of the court of first instance that there was no need to 
go into the applicability of the Rules for bankruptcy trustees (the Rules) since these Rules 
only aim to provide guidance and are not binding.1080 The non-binding, guiding nature of the 
Rules was not challenged on appeal, but the appellant did argue that the Rules put down in 
writing the prevailing opinions within the profession as well as the customary norms and 
                                                
1076 Rb. Amsterdam 22 November 2006, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2006:AZ3700. 
1077 Rb. Amsterdam 22 November 2006, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2006:AZ3700. On this decision, see Giesen 2008, p. 
786. Cf. Hof Amsterdam 26 March 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:944, para 2.7, stating that, in the case at 
hand, the Code of Conduct for judicial experts did not have independent significance. 
1078 Hof Amsterdam 26 January 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BO7591, paras 3.5.2, 3.5.4, 3.6.2. 
1079 Discussed by Giesen 2008, p. 787; Van der Heijden 2012, pp. 182-183. 
1080 Hof Arnhem 11 September 2007, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2007:BB8620, para 4.1. 
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values followed by bankruptcy trustees in performing their activities. As a corollary, 
according to the appellant, the Rules can be perceived as a form of customary law and can be 
used to specify the general duty of care included in Article 6:162 DCC.1081 The court of 
appeal agreed with appellant’s line of reasoning, but dismissed his conclusion. At this point, it 
shared the opinion of the court of first instance. The norms included in the Rules that can be 
considered legally valid derive this validity from the prevailing legal opinion in society on 
what is socially proper, and not from the Rules themselves.1082 Neither does the fact that 
bankruptcy trustees commonly abide by certain rules necessarily imply that they perceive 
them as legal rules, nor does it constitute an argument to classify the Rules as general legal 
rules that impose obligations upon third parties or as general legal rules from which third 
parties (e.g., appellant) can derive certain rights. The Rules are, in the words of the court “no 
more, or sometimes even less, than an indication of what a bankruptcy trustee should refrain 
from doing or how he should act from a legal perspective”.1083 Thus, the Arnhem Court of 
Appeal kept its distance with a view to the non-binding and non-legal nature of the Rules, 
notwithstanding the fact that Insolad itself classifies its Rules as ‘best practice rules’ that aim 
to fill the gaps left where neither legislation nor case law provides guidance.1084 In effect, the 
court held that the non-legal Rules cannot independently call into being legally enforceable 
obligations or rights. Nevertheless, later on in its ruling the court does refer to the Rules. It 
clarifies the content of one of the provisions of the Rules and subsequently uses this provision 
to support its argument (cf. the Rules as an ‘indication’).1085 This leads Giesen to conclude 
that the Rules have at least some radiating effect.1086 
 
6.3.2.2.4 Industry codes and fundamental principles of law 
 
To close this subsection, it can be pointed at a judgment of the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of 
Appeal, in which the plaintiff relied upon the Rules of Professional Conduct 1992 for 
lawyers. The reason why the dispute arose was the fact that the summons to appear in court 
did reach the plaintiff, but was not passed on to the right person. Consequently, the judgment 
was delivered without the plaintiff being present. A troubling factor for the plaintiff was that 
the judgment fell within the scope of a provision of the Dutch Civil Code stipulating that 
neither appeal nor appeal in cassation could be lodged against the decision of the district 
                                                
1081 Hof Arnhem 11 September 2007, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2007:BB8620, para 4.2. 
1082 Cf. Van Zeben & Du Pon 1981 (Parliamentary history DCC), p. 616, on Article 6:162 DCC with reference to 
HR 8 January 1960, NJ 1960/415 (Scrabble): “a violation of a norm of professional ethics, recognized within a 
certain group, only constitutes an unlawful act, if that norm also qualifies as a rule of unwritten law”. 
1083 Hof Arnhem 11 September 2007, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2007:BB8620, paras 4.2-4.3 (quotation para 4.2). In 
October 2005, the Leeuwarden Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the legal scope of the Insolad Rules was 
unclear. The court added that the Rules did not cover the current situation and, accordingly, disregarded the 
Rules. This follows on from the appeal in cassation: HR 22 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA2511, NJ 2007, 
520 (ING/Verdonk q.q.), para 3.2. On the Supreme Court ruling, see Giesen 2008, pp. 787-788. 
1084 <www.insolad.nl/praktijkregels.html> (accessed 1 July 2016). Bartman greets the decision of the Arnhem 
Court of Appeal with applause. He proposes to apply the same argument to the Corporate Governance Code. See 
S.M. Bartman, case note to Hof Arnhem 11 September 2007, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2007:BB8620, JOR 2007/316. 
Giesen, by contrast, shows himself more critical of the court’s argument. See Giesen 2008, p. 787. 
1085 Hof Arnhem 11 September 2007, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2007:BB8620, para 4.9.  
1086 Giesen 2008, p. 787. 
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court, unless, among other things, fundamental principles of law had been violated. The 
plaintiff contended that the principle of hearing both sides of the argument had been violated, 
with one of the arguments being that Rules of Professional Conduct entailed an obligation to 
send a copy of the application to the lawyer of the opposing party, which the lawyer of the 
plaintiff had failed to do. The court of appeal held that the plaintiff has been summonsed in 
accordance with the principal legal rule and that there is no legal rule that dictates that a copy 
of the application has to be sent to the lawyer of the opposing party. According to the court 
“the rules of conduct for lawyers can serve as a guideline for actions within the profession, 
but cannot autonomously call such a legal rule into being”.1087 From a legal perspective, it 
does not come as a surprise that private regulation cannot independently set aside a statutory 
provision. The judgment however does raise questions as to the value of industry codes of 
conduct going beyond what is legally required, as the Rules of Professional Conduct did. Is it 
the private nature of the rules that forms the obstacle here or is the court’s decision influenced 
by the fact that the case revolved around fundamental principles of law?  
 Similar observations can be made as regards a case brought before the North-Netherlands 
District Court in which a lawyer and his client quarreled about whether it was agreed upon 
that the lawyer would work on the basis of ‘no cure, no pay’. The client in this respect, among 
other things, held that the lawyer had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct 1992 which 
stipulate that important agreements should be in writing, since there was only an oral 
agreement about the fees. The district court dismissed this claim, indicating that the fact that 
there is only an oral agreement may be contrary to the professional rules for lawyers, but it 
does not imply there is no agreement between the lawyer and its client. After all, as the court 
pointed out, an oral agreement has as much legal force as a written agreement.1088 Thus, the 




6.3.3.1 Three judicial ‘techniques’ 
 
The discussion in the previous sections unveils the fact that Dutch district courts and courts of 
appeal are generally willing to take account of industry codes of conduct relied upon by 
parties to the proceedings. Courts have done so in different ways. More specifically, it follows 
on from the case law analysis that they have used three judicial ‘techniques’ to assign legal 
relevance to these codes. First of all, judges have used private rules to color open norms, such 
as the different duties of care that exist under Dutch civil law. Secondly, in few instances, 
courts have transformed industry codes into existing private law concepts. The previous 
section includes examples of judgments in which industry codes were classified as custom 
within the meaning of Article 6:248 DCC and as third-party beneficiary clause, assuming 
                                                
1087 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 17 February 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:1078, paras 3.2-3.12 (quotation para 
3.12). 
1088 Rb. Noord-Nederland 4 March 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2015:1112, para 4.5. 
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legal relevance accordingly.1089 Thirdly, courts have referred to (the violation of) industry 
codes as a self-standing argument, for instance in establishing the lawfulness of the conduct at 
issue or in addressing questions related to contractual obligations.1090 Contrary to what might 
have been anticipated with a view to the private origins of industry codes,1091 courts have 
used these techniques to confer legal relevance upon industry codes without any visible 
reservations. The private, non-legal origins of these codes have not proven to be an obstacle 
in this regard. Rather, the judgments in which the court’s displayed an open attitude towards 
industry codes suggest that judges generally tend to go along with the litigants’ argument that 
a code bears legal significance in the case at hand. Accordingly, reflections on the role of the 
private rules form a self-standing part of the overall judicial assessment of the case. The legal 
weight that is eventually attributed to the rules differs, however. In some judgments, industry 
codes are referred to as a relevant factor or as a viewpoint, while in others, they formed one of 
the weightier self-standing building blocks in the court’s line of reasoning. Furthermore, the 
case law analysis includes examples of judgments in which industry codes played a decisive, 
self-standing role in that the judicial decision was founded entirely on the applicable code. 
 However, even though industry codes of conduct play a legally relevant part in the 
majority of the judgments analyzed, there are also cases in which courts have displayed a 
more reticent or even dismissive attitude, either withholding legal relevance of the codes or 
limiting this relevance.1092 In some cases, disregarding the private rules concerned was a 
fairly straightforward matter, given the fact that the rules were, broadly speaking, 
inapplicable. In other cases, however, the private, non-legal nature of the codes appears to 
have echoed through as an argument to mitigate or deny the legal relevance of these codes. 
Considering the fact that most courts have shown themselves open to assigning legal 
relevance to industry codes and hence do not appear to be troubled by the private origins of 
the rules, this observation begs the question as to what exactly constitutes the difference 
between the two sets of judgments. Put in more general terms: what determines the way in 
which lower courts respond to confrontations with rules adopted by private actors? In 
answering this question, I will first take a closer look at the influence of the ‘procedural’ 
context of a case on the possible legal relevance of an industry code (section 6.3.3.2). 
Thereupon, I turn to the way in which the courts – against the procedural backgrounds of a 
case – have approached the ‘legal relevance issue’ (section 6.3.3.3). 
 
 
                                                
1089 Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 10 July 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BA9210 (custom, discussed in section 6.3.1.3) and 
Rb. Arnhem 26 March 2008, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2008:BC8904 (third-party beneficiary clause, discussed in 
section 6.3.1.2). 
1090 Cf. Verbruggen 2014a, pp. 19, 288-289, indicating that contract law (breach of contract) and tort law (e.g., 
the open-ended legal standard of negligence) form the legal basis for the judicial enforcement of private 
regulation. 
1091 See Chapter 1, section 1.2.2 where I explained that according to the prevailing opinion, visualized by 
Vranken (2006, p. 66) in the “framework of legislation and adjudication”, private regulation lacks a clear self-
standing legal status of its own, due to the private origins of this form of regulation. 
1092 The judgments in which industry codes were assigned legal importance outnumber those in which such 
importance was denied: section 6.3.2 includes only about fourteen cases in which the lower courts took a 
dismissive attitude towards the industry code of conduct at issue. 
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6.3.3.2 Procedural context  
 
The room for maneuver that a court has in respect of industry codes of conduct is demarcated 
by procedural ‘factors’, most notably the facts of the case, the nature of the dispute, existing 
lines of case law and the way in which parties to the proceedings formulate their claims and 
defenses. Illustrative in this respect is a set of cases that has not been discussed in the 
previous sections: cases in which courts could not take account of the private regulatory 
scheme relied upon by litigants.1093 In substantiating their decision to disregard the scheme, 
among other things, courts referred to the fact that the litigant relying upon the scheme failed 
to substantiate his claim that the private rules had been violated or failed to specify which 
rules had been violated,1094 or relied upon rules that did not cover the subject matter1095.1096 
These arguments show what matters is the way in which an industry code is brought to the 
fore by parties to the proceedings. Equally relevant is the way in which a claim is framed in 
respect of an industry code. If, for instance, a plaintiff relies upon a code of conduct in 
substantiating his claim that the standard of due care has been infringed, in principle, 
depending on the defense put up by the defendant, the court will consider the code when 
carving out the standard of due care. When a private regulatory scheme is invoked as a self-
standing touchstone, the court will generally assess it in that context. Hence, parties to the 
proceedings set an important part of the scene of a dispute. 
 Another part of this scene is set by established lines of Supreme Court case law, on which 
lower courts generally build their decisions. As regards the legal relevance of industry codes 
of conduct, it can for instance be referred to the Supreme Court’s stance on the role of 
‘industry views’ (brancheopvattingen) in detailing the general duty of care enclosed in Article 
6:162 DCC. From the established case law at this point we learn that “social opinions on 
proper conduct do not give rise to a legal duty to act in conformity with these opinions”.1097 
Of similar relevance is the settled case law on the role of decisions of disciplinary councils in 
                                                
1093 Cf. Giesen 2008, pp. 791-792, who indicates that it is up to the litigants to supply judges with the necessary 
information on the private rules that they invoke. 
1094 E.g., Rb. Amsterdam 4 December 2013, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:9884, para 4.8; Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 5 
November 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:8290, para 3.12. In Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 26 March 2014, 
ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:2385, paras 4.6-4.7 and Rb. Midden-Nederland 30 July 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2014:3030, para 4.5 it was not specified which provisions had been violated. 
1095 E.g., Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 15 December 2015, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2015:5258, para 3.7.7; Hof Amsterdam 2 
September 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:3704; Rb. Amsterdam 18 July 2013, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:5253, 
para 4.5; Rb. Overijssel 25 June 2014, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2014:3607, para 4.21; Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 19 
March 2013, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:BZ5106, para 4.15; Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 15 July 2014, 
ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2014:2143, para 7.10; Rb. Utrecht 15 February 2012, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2012:BW0548, para 
5.13; Rb. Utrecht 29 February 2012, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2012:BV8187, para 2.19. 
1096 Sometimes the court simply does not get around to an assessment of the private rules invoked. See, e.g., Rb. 
Arnhem 12 September 2012, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2012:BX8182, paras 4.6-4.7; Rb. Amsterdam 7 May 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:3455, para 4.4. 
1097 Thus the interpretation of Asser Procesrecht/Veegens, Korthals Altes & Groen 2005/105 of HR 8 January 
1960, NJ 1960/415 (Scrabble). In this judgment, it was held that “when answering the question whether a certain 
action contravenes the standard of proper social conduct, the fact that this action is perceived as unusual and 
inappropriate in the industry sector concerned is not readily decisive” (HR 8 January 1960, NJ 1960/415 
(Scrabble). This judgment was sustained in HR 27 June 1986, NJ 1987/191 (Decca/Holland Nautica). See also 
Van Nispen in: GS Onrechtmatige daad IV 2.2.20 (last updated 3 February 2015); Giesen 2007, pp. 117-118; 
Van Driel 1989, pp. 151-152, 167. 
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civil law cases. More specifically, decisions entailing that a professional rule has been 
violated do not compel a civil court to rule that, accordingly, a party is in default or has 
committed an unlawful act.1098 Nonetheless, a court is only allowed to dissent from a decision 
of a disciplinary body if properly motivated.1099 Thus, a decision of a disciplinary council as 
regards the liability of a professional can play a role in civil law proceedings, but often only 
as a relevant factor in establishing civil liability.1100 After all, as the Supreme Court has held, 
a ‘negative’ disciplinary decision does not readily warrant the conclusion that one is liable 
under civil law for having infringed a civil law duty of care.1101 This line of case law has led 
several scholars to submit that a breach of disciplinary norms or professional rules of conduct 
does not carry decisive force in civil law proceedings either. Like the decisions of a 
disciplinary council, these rules form but one of the viewpoints that a civil court can draw on 
in establishing civil law liability (for a professional error).1102 Leading the foregoing back to 
the judgments discussed in section 6.3.2, it can be said that this line of case law might carry 
(some) explanatory force as to the lower courts’ reticent attitude towards the professional 
rules for bankruptcy trustees and the professional rules for journalists.  
 Thus, procedural factors will to a certain extent steer the judicial approach to industry 
codes by ‘setting the scene’ of a dispute. As such, they may also influence the legal weight 
that can be attributed to a code.1103 However, judges themselves always have the last say. It is 
eventually up to them, within the given procedural context, to decide upon what legal 




                                                
1098 HR 15 November 1996, NJ 1997/151 (NTK/Paardekooper c.s.), para 3.5. 
1099 Vranken 2006, p. 74, with reference to HR 12 July 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE1532, NJ 2003/151 (A./E.). 
1100 HR 10 January 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF0690, NJ 2003/537 (Portielje/Y.), para 3.3; HR 13 October 
2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AW2080, NJ 2006/528 (Vie d’Or), para 5.4.3 Cf. HR 12 January 1996, NJ 1996, 683 
(Kroymans/Sun Alliance) where the Supreme Court attached significance to the decisions of the disciplinary 
body of the insurance sector (then: Raad van Toezicht op het Schadeverzekeringsbedrijf) under the guise of the 
current juridical views in the Netherlands (Article 3:12 DCC). This approach has been sustained in HR 14 May 
2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AO5662, NJ 2006/188 (Witte/Leipziger) and HR 3 December 2004, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AQ8089, NJ 2005/160 (A./London). 
1101 Thus HR 3 April 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:831, NJ 2015/479 (Reijnders-Louis/Ribama BV Novitaris), para 
3.5.3, with reference to HR 13 October 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AW2080, NJ 2006/528 (Vie d’Or). The 
rationale behind this approach is that the aim of disciplinary law differs from that of civil law. Whereas the first 
seeks to ensure the quality of professional practices, the latter revolves around redress and damages. The 
standards applied in the assessment of a disciplinary complaint are, accordingly, different from those used to 
establish civil liability. Furthermore, the rules of evidence that have to be applied in civil law proceedings are not 
applicable in disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, liability under disciplinary law - resulting from a violation of 
professional rules - does not necessarily amount to liability under civil law. See Vranken 2005, p. 94; HR 10 
January 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF0690, NJ 2003/537 (Portielje/Y.), para 3.3; HR 13 October 2006, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AW2080, NJ 2006/528 (Vie d’Or), para 5.4.3. 
1102 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-IV 2011/79; E.J. Dommering, case note to HR 8 April 2011, NJ 2011/449 
(Achmea/Rijnberg), under 3-5; Van Nispen, in: GS Onrechtmatige daad IV 2.2.19-21 (online, last updated 3 
February 2015); Huijgen, in: GS Onrechtmatige daad VI.1.11 (online, last updated 24 December 2014); Giesen 
2007, pp. 116-118. Cf. Van Zeben & Du Pon 1981 (Parliamentary history DCC), p. 616. 
1103 This may also partly explain why one and the same code has provoked different judicial responses. The 
different ways in which courts have deployed the SMS Code of Conduct, the Code of Ethics for Franchising and 
the Code of Conduct for Debt Settlement all exemplify this (see sections 6.3.1.2, 6.3.1.4 and 6.3.1.7). 
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6.3.3.3 Approach of the lower courts 
 
How then do Dutch lower courts decide upon the legal relevance of industry codes? Before 
answering this question, it should be noted that the courts themselves generally do not 
explicitly motivate why an industry code bears or lacks legal relevance. Nonetheless, it has 
been possible to deduce the following broad outline from the above discussion. 
 A closer analysis of the case law at this point shows that three sets of cases can be 
distinguished. The first set comprises the judgments in which the binding force or 
applicability of an industry code of conduct was beyond dispute. In these judgments, the 
binding force of a code or consensus between the litigants on the binding force or the 
applicability of a code constituted sufficient ground for courts to readily assign legal 
relevance to the code. The second set includes the judgments where a code’s binding force or 
applicability was a point of contention. In these cases, courts have adopted different 
approaches: they either disregarded a code for want of binding force, or referred to the 
radiating effect of a code or to its non-legal nature in deciding upon the legal significance of 
the code concerned. The third set of judgments is small and comprises judgments in which 
other arguments were advanced to establish the legal relevance of an industry code. Jointly, 
these observations lead to the following general overview of how the lower courts determine 
the legal relevance of industry codes. 
 
• Binding force and consensus about applicability 
In the vast majority of judgments in which industry codes assumed legal relevance, the 
approach of the Dutch lower courts was rather straightforward. If the binding force or 
applicability of a code could be established or if there was agreement between the parties to 
the proceedings on the applicability of a code, judges readily attributed legal relevance to the 
code, without applying additional criteria and without the private nature of the rules 
constituting an obstacle.  
 In several judgments, courts referred to or established the binding force of the code 
relied upon by the parties to the proceedings before incorporating the code into their line of 
argument. In these judgments, more specifically, courts either stated that one of these parties 
was bound to the code or remarked that the binding force of the code had not been disputed. 
In some instances, it was indicated in the judgment where the source of this binding force lay. 
Examples include instances where a code was declared applicable to the legal relationship 
between the litigants,1104 where a litigant had contractually subscribed to a code,1105 where a 
code was made part of the contract between the litigants,1106 or where the legislator formally 
acknowledged the code1107. In these cases, the legal relevance of a code in the dispute at hand 
                                                
1104 Rb. Den Haag 23 October 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:14241 (see section 6.3.1.4) 
1105 Rb. Arnhem 26 March 2008, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2008:BC8904 (see section 6.3.1.2) 
1106 Rb. Rotterdam 18 January 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BV196 (see section 6.3.1.7) 
1107 Rb. Oost-Brabant 22 May 2014, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2014:2701; Vzr. Rb. Haarlem 16 July 2009, 
ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2009:BJ3060 (see section 6.3.1.6); Rb. Oost-Brabant 29 June 2016, 




is the logical consequence of the fact that the code concerned already had legal binding force 
before ‘entering’ the legal dispute. In other judgments, however, the source of the binding 
force referred to by the court remained opaque.1108 
 Alternatively, courts have referred to the fact that there was consensus on the 
applicability of the industry code between the parties to the proceedings, without referring to 
the binding force of the code. Some judgments explicitly refer to this consensus or to the fact 
that the applicability of the code has remained uncontested.1109 There are also judgments in 
which both plaintiff and defendant have relied upon the code of conduct, and judgments 
where the plaintiff has invoked a code without the defendant ‘visibly’ putting up a defense in 
this respect.1110 Arguably, also in these judgments, parties to the proceedings consented to the 
application of the rules, albeit only implicitly. From a procedural perspective, this approach of 
the Dutch lower courts does not come as a surprise. After all, Article 149 of the Dutch Code 
of Civil Procedure obliges lower courts to accept as established “facts or rights stated by one 
party, that have not been or not sufficiently been contested”.1111 
 The question is whether ‘binding force’ of a code of conduct forms a ‘criterion for entry’ 
for judicial scrutiny and possible legal relevance of a code. The different judicial references to 
this binding force suggest that it does, as do the judgments in which courts rejected the 
applicability of a code of conduct for the want of binding force (see section 6.3.2.1). 
However, explicit or apparent agreement on the applicability of the private rules also appears 
to be sufficient for courts to take account of a code. Moreover, the references to the binding 
force of the private rules in question are often only mentioned in passing, rather than as an 
explicit reason for drawing these rules into the legal sphere. Therefore, stating that the binding 
force of an industry code forms an explicit criterion of entry for judicial scrutiny seems to be 
too firm a conclusion.1112  
 
• Other factors 
Occasionally, courts have referred other factors, i.e., other than binding force or (consensus 
on) applicability, in establishing the legal relevance of the private rules at dispute in cases 
                                                
1108 The cases in which it remained unclear where the binding force originated from, provide food for some legal 
theoretical reflections. See section 6.5.2 below. 
1109 See inter alia Rb. Utrecht 10 January 2010, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2007:AZ6197 (Professional rules midwives, 
discussed in section 6.3.1.12); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 10 July 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BA9210 (Professional 
rules for lawyers, discussed in section 6.3.1.3); Rb. Leeuwarden 11 February 2009, 
ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2009:BH2709 (SMS Code of Conduct, discussed in section 6.3.1.2); Rb. ’s-Hertogenbosch 18 
August 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSHE:2010:BN4531 (Code of Conduct European Lawyers, discussed in section 
6.3.1.3). See also the judgments concerning the GPO and the Sectoral Regulations of the Dutch Association of 
Insurers referred to in n 995 and n 996, respectively. 
1110 E.g., Rb. Gelderland 3 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2014:5645 (Code of Conduct for Insurers of the 
Dutch Association of Insurers, discussed in section 6.3.1.5) and several of the judgments concerning the GPO 
and the Sectoral Regulations of the Dutch Association of Insurers (see the cases mentioned in n 995 and n 996, 
respectively).  
1111 Jongbloed 2006, p. 245. See also Asser Procesrecht/Asser 3 2013, sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
1112 Admittedly, there is a link between ‘binding force’ and ‘applicability’. On the one hand, it can be argued that 
actors are likely to agree on the applicability of a code of conduct when they are in some way bound to it. 
Viewed from this perspective, binding force precedes applicability. On the other hand, the fact that a code had 
binding force upon an actor implies that it is, at least in that respect, applicable to the dispute. In this sense, 
applicability and binding force are more or less equivalent. 
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where there was no apparent disagreement on the rules. These factors include whether the 
private actors were familiar with the code or should have been familiar with it,1113 the 
accessibility of the code,1114 and the level of support that the code enjoys1115. It is unclear as 
to whether governmental approval or backing also bears significance.1116 However, since 
these arguments were advanced in only a few or even in just one judgment, their actual value 
as more ‘general’ factors for determining the legal relevance remains unclear. At this point, 
the only status they have is that of possible hints as to what may be of importance when 
determining such relevance 
 
A different picture emerges when the binding force or applicability of an industry code of 
conduct is a point of contention. 
 
• Nature of the rules 
Putting it broadly, the arguments advanced in the judgments where courts have adopted a 
reticent attitude to industry codes of conduct can be said in most instances to pertain to the 
nature of the code at issue, i.e., either the non-binding nature or, seemingly, the private nature 
of the code.1117  
 In several judgments, disagreement on the binding force or applicability has led courts to 
disregard the private rules brought up for discussion with reference to the non-binding nature 
of the rules, i.e., the fact that the binding force or applicability of the rules at issue could not 
be established in the dispute at hand.1118 Considering that in other cases, (consensus on) the 
binding force or applicability constituted an argument to assign legal relevance to codes of 
conduct, this rather straightforward argument could reasonably be expected. After all, it is 
difficult to maintain that a code has legal relevance when it lacks binding force or 
applicability. Yet, as few other cases suggest, it is not entirely out of the question that legal 
relevance is assigned to a code in these cases (see below under ‘radiating effect’).  
                                                
1113 Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 1 May 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BW4879; Rb. Roermond 23 November 2011, 
ECLI:NL:RBROE:2011:BU5452 (discussed in section 6.3.1.10); Hof Amsterdam 3 June 2014, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:2410 (discussed in section 6.3.1.3). Cf. Hof 26 January 2010, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BO7591 (discussed in section 6.3.2.2.2). 
1114 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 19 March 2013, ECLI:CL:GHARL:2013:BZ4776 (discussed in section 6.3.1.7). 
Cf. Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 24 December 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:9929, referring to the broad, online 
accessibility of the SMS Code, in addition to the fact that the applicability of the Code was not contested 
(discussed in section 6.3.1.2). 
1115 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 19 March 2013, ECLI:CL:GHARL:2013:BZ4776 (discussed in section 6.3.1.7); 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 24 December 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:9929 (discussed in section 6.3.1.11). 
1116 In Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2 September 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:6792 (discussed in section 6.3.1.8) 
it was referred to the fact that the legislator left it to the industry to specify the open norm of responsible lending. 
In Hof Amsterdam 18 January 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:BA5933 it was held that the Protocol provided 
sufficient safeguards, on the basis of a declaration issued by the DPA. Yet, only one ‘privacy-judgment’ 
(discussed in section 6.3.1.6) made mention of the fact that the applicable Privacy Code had been approved by 
the DPA, only to find that the declaration of approval had expired (Rb. Zutphen 8 October 2009, 
ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2009:BK4206) 
1117 Cf. section 6.3.2.2.4 for a discussion of two judgments in which the court’s decision to pass over the private 
rules was based on a different argument, namely the fact that fundamental principles of law were concerned. 
1118 See the judgments discussed in section 6.3.2.1. 
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 In some judgments, by contrast, it seems as if the private, non-legal nature of the private 
rules echoes through in the court’s decision to keep the rules at a distance, either mitigating 
the importance of the rules1119 or disregarding the rules1120. The judgments involving the 
European Code of Ethics for Franchising and the Rules for bankruptcy trustees in particular 
seem to hint at the fact that these private origins may become relevant when the binding force 
of the rules cannot be established.1121  
 
• Radiating effect 
Even though the lack of (agreement on) binding force or applicability of a code in most 
judgments led the courts to disregard or at best adopt a reticent attitude to the code, case law 
suggests that courts can also move around the issue by lending radiating effect to the code, 
i.e., by applying the industry code to an industry actor that has not subscribed to the code. 
Going by the two judgments in which this radiating effect was considered, it seems that two 
scenarios can be distinguished here. The first scenario concerns cases in which the vast 
majority of the industry is bound by the code of conduct. Then, radiating effect can come 
about when rules are repeatedly applied by the courts and the validity of the rules is accepted 
in case law.1122 The second scenario is that in which a code has binding force upon a large 
part of the industry, even though a ‘not unsubstantial’ part of the industry actors not having 
subscribed to the code. Here, it seems that the scope of a code can extend to these ‘non-
subscribing parties’ when the rules carry such significance that there is a social, legally 
enforceable duty to comply with them or when the rules have become trade usage or 
custom.1123 Finally, it can be pointed at a ruling of the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal, 
which seems to suggest that radiating effect may be present when private rules ‘color an 
open-ended legal standard in such a way’ that even without the rules being applicable, they 
can still be used as a specification of this norm.1124 
 
 
                                                
1119 Hof Arnhem 11 September 2011, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2007:BB8620 (Rules for bankruptcy trustees, 
discussed in section 6.3.2.2.3). 
1120 Rb. Noord-Nederland 29 November 2013, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2013:7307 and Rb. Overijssel 13 November 
2015, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2015:5020 (European Code of Ethics for Franchising, discussed in section 6.3.2.2.1); 
Vzr. Rb. Amsterdam 11 April 2013, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:BZ7028 (Rules of conduct for journalists, 
discussed in section 6.3.2.2.1); Rb. Gelderland 3 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2014:5645 (Claimcode, 
discussed in section 6.3.1.1) Cf. also Rb. Amsterdam 22 November 2006, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2006:AZ3700 
(advisory nature of the OSB Recommendations, discussed in section 6.3.2.2.2) and Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 17 
February 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:1078 (Rules of conduct for lawyers, discussed in section 6.3.2.2.4). 
1121 Hof Arnhem 11 September 2011, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2007:BB8620 (Rules for bankruptcy trustees, 
discussed in section 6.3.2.2.3); Rb. Noord-Nederland 29 November 2013, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2013:7307 and Rb. 
Overijssel 13 November 2015, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2015:5020 (European Code of Ethics for Franchising, 
discussed in section 6.3.2.2.1) 
1122 Vzr. Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 24 July 2004, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2004:AQ5353 (Code on Pharmaceutical 
Advertising, discussed in section 6.3.1.11).  
1123 This can a contario be inferred from Hof Amsterdam 2 March 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BN1316, 
paras 4.5-4.7 (discussed in section 6.3.1.5), where the court of appeal applied these criteria, yet reached the 
conclusion that they were not met. Accordingly, the private rules at issue were thus held not to have radiating 
effect. 
1124 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2 September 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:6792 (discussed in section 6.3.1.8). 
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• General starting points 
Besides the aforementioned ‘criteria’, three general starting points can be deduced from the 
case law discussed in this section, with the caveat that these starting points are mentioned in 
very few rulings. First of all, it follows on from the case law analysis that, given their private, 
non-legislative origins, industry codes of conduct cannot derogate from fundamental legal 
principles and legal requirements.1125 This reflects the general legal principle that private rules 
cannot be applied or interpreted contra legem.1126 Secondly, courts have repeatedly held that 
the fact that a private actor has complied with an industry code does not readily warrant the 
conclusion that the actor has acted lawfully. More specifically, the fact that a code of conduct 
has been complied with does not automatically imply that the ‘corresponding’ legal rules are 
also complied with.1127 Furthermore, compliance with an industry code does not mean that 
one cannot be held legally liable.1128 Conversely, and this is the third starting point, non-
compliance with a code of conduct does not imply that a private actor has thus acted 
unlawfully, albeit non-compliance could still serve as an indication in establishing the 
unlawfulness of certain conduct.1129 However, case law is not unequivocal at this point. In 
some judgments, the violation of private rules was qualified as unlawful conduct or as an 
unlawful act.1130  
 
In sum, the approach of the Dutch lower courts is as follows. If the (legal) binding force of an 
industry code of conduct can be established or if there is consensus between the parties to the 
proceedings about the applicability of a code, courts assign legal relevance to the code of 
conduct and use it as a viewpoint, argument or standard for assessment when making their 
decision. When this consensus is lacking, however, the approach of the courts becomes more 
ambiguous. On the one hand, there are the judgments in which the rules on pharmaceutical 
advertising1131 and the Fire Insurance (Right of Recourse) Sectoral Regulations1132, 
                                                
1125 Rb. Zutphen 12 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2012:BY6138, paras 5.6 (discussed in section 6.3.1.6); 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 17 February 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:1078; Rb. Noord-Nederland 4 March 
2015, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2015:1112 (discussed in sections 6.3.1.3). See in the context of administrative law 
ABRvS 25 May 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BQ5921, para 2.10.1 where the Council held that the code of honor 
of the aquatic sports sector could not derogate from the legal competence of the Minister to restrict access to a 
nature reserve. 
1126 Verbruggen 2014a, p. 290. 
1127 Rb. Rotterdam 19 April 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BW3358, para 23.3 (section 6.3.1.9). 
1128 Particularly not when actions can be qualified as criminal, thus Rb. Zutphen 12 December 2012, 
ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2012:BY6138, paras 5.4-5.6 (discussed in section 6.3.1.6). See also Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 
12 April 2016, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2016:2876 (discussed in section 6.3.1.4). Cf. HR 1 April 2005, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AS6006, NJ 2006/377 (X/ZAO), para 3.4: compliance with a medical protocol “does not 
naturally equate with correct behavior”. See below, n 1207. 
1129 Hof Amsterdam 23 February 2016, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:635 (discussed in section 6.3.3.3); Rb. 
Amsterdam 8 January 2014, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:9, para 4.9 (discussed in section 6.3.1.6); Rb. Amsterdam 
7 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2012:BV9330 (discussed in section 6.3.2.1); Vzr. Rb. Amsterdam 11 April 
2013, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:BZ7028; Rb. Limburg 3 September 2015, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2015:7621 (both 
discussed in section 6.3.2.2.1) and, more generally, the line of case law on the civil law relevance of disciplinary 
rules of conduct (discussed in section 6.3.3.2). Cf. also HR 8 January 1960, NJ 1960/415 (Scrabble) on ‘industry 
views’. See also Giesen 2007, pp. 116-118, 129. 
1130 Rb. Zutphen 12 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2012:BY6138, paras 5.4-5.6 (section 6.3.1.6). The GPO 
has been applied in a similar fashion on several occasions. See the case law referred to in section 6.3.1.5. 
1131 Rb. The Hague 24 Juli 2004, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2004:AQ5353 (discussed in section 6.3.1.11). 
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respectively, were assigned legal relevance, in spite of the fact that the applicability of these 
rules was disputed. On the other hand, however, there is also a case in which the Fire 
Insurance (Right of Recourse) Sectoral Regulations, the applicability of which was disputed, 
were denied legal relevance.1133 In another ruling, the Franchise Code met with the same 
fate.1134 Accordingly, it remains unclear as to how the legal relevance of industry codes is to 
be determined in these cases.   
 
6.4 Supreme Court 
 
This section takes a closer look at the responses of the Supreme Court (hereafter also referred 
to as the Court) to industry codes of conduct. I start the discussion with a description of the 
relation between industry codes and Article 79 of the Judiciary Organization Act (Wet op de 
Rechterlijke Organisatie, hereafter: RO), which lays down the grounds for cassation (section 
6.4.1). Thereupon, I discuss the cases in which the Court was faced with industry codes 
(section 6.4.2). The section closes with a general analysis of the Court’s approach that follows 
on from these cases (section 6.4.3).  
 
6.4.1 Article 79 RO 
 
Article 79 RO cannot be ignored when analyzing the approach of the Supreme Court. In 
laying down the grounds for cassation (in brief: procedural defects and infringements of law) 
this provision forms the statutory ‘gateway’ to appeal in cassation. 
 
6.4.1.1 Article 79 RO: ‘Infringements of the law’ 
 
Article 79 RO1135 provides that the Supreme Court can set aside acts, judgments and orders in 
case of procedural defects or infringements of the law.1136 This section will focus on the 
second ground of cassation, infringements of the law, as this ground determines whether 
industry codes are subject to review in cassation. This second ground did not exist until 1963. 
Originally, appeal in cassation could only be lodged in case of procedural defects, excess of 
jurisdiction and infringements of legislation. Besides primary legislation, the notion of 
legislation included “external rules, that is to say, generally applicable rules directed at 
everyone, enacted by a public authority, which derived its regulatory authority from 
                                                                                                                                                   
1132 Hof The Hague 28 October 2008, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2008:BG2212 (discussed in section 6.3.1.11). 
1133 Hof Amsterdam 2 March 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BN1316 (discussed in section 6.3.1.5) 
1134 Rb. Noord-Nederland 29 November 2013, ECL:NL:RBNNE:2013:7307 (discussed in section 6.3.2.2.1). 
1135 Until 1 January 2002, Article 99 RO laid down the grounds for cassation. 
1136 The full Article reads as follows: “- 1. The Supreme Court sets aside acts, judgments and orders: a) on 
account of a procedural defect in so far as nullity is the express consequence of such defect or such nullity 
results from the nature of the procedural defect; b) on account of an infringement of the law, with the exception 
of the law of foreign states. - 2. Facts from which the applicability or otherwise of a rule of customary law is 
inferred are assumed, in so far as they require proof, to have been established only on the basis of the disputed 
decision.” Translation taken from <www.rechtspraak.nl/English/Pages/Legislation.aspx> (accessed 1 July 2016).  
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legislation, i.e., a regulation issued by the legislature”1137. In 1963, the scope of this ground 
was broadened to infringements of the law, as a result of which the Supreme Court can now 
set aside judgments of lower courts because of both infringements of legislation and 
infringements of unwritten law, e.g., customary law and international private law.1138 One can 
speak of an ‘infringement’ when a lower court has made an incorrect judgment as to the 
content or applicability of the law.1139 Worth noticing is that the proposed amendment of the 
legal rules on cassation, from which this eventual broadening ensued, initially also entailed 
the introduction of another cassation ground, namely the incorrect interpretation of general 
applicable regulations (reglementen), statutes (statuten) and standard clauses 
(standaardbedingen). The rationale behind this proposal was the general scope and intended 
uniform nature of these rules: subjecting their interpretation to review in cassation would 
ensure their uniform application. Rules adopted by private legal entities or groups of persons 
without a more general reach were thereby explicitly excluded from the scope of the notion of 
‘law’ as their binding force is founded on contract.1140 However, in the end, this amendment 
was not approved.1141 
 What rules qualify as law within the meaning of Article 79 RO? The criteria initially 
formulated by the Supreme Court with respect to the notion ‘legislation’ still apply in this 
respect. Accordingly, a rule qualifies as ‘law’ i) when the regulatory power on the basis of 
which the rule was adopted is derived from legislation (sufficient legal basis for the rule), ii) 
when the rule can be regarded as an external, generally applicable rule directed at everyone, 
and (iii) when the rule has been made known in a duly fashion.1142 The first criterion, 
however, did not constitute an obstacle for the Supreme Court when it ruled that policy rules 
as well as the docket procedures of a court constitute law for the purposes of Article 79 RO. 
The Court in this respect first of all pointed at the fact that both types of rules are intended to 
regulate the exercise of the powers of the body that has enacted them. Even though both types 
of rules are not issued on the basis of legislative authority, the Court held that they do have 
binding force upon administrative authorities and judges, respectively, on the basis of general 
principles of law, i.e., the principles of proper administration for administrative authorities 
and the principles of proper judicial procedure for judges. Moreover, since the rules were duly 
published and suitable to be applied as legal rules with respect to those concerned, the 
                                                
1137 This formula has its origins in HR 10 June 1919, NJ 1919/647 and 650 (Rogge-arrest): “alle naar buiten 
werkende, dus tot eenieder gerichte algemeene regelingen, welke zijn uitgegaan van een openbaar gezag, dat de 
bevoegdheid daartoe aan de wet, in den zin van eene regeling door de wetgevende macht, ontleent”.  
1138 Parliamentary Papers II 1950/51, 2079, no. 3, p. 4. Cf. Teuben 2004, p. 56; Asser Procesrecht/Korthals 
Altes & Groen 7 2015/33, 100, 109; Röttgering 2013, pp. 93-96. With the 1963 amendment, excess of 
jurisdiction ceased to exist as ground of cassation. 
1139 Röttering 2013, p. 96. 
1140 Parliamentary Papers II 1950/51, 2079, no. 3, p. 4. 
1141 The reason for this was the general nature of the notions regulations, statutes and standard clauses, and the 
ensuing fear that the new cassation ground would lead to legal uncertainty and, as a corollary, to a higher case 
load for the Supreme Court until proper demarcation of these notions by the Court had taken place. See Asser 
Procesrecht/Korthals Altes & Groen 7 2015/127. 
1142 See for instance HR 24 November 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AY9222, NJ 2006/644 (Renzenbrink/Van 
Lanschot Bankiers), para 3.3.2. Cf. Giesen 2007, p. 46; Stein & Rueb 2009, p. 251. The formulation of the 
second criterion varies: the Court has also used the phrase ‘rules with an external effect that are binding upon 
those involved’ (‘naar buiten werkende, voor betrokkenen bindende regels’), as Teuben notes (2004, p. 57). 
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Supreme Court did mark them as law within the meaning of Article 79 RO.1143 Collective 
agreements that have been declared generally binding as well as pension schemes with a legal 
obligation to participate can also be considered ‘law’.1144 Considering the foregoing, it can be 
said that the Supreme Court has softened the criterion that regulatory authority should be 
based on primary legislation.1145 Nonetheless, the factor ‘state involvement’, broadly 
speaking, still constitutes an important factor in defining what can be considered ‘law’:1146 
policy rules and docket procedures are adopted by state organs while collective agreements 
and participation in pension schemes are eventually rendered legally binding by the 
legislator.1147 However, the fact that rules have been adopted by a public body does not by 
definition imply that these rules classify as law for the purposes of Article 79 RO, as several 
Supreme Court rulings on general terms and conditions drafted by a district water board 
(waterschap) make clear. With the binding force of these terms originating in the individual 
contract in which they are included, they cannot be considered ‘law’, notwithstanding the fact 
that the government is a party to said contract, the Court ruled.1148 This warrants the general 
conclusion that duly published and generally applicable rules can be considered ‘law’ within 
the meaning of Article 79 RO when these rules or their binding force can be traced back to a 
basis in public law, e.g., when the regulatory authority is based on legislation (cf. the criteria 
above) or when the legislator has lent the rules legal binding force (cf. collective agreements 
and pension schemes).  
 The result of a classification of a rule as ‘law’ is not only that an appeal in cassation can 
be lodged for infringements of this rule, leading to a quashing of the judgment of the lower 
court if the Supreme Court finds that this is indeed the case, but also that the rule can be 
subject to full review in cassation.1149 That is to say that the Supreme Court can assess the 
                                                
1143 Teuben 2004, pp. 57-62, 104-105, 126-127. See also Asser Procesrecht/Korthals Altes & Groen 7 2015/115-
116. With respect to policy rules, see HR 28 March 1990, NJ 1991/118; HR 19 June 1990, NJ 1991/119 and HR 
29 June 1990, NJ 1991/120, whereby the Supreme Court added that the rules had been adopted within the 
boundaries of the competence of the administrative authority. On docket procedures, see HR 28 June 1996, NJ 
1997/495 (De Nieuwe Woning/Staat). Cf. HR 10 September 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM5710 (Eiser/Gemeente 
Oude IJsselstreek), para 3.4). More extensively on the relation between the different ‘criteria’, see Teuben 2004, 
Chapter 4. 
1144 With respect to collective agreements, see for instance HR 16 March 1962, NJ 1963/222 (Bakker/Grafische 
Industrie) and, more recently, HR 31 May 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE2376, NJ 2003/110 (De Heel/X). On 
pension schemes, see, e.g. HR 16 October 1987, NJ 1988/117 (Pensioenfonds voor Huisartsen/Schmidt) and, 
more recently, HR 30 March 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0806, NJ 2001/292 (Stichting Pensioenfonds 
Medische Specialisten/X.). Cf. Asser Procesrecht/Korthals Altes & Groen 7 2015/109. 
1145 Teuben 2004, p. 57 submits that there are several indications that the Supreme Court has abandoned this 
criterion. 
1146 Giesen 2007, p. 48. See also below, section 6.4.1.2. 
1147 Giesen 2007, pp. 47-48; Teuben 2004, pp. 101-102. 
1148 HR 5 February 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BK0870, NJ 2010/242 (Willems/Hoogheemraadschap), para 3.4. 
Earlier: HR 10 January 1992, NJ 1992/670 (Scheffers/Gemeente Utrecht). See also HR 12 May 1989, NJ 
1989/613 (Reco/Staat), para 3.1.1 where the Court held that the rules concerned “merely contained general terms 
and conditions” that bind contracting parties because they have been agreed upon, and not on a public law basis. 
1149 As Teuben notes, whether or not the application of ‘law’ by a lower court is fully reviewable in cassation 
depends on whether the judicial decision qualifies as a ‘findings of law’ (rechtsbeslissing), as a ‘factual decision’ 
(feitelijke beslissing) or as a ‘mixed decision’ (gemengde beslissing). Findings of law will be fully reviewed in 
any case, while factual decisions are subject to marginal review only. See Teuben 2004, pp. 203-204. See also 
Röttgering 2013, pp. 128-143; Asser Procesrecht/Korthals Altes & Groen 7 2015/145-157.  
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correctness (juistheid) of the interpretation and application of the rule.1150 Thus, the 
classification of rules as law within the meaning of Article 79 RO enables the Supreme Court 
to exert control over the application and the interpretation of said rules.1151 This opportunity is 
lacking when certain rules do not qualify as ‘law’. Then the Supreme Court can only assess 
the comprehensibility (begrijpelijkheid) of the interpretation given to the rules by the lower 
court, not the correctness of the way in which the rules as such have been applied or 
interpreted.1152 
 
6.4.1.2 Article 79 RO and industry codes of conduct 
 
Turning to the relation between Article 79 RO and industry codes of conduct, the well-known 
Kouwenberg/Rabo case comes to mind. In this case, the Supreme Court held that “the RHO 
[the Rules concerning trade on the options exchange, MM], which concerns private 
regulation, does not meet the criteria developed in Supreme Court case law in order to be 
qualified as law” within the meaning of Article 79 RO.1153 One could infer from this ruling 
that private rules cannot be considered law for the purposes of Article 79 RO. However, the 
discussion in the previous subsection has shown that this conclusion is not by definition 
warranted. When the binding force of an industry code or the private actor’s regulatory 
authority have their roots in public law, the code may be considered law within the meaning 
of Article 79 RO (cf. the case law on collective agreements and pension schemes). Illustrative 
in this respect are the following three rulings, which, pursuant to the discussion in the 
previous subsection, highlight that private regulatory schemes that are founded on and come 
to operate within a broader network of public regulation can eventually be classified as ‘law’. 
 The first case that can be mentioned in this respect is ACM/Albert Heijn, involving the 
now obsolete Fondsenreglement, a private regulatory scheme adopted by the stock exchange 
sector stipulating, among other things, the conditions for stock exchange listing. The Supreme 
Court held that this scheme could be regarded as law for the purposes of Article 79 RO. In 
substantiating its argument, the Court referred to the fact that the scheme was designated by 
law as implementing several European directives, that the authority issuing the rules 
(Euronext) was approved by law as the organization responsible for compliance with these 
directives, and that the external, generally applicable scheme was duly published.1154 In a 
                                                
1150 Teuben 2004, pp. 85, 103, 192, 203, 209-210, 347-348; Korthals Altes 2005, no. 25; Giesen 2007, pp. 45-51. 
Moreover, as Teuben notes, this ‘reviewability’ presumes that the rule conforms to the applicable legal rules. 
This means the rule itself can be assessed in the light of said legal rules. If it is in breach of the law, the Supreme 
Court will refrain from reviewing it. Thus, the classification of rules as law for the purposes of Article 79 RO 
enables the Supreme Court to exert control over the application and interpretation of these rules. See Teuben 
2004, pp. 205-209, with a description of the ways in which the Court can perform this assessment. 
1151 Teuben 2004, pp. 179, 201-202. 
1152 Korthals Altes 2005, no. 25; Giesen 2007, pp. 45-51.  
1153 HR 11 July 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7419, NJ 2005/103 (Kouwenberg/Rabo), para 3.5.3. 
1154 HR 24 February 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AV0046, NJ 2006/302 (ACM/Albert Heijn) para 3.5. As a result, 
the Supreme Court was authorized to assess the correctness of the court of appeal’s interpretation of the 
Fondsenreglement. For a detailed description of the regulatory context of the case, see Advocate General 
Wesseling-van Gent’s conclusion in the case, ECLI:NL:PHR:2006:AV0046, paras 2.1-2.24. The Advocate 
General submits that the fact that the Fondsenreglement eventually comes to effect by means of a private law 
agreement “does not obstruct the classification as ‘law’ since the Fondsenreglement itself demands the 
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similar vein, the Supreme Court in Renzenbrink/Van Lanschot Bankiers held that the Nadere 
Regeling Toezicht Effectenverkeer 1995, which also entailed rules of conduct for trading in 
options, could be considered ‘law’. In this case, it was considered relevant that the regulation, 
besides being duly published and generally applicable, was, on the one hand based on legal 
provisions and, on the other hand, specified these provisions, which, in their turn, specified 
another statutory provision. This statutory provision eventually constituted the legal, public 
law basis for the private rules.1155 A different lot befell the General Regulations AEX 
(Algemeen Reglement AEX) and the Listing and Trading rules for Screentrading, adopted 
unilaterally by Euronext and then applicable to the trade on the AEX options exchange (now 
Euronext). These rules, which were central to the third case (Euronext/AFS), did not 
constitute ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 79 RO.1156 Consequently, the Supreme Court 
had to focus on the comprehensibility of the court of appeal’s interpretation of the private 
rules, instead of reviewing the correctness of this interpretation.1157 What then constituted the 
difference between these rules and the private regulatory schemes in ACM/Albert Heijn and 
Renzenbrink/Van Lanschot Bankiers? All three sets of rules had been duly published and were 
generally applicable. However, the private rules in the Euronext/AFS case, unlike the other 
two regulatory schemes, lacked any sufficient basis in public law. The fact that the Minister 
of Finance subjected these rules to a certain degree of public supervision did not constitute 
sufficient reason to conclude otherwise.1158 Thus, the lack of any (sufficient) public law basis 
eventually formed an obstacle to classifying the private regulatory schemes as law for the 
purposes of Article 79 RO.1159 
 It follows on from these judgments that the private origins of industry codes of conduct 
will constitute a stumbling block as regards the ‘application’ of Article 79 RO in relation to 
such codes.1160 Considering the discussion in the previous subsection of the concept of ‘law’ 
                                                                                                                                                   
conclusion of this agreement”. Moreover, “the mere fact that the applicability of the Fondsenreglement is 
ensured by means of a private law instrument does not derogate from the content and the general nature of the 
Regulation”. See para 2.22 of the Conclusion. 
1155 See HR 24 November 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AY9222, NJ 2006/644 (Renzenbrink/Van Lanschot 
Bankiers), para 3.3.2 (with reference to the conclusion of Advocate General Verkade, para 4.13.5) and the 
Conclusion of Advocate General Verkade in this case, ECLI:NL:PHR:2006:AY9222, paras 4.13-4.13.5. 
1156 HR 22 October 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BN5665, NJ 2010/570 (Euronext/AFS), paras 3.3.1-3.4.4. 
1157 The Supreme Court noted in this respect first and foremost that an interpretation of the rules “mainly 
depends on objective factors, such as the wordings of the provision in question, read in the light of the purpose 
of that provision and that of the Trading Rules as a whole” (para 3.4.4). Thereupon, it established how the 
provision concerned had to be interpreted and dismissed the interpretation of the court of appeal at this point as 
‘incomprehensible’.  
1158 HR 22 October 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BN5665, NJ 2010/570 (Euronext/AFS), paras 3.3.1-3.3.2; 
Conclusion Advocate General Huydecoper in Euronext/AFS, ECLI:NL:PHR:2010:BN5665, no. 4-12. 
1159 See in this respect also Giesen 2007, pp. 47-48; Teuben 2004, pp. 101-102, who point at HR 1 November 
1991, NJ 1992/30 (M./H.), where it was held that the alimony guidelines of the Nederlandse Vereniging voor 
Rechtspraak (Dutch Association for the Judiciary) could not be considered ‘law’ since they have been developed 
by a private law body and not by the judiciary itself. Likewise, the court-approved scale of costs 
(liquidatietarief), developed by the Bar of the Netherlands and Dutch Association for the Judiciary, were not 
considered law for the purposes of Article 79 RO either. See HR 3 April 1998, NJ 1998/571 
(Lindenboom/Beusmans). 
1160 Notwithstanding the fact that the criteria ‘generally applicable’ and ‘duly published’ may also constitute 
obstacles in this respect, since these also seem to be tailored to ‘public law norms’. For a more detailed 
assessment of these criteria, see Teuben 2004, pp. 155 et seq. 
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included in Article 79 RO, this conclusion will not come as a surprise. After all, it follows on 
from this discussion that the understanding of law for the purposes of Article 79 RO is rooted 
in the traditional concept of law. In this concept, tellingly visualized by Vranken in terms of 
the framework of legislation and adjudication, law denotes ‘rules’ enacted by the legislator or 
the judiciary.1161 Industry codes, accordingly, do not qualify as law in and of themselves. 
Even though it is not unlikely that the State, in one way or another, is involved with an 
industry code, the degree of State influence required by the Supreme Court in the context of 
Article 79 RO goes beyond the mere presence of the State. Hence, the vast majority of 
industry codes will not be considered law within the meaning of Article 79 RO. As a 
consequence, the Supreme Court will not exert full control over the application or 
interpretation of these codes, but rather limit itself to assessing the comprehensibility of the 
judgment of the lower court at this point. 
 These observations have given rise to the suggestion that the legal binding force of 
private regulation may be dependent on whether the private rules can be considered ‘law’ 
within the meaning of Article 79 RO.1162 However, although of importance for the intensity of 
the review in cassation, Article 79 RO does not appear to be decisive for the legal influence of 
industry codes, at least not entirely. Obviously, this statutory provision is no impediment to 
lower courts when taking account of codes of conduct. What is more, Article 79 RO does not 
stand in the way of industry codes having significance in rulings of the Supreme Court either, 
as the analysis in the next section highlights.1163 Thus, as Giesen notes, Article 79 RO 
determines the degree of control that the Supreme Court can exert over a certain norm, 
without derogating from the intrinsic influence of this norm on the decision of the Court.1164 
 
6.4.1.3 A brief side-step to round off: The Knooble case 
 
To conclude this section, it is worthwhile making a brief change of context by going to 
administrative building law and taking a look at the Knooble case, the Dutch equivalent of 
Fra.bo.1165 This case illustrates how vital the divide between ‘law’ and ‘non-law’ can be to 
the outcome of a legal dispute. 
 The reason for the dispute to arise between Knooble, a consultancy agency operating in 
the construction sector, and the Dutch government was the fact that Knooble was not allowed 
to publish technical standards developed by the Netherlands Standardization Institute (NNI). 
These so-called NEN standards are referred to in the Dutch Buildings Decree (BD) 
                                                
1161 Vranken 2005, pp. 79-86. See also Akkermans 2011 and Chapter 1, section 1.5.2 of this doctoral thesis. 
1162 Giesen 2007, p. 45.  
1163 See also Giesen 2007, pp. 45-51; Korthals Altes 2005, no. 25; Teuben 2004, pp. 201-202, 229-230; Kristic, 
Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009, p. 200. Cf. Menting 2013, p. 120, Menting 2015, pp. 107-108. 
1164 Giesen 2007, p. 50. 
1165 Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 31 December 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BG8465; Hof ’s-Gravenhage 16 November 
2010, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BO4175; HR 22 June 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW0393, NJ 2012/397 
(Knooble/Staat). Like Fra.bo (discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.4.2.3), Knooble/Staat caused quite a stir among 
legal scholars, as is testified by the legal publications that came out after the decision of the district court was 
published. See, mainly on the implications of the respective judgments, e.g., Van Gestel 2009 and 2012; 
Munneke et al. 2009; Van Gestel & Micklitz 2013. For a taste of the discussion before Knooble/Staat, see 
Elferink 1998 and Evers 1999. 
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(Bouwbesluit) and in the Regulations governing the Buildings Decree (RBD) as a 
specification of technical construction requirements.1166 Consequently, they need to be 
complied with when buildings are constructed or renovated. An exception to this rule can be 
found in the equivalence clause of the BD, setting forth that one is allowed to employ 
alternatives to the NEN standards, provided that these alternative options ensure that the 
building meets an equivalent degree of, in short, quality and protection as required by the 
NEN standards referred to in the BD. The NEN standards, which are not published by the 
State, can only be acquired by buying them from the NNI. As the NNI advocates that it holds 
the copyright to the NEN standards, Knooble was not permitted to publish these norms itself. 
This led Knooble to lodge a complaint against both the NNI and the State of the Netherlands 
with the District Court of The Hague.1167 
 The district court starts out by indicating that the private law status and voluntary nature 
of NEN standards that are not referred to in legislation and regulations is undisputed. 
Thereupon, the court holds that the NEN standards transform from private to public rules 
once they are referred to by the BD and the RBD. This reference, more specifically, turns the 
initially private standards into standards with a generally binding nature.1168 The fact that the 
standards have been adopted by a private law body does not derogate from this argument. On 
the contrary, the district court establishes that by referring to the NEN standards in generally 
binding regulations, i.e., the BD and the BDR, the public authorities “have simultaneously 
determined the content of the standards referred to as rules binding upon all persons”.1169 
Accordingly, the State was under a duty to duly publish the NEN standards.1170 Both the 
Court of Appeal of The Hague and the Supreme Court, however, were of a different opinion. 
The court of appeal, more specifically, ruled that the mere reference to the (private) NEN 
standards in a generally binding regulation does not change the color of these standards. Even 
though the references do turn the standards into public, generally applicable norms, they do 
not become generally binding regulations (algemeen verbindende voorschriften). The court of 
appeal in this respect clings on to one of the formal requirements for classifying a rule as a 
generally binding regulation, namely that it has to be laid down on the basis of regulatory 
powers under public law. The NEN standards are adopted on the basis of private agreements 
                                                
1166 More specifically, Article 2 of the Dutch Housing Act (Woningwet) states that rules will be laid down by 
order in council concerning, in short, the construction of new buildings and the state of existing buildings, 
whereby ‘order in council’ denotes the Buildings Decree. Article 3 of the Housing Act subsequently reads that it 
can be referred to, among other things, standards by order of council. Against this background, the Buildings 
Decree entails technical requirements both for existing buildings and buildings that are yet to be constructed. 
These requirements have not all been fleshed out in the BD itself; part of their specifications can be found in the 
NEN standards to which the BD, in accordance with Article 3 Housing Act, refers. See Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 31 
December 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BG8465, paras 2.3-2.6. 
1167 Van Gestel & Micklitz 2013, p. 161; Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 31 December 2008, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BG8465, paras 2.1-2.4. 
1168 Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 31 December 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BG8465, paras 4.5-4.11. The court thereby 
inter alia attached significance to a passage from the Explanatory Memorandum to the Housing Act reading that 
private standards assume a public law nature and become generally applicable through such a reference. Cf. 
Parliamentary Papers II 1986/87, 20 066, no. 3, p. 38. 
1169 Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 31 December 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BG8465, para 4.14. 
1170 Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 31 December 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BG8465, para. 4.22. Cf. Van Gestel & 
Micklitz 2013, p. 162. 
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between organizations that lack this authority. Consequently, they cannot be considered 
generally binding regulations.1171 The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the court of 
appeal,1172 affirming that under or pursuant to the law, the NNI was indeed not authorized to 
enact legal rules, that the NEN standards could, accordingly, not be classified as such and that 
the legal references to the standards did not change this.1173  
 The judgment of the Supreme Court as well as that of the appellate court coincides with 
the traditional focus on the public law origins of rules and norms. Both the Supreme Court 
and the court of appeal found that the private nature of these standards, i.e., the fact that they 
are adopted on the basis of private agreements between organizations without public 
regulatory powers, stood in the way of considering the standards as generally binding 
regulations.1174 It is highly questionable however, whether this status-based judicial approach, 
as a result of which NEN standards continue to reside in the realm of private law, squares 
with the de facto effect of the standards and the actual power of the organizations adopting 
them. Exemplifying in this respect is the equivalence clause included in the BD, which 
enables the construction industry to use alternative options to comply with the legal 
requirements, provided that these options are equivalent to the NEN standards. In theory, this 
clause leaves the choice to the industry. Yet, in order to establish whether the option chosen is 
indeed equivalent to the NEN standards, one first needs to have knowledge of these very 
standards. As this knowledge can only be obtained by purchasing the standards from the NNI, 
one can rightly question whether use of NEN standards is all that voluntary.1175 When viewed 
from this perspective, the private nature of standardization appears to be, to use the words of 
Van Gestel and Micklitz, no more than a veil, which the Supreme Court is not (yet) prepared 
to pierce.1176 Again, however, a caveat has to be introduced. Before the Supreme Court 
delivered its judgment, the highest administrative court in the Netherlands, the Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
                                                
1171 Hof ’s-Gravenhage 16 November 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BO4175, para 8. Cf. Van Gestel & Micklitz 
2013, p. 162. The court of appeal added that this is not altered by the fact that public officials may initiate the 
development of or changes in the NEN standards, or can be on the committees setting the standards. Moreover, 
the standards only contain technical requirements and as such do not set out rules. The court also points at the 
fact that the equivalence clause of the BD allows the construction industry to opt for alternative ways to comply 
with the legal requirements. As a final point, the court remarks that cost-wise (the costs for obtaining the NEN 
standards are passed on to other parties) the system does not lead to unacceptable consequences either. See 
Hof ’s-Gravenhage 16 November 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BO4175, paras 9-13. See also Van Gestel & 
Micklitz 2013, pp. 162-163. 
1172 HR 22 June 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW0393, NJ 2012/397 (Knooble/Staat), para 3.8.  
1173 This is not to say that NEN standards cannot play a legally significant role as Rb. Rotterdam 28 May 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:4578 illustrates. Here, the court held, with reference to the dominant objective of NEN 
standards (creation of objective security and safety) and the fact that clients often select a company for the very 
reason that they apply such standards, that the insurer was allowed to apply NEN standards as one of the 
touchstones in assessing whether the insured party had taken all required precautionary and safety measures. The 
fact that the standards were not included in the policy conditions did not derogate from this conclusion. 
1174 Hof ’s-Gravenhage 16 November 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BO:4175, para 8; HR 22 June 2012, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW0393, para 3.8. 
1175 Van Gestel & Micklitz 2013, pp. 176, 165; Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 31 December 2008, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BG8465, para 4.11. 
1176 Van Gestel & Micklitz 2013, p. 153. This is in sharp contrast to the ruling in the Fra.bo, where de CJEU did 
look beyond the public-private divide. See also Van Gestel & Micklitz 2013, pp. 153, 169-177. 
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State), had already reached a similar conclusion in another case.1177 Herewith, the Court was 
from a procedural perspective more or less compelled to follow the line of argument of the 
Council of State, as Van Gestel and Micklitz note. Otherwise, from the perspective of legal 
unity there would be an undesirable clash between the two highest courts in the 
Netherlands.1178 In this light, it was not up to the Supreme Court to pierce the private veil, at 
least, not in this case. 
 
6.4.2 The Supreme Court and industry codes of conduct 
 
6.4.2.1 Endorsement of the use of industry codes of conduct by courts of appeal 
 
In some of its rulings, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of private rules by courts of 
appeal, without delving into the legal relevance of these rules itself. A first example in this 
respect is the Supreme Court ruling in a dispute between the Netherlands Inspection Service 
for Horticulture (Naktuinbouw), an inspection and certification agency, and a grower of 
strawberries. This grower, who was not in a direct business relationship with Naktuinbouw, 
had bought plants that suffered from mites, which should not have been the case as the plants 
had been certified by Naktuinbouw. This gave rise to the question whether Naktuinbouw had 
committed an unlawful act against the grower. The court of appeal held that Naktuinbouw had 
violated its Certification Regulation by issuing certificates for the plants concerned. 
Consequently, Naktuinbouw was held liable by reason of a wrongful act since “buyers, like 
the grower in this case, should be able to rely on the trustworthiness of the certificates issued 
by NAK, in the sense that the inspections leading to certification are conducted in conformity 
with the Certification Regulation”.1179 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in cassation. 
In doing so, the Court arguably agreed with the relevance of the Certification Regulation in 
scrutinizing the conduct of Naktuinbouw, even though the Regulation itself was not in 
question in the case before the Court.1180  
 Likewise, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeal was allowed to use the fact that 
the then valid technical standards for gas installations (GAVO-voorschiften) had been 
infringed as an argument to substantiate its claim that there had been a violation of a norm 
aimed at protection against a specific danger.1181 In ING/Verdonk q.q., the Court validated the 
decision of the court of appeal to dismiss the plaintiff’s reliance on the Insolad Rules of 
bankruptcy trustees: “apart from the legal status of the rules, of which the court of appeal also 
took account, the judgment of the court of appeal that the current situation is not covered by 
                                                
1177 ABRvS 2 February 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BP2750. 
1178 Van Gestel & Micklitz 2013, p. 163. 
1179 HR 29 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA0895 (Aarbeienmijt), para 3.2. 
1180 Aarbeienmijt, paras 3.2-3.3. On this case, see also Giesen 2008, p. 788; Van der Heijden 2012, p. 18; 
Verbruggen 2014d, under 5. 
1181 HR 13 July 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA4200 (X./Fortis Insurance), paras 3.3.1, 3.3.5. Giesen 2008, p. 789 
also touches upon this ruling. 
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(Article 7.2 of) the rules is not incomprehensible”.1182 In another judgment, the Supreme 
Court concurred with the decision of the court of appeal to take the rules of conduct for 
lawyers as its starting point in the assessment of the contractual relationship between the 
parties to the proceedings by dismissing the cassation appellant’s arguments directed at this 
decision.1183  
 The Court also endorsed the far-reaching stance of the Enterprise Division of the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal in the Versatel case.1184 The Amsterdam Court of Appeal, more 
specifically, not only founded its ruling on the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, but also 
extended the reach of this Code beyond its intended scope of application, i.e., listed 
companies. In short, the court of appeal held that, given the facts of the case, the principles of 
the Code remained applicable even though Versatel no longer classified as a listed company. 
Accordingly, Versatel was not allowed to deviate from the principle on conflicts of interest 
and the accompanying best practice provisions, despite the ‘comply or explain’ nature of the 
Code.1185 This has led some scholars to conclude that the rulings of both the Supreme Court 
and the court of appeal equate the legal force of the Corporate Governance Code with that of 
legislation.1186 Others deduced from these judgments that the principles of reasonableness and 
fairness included in Article 2:8 DCC can set aside the Code’s ‘comply or explain’ nature.1187  
 Finally, it can be pointed at Bouwhuis/Dexia Bank Nederland, delivered in the aftermath 
of the lingering securities lease affair.1188 Two years before, in 2009, the Supreme Court had 
already established that providers of security lease products have a special duty of care 
towards the buyers of these products. This duty of care in brief entails that the provider has to 
warn a buyer about the residual debt risk, and that he has to conduct an income and assets test 
prior to the conclusion of the securities lease agreement, with the ensuing obligation to advise 
the buyer to refrain from concluding the agreement in case the results of this test show that 
the agreement would lead to an unacceptably high financial burden for the buyer.1189 The 
Bouwhuis/Dexia Bank Nederland case, which elaborates on these 2009 Dexia cases,1190 
revolved around the formula used by the court of appeal to establish the financial room of the 
                                                
1182 HR 22 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA2511, NJ 2007/520 (ING/Verdonk q.q.), para 3.5 (discussed by 
Giesen 2008, p. 788). It should be noted that this judgment has been delivered in a case different to that which 
gave rise to the court of appeal judgment involving the Insolad Rules that I discussed in section 6.3.2.2.3. 
1183 HR 8 January 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BK0163, NJ 2010/43 (R./Moonen Vastgoed B.V.), para 3.5.3. 
1184 HR 14 September 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA4887, NJ 2007/612 (Versatel II). 
1185 Hof Amsterdam (Enterprise Division) 14 December 2005, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2005:AU8151, para 3.6. On 
this case, see Giesen 2007, p. 72; Memelink 2010, p. 48; Raaijmakers 2006, pp. 203-205; J.M.M. Maeijer, case 
note to HR 14 September 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA4887 (Versatel II), NJ 2007/612. 
1186 Raaijmakers 2006, p. 205; J.M.M. Maeijer, case note to HR 14 September 2007, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA4887 (Versatel II), NJ 2007/612, under 3. Cf. Memelink 2010, p. 48, pointing out that the 
ruling of the court of appeal concerned a preliminary injunction. According to Memelink, this could imply that it 
is still possible to deviate from the Code, but that this does not stand in the way of granting injunctive relief 
which declares the Code binding upon the parties concerned. 
1187 S.M. Bartman, case note to HR 14 September 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA4887, JOR 2007/239, under 4. 
1188 HR 5 April 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP4003, NJ 2013/41 (Bouwhuis/Dexia Bank Nederland). 
1189 HR 5 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2815, NJ 2012/182 (de Treek/Dexia); HR 5 June 2009, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2811, NJ 2012/183 (Levob Bank/Bolle); HR 5 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2822, 
NJ 2012/184 (Stichting Gedupeerden Spaarconstructie/Aegon Bank).  
1190 See J.B.M. Vranken, case note to HR 5 April 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP4003 (Bouwhuis/Dexia Bank 
Nederland), NJ 2013/41, under 1 and 10.  
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buyer of a securities lease product so as to assess whether there was an unacceptably high 
financial burden. According to the cassation appellant, this formula allowed “lending beyond 
what is and could be considered acceptable on the basis of the present and then valid codes of 
conduct [adopted by the VFN and the NVB, respectively, MM]”.1191 However, the appellant 
in cassation vainly sought recourse to the VFN and NVB Codes of Conduct on Consumer 
Credit. The Supreme Court in this respect first of all held that judges are allowed to use a 
general formula to assess the financial capacity, provided that this formula leaves sufficient 
room for weighing the individual circumstances of the buyer.1192 Thus, it was at the discretion 
of the court of appeal to decide which frame of reference it wished to use in this respect. 
Moreover, the Court points out, the codes of conduct referred to cover consumer credit rather 
than agreements on securities leases. According to the Court, the latter cannot be equated with 
the former. Furthermore, the respondent and the appellant in cassation held different views on 
whether it was desirable to take account of these codes of conduct in the calculation of the 
customer’s financial room as well as on the applicability of the ‘2% norm’ set out by the 
codes. All this led the Supreme Court, which did not voice any objections to the use of the 
VFN and NVB codes as such in this context, to conclude that the court of appeal was not 
obliged to apply the aforementioned codes as a yardstick.1193 
 As the Supreme Court takes a fairly passive stance in the judgments just discussed, the 
foregoing in effect does not tell us much about the attitude of the Court towards industry 
codes and other forms of private regulation. Giesen, however, submits that the first three 
cases allowed the Supreme Court to voice any objections against the legal relevance of the 
private rules concerned,1194 even though neither of the appeals in cassation prompted the 
Court to actively engage in a debate on the legal importance of rules.1195 In refraining from 
doing so, the Court has shown itself not unfavorably disposed to private regulation having 
legal significance, Giesen argues.1196 Even though this might hold true, the fact remains that 
the Court itself has kept silent upon the legal role of the private rules at issue and, 
accordingly, kept its attitude towards these rules veiled. 
 
                                                
1191 Conclusion Deputy Procurator General De Vries Lentsch-Kostense in Bouwhuis/Dexia Bank Nederland, 
ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BP4003, para 5.8. 
1192 Bouwhuis/Dexia Bank Nederland, para 4.2. Similarly: HR 29 April 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP4012, NJ 
2013/40 (Van der Heijden/Dexia Bank Nederland), para 4.1.2. This ruling also elaborates on the 2009 Dexia 
cases. 
1193Bouwhuis/Dexia Bank Nederland, para 4.5.2. Cf. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 1 April 2014, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:1135, paras 3.14-3.42, referring Bouwhuis/Dexia Bank Nederland.  
1194 Giesen 2008, pp. 789-790. He also discusses HBU/Groenendijk (see section 6.4.2.2.5 below), HR 13 July 
2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA3161, NJ 2007/505 (X./Staat) and HR 7 December 2007, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BB9613, NJ 2008/554 (Man/Vrouw). Since the latter two judgements involve rules adopted 
by a public law body (a Public Prosecution Service Guideline and a Regulations of the appellate courts 
concerning application proceedings, respectively), I will not be discussing them in this chapter. 
1195 In HR 22 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA2511, NJ 2007/520 (ING/Verdonk q.q.), the fact that the Insolad 
Rules were not applicable already formed sufficient grounds for dismissal. In the other two cases, the appellants 
in cassation did not broach the issue of the legal status of the rules. See Giesen 2008, pp. 788-789. 
1196 Giesen 2008, pp. 788-790. With regard to ING/Verdonk q.q. Giesen, more specifically, points at the fact that 
the Supreme Court passed over the opinion of Advocate General Wuisman, who argued that the Insolad Rules 
only carry limited legal force (ECLI:NL:PHR:2007:BA2511, para 2.7). Giesen however readily admits that there 
was no need for the Supreme Court to go into this statement. 
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6.4.2.2 Supreme Court’s own interpretation of the legal relevance of industry codes of 
conduct 
 
The judgments discussed in this section shed more light on the matter: in these judgments the 
Supreme Court took a more ‘active’ approach in assessing the legal relevance of the private 
rules concerned.  
 
6.4.2.2.1 ABN Amro case 
 
A first example in this respect is the judgment in the ABN Amro case. Here, the Court itself 
held that the Dutch Corporate Governance Code reflects the prevailing juridical view in the 
Netherlands.1197 According to the Court, this view is a relevant factor in substantiating the 
principles of reasonableness and fairness included in Article 2:8 DCC and the requirement 
imposed on a director by Article 2:9 DCC to properly perform its tasks.1198  
 
6.4.2.2.2 Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan 
 
Simplified, the dispute in Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan (1996) centered upon the question 
whether Van der Tuuk Adriani, a pharmacist, was enriched in an unjustified way by the take-
over of the pharmacy of Batelaan, a general practitioner.1199 The court of appeal in this 
respect assigned relevance to the so-called BACO Agreement, concluded between the 
professional associations of pharmacists and medical practitioners. This agreement provides 
guidelines to fix the take-over price to be paid by a pharmacist that takes over the pharmacy 
of a general practitioner. These guidelines do not apply directly to individual pharmacists and 
medical practitioners; for these groups, the rules are of a non-binding, advisory nature.1200 
The Supreme Court used the BACO Agreement as an important argument in establishing that 
the court of appeal had not erred in law.1201 The Court thereby referred to the fact that it 
follows on from the adoption of the BACO Agreement that the respective professional 
associations have deemed it fair and just to compensate the general practitioner’s loss of 
                                                
1197 HR 13 July 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA7972, NJ 2007/434 (ABN Amro), paras 4.4, 4.8. Herewith, the 
Supreme Court implicitly refers to Article 3:12 DCC in which this juridical view is included. See Memelink 
2010, p. 47; S.M. Bartman, case note to HR 14 September 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA4887, JOR 2007, 239, 
under 3. See earlier HR 21 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF1486, NJ 2003, 182 (HBG), where it was held 
that the views on corporate governance accepted in the Netherlands may constitute a source of legal rules, thus 
Eijsbouts 2010, pp. 55, 73. Cf., more generally, Conclusion Advocate General Langemeijer in HBG, 
ECLI:NL:PHR:2007:AZ9122, para 3.8 indicating that this view could be reflected in, for instance, codes of 
conduct. 
1198 HR 13 July 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA7972, NJ 2007/434 (ABN Amro), paras 4.4, 4.8. See also Memelink 
2010, p. 47; HR 9 July 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM0976, NJ 2010/544 (ASMI), para 4.4.2. Eijsbouts 2010, p. 
74 points out that the judgment is indicative of the fact that a corporate specification of the principles of 
corporate governance can thus give rise to specific obligations against shareholders and, perhaps, other 
stakeholders. 
1199 HR 15 March 1996, NJ 1997/3 (Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan). 
1200 Conclusion Advocate General Koopmans in Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan, para 3; J.B.M. Vranken, case 
note to HR 2 February 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AA9765 (Hulsman/Van der Graaf), NJ 2001/319, under 5. 
1201 J.B.M. Vranken, case note to Hulsman/Van der Graaf, NJ 2001/319, under 6. 
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income in the given circumstances. Van der Tuuk Adriani’s argument that the agreement was 
not directly applicable to the relation between the parties to the proceedings was of no avail as 
this had not been misunderstood by the court of appeal, the Supreme Court found.1202 As 
Vranken points out, the Court thus pulled private regulatory guidelines in the legal sphere as 
an expression of the fundamental conceptions of law in a certain societal circle and therewith, 
notwithstanding the voluntary and legally non-binding nature of the BACO Agreement for 
members of the professional associations, indirectly turned these guidelines into de facto 
binding norms.1203  
 
6.4.2.2.3 Trombose case 
 
The Trombose case (2001) revolved around the legal relevance of a hospital protocol.1204 The 
reason for the dispute to arise was the fact that a physician had forgotten to administer his 
patient anticoagulants after his knee operation, as stipulated by a hospital protocol. As a result 
of this omission, the patient sustained thrombosis. The patient sued both the hospital and the 
physician for damages and founded his claim directly on a breach of the hospital protocol. 
The court of appeal had held that the protocol applied to the relation between the physician 
and the patient as the rules, in short, fill out the duty of proper care of the physician (cf. 
Article 7:453 DCC). Furthermore, the court noted that the protocol was based on consensus 
between the hospital and its physicians on proper medical care. Against this backdrop, the 
court held that the failure to adhere to the protocol indeed constituted an attributable failure 
from the side of the physician, as the breach of the protocol did not rest on solid arguments, 
but rather resulted from the physician simply having forgotten to administer the 
anticoagulants.1205 The hospital and the physician appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, 
inter alia, that the infringement of the protocol was an insufficient ground for liability since 
the protocol had an internal scope: it only applied to the physician and the hospital itself. The 
court of appeal should have looked at the way in which a reasonably competent fellow 
physician, acting reasonably would have proceeded. In this regard, the court should have 
considered the degree of consensus within the medical profession on (the treatment prescribed 
by) the protocol.1206 The Supreme Court dismissed this argument and ruled that the appellate 
court, in the given circumstances, had not erred in law. The Court thereby rephrased the 
decision of the court in more general terms. It held that the protocol was based on consensus 
between the hospital and its physicians on proper medical care and that in principle both the 
                                                
1202 Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan, paras 3.6-3.8. After the judgment, the association of pharmacists unilaterally 
terminated the BACO Agreement. See J.B.M. Vranken, case note to Hulsman/Van der Graaf, NJ 2001/319, 
under 7. Cf. HR 2 February 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AA9765, NJ 2001/319 (Hulsman/Van der Graaf) where 
the Supreme Court affirmed the argument of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal that the BACO Agreement was not 
applicable to the specific case at hand, and Rb. Leeuwarden 4 December 2002, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2002:AF2583. 
1203 J.B.M. Vranken, case note to Hulsman/Van der Graaf, NJ 2001/319, under 8. Cf. Giesen 2007, pp. 23, 59. 
1204 HR 2 March 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0377, NJ 2001/649 (Trombose). 
1205 See the judgment of the Leeuwarden Court of Appeal, para 10-11 (published in NJ 2001/649). 
1206 Ground for cassation no. 1.1, as included in NJ 2001/649. 
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hospital and the physicians are expected to adhere to these self-imposed rules. One is only 
allowed to diverge from the protocol when desirable in the interests of proper patient care.1207  
 Thus, the Supreme Court founded its judgment that the physician was liable for the 
damages resulting from the breach of the protocol directly on the private rules. The protocol is 
assigned legal importance, yet without any references to the private nature of the rules.1208 
Admittedly, the appeal in cassation, as in the judgments discussed in section 6.4.2.1, did not 
(explicitly) raise the issue of the private nature. The lack of references can however be 
considered remarkable when one recalls the ‘Article 79 RO discussion’ in the previous 
section and the generally assumed lack of legal binding force of private regulation. What is 
more, the Trombose case, as the appellate court noted, in effect did center upon the question 
about the legal weight of the protocol.1209 Viewed from this perspective, one might have 
expected the Supreme Court to broach Article 79 RO or to at least touch upon the fact that the 
protocol contained private regulation. However, in forming its opinion on the legally binding 
force of the rules, the Court did not go into the issue. The fact that the rules rested on 
consensus between the hospital and the physician together with the ensuing obligation to 




Kouwenberg/Rabo (2003), together with Trombose, is perhaps one of the most well-known 
civil law cases involving private regulation.1210 The case revolved around the question 
whether a bank had failed to fulfill its duty of care towards a client involved in option trading 
by not adhering strictly to the overdraft limit of the client’s account. One set of rules 
applicable to this case were the Rules concerning trade on the options exchange (Reglement 
voor de handel op de optiebeurs, hereafter: RHO), governing the relation between the options 
exchange and the securities houses trading at the exchange.1211 Article 31m RHO, more 
specifically, concerning the overdraft limit, imposed an obligation on the bank to demand 
from its clients that they provide the cover required by the options exchange, before 
proceeding with option trading on behalf of these clients.1212 The court of appeal had already 
                                                
1207 Trombose, para 3.3.3. The Supreme Court adds that there was no need for the court of appeal to go into the 
argument that there was a lack of consensus within the medical profession on the treatment prescribed by the 
protocol, since the breach of the protocol resulted from the fact that the physician had forgotten to administer the 
anticoagulants. However, if the deviation from the protocol is made with a view to the patient’s interests, this 
consensus may become relevant (Trombose, para 3.3.3) See also Vranken 2005, pp. 92-93. Cf. HR 1 April 2005, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AS6006, NJ 2006/377 (X/ZAO), sustaining in para 3.4 that “a medical protocol is a guideline 
that in principle has to be observed, but from which one is allowed to divert provided that the patient is given the 
care that can be demanded from a reasonably competent doctor in the circumstances of the case. This implies 
that divergence from the protocol has to be substantiated. At the same time, however, compliance with the 
protocol does not naturally equate with correct behavior”. Giesen 2007, pp. 31, 77-78, 105 discusses this ruling. 
1208 Cf. Vranken 2005, p. 93. 
1209 Judgment of the Leeuwarden Court of Appeal, para 4 (published in NJ 2001/649). 
1210 HR 11 July 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7419, NJ 2005/103 (Kouwenberg/Rabo). 
1211 The client had signed a declaration to the effect, inter alia, that the RHO was applicable to the relationship 
between the client and the bank. See Conclusion Advocate General Verkade in Kouwenberg/Rabo, 
ECLI:NL:PHR:2003:AF7419, para 2.2. 
1212 Vranken 2006, p. 72. 
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ruled that this obligation does not imply that a bank always has to refrain from option trading 
when the required cover cannot be provided.1213 The client appealed to the Supreme Court, 
challenging inter alia this decision of the court of appeal. One of the arguments advanced by 
the client in this regard entailed the claim that the RHO constituted law within the meaning of 
Article 79 RO. The Supreme Court started out by agreeing with the decision of the court of 
appeal as regards the scope of Article 31m RHO. Subsequently, it dismissed the claim that the 
RHO is to be considered ‘law’. According to the Court, “the RHO, which concerns private 
regulation, does not meet the criteria developed in Supreme Court case law in order to be 
qualified as law”.1214 Finally, the Court provided a list of viewpoints that have to be used as a 
yardstick in assessing the scope of the bank’s duty of care. The RHO are one of the factors 
that have to be taken into account in this respect.1215 The subsequent application of these 
viewpoints on the facts of the case, eventually made the Court reach the decision that the bank 
had failed to live up to its duty of care.1216 
 Vranken has shown himself critical of the Supreme Court’s line of argument, pointing out 
that the Court could have reached the same decision directly on the basis of the RHO.1217 
Instead, however, the Supreme Court “distanced itself from the Rules” by holding that the 
RHO amounted to no more than a viewpoint in establishing the duty of care of the bank 
towards its client, Vranken argues.1218 With the judgment remaining silent about the reasons 
for going down the ‘viewpoints route’, it is difficult to pinpoint why the Court chose to 
attribute only limited legal weight to the RHO, as Vranken notes. Does the refusal of the 
Court to qualify the RHO as ‘law’ echo through at this point? Is the Court’s reticence, in other 
words, caused by the fact that the RHO contains private regulation? Vranken submits that it 
may indeed have been the RHO’s lack of a legal nature that led the Supreme Court to its 
current approach, yet at the same time does not rule out the possibility that the Court’s 
approach follows on from its interpretation of the RHO.1219 What does become clear, 
however, is that the barrier raised by Article 79 RO in the end did not prevent the Supreme 
Court from taking account of the RHO, albeit the private origins of the rules might have 





                                                
1213 Judgment Court of Appeal ’s-Hertogenbosch, para 4.10.1 (published in NJ 2005/103). 
1214 Kouwenberg/Rabo, para 3.5.3. 
1215 Kouwenberg/Rabo, para 3.6.3. See also Vranken 2005, p. 90. 
1216 Kouwenberg/Rabo, para 3.6.4. See also Vranken 2005, p. 90. 
1217 Vranken 2005, p. 91. Additionally, it can be noted that the RHO undisputedly aims to protect the interest of 
the bank’s clients, as the Supreme Court itself already held in HR 26 June 1998, NJ 1998/660 (Van de 
Klundert/Rabobank), para 3.6. Cf. HR 24 January 1997, NJ 1997/260 (D./Internationale Nederlanden Bank) and 
HR 23 May 1997, NJ 1998/192 (Rabobank/Everaars), where the RHO also played a role. 
1218 Vranken 2005, pp. 90-91. English quotation taken from Vranken 2006, p. 72. 
1219 Vranken 2005, p. 91. Cf. Giesen 2007, p. 100. Additionally, it can be pointed out that the ‘viewpoint 
approach’ and the ensuing role of the RHO already follow on wordily from HR 26 June 1998, NJ 1998/660 (Van 
de Klundert/Rabobank), para 3.6. As the appellant in cassation did not broach the status of the RHO under 





In HBU/Groenendijk (2007), the Supreme Court used the Code of Conduct on the Processing 
of Personal Data by Financial Institutions (Gedragscode Verwerking Persoonsgegevens 
Financiële Instellingen) in determining the reach of the statutory right to receive an overview 
of the personal data processed (Article 35 Wbp). Considering that the Code forms an 
elaboration of the provisions of the Wbp and that as such it has been formally approved by the 
DPA, the Court more specifically held that the scope and content of the aforementioned right 
“partly depend on the rules of the code in this respect as well as on the circumstances of the 
case”.1220 Accordingly, the Court used several provisions of the Code to found its line of 
argument.1221 
 Interestingly, it is the Supreme Court itself that brings up the private rules; neither the 
appellate court nor the appellant in cassation had made mention of the Code.1222 Advocate 
General Verkade, by contrast, does refer to the Code and briefly reflects upon the relation 
between the Code and Article 79 RO in what he calls ‘a diagnosis of the status of the code of 
conduct’ (statusdiagnose). He concludes that the mere fact that the DPA has approved the 
Code does not turn it into ‘law’. According to Verkade, judges are not bound to the industry 
interpretation of the Wbp reflected in the Code, yet it is possible that “reliance on the Code by 
one of the parties should be considered as a viewpoint or an essential argument that judges 
need to decide upon”1223. As Giesen rightly remarks, the Supreme Court does not seem to 
concur with the view of the Advocate General. The Code plays a rather important part in the 
Court’s reasoning (‘partly depend on’), without a single word being mentioned about the legal 
status of the Code, but with the Supreme Court in fact presenting the rules as binding. The 
private rules therewith seem to amount to more than a viewpoint or an essential argument, 
Giesen argues.1224 The fact that the Supreme Court draws the private rules in at its own 




                                                
1220 HR 29 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA3529, NJ 2007/639 (HBU/Groenendijk), para 3.7. Discussed by 
Giesen 2008, pp. 788-789; Van der Heijden 2012, pp. 183-184. Similarly: HR 29 June 2007, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ4664 (Dexia/Verweerder) and HR 29 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ4663, NJ 
2007/638 (Dexia/Van Steenoven). 
1221 Cf. Giesen 2008, p 789. 
1222 In substantiating his argument, the cassation appellant did refer to the applicable European legal framework, 
legislative history, literature and case law. He also made some remarks from the perspective of comparative law. 
Against this backdrop, it is even more striking that a code of conduct, explicitly mentioned in both the European 
and the Dutch legal frameworks was overlooked (cf. Chapter 4, section 4.4.1.1.3 under i). 
1223 Conclusion Advocate General Verkade in HBU/Groenendijk, ECLI:NL:PHR:2007:BA3529, para 4.13. 
Additionally, the Advocate General notes that an actor can become contractually bound to the Code by referring 
to the rules in a contractual relationship with a client. This can result in obligations for the legal actors that go 
beyond what is required by the Wbp, but cannot lead to a derogation from the provisions of the Wbp to the 
detriment of the client. The Advocate General concludes by pointing to the fact that industry peers who do not 
subscribe to the Code may have the appearances against them when they interpret the Wbp in a more restrictive 
fashion, particularly when the elaboration of open norms is concerned. See Conclusion Advocate General 
Verkade in HBU/Groenendijk, ECLI:NL:PHR:2007:BA3529, para 4.14. 





Central issue in the appeal in cassation in the Pretium/Tros case (2011),1225 concerning the 
lawfulness of the broadcasting of visual material collected with a hidden camera, was the role 
of the Guidebook for Journalistic Behavior (Leidraad voor de Journalistiek) of the 
Netherlands Press Council. One of the provisions of this Guidebook concerns the use of 
hidden recording equipment. Neither the court of first instance nor the court of appeal had 
referred to the Guidebook in establishing the lawfulness of the broadcast. Wrongly, according 
to Pretium, the appellant in cassation. The appellate court should have decided the case on the 
basis of the applicable private rules, as the Guidebook is generally considered unwritten law 
within the meaning of Article 6:162(2) DCC. Tros violated the Guidebook and hence 
committed an unlawful act, Pretium claimed.1226 The Advocate General argued that the 
Guidebook cannot be equated with current Dutch law and deemed it highly unlikely that this 
plea would be successful. The Advocate General in this respect referred to the line of case law 
establishing that a violation of disciplinary or professional rules, to which the Guidebook 
bears resemblance, does not necessarily equate to unlawful conduct, but rather serves as an 
indication that a legal norm or a standard of care has been breached. 1227 The Supreme Court, 
in its turn, did not agree with the proposition of Pretium either. The lawfulness of the disputed 
behavior had to be assessed by balancing the interests and circumstances involved. The 
journalistic standards included in the Guidebook could in this respect not be considered “a 
criterion that has to be applied as a matter of law”, but rather constituted “a condition which, 
as a rule, will carry some weight, but which will not necessarily be decisive”.1228  
 With the appellant in cassation expressly advocating that the Guidebook carried legal 
significance, the Court had to rule on the legal role of the private rules. Clearly, the Supreme 
Court did not wish to follow Pretium in its apparently too far-reaching qualification of the 
Guidebook as ‘unwritten law’ and its ensuing conclusion that the violation of the rules 
(therefore) amounted to an unlawful act. However, the Court fails to provide the reasons 
behind its decision. Several scenarios can be thought of in this respect. The wordings of the 
judgment (the Guidebook is not ‘a criterion that has to be applied as a matter of law’) suggest 
that the lack of a legal nature, resulting from the private origins of the rules, has induced the 
Court to adopt a reticent attitude, limiting the legal weight of the rules to no more than a 
relevant factor in the context of the judicial balancing exercise.1229 However, following on 
                                                
1225 HR 8 April 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP6165, NJ 2011/449 (Pretium/Tros) 
1226 Pretium/Tros, NJ 2011/499 - Notice of Appeal, notably I.1-I.4; E.J. Dommering, case note to HR 8 April 
2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP6165 (Pretium/Tros), NJ 2011/449, under 1. 
1227 Conclusion Advocate General Huydecoper in Pretium/Tros, ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BP6165, paras 16, 22.  
1228 Pretium/Tros, para 3.3.2. Cf. HR 5 October 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW9230, NJ 2012/571 (Endemol/SBS 
& Peter R. de Vries/Koos H.). In this case, the court of appeal balanced the interests and circumstances involved, 
whereby it assigned relevance to the private journalistic standards. The Supreme Court held that the appellate 
court had applied the correct yardstick. 
1229 Noticeable in this respect is the remark of the Advocate General that the Guidebook cannot be equated to 
current law since the content of the private rules on the use of hidden cameras more or less coincides with the 
rules formulated in case law (Conclusion Advocate General Huydecoper in Pretium/Tros, 
ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BP6165, para 23). One could infer from this argument that there was no need to take 
account of the Guidebook, since it would lead to a similar result if the case was decided on the basis of the 
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from the reasoning of the Advocate General, the decision of the Court could also have been 
dictated by its judgments concerning disciplinary rules.1230 Alternatively, the judgment may 
have been inspired by factors pertaining to the manner in which the profession itself applies 
the Guidebook, such as the fact that its status is not undisputed within the profession.1231 It is 
thus difficult to draw firm conclusions as to how the Pretium/Tros judgment is to be 
interpreted at this point. Be that as it may, it can be concluded that the Supreme Court did not 




The Achmea/Rijnberg case (2014) forms, for now at least, the tailpiece of the Supreme 
Court’s case law on private regulation.1232 The dispute arose following the decision of an 
insurance company to terminate the invalidity insurance of an insured person. This decision 
was based on the results of a personal inquiry into the activities of this person, which revealed 
that he had furnished the insurance company with false information regarding his work-
disability. In the judicial procedure that followed, both the insurance company and the insured 
person referred to the GPO in substantiating their respective claims. This led the district court 
and the court of appeal to deploy the GPO as the central touchstone in assessing the 
permissibility of the personal inquiry.1233 Accordingly, the case came to revolve around the 
question whether the insurance company had lived up to the GPO and, if not, what 
consequences this should have for the information obtained through the personal inquiry.1234 
 The applicability of the GPO as a central assessment framework was also beyond dispute 
in the appeal in cassation, where the insurer challenged the appellate court’s interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                   
applicable legal rules. This of course begs the question whether, against the backdrop of the line of case law on 
disciplinary rules, things would have been different had there been no case law on the use of hidden cameras. 
1230 Cf. section 6.3.3.2. Dommering also seeks a link between the ruling and the line that follows on from the 
Court’s case law on disciplinary and professional rules. See E.J. Dommering, case note to Pretium/Tros, NJ 
2011/449, under 1, 3-4. In my opinion, this would not be a fully convincing foundation of the Court’s argument. 
The rules set out by the Guidebook on the use of hidden camera’s more or less coincide with the rules 
formulated in case law, as the Advocate General points out (Conclusion Advocate General Huydecoper in 
Pretium/Tros, ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BP6165, para 23). Viewed from this perspective, it appears difficult to 
maintain that the purpose of the rules at issue is merely to guard the quality of professional conduct, as the 
rationale behind the line of case law on professional and disciplinary rules assumes. Admittedly, however, 
drawing a distinction between professional rules that meet this rationale and rules that have a different purpose 
might be too much of a differentiation.  
1231 See E.J. Dommering, case note to Pretium/Tros, NJ 2011/449, under 1-5. 
1232 HR 18 April 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:942, NJ 2015/20 (Achmea/Rijnberg). For an analysis of this case in 
the light of earlier Supreme Court rulings involving private regulation, see Menting 2015. 
1233 The district court thereby held that the GPO had been complied with and that, hence, the personal inquiry 
was justified. This decision was overturned on appeal. According to the appellate court, the insurance company 
had intruded on the privacy of the insured person, which, in absence of a justification defense, constituted an 
unlawful act. This implied that the evidence gathered through the personal inquiry had been obtained illegally. 
The court eventually decided to exclude the evidence. The fact that the company, in the view of the court of 
appeal, had been in breach of the code, played an important part in the appellate court’s judgment. See Rb. 
Middelburg 29 September 2010, ECLI:NL:RBMID:2010:BO9418 and Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 4 September 2012, 
ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BX9465. 
1234 Cf. Menting 2015, p. 106. See also Rb. Middelburg 29 September 2010, ECLI:NL:RBMID:2010:BO9418, 
paras 2.1-2.6, 4.1; Conclusion Advocate General De Vries Lentsch-Kostense in Achmea/Rijnberg, 
ECLI:NL:PHR:2014:77, para 20. 
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the GPO as well as the court’s reasoning with respect to the exclusion of the evidence. The 
Supreme Court in this respect first and foremost stated that a personal inquiry such as the one 
under dispute violates the right of the insured party to privacy protection. Such a violation is 
in principle unlawful, unless a ground for justification applies. The presence of any such 
ground has to be ascertained on the basis of a balancing of interests: the right to privacy 
protection has to be weighed against the interest of the insurance company to prevent, detect 
and combat fraud.1235 Here, the GPO plays a decisive role: 
 
“With the Code of Conduct, the Dutch Association of Insurers has, also in the interests of the 
insured, sought to specify the aforementioned balancing of interests, particularly by including an 
obligation for insurance companies to observe the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. It 
follows on from the introduction that the Code of Conduct seeks to link up with current 
legislation in the field of privacy, such as the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act and legislation 
on the (secret) use of camera’s. Regarding the content and purpose of the Code of Conduct, it can 
be taken as a starting point that a violation of the Code by an insurance company constitutes an 
unjustified and therewith unlawful intrusion on the privacy of the insured person.”1236 
 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court held that deployment of the GPO as a central 
framework for assessment was rightly beyond dispute: the insurers’ decision to hold a 
personal inquiry had to be assessed on the basis of the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity as embodied in the GPO. However, the Court mentions in passing, the GPO 
cannot be considered law within the meaning of Article 79 RO since it is based on self-
regulation. Consequently, the Court held, the correctness of the appellate court’s 
interpretation of the code cannot be reviewed in cassation.1237 The following assessment of 
the grounds of cassation eventually led to a dismissal of the appeal in cassation.1238 
 So, instead of turning straight to the grounds for cassation put up by the appellant in 
cassation, the Supreme Court first dedicated some general considerations to the role of the 
GPO. It is not uncommon for Supreme Court rulings to start out with a general proposition or 
general reflections. What is exceptional is that the current propositions concern private 
regulation. The Court rarely rules on private regulation in such general terms.1239 Moreover, 
in the light of the judgments preceding this case, it would have been reasonable for the Court 
to adopt a slightly cautious approach. In fact, it could have confined itself to referring to 
Article 79 RO and, in doing so, agree with the reasoning of the appellate court. Instead, the 
Supreme Court, as in the Trombose ruling, choose to cast aside the reservations that it might 
previously have had by lending the private rules decisive legal force, using express and 
general wordings. Herewith, the Court has conferred far greater legal importance on private 
regulation than in most other rulings. The private nature of the rules is thereby only referred 
                                                
1235 Achmea/Rijnberg, para 5.2.1. 
1236 Achmea/Rijnberg, para 5.2.1. 
1237 Achmea/Rijnberg, para 5.2.1. 
1238 The Supreme Court, more specifically, ruled that the court of appeal’s interpretation of the GPO was not 
incomprehensible and that the court did not err in law with its subsequent decision to exclude the evidence 
obtained through the personal inquiry. See Achmea/Rijnberg, paras 5.3.1-5.4.2. 
1239 The Trombose ruling forms the main exception here. See Menting 2015, pp. 106-107. 
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to in passing in the guise of Article 79 RO, without derogating from the legal significance of 
the rules. Viewed in the light of this judgment, the suggestion that the private origins of a 
regulatory scheme may be of influence on its legal weight loses force.1240  
 Arguably, the Court already prescribes how the GPO is to be applied, before even having 
touched upon the grounds of cassation. In doing so, Article 79 RO is in effect brushed aside. 
This once more highlights that this statutory provision does not conclusively steer decisions 
of the Supreme Court on the legal importance of private regulation (cf. section 6.4.1.2). What 
is more, the Supreme Court seems to tie in with one of the lines that can be inferred from the 
lower courts’ body of case law, namely that courts are generally inclined to apply private 
regulation when the parties to the proceedings agree upon its applicability. After all, in 
Achmea/Rijnberg, the Supreme Court follows these parties in taking the GPO as the central 
framework for assessment. Strengthened by the fairly explicit way in which the Court 
proceeded, this apparent link with one of the lower courts’ lines of case law may offer new 




6.4.3.1 The approach of the Supreme Court 
 
The picture that emerges from the discussion in the previous subsections is that the Supreme 
Court, perhaps contrary to what might have been anticipated with a view to Article 79 RO, 
does not always adopt a dismissive approach towards industry codes. In fact, the private 
origins of these codes and the ensuing lack of fit with the notion of ‘law’ ex Article 79 RO 
have not withheld the Court from attributing legal relevance to industry codes of conduct. The 
Supreme Court went down different routes in this respect, adopting both a passive (affirming 
the use of codes of conduct by courts of appeal) and an active approach. As regards the latter, 
the case law discussed shows that industry codes have been employed as one of the 
viewpoints in carving out blanket clauses (Kouwenberg/Rabo, Pretium/Tros), as an 
expression of the prevailing juridical view (ABN Amro) within a social circle (Van der Tuuk 
Adriani/Batelaan), as a weighty argument (‘partly dependent on’) in the interpretation of a 
statutory right (HBU/Groenendijk) and in a decisive, self-standing role (Trombose, 
Achmea/Rijnberg). Thus, at first blush, it seems fair to say that the Court does not seem to be 
unfavorably disposed to attaching legal relevance to industry codes.1243 
 On closer analysis, however, there is a contrast between the judgments that catches the 
eye: the legal weight that the codes of conduct have assumed varies. The important role of the 
codes in Van der Tuuk/Adriani and Trombose was followed by a more marginal one in 
Kouwenberg/Rabo. And after having considered an industry code as a partly determinative 
factor in HBU/Groenendijk, the Supreme court took a more reticent stance in Pretium/Tros. 
                                                
1240 I already made these observations in Menting 2015, pp. 106-108. 
1241 Menting 2015, pp. 107-109, 111. 
1242 The analysis partially draws on one I conducted earlier in Menting 2015. The overlap between the analyses 
will be marked through references to the relevant sections of that publication. 
1243 Similarly: Giesen 2008, pp. 788-790. 
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The latter case in turn, is followed by the explicit ruling in the Achmea/Rijnberg case. The 
ensuing picture is that of an ambiguous approach. This most notably comes to the fore when 
contrasting the Kouwenberg/Rabo and Tros/Pretium with Trombose and Achmea/Rijnberg. 
Whereas the industry codes concerned carried important legal weight in the latter two 




These observations raise the question as to how the Supreme Court decides whether an 
industry code of conduct bears legal significance. Thus far, the Court has not been particularly 
explicit about the reasons underlying its approach. In Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan, it 
seems to base its conclusion that the BACO Agreement bore legal relevance on the fact that 
the agreement resulted from consensus of the adopting professional organizations on the rules 
included in it. Similarly, in Trombose the Supreme Court seems to found its decision that the 
self-imposed hospital protocol had legal relevance on the fact that the protocol rested on 
consensus between the hospital and its physicians. The code of conduct that played a role in 
HBU/Groenendijk was drawn into the legal sphere with reference to the fact that it formed a 
‘DPA approved’ specification of the Wbp. In Achmea/Rijnberg, the legal binding force of the 
GPO appears to have been motivated by substantive criteria. The Court referred to the 
‘content and purpose’ of the GPO, which in fact encompassed the following five features of 
the GPO: the fact that its adoption was also in the interests of the insured, its purpose, its 
contents (notably the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity), its compulsory nature, 
and its link with current privacy legislation. Regarding these features, the framework set out 
by the GPO reflects the balancing of interests that has to be applied as a yardstick in case of 
violations of the right to privacy protection. The ‘fitness’ of the private rules in this respect 
led the Supreme Court to lend the GPO decisive legal binding force.1245 Additionally, with the 
ruling seemingly linking up with the lower courts’ approach at this point, the employment of 
the GPO as a central framework for assessment may have been motivated by the fact that 
there was consensus between the parties to the proceedings on the applicability of the GPO.  
 Whereas in neither of these four judgments nor in ABN Amro (where the Court did not 
apply any ‘criteria’), the private nature of the industry code at issue played a role, it does 
appear to have been a relevant factor in Kouwenberg/Rabo and Tros/Pretium. More 
specifically, in the latter two judgments the Court seems to have used the private, non-legal 
nature of the rules as an argument to mitigate their legal weight. The criteria of Article 79 RO 
might have echoed through in this regard.1246 Admittedly, however, it cannot and should not 
                                                
1244 A good illustration is the contrast between Pretium/Tros and Achmea/Rijnberg. While the starting point was 
similar in both cases, namely a balancing of interests, the role assigned to the applicable private rules in this 
respect differed widely. In Pretium/Tros, the Court dismissed the argument that a violation of the Guidebook 
amounted to an unlawful act, limiting the legal role of the Guidebook to that of a relevant factor. In 
Achmea/Rijnberg, by contrast, the Court held with respect to the GPO that a violation of the private rules was in 
effect unlawful. 
1245 Menting 2015, p. 108. 
1246 See the remarks to the Pretium/Tros judgment (section 6.4.2.2.6) and Vranken 2005, pp. 90-92 with respect 
to the Kouwenberg/Rabo judgment.  
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be ruled out that the Court’s decision has been motivated by other arguments, as was already 
submitted during the discussion of the judgments. It is therefore difficult to put a finger on the 
source of the reticence that the Court displays in these cases. 
 What can be inferred from these observations as to how the Supreme Court decides upon 
the legal relevance of industry codes? To put it briefly: there is no consistency in the Court’s 
case law at this point. As the Supreme Court does not state the reasons behind its approach, it 
is difficult to ascertain whether the aforementioned elements can be considered criteria used 
by the Court to establish the legal significance of the private rules concerned, or whether these 
elements are just arguments that fit the context of the case. The Court still appears to decide 
upon the applicability and legal relevance of industry codes on a case-by-case basis.1247 An 
explanation for this ambiguous approach might be found in the procedural context in which 
the Supreme Court cases are embedded, which limits the Court’s room for maneuver.1248 
 
6.4.3.3 Procedural context 
 
The procedural environment within which the Supreme Court has ruled on the legal relevance 
of industry codes of conduct differs from the procedural context in which the lower court 
cases involving private regulation were situated.1249 These differences might explain the 
ambiguous nature of the Supreme Court approach towards industry codes, as opposed to the 
more unequivocal approach of the lower courts at this point. First of all, it can be noted that 
only few cases involving industry codes have reached the Supreme Court. These cases 
moreover tend to be the ‘problematic ones’, in that the industry codes are, in one way or 
another, subject to dispute (e.g., because of a lack of consensus between the litigants about the 
applicability of the code). This complicates the development of a more uniform approach. The 
procedural framework of Article 79 RO, which does not affect the lower courts, further 
complicates the matter. Following the narrow conception of ‘law’ laid down by Article 79 
RO, the Supreme Court can exert only limited control: it can subject the lower court’s 
interpretation and application of a code of conduct to a marginal review only. As such, Article 
79 RO has even given rise to the impression that industry codes cannot have legal binding 
force.1250 However, as several scholars indicate1251 and as the case law analysis conducted in 
this chapter affirms, this impression does not hold true: industry codes have been assigned 
legal relevance, in spite of Article 79 RO. The majority of the Supreme Court rulings 
                                                
1247 As was already noted in 2009 by Kristic, Van Tilburg and Verbruggen (2009, p. 203). 
1248 Cf. Giesen 2008, pp. 788-790. Illustrative in this respect are the ‘approval cases’, where the Court did not 
need to delve into the nature and legal relevance of the rules concerned, since these issues had not been raised by 
the parties to the proceedings, and Pretium/Tros, where the explicit argument of the appellant in cassation 
caused the Court to have to consider the legal role of the Guidebook. 
1249 Cf. section 6.3.3.2 where the role of ‘procedural context’ in the case law of the lower courts was discussed. 
1250 As suggested by Giesen 2007, p. 45. 
1251 See Giesen 2007, pp. 45-51; Korthals Altes 2005, no. 25; Teuben 2004, pp. 201-202, 229-230; Kristic, Van 
Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009, p. 200; E.J. Dommering, case note to HR 29 June 2007, 




discussed in this section do not even make mention of the provision.1252 Furthermore, Article 
79 RO has not withheld the Court in Trombose and Achmea/Rijnberg from de facto ruling on 
the manner in which the private rules at issue must be applied. The results of this have been 
aptly described by Dommering: the fact that private regulation in principle cannot be 
considered law for the purposes of Article 79 RO “does not prove an obstacle to the Supreme 
Court in explaining vague open norms or the specification of the standard of due care. Thus 
sailing around the tight law/facts scheme of Article 79 RO, various pseudo-legal sources 
sneak in and are ‘interpreted’ by the Supreme Court”.1253 Nonetheless, Article 79 RO still 
remains determinative as to the degree of control that the Court can exert.1254 As such, it can 
still complicate the development of a more uniform approach. 
 However, neither the problematic nature of the cases nor the formal confines of Article 
79  RO have to be an obstacle for the Supreme Court to rule on the legal relevance of 
industry codes in general terms and in a more explicit fashion. After all, in its capacity of 
developer of the law, the Supreme Court can seize questions of law concerning industry codes 
of conduct as an opportunity to expressly rule on the legal relevance of such codes, these 
procedural obstacles notwithstanding. Thus far, however, the Supreme Court has refrained 
from doing so. Rather, it mainly seems to proceed on the basis of a casuistic approach. As 
signaled by Kristic, Van Tilburg and Verbruggen, this leads to legal uncertainty as regards the 
legal relevance of codes of conduct and other forms of private regulation in Dutch private 
law.1255 Therefore, it is time for the Supreme Court to step up a gear and to unequivocally 
express its opinion on the private law relevance of industry codes of conduct in general terms. 
How the Court should exactly go about in this regard will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
6.4.3.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The discussion in this section shows that, notwithstanding the orientation of Article 79 RO on 
‘public’ rules, the Supreme Court has been willing to take industry codes of conduct on board 
and to assign them legal relevance. However, the Court does not seem to have unequivocally 
defined its position on the legal significance of industry codes as of yet. The contrasting of the 
Supreme Court judgments unveiled that the Court occasionally kept private rules at a 
distance. At the same time, however, in its for now latest judgment in the Achmea/Rijnberg 
case, the Court seems to have adopted a more open attitude. In this judgment, the Court not 
only attached more relevance to private regulation than in most of its previous rulings, but 
also appeared to tie in with the approach of the lower courts. However, it still remains to be 
seen whether the Court will continue to travel this path, as Achmea/Rijnberg was featured by 
a continuing background presence of Article 79 RO and did not contain general statements or 
                                                
1252 This may have to do with the issues that the appellant in cassation brings to the fore in the grounds for 
cassation. When these grounds contain explicit complaints as to the interpretation and application of private 
regulation by the appellate courts, then the Supreme Court brings into play Article 79 RO. 
1253 E.J. Dommering, case note to HR 29 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA3529 (HBU/Groenendijk), NJ 
2007/639, under 8. 
1254 Cf. also Giesen 2007, pp. 45-51; Korthals-Altes 2005, no. 25; Teuben 2004, pp. 201-202, 229-230. 
1255 See also Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009, p. 203. 
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criteria on the legal relevance of private regulation (cf. the casuistic nature of the Court’s 
approach).1256 Hence, it cannot be ruled out that in a following judgment, the Court retraces 





This chapter has sought to unveil how the Dutch judiciary deals with industry codes of 
conduct in civil law cases. As already follows from my choice of words in the foregoing, I 
have not committed myself to any firm conclusions at this point, since most courts are not 
particularly explicit about the reasons underlying their decision on the legal relevance of 
industry codes of conduct. Nonetheless, within the limitations that case law analysis entails, it 
has been possible to deduce some general lines from the judgments discussed. In this closing 
section, I will seek to tie these lines together. 
 
6.5.1 The Dutch judicial approach 
 
In 1989, Van Driel advocated that courts should make use of private regulations more often 
when delivering their judgments.1257 Almost three decades later, it can be concluded that the 
Dutch judiciary has shown itself responsive to this call, at least in respect of industry codes of 
conduct. In 2008, Giesen already indicated that private regulation was attracting more 
attention in civil case law, at least optically.1258 Either as a cause or as a consequence of the 
predominantly responsive attitude of the Dutch judiciary signaled above, judicial references 
to industry codes in the case law of the lower courts have continued to increase, going by the 
number of lower court judgments discussed in this chapter. In the case law of the Supreme 
Court, by contrast, industry codes are making less numerical headway.  
 Generally, lower courts as well as the Supreme Court have shown willing to take industry 
codes on board and to assign them legal relevance The private, non-legal nature of the codes 
has not withheld courts from doing so. Accordingly, industry codes have assumed legal 
relevance as a viewpoint, as an argument or as a standard for assessment in establishing civil 
law liability or, more generally, in deciding private law disputes. Particularly noticeable in 
this respect is the approach that appears to be taking shape in the case law of the lower courts, 
which has thus far not been observed in Dutch private law literature. When the binding force 
or applicability of a code of conduct is beyond dispute, district courts and courts of appeal 
readily take account of the code, without reservation. This approach contrasts sharply with the 
case-by-case approach that the Supreme Court takes. Thus, contrary to what Giesen observed 
in 2008, the lower courts rather than the Supreme Court appear to have taken the lead in 
                                                
1256 Menting 2015, p. 111. 
1257 Van Driel 1989, pp. 167-168. 
1258 Giesen 2008, p. 785. 
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assigning legal relevance to codes of conduct through their ‘consensus = legal application’ 
approach. Their reported hesitant attitude has vanished, at least for the most part.1259  
 At the same time, however, it should be noted that as of yet matters have not fully 
crystalized. The case law analysis included several judgments in which the litigants’ reliance 
on an industry code was of little or no avail. In these cases, courts have distanced themselves 
from the private rules, either by disregarding the rules or by conferring upon them only 
limited legal relevance. At this point, the slightly ambiguous nature of the Dutch judicial 
approach comes to the surface. On the one hand, the private origins of industry codes have 
not prevented courts from taking account of the codes, sometimes even founding their 
judgments directly on these codes. On the other hand, it may have been precisely this non-
legal nature that stood in the way of codes of conduct assuming legal significance in other 
judgments. Yet, without the courts clearly motivating their decisions at this point, it remains 
difficult to put a finger on the source of this reticence that courts occasionally display. More 
specifically, it remains unclear how the legal relevance of an industry code is to be 
determined in cases where the approach of the lower courts cannot be applied, i.e., cases in 
which there is no consensus between the parties to the proceedings on a code’s binding force 
or applicability. The picture that emerges from the case law of the lower courts at this point 
varies. Whereas in some cases, codes were assigned legal relevance, in spite of the lack of 
consensus, they were denied such relevance in others, whereby courts advanced different 
arguments.1260 The Supreme Court rulings in Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan and Trombose 
might throw some light on the matter. Here, the Court dismissed the argument that the private 
rules at issue had internal legal effect only (i.e., in the relationship between the private 
regulator and the regulated actors) and assigned relevance to the rules in the external 
relationship between the parties to the proceedings. In both cases, the Supreme Court seems 
to found its decision on the fact that there was consensus about the rules in the internal 
regulator-regulated relationship.1261 The legal relevance of the private rules in these 
judgments can thus be said to be implicit in the internal consensus about the rules. 
 However, these two judgments shed no definite light on the matter, as the Court is, in the 
end, not overly explicit about the reasons underlying its decision. To clear the issue of the 
legal relevance of industry codes in cases where consensus about the binding force or 
applicability of a code is lacking from the side of the judiciary, more case law is needed.1262 
Considering the findings of this chapter, the ball is also expressly in the court of the Supreme 
Court at this point, which can be said to stand at a crossroads here with its recent ruling in the 
Achmea/Rijnberg case.1263 The Supreme Court can no longer hide itself away from the matter 
                                                
1259 See Giesen 2008. 
1260 As discussed in section 6.3.3.3 of this chapter. 
1261 HR 15 March 1996, NJ 1997/3 (Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan), para 3.7: “as appears from the formation of 
the ‘BACO Agreement’, not only the professional organization of the physicians, but also that of the pharmacists 
have deemed reasonable the payment to be made by the pharmacists in cases such as the present one” and HR 2 
March 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0377, NJ 2001/649 (Trombose), para 3.3.3 where the Supreme Court 
indicated that it was not in dispute that the protocol rested on consensus between the hospital and its physicians. 
1262 In Chapter 7, I will explore which possible legislative, judicial and private avenues exist to provide clarity in 
these situations. 
1263 Menting 2015, p. 111. 
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and will have to unequivocally express its opinion on the legal relevance of industry codes in 
general and on the aforementioned ‘lack of consensus cases’ in particular. Parties to the 
proceedings and their lawyers also have a role to play here. After all, it is in first instance up 
to them to bring the applicable private rules to the table in civil law disputes and to provide 
the information necessary to facilitate the judicial assessment of these rules.1264 This interplay 
between parties to the proceedings and the judiciary can contribute to a further crystallization 
of the legal role of industry codes of conduct. 
 
6.5.2 Binding force: Some theoretical reflections 
 
In the course of the case law analysis, I implicitly parked the question on the source of the 
binding force to which several lower courts refer in their judgments. As noted in section 
6.3.3.3, some judgments do make clear where this binding force comes from, while other 
judgments remain silent in this regard. The latter set of judgments provides food for some 
brief theoretical reflections on where this binding force stems from and on the implications of 
these judicial references.1265  
 Giesen has distinguished three ways in which industry codes of conduct and other forms 
of private regulation can gain binding force in Dutch private law.1266 First of all, the law (or 
the legislator for that matter) can form the basis for this binding force. Examples included 
cases where a private regulatory scheme is formally recognized by the legislator, where 
private standards are incorporated into public regulation or where the private rules are 
adopted by a private actor that is statutorily empowered to regulate certain issues, as is the 
case with several professional bodies.1267 Secondly, one can become bound to private 
regulation by choice or, as Giesen has termed it, on the basis of consensus (cf. the principle 
of private autonomy). Here, the fact that one has agreed to abide by the private rules renders 
the rules binding.1268 Generally, this consensus is reflected in organizational or contractual 
commitments. The first category of commitments comprises instances in which private actors 
acquire membership of a trade association or professional body that has adopted the private 
rules (as is the case with many industry codes of conduct). Subscription to the rules then 
constitutes a condition for membership or ‘automatically’ follows on from the affiliation with 
the industry association through the association’s bylaws. The second category of 
commitments refers to cases in which private regulation is included in a contract or where 
                                                
1264 Menting 2015, p. 111; Giesen 2007, p. 791-792. Cf. Vranken 2005, p. 85. 
1265 With the case law analysis, in line with the scope of this thesis, being limited to industry codes of conduct, 
this subsection will not address the specificities of corporate codes of conduct in this respect. On the binding 
force and judicial enforcement of these codes in a private law context, see, e.g., Beckers 2015 (for Germany and 
the UK); Vytopil 2015; Peterkova-Mitkidis 2015; Van der Heijden 2012.  
1266 Giesen 2007, pp. 60-75. 
1267 Giesen 2007, p. 60; Verbruggen 2013, p. 2; Verbruggen 2014a, pp. 273-275; Benvenisti & Downs 2012, pp. 
132; Cafaggi 2011a, p. 22. Cf. Schwarcz 2002, pp. 324-326. 
1268 Giesen 2007, pp. 62-66. Cf. Cafaggi 2011a, p. 22, noting that once the subscription to a private regulatory 
scheme is a fact, compliance with the rules is no longer voluntary and can be enforced. 
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private actors become signatories to a private regulatory scheme that takes the shape of a 
contractual arrangement.1269  
 
It should be noted that the consensus to which Giesen refers is different from the consensus to 
which lower courts refer in assigning legal relevance to industry codes. Giesen refers to the 
internal consensus about the code as between the private regulator and the actors regulated by the 
code, as reflected in the associational or contractual commitment of the latter actors. The 
consensus to which the lower courts refer is that between parties to the proceedings: the private 
actor that applies the code (the regulated actor) and the other party. 
 
Thirdly, private regulation can gain binding force through open norms. When courts use 
private regulation to substantiate open norms, they confer binding force upon these rules, 
according to Giesen.1270  
 The fact that the ‘binding force references’ are made before courts take an industry code 
into consideration implies that the source of the binding force lies outside the courtroom, i.e., 
either in the law or in consensus. Frequently, private actors subscribe to an industry code of 
conduct on the basis of consensus, i.e., an organizational commitment or a contractual 
commitment. These commitments are, broadly speaking, assumed in relation to the private 
regulator. Hence, the obligation to comply with the rules in principle arises in the private 
regulator-regulated actor relationship (and possibly also in relation to fellow-regulated 
actors). The source of the binding force of an industry code that is founded on consensus thus 
lies in this relationship. Viewed from this perspective, judicial enforcement of the code of 
conduct is limited to these internal relationships.  
 However, the civil law cases discussed in this chapter for the most part revolved around 
the legal relevance of industry codes in the relation between the private actor that applies the 
code (the regulated actor) and the third-party beneficiaries of these rules, i.e., actors that are 
the beneficiaries of the rules, yet stand outside the internal private regulator-regulated 
relationship (such as consumers).1271 Arguably, the fact that many private regulatory schemes 
are accompanied by enforcement mechanisms that can also be invoked by the third-party 
beneficiaries reflects that there is also a commitment towards these actors. Yet, from a legal 
perspective, the binding force lies in the ‘internal’ relation between the regulator and the 
regulated, except in those cases where the private rules are formally declared applicable to the 
‘external’ relationship between the regulated actor and the third-party beneficiaries, in one 
way or another (e.g., as part of the contract, as a clause in the general terms and conditions1272 
or simply by means of a declaration that the code is applicable). However, if such a 
declaration is lacking, the regulated actors are, strictly speaking, not under a formal obligation 
to comply with the rules in their external relationship with the third-party beneficiaries. After 
                                                
1269 Cafaggi 2012b, p. 3; Giesen 2007, p. 64-65; Menting 2017 (forthcoming). 
1270 Giesen in this respect explicitly refers to Article 3:12 DCC as a ‘gateway’ for private regulation to the realm 
of private law. More specifically, private regulation can be drawn in as an elaboration of ‘the current juridical 
views in the Netherlands’ that this provision refers to. See Giesen 2007, pp. 68-69.  
1271 Cafaggi 2011a, p. 32 describes these third-party beneficiaries as “those who are supposed to benefit from 
compliance with the regulation and are harmed by their violation”. 
1272 See, e.g., Peterková Mitkidis 2015, pp. 153-163; Beckers 2015, pp. 47-58. 
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all, in these cases the regulated actors have only formally undertaken a commitment to follow 
the rules vis-à-vis the private regulator, not in relation to these beneficiaries. 
 Yet, the judgments in which the lower courts have pointed at the binding force of an 
industry code without referring to the source of this binding force remain silent in this regard. 
In these cases, courts readily assigned legal relevance to the codes, without pausing over any 
of the observations made above. On the one hand, this could imply that the binding force 
referred to did stem from an incorporation of the code into a contract or into general terms 
and conditions, or from the fact that the code was formally declared applicable to the external 
relationship. On the other hand, however, with references to the source lacking, it cannot be 
ruled out that the binding force referred to originated from the organizational or contractual 
commitment undertaken by the regulated actor vis-à-vis the private regulator. Should this 
hold true, it would imply that as soon as a private industry actor has ‘internally’ consented to 
abide by an industry code of conduct, through either an organizational or contractual 
commitment, the industry actor also takes on an obligation to comply with the code vis-à-vis 
third-party beneficiaries of the code once it engages in a (legal) relationship with these 
beneficiaries. As follows from the fact that lower courts have proceeded to assign legal 
relevance to codes of conduct that have binding force, this would be a legally enforceable 
obligation. The legal relevance that lower courts assign to codes of conduct in these cases 
would thus in effect build on ‘internal consensus’,1273 which would stretch the scope of the 
binding force originally assumed beyond its confines.  
 
6.5.3 Closing remarks 
 
The general observation that Dutch civil courts are open to attributing legal significance to 
industry codes of conduct is not groundbreaking: several Dutch private law scholars have 
reached the same conclusion.1274 However, the case law analysis shows that the scale on 
which this occurs is far greater than hitherto assumed. As a result of the predominantly ‘open’ 
approach of the Dutch judiciary towards industry codes of conduct, enabled by the open 
nature of the Dutch private law system,1275 industry codes have entered the realm of private 
law. As Giesen indicates, this judicial reliance on industry codes has three effects running in 
parallel. First of all, it leads these codes to pass the ‘judicial gate’ of the framework 
legislation-adjudication and to gain legal binding force accordingly. Secondly, in passing this 
gate, the codes are enforced by the courts and in some instances subjected to judicial 
interpretation. Thirdly, judicial reliance on industry codes can lead to the local development 
of law, i.e., in respect of the private actors that have subscribed to the code and the third 
parties who are in a relationship to these actors where said relationship is covered by the code. 
According to Giesen, this ‘law-creating effect’ particularly arises when the courts use the 
                                                
1273 Cf. the discussion in section 6.5.1 on the implications of the Supreme Court judgments in Van der Tuuk 
Adriani/Batelaan and Trombose. Cf. at this point also Akkermans 2011, p. 513: “it would in any case probably 
be better to not conceive of this legal binding force as indirect, i.e., as stemming from the legislator or the judge, 
but as a quality that can be inherent to societal regulation in various degrees” (my own translation). 
1274 Notably, Giesen 2008 and 2007; Vranken 2006; Van Driel 1989; Kristic, Verbruggen & Van Tilburg 2009. 
1275 Giesen 2007, p. 72; Snijders 2007, p. 14. 
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code rules to give substance to an open norm under private law. The rules accordingly 
become an expression of what is right in law.1276 Viewed from such a perspective and against 
the background of this chapter, this suggests, to speak with Vranken, that private regulation 



































                                                
1276 Giesen 2007, pp. 97-102, 130; Giesen 2008, p. 785. 














By raising the question on the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct in a multi-layered 
Dutch private law, this doctoral thesis broaches a subject that has thus far aroused relatively 
limited interest among Dutch civil lawyers. Generally, Dutch private law literature devotes 
only little attention to the notion of private regulation of B2B and B2C relationships. At the 
European level, by contrast, the regulatory nature of European private law and private 
regulation have managed to catch the attention of scholars of private law.1279 A possible 
explanation for the relative lack of interest of Dutch civil lawyers in the topic can be found in 
the idea of codification (codificatiegedachte), enshrined in Article 107 of the Dutch 
Constitution.1280 Following the belief that general private law rules should in principle be laid 
down in the Dutch Civil Code, Dutch civil lawyers automatically focus on the central, 
national legislator when confronted with issues of regulation.1281 The prevailing doctrine 
when it comes to private regulation is still that of the ‘exclusivity’ of the legislator: it is the 
legislator that, in concerted action with the civil courts, develops private law,1282 wrongly, as 
the findings of this research show. Codes of conduct are ubiquitous in European and Dutch 
private law, where they play an important (regulatory) role, both at the level of industry 
associations and at the level of individual companies.1283 This doctoral thesis shows, on the 
basis of perspectives that are new to the Dutch private law debate (an empirical perspective, 
the functions, the perspective of the legislator and the European perspective), that these codes 
have legal relevance in Dutch private law through legislation and case law. 
                                                
1278 Smits 2015a, p. 546 (summary). 
1279 On the regulatory nature of European private law, see, e.g., Micklitz 2009; Cafaggi & Muir Watt 2009 and 
the European Regulatory Private Law’ (‘ERC-ERPL’) project conducted at the European University Institute 
(<https://blogs.eui.eu/erc-erpl>, accessed 1 July 2016). The previous chapters of this doctoral thesis already 
referred to European private law literature on private regulation. 
1280 Article 107(1) reads as follows: “Civil law, criminal law and civil and criminal procedure shall be regulated 
by Act of Parliament in general legal codes without prejudice to the power to regulate certain matters in separate 
Acts of Parliament”. Translation taken from the English translation of the Dutch Constitution (2008) provided by 
the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations. This translation is available at 
<www.government.nl/topics/constitution/documents/regulations/2012/10/18/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-
the-netherlands-2008> (accessed 1 July 2016). 
1281 Menting & Vranken 2014, pp. 7-8. 
1282 Vranken 2005, pp. 79, 82; Menting & Vranken 2014, p. 8. 
1283 For a private law perspective on corporate codes of conduct concerning CSR issues, see, e.g., Beckers 2015; 
Peterková Mitikidis 2015; Vytopil 2015; Van der Heijden 2012. 
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 In this concluding chapter, I first of all present the main findings of the research, 
whereupon I answer the central research question (section 7.2). Having sketched the broader 
implications of these findings for Dutch private law (section 7.3), I step outside the confines 
of central research question and address the frequently raised question of the need for some 
form of regulation of the use of industry codes in Dutch private law on the basis of a brief 
exploration (section 7.4). I close the chapter with an outlook (section 7.5). 
 
7.2 Findings and conclusion 
 
7.2.1 Findings: New developments 
 
In this section, I will discuss the main research findings, focusing on those findings that are 
new to the Dutch private law debate or have thus far remained underexposed. This means I 
will be discussing the following: the functions of industry codes of conduct (section 7.2.1.1), 
the European developments (section 7.2.1.2) and the developments in Dutch civil case law 
(section 7.2.1.3). 
 
7.2.1.1 Empirical insights: Industry codes of conduct and their functions 
 
The 80 European and Dutch industry codes of conduct studied in the course of the empirical 
inquiry into the functions of these codes highlight that many industry associations - small and 
large, European and national - use codes of conduct to regulate certain aspects of private law 
B2B and B2C relationships.1284 These industry codes can have various functions, at both the 
European level and the Dutch level. Codes can, for instance, play a role in offering protection 
to consumers (protective function), in fleshing out public rules with sector-specific norms 
(complementary function), in setting and raising the quality standards within an industry 
(quality control function) and in positioning an industry vis-à-vis its stakeholders (e.g., as 
‘socially responsible’ - signaling function). More specifically, the overview of the functions 
compiled on the basis of the empirical study shows that industry codes can have functions that 
are comparable to those of public regulation, and in some instances even take over these 
functions. Examples include industry codes that regulate a matter of public interest, such as 
advertising, consumer protection or privacy, and codes that are employed by the government 
as an alternative or complement to legislation and regulations (policy instrument function), as 
has for instance occurred in the field of consumer law and as part of the audiovisual media 
policy of the EU. These empirical insights contrast with the picture drawn in section 7.1, in 
which private law regulation is regarded as being exclusively within the domain of the 
legislator and the judiciary. 
 The research design set out in Chapter 1 of this doctoral thesis envisaged the functions to 
play a role as important reference points and building blocks in determining the legal 
relevance of industry codes in Dutch private law. However, it followed on from the analysis 
                                                
1284 See Annex 1. 
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of the case law of Dutch lower courts that the conferment of legal relevance on industry codes 
already takes place in a more or less settled way (see section 7.2.1.3). Consequently, the 
initial idea of using the functions as a yardstick, prompted by the, in retrospect, outdated 
picture outlined by Dutch private law literature was consigned to the dustbin. This means that 
the functions will not be considered as such when answering the central research question. 
Nonetheless, they can play a role in addressing the question about the need for regulation of 
industry codes, as will be discussed in section 7.4. However, this role is now different from 
the role that the functions were envisaged to play following the initial research design. 
 
7.2.1.2 European Union 
 
The European legislator and the Court of Justice of the European Union have expressly 
assigned legal relevance to industry codes in European private law. What stands out is that the 
way in which these actors proceeded in this respect partially differs from the approach taken 
by their Dutch ‘counterparts’. 
 
 European legislator: References in European directives 
The use of alternative regulatory instruments, such as codes of conduct, has grown into one of 
the cornerstones of EU legislative policy. Although doubts can be expressed as to the extent 
to which this policy is actually implemented,1285 this has resulted in the use of industry codes 
of conduct as an alternative or complement to EU legislation in several European private law 
policy domains (e.g., a code of conduct for unfair B2B commercial practices and a code of 
conduct concerning age classification for online games). However, the EU has not limited 
itself to the deployment of codes as a policy instrument. Industry codes of conduct have also 
been given a place in several European private law directives that in this respect call upon the 
European Commission and the Member States to foster the development of industry codes or 
entail direct references to codes of conduct.1286 The latter statutory references have as a result 
that codes of conduct become embedded in Dutch private law (through the implementation of 
the directives in the Dutch Civil Code) and can, in some instances, gain direct legal 
consequences.  
 
More specifically, as discussed in Chapter 4, the statutory references have resulted in: codes of 
conduct entering the realm of private law through pre-contractual information duties;1287 codes 
that possibly assume a certain legal status;1288 or even in codes gaining direct legal binding force 
on the basis of private law (under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive1289). As a 
                                                
1285 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.1.6. 
1286 See the different European private law directives discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.4.1.1. 
1287 These duties can be found in the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU), the Services Directive 
(2006/123/EC), the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) and the Timeshare Directive (94/47/EC). See Chapter 
4, section 4.4.1.1. 
1288 This is the case under the Data Protection Directive/General Data Protection Regulation (Directive 95/46/EC 
and Regulation (EU) 2016/679, respectively), the Food Safety Directive (2001/95/EC) and the Directive on 
Company Reporting (2013/34/EU). See Chapter 4, section 4.4.1.1. 
1289 Directive 2005/29/EC. See Chapter 4, section 4.4.1.1. 
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consequence, national courts in certain instances will have to apply the code of conduct at 
issue.1290 
 
 References in Dutch private law? 
Dutch private law, by contrast, entails only few such references.1291 The vast majority of 
direct statutory references to industry codes in Dutch private law stem from European 
directives. Hence, it can be concluded that the European legislator is far more active than the 
Dutch legislator when it comes to attaching legal consequences to codes of conduct.1292 
 
Whether the EU is more active right across the board is however difficult to ascertain on the basis 
of this research. On both the European level and the national level, industry codes are also used as 
a policy instrument without references being made in legislation and regulations. One can for 
instance think of cases in which the government exerts pressure on an industry to self-regulate or 
indicates in a policy document that it leaves regulation, in partial at least, to the industry itself.1293 
For the want of sufficient empirical data at this point, it cannot be ascertained on which scale this 
occurs in the European Union and in the Netherlands. Further research would provide us with a 
more definite answer about the matter. 
 
 The functional approach of the CJEU in free movement and competition law cases 
The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning private regulation 
diverges from Dutch civil case law at this point, in two respects. The first difference pertains 
to the context in which the legal proceedings are conducted. At the European level there are, 
broadly speaking, two possibilities: industry codes can be central to cases concerning free 
movement and competition or can play a role in the interpretation and application of 
European legislation, particularly when this legislation entails direct references to codes of 
conduct. Thus far, European judicial assessment of industry codes and other forms of private 
regulation has mainly taken place in free movement cases and competition law cases. By 
contrast, in the vast majority of Dutch civil law cases that I studied, industry codes were 
addressed under contract law or liability law.1294 Given the direct references to codes of 
conduct in European private law directives discussed above, it is however conceivable that the 
CJEU, urged on by prejudicial questions, will have to rule on the legal relevance of industry 
codes in the context of these directives at some time.  
 The second difference pertains to the approach of the CJEU. When viewed from the strict 
public-private divide in which the Treaty is traditionally perceived to be rooted, industry 
                                                
1290 Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.9 includes examples of cases in which Dutch courts were asked to rule upon a code 
of conduct in the context of unfair commercial practices (Article 6:193a et seq. DCC).  
1291 In fact, Chapter 4, section 4.4.2 only mentioned the Media Act 2008 as entailing references relevant within 
the context of this doctoral thesis.  
1292 This conclusion was already drawn in Menting & Vranken 2014, pp. 11-12, 21, building on almost similar 
data. 
1293 Examples of such references were discussed in Chapter 4, sections 4.4.1.2 (EU) and 4.4.2 (NL). 
1294 It should be noted that industry codes of conduct also play a role in Dutch competition law cases (and other 
‘public law’ cases). In the Netherlands, however, unlike in Europe, industry codes have also been subjected to 
judicial assessment in private law cases. With a view to the private law focus of this doctoral thesis, it was 
therefore decided not to take account of the Dutch ‘public law’ cases.  
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codes of conduct (of either a self-regulatory or co-regulatory nature) would readily fall 
outside the scope of both EU free movement law (addressed to Member States) and EU 
competition law (governing the economic conduct of private actors). However, private rules 
can just as well obstruct free movement or restrict competition. Against this backdrop, the 
CJEU found its way around the conceptual public-private obstacles by adopting a 
predominantly functional approach.1295 More specifically, by taking the nature and the effects 
of the regulatory activities as a point of reference, rather than the (private or semi-private) 
origins of the rules, the CJEU has brought (collective) private regulation within the scope of 
EU free movement law and competition law. 
 
The functional approach of the CJEU results in a certain degree of regulation of industry codes 
and other forms of (collective) private regulation. Private rules will have to keep in line with the 
rules on free movement and competition, subject to sanctions under national private law. 
Furthermore, the Court has been held to regulate private regulation by exempting private 
regulatory schemes that meet certain good governance requirements (pertaining to e.g., the 
composition of the regulatory body) from free movement law and competition law scrutiny in 
certain particular instances.1296 
 
Matters are partially different in Dutch civil case law, where the private origins of industry 
codes in some cases did appear to have played a role (see below). 
 
7.2.1.3 Dutch civil case law 
 
 Lower courts 
The picture that emerges from the analysis of Dutch civil case law is that the lower courts 
(i.e., district courts and courts of appeal) generally do not have much difficulty in assigning 
legal relevance to industry codes of conduct in civil law disputes. Nevertheless, there are also 
cases in which judges have kept their distance and assigned no legal relevance or only limited 
legal relevance to the code of conduct relied upon by parties to the proceedings. In few cases, 
the court’s decision at this point appeared to be motivated by the private nature of the code at 
issue.1297 
 As regards the lower court judgments in which industry codes were assigned legal 
relevance, the following conclusions can be drawn. In part of the case law studied, the 
decision to assign legal relevance to an industry code was self-evident. This is because the 
code concerned was already legally binding at the time it was brought up in the legal 
proceedings (e.g., because it had been declared applicable to the relationship between the 
parties to the proceedings, because it was included in the contract between these parties, or 
because it was formally acknowledged by the government). However, lower courts also 
                                                
1295 As submitted in Chapter 5, the approach of the Court still embodies some formal elements that do link up 
with the (public or private) nature of the regulator, both in free movement law (goods) and in competition law 
(the effect utile doctrine). See Chapter 5, particularly sections 5.4.5 (free movement) and 5.5.3 (competition). 
1296 As already argued by Mataija (2016) and Schepel (2002), and explained in Chapter 5, section 5.6. 
1297 See Chapter 6, section 6.3.2. 
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pursued their own course and assigned legal relevance to industry codes of conduct, when, 
briefly stated, there was agreement between the parties to the proceedings on the fact that one 
of these parties was bound to the code or on the applicability of a code. Thus, the approach of 
the lower courts is as clear as it is simple: when an industry code already has legal binding 
force, or when there is consensus between the parties to the proceedings on the binding force 
or the applicability of an industry code, then the code also bears legal relevance (e.g., as a 
substantiation of an open-ended legal standard, in the interpretation of a contractual clause, or 
as a self-standing argument in the determination of the legality of certain conduct. This 
approach of the Dutch lower courts has not been identified in any previous private law 
research on the topic. 
 From a procedural point of view, the approach of the lower courts will not come as a 
particular surprise. Pursuant to Article 149(1) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, lower 
courts have to accept as established “facts or rights stated by one party, that have not been or 
not sufficiently been contested”.1298 However, when contrasted with the arguments advanced 
in Dutch private law literature as regards the ways in which the legal relevance of private 
regulation is to be determined, the course steered by the lower courts can be called striking, 
with good reason. When the legal significance and quality of private regulation is brought up 
for discussion in private law literature, legal scholars usually put forward substantive (e.g., the 
comprehensibility and sustainability of the rules) as well as formal criteria (such as 
representativeness, level of support, public consultation, monitoring and accountability).1299 
Dutch lower courts, by contrast, do not apply such criteria.  
 
 Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has also assigned legal relevance to industry codes of conduct. The fact 
that these codes, due to their private origins, cannot be qualified as ‘law’ within the meaning 
of Article 79 RO did not prove to be an obstacle in this regard.1300 Moreover, the ensuing 
limitation of the intensity of the review in cassation has not withheld the Court from giving 
more general considerations to the role and binding force of the private rules at issue in 
Trombose and Achmea/Rijnberg.1301 Nonetheless, in some Supreme Court judgments the 
private nature of codes of conduct does seem to have played a role. In Kouwenberg/Rabo and 
Pretium/Tros, more specifically, the Court’s reticent attitude towards the private rules 
concerned, reflected in its decision to assign only limited legal relevance to these rules, 
                                                
1298 Jongbloed 2006, p. 245. See also Asser Procesrecht/Asser 3 2013, sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. On the influence 
of what I have termed ‘procedural factors’ on the lower courts’ approach, see Chapter 6, section 6.3.3.2. 
1299 Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009; Giesen 2007, pp. 138-142; Van Driel 1989, pp. 119-123; 
Akkermans 2011, pp. 513-514. Cf. also Vranken 2005, pp. 97, 100 and, in the context of administrative law, 
Scheltema 2016 and Polak 1986, pp. 220-222. For the European and transnational private law context, see, e.g., 
Cafaggi 2011b, pp. 124-125; Cafaggi 2014, p. 55; McHarg 2006, pp. 89, 93-94. 
1300 See Chapter 6, section 6.4.2.3.3 and the literature referred to in that section. 
1301 HR 2 March 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0377, NJ 2001/649 (Trombose) and HR 18 April 2014, 




appears to have been motivated by the private origins of the rules.1302 However, it cannot be 
ruled out that the Supreme Court founded its decisions on other considerations and 
arguments.1303 
 With these observations, we arrive at the difference between the lower courts and the 
Supreme Court. Whereas in the case law of the lower courts, a more or less fixed approach to 
determining the legal relevance of industry codes is taking shape, the Supreme Court still 
appears to determine this relevance on a case-by-case basis.1304 Considering this conclusion 
entirely on its own merits, it can be said that the lower courts are ahead of the Supreme Court 
at this point. In defense of the Supreme Court, it should be noted that the framework under 
procedural law within which the Court has to operate is different from that within which the 
lower courts have to take their decisions. The narrow conception of ‘law’ laid down in Article 
79 RO limits the room of maneuver of the Supreme Court, in that the Court’s review of 
industry codes is formally limited to an assessment of the comprehensibility of the lower 
court’s reasoning in respect of a code of conduct.1305 Furthermore, the cases presented to the 
Supreme Court are generally the ones in which disagreement exists as to the private rules at 
issue. However, these ‘procedural limitations’ do not derogate from the fact that the Supreme 
Court can still rule in general terms on the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct and 
other forms of private regulation. After all, given its general capacity of developer of the law, 
the Supreme Court can use questions of the law concerning industry codes as a stepping-stone 
to rule explicitly and in general terms on ‘the legal relevance issue’. Thus far, however, the 
Court has refrained from giving a general opinion on the issue, remaining within the formal 
confines of Article 79 RO.1306 This has resulted in a situation in which the Court does assign 
legal relevance to codes of conduct, yet seems to do so in a fairly casuistic fashion.1307 From a 
legal certainty perspective, this is an undesirable situation, the more so since by now industry 
codes of conduct are knocking firmly at the door of Dutch private law. Therefore, it is time 
for the Supreme Court to show its colors and to take on its role as a developer of the law to 
unequivocally and expressly rule on the legal relevance of industry codes in private law (see 
section 7.4.2.2, under ‘Supreme Court’). 
 
                                                
1302 HR 11 July 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7419, NJ 2005/103 (Kouwenberg/Rabo) and HR 8 April 2011, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP6165, NJ 2011/449 (Pretium/Tros) (discussed in Chapter 6, sections 6.4.2.2.4 and 
6.4.2.2.6, respectively). 
1303 Vranken for instance notes that the Supreme Court’s reticent attitude in Kouwenberg/Rabo could also have 
been prompted by the interpretation of the private rules concerned (Vranken 2005, p. 91). The Court’s decision 
in Pretium/Tros could also have been based on the settled line of Supreme Court case law on the legal 
significance of disciplinary rules (cf. Conclusion Advocate General Huydecoper in Pretium/Tros, 
ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BP6165, under 23) or on the way in which the profession itself has dealt with the 
Guidebook for Journalistic Behavior (E.J. Dommering, case note to HR 8 April 2011, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP6165 (Pretium/Tros), NJ 2011/449, under 1-5). These ‘alternative’ considerations were 
also discussed in Chapter 6, sections 6.4.2.2.4 and 6.4.2.2.6. 
1304 Albeit that the Supreme Court in Achmea/Rijnberg seems to tie in with the approach of the lower courts. See 
Chapter 6, section 6.4.2.2.7. The fact that the Court adopts a case-by-case approach at this point was already 
signaled by Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009, p. 205 and Giesen 2008, pp. 790-791. 
1305 More extensively: Chapter 6, section 6.4.2.3.3. 
1306 See also Chapter 6, section 6.4.2.3.3. 
1307 See also Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009, p. 201. 
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 Taking stock of Dutch civil case law: (lack of) clarity about legal relevance 
Taking stock, it can be concluded that the lower courts as well as the Supreme Court have 
assigned legal relevance to industry codes of conduct. The lower courts have adopted a more 
or less uniform approach in this respect, as opposed to the Supreme Court, which takes a far 
more casuistic approach. The approach of the lower courts, however, does not cover cases in 
which there is no consensus between the parties to the proceedings on the binding force or 
applicability of an industry code. This raises the question as to how in these cases the legal 
relevance of a code of conduct should be determined. Decisions given in the lower court 
judgments in which this scenario was at issue differ. In some of these judgments, codes were 
denied legal relevance with reference to the fact that the binding force or applicability of the 
rules could not be established in the case at hand. However, this did not withhold the District 
Court of The Hague from applying the rules on pharmaceutical advertising (from the 
Foundation for the Code for Pharmaceutical Advertising) on an industry actor that had not 
subscribed to them.1308 The Fire Insurance (Right of Recourse) Sectoral Regulations, by 
contrast, were not given such radiating effect.1309 And while the contestation of the binding 
force and applicability of the Franchise Code constituted a reason for the court to immediately 
put forward the private nature of the Code and, subsequently, to disregard the Code 
altogether,1310 the argument that the Fire Insurance (Right of Recourse) Sectoral Regulations 
only had internal binding force was brushed aside in another case, where in giving its 
judgment the court took account of the Regulations1311. Two Supreme Court judgments 
suggest that a difference of opinion on this point does not always have to affect the legal 
relevance of a code of conduct. In Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan, more specifically, the 
Supreme Court passed over the argument that the private rules at issue, drawn up by two 
professional organizations, were just guidelines and hence did not have direct effect in the 
legal relationship between two members of these professional organizations.1312 In a similar 
vein, in the Trombose case, the Court dismissed the claim that the hospital protocol only had 
internal binding force and therefore could not form a basis for liability of the physician to its 
patient.1313 In both judgments, the Supreme Court seems to attach importance to the fact that 
there was consensus between the authors of the private rules on the rules themselves.1314 
 
                                                
1308 Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 24 July 2004, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2004:AQ5353 (discussed in Chapter 6, section 
6.3.1.11). 
1309 Hof Amsterdam 2 March 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BN1316 (discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.5). 
1310 Rb. Noord-Nederland 29 November 2013, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2013:7307, para 5.15 (discussed in Chapter 6, 
section 6.3.2.2.1). 
1311 Hof ’s-Gravenhage 28 October 2008, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2008:BG2213, para 6 (discussed in Chapter 6, 
section 6.3.1.5). 
1312 HR 15 March 1996, NJ 1997/3 (Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan) (discussed in section 6.4.2.2.2). 
1313 HR 2 March 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0377, NJ 2001/649 (Trombose) (discussed in section 6.4.2.2.3). 
1314 See Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan, para 3.7: “as appears from the formation of the ‘BACO-agreement’, not 
only the professional organization of the physicians, but also that of the pharmacists have deemed reasonable the 
payment to be made by the pharmacists in cases such as the present one” (my own translation) and Trombose, 
para 3.3.3, where the Supreme Court indicated that it was not in dispute that the protocol rested on consensus 
between the hospital and its physicians. On these judgments, see also Giesen 2007, pp. 59, 78-79.  
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7.2.2 The legal relevance of industry codes of conduct in a multi-layered Dutch private 
law 
 
Considering the foregoing, the answer to the central research question on the legal relevance 
of industry codes of conduct in a multi-layered Dutch private law is that industry codes have 
legal relevance in Dutch private law as a regulatory instrument, as a policy instrument and as 
a viewpoint, as an argument or as a standard for assessment in civil case law in establishing 
liability under civil law or, more generally, in deciding private law disputes. As such, industry 
codes of conduct constitute an important manifestation of the (increasingly) multi-layered 
nature of Dutch private law. 
 In itself, this is not a new conclusion. In the relatively small body of Dutch private law 
literature on the topic, industry codes and other forms of private regulation are usually taken 
to have legal relevance.1315 Nonetheless, matters have still not fully crystalized: the eventual 
legal, law-developing (rechtsvormende) status of private regulation and the criteria to be 
applied in that respect, as well as the related question on the need to develop a framework for 
private regulation, remain recurrent themes within the Dutch debate. In other words, the 
question remains: how exactly should private regulation be dealt with? The developments 
described in this doctoral thesis, particularly those on the European level and the 
developments in the case law of the Dutch lower courts, in any case shed new light on this 
question. These developments not only show that industry codes bear greater legal relevance 
in Dutch private law than is assumed in the literature, but also make clear that such relevance 
is being shaped by European developments and lines in the case law of Dutch lower courts 
that have thus far remained underexposed or undiscussed in the private law debate being 
conducted here in the Netherlands. 
 
7.3 Broader perspective: Three (future) developments 
 
The conclusion that industry codes have legal relevance as a regulatory instrument, as a 
policy instrument and in civil case law seems perhaps straightforward. However, this vanishes 
when taking a closer look at the implications of the conclusion. From a broader perspective, 
my conclusion reveals three related, fundamental developments within private law. 
 
1) Unavoidable multi-layeredness 
The conclusion first of all underlines the unavoidability of the multi-layered nature of the 
European and Dutch private law legal orders.1316 Industry codes are present at the 
international, the European and the national level and play a well-established regulatory, 
steering role in many different fields. Nowadays, the legislator and the judiciary at both the 
European and the national level no longer keep themselves aloof from private regulation. As a 
                                                
1315 See, most notably, Akkermans 2011; Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009; Giesen 2007; Vranken 2005; 
Van Driel 1989. Cf. also Vytopil 2015 and the contributions in Weyers & Stamhuis 2003. 
1316 See Smits 2011 (EU) and Vranken 2005, pp. 94-99 (NL). From a more general perspective, see Smits 2015a; 
Smits 2015b and Van Gerven & Lierman 2010, particularly pp. 109-172. 
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consequence, private rules are percolating through European and Dutch private law, 
introducing a new form of regulation and lending private law a more hybrid nature.1317 Rules 
that are legally relevant to private law relationships no longer solely stem from the legislator 
and the judiciary,1318 but also originate from private actors themselves. Put more succinctly: 
the formation of private law (privaatrechtelijke rechtsvorming) in a multi-layered private law 
legal order to an increasing extent also takes place through international, European and 
national forms of private regulation.1319 Private law, as Smits puts it, has grown into “a 
network of various legal orders that exist side by side and overlap one another”.1320 
 
2) Tenability of the framework of legislation-adjudication 
The first development strikes at the roots of the exclusiveness of the “framework of 
legislation-adjudication”, which still dominates thinking in Dutch private law.1321 The 
research findings of this doctoral thesis highlight private law regulation as no longer the 
exclusive prerogative of the central legislator1322 and accordingly judges can no longer 
confine themselves to taking account of public regulation only when delivering a judgment. 
Neither the fact that the law-developing effect (rechtsvormende werking) of industry codes of 
conduct is ultimately still implemented by the legislator and the judiciary, nor the fact that 
this effect in the first instance occurs only at the local level (lokale rechtsvorming),1323 detract 
from the fact that private rules constitute the applicable legal norm.1324 Hence, it cannot be 
maintained that the legislator and the judiciary are the only developers of the law when it 
comes to private law: by now, industry codes are firmly and persistently knocking at the door 
of the framework of legislation and adjudication.1325 Accordingly, Dutch private law is faced 
with a problem that also exists in international law: what rules should be designated as a 
source of law and, next, what hierarchy exists among these sources?1326 In view of the 
developments that are taking place in (legal) practice, it is all but unavoidable that the 
framework of legislation and adjudication will be redeveloped at a certain point in time and 
that industry codes of conduct (and other forms of private regulation) will be given their own 
                                                
1317 Vranken 2005, p. 87 refers to this development as the ‘privatization of private law’. 
1318 One can however question whether regulation has ever been the sole prerogative of the State; the 
phenomenon of private regulation already existed in the Middle Ages, where guilds undertook their own 
regulatory activities. See, e.g., Cafaggi 2015, pp. 884-888, Janczuk-Gorywoda 2012, pp. 17-18; Van Gestel 
2000, pp. 25-27. 
1319 Giesen (2007, p. 104) in this regard speaks of private actors as a ‘third law-developing authority’ (next to the 
legislator and the judiciary). Akkermans (2011) refers to private regulation as a ‘source of legal norms’. In the 
transnational context, see Calliess & Zumbansen 2010. For an impression of the regulatory role of private 
regulation at the international level, see, e.g., Haufler 2001; Dilling, Herberg & Winter 2008; Mattli & Woods 
2009; Vogel 2010; Büthe & Mattli 2011. 
1320 Smits 2015a, p. 538 (my own translation). 
1321 Vranken 2005, p. 80. 
1322 Smits 2015a, pp. 523, 537; Vranken 2005, pp. 100-101. 
1323 That is to say that the effect of industry codes in terms of developing law is limited to the group of actors that 
have subscribed to the code and to those ‘third’ parties (i.e., parties that are affected by the private rules, yet are 
outside the private regulator-regulated relationship) that stand in a (legal) relation to the regulated actors covered 
by the code. See Giesen 2007, p. 102. 
1324 Akkermans 2011, p. 513. 
1325 Cf. Vranken 2005, p. 82. 
1326 For a recent discussion of this problem in international law, see, e.g., d’Aspremont 2013 and Thirlway 2014. 
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place as a source of law within that framework.1327 However, before this step can actually be 
taken, practice will have to crystalize further and more empirical research and research into 
legal theory will have to be conducted in order to release private law thinking from the 
traditional conceptual paradigms (see section 7.5). 
 
3) A new role for substantive private law 
The two preceding developments reflect the growing regulatory and law-developing 
importance of industry codes of conduct for substantive private law. By the same token, such 
growing importance increases the significance of substantive private law for industry codes. 
This becomes apparent when considering how frequently industry codes of conduct include 
‘third party rules’, i.e., rules that, broadly speaking, cover the (legal) relationship between the 
private actor applying the code and the other party to that relationship and, in doing so, grant 
certain ‘rights’1328 to this other party or, in very rare cases,1329 impose obligations on them. 
Viewed from this perspective, a more prominent role of industry codes in private law will 
prompt questions under substantive private law that have thus far not been raised in Dutch 
civil case law. One such question is whether the person applying the code of conduct, i.e., the 
regulated actor, can be held directly responsible under civil law for non-compliance with an 
obligation following on from the code. Another question is whether performance of an 
obligation under the code is demandable.1330 Thus, the rules of substantive private law retain 
their relevance, both in deciding upon the aforementioned questions and in establishing, for 
instance, whether an infringement of a code can give a right to compensation or can constitute 
a ground to suspend performance of an obligation. 
 
In my opinion, we should value positively the legal role and relevance of industry codes of 
conduct and their ensuing law-developing role in European and Dutch private law. This legal 
role and relevance are in keeping with the regulatory importance and reality of industry codes 
on the international, the European and the national level. Considering the three developments 
outlined in this section, the challenge for private law at this point lies in finding a modus 
vivendi with industry codes of conduct. A discussion of the exact design of this modus and the 
                                                
1327 Cf. Giesen 2007, p. 75, 104; Akkermans 2011, pp. 510-512. 
1328 It should be noted that industry codes generally do not directly grant ‘rights’ to third parties. Rather, they 
impose obligations on the private actors that have subscribed to the code. The ‘rights’ granted to third parties are 
the mirror image of these obligations. Thus, for the purposes of this chapter the term ‘rights’ is taken to denote 
the fact that third parties can benefit from industry codes in the sense that they may derive claims from these 
codes. Given this rather specific interpretation, the term rights will be put in quotation marks. Cf. Cafaggi 2011a, 
p. 32 who in this respect speaks of ‘third-party beneficiaries’, which he describes as “those who are supposed to 
benefit from compliance with the regulation and are harmed by their violation”. 
1329 The results of the empirical study suggest that industry codes very rarely impose obligations upon third 
parties. An example of such a code is the European Code of Ethics for Franchising, which imposes obligations 
on both the franchisor and the franchisee. The Code can be found at <www.eff-franchise.com> - Self 
Regulation/European Code of Ethics. Cf. also the Dutch Franchise Code (available at 
<www.franchise.nl/Franchise-Informatie/Nederlandse-Franchise-Code-ontwerp>). Websites accessed 1 July 
2016. 
1330 Cf. Beckers 2015, who has researched which possibilities German and English private law offer to enforce 
and sanction non-compliance with corporate codes of conduct concerning CSR.  
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legal theoretical questions that it carries1331 is beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis. 
However, the scope of this thesis does allow for a closer look at the more pragmatic question 
that the research findings and the three developments sketched above involve: the question of 
the need for regulation of industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law.  
 
7.4 Towards regulation of industry codes in Dutch private law? 
 
This section takes a closer look at the aforementioned regulation question, which is frequently 
raised in Dutch private law literature. In doing so, the section in fact steps outside the ambit of 
the central research question, yet without aspiring to conduct a full-fledged analysis (cf. 
Chapter 1, section 1.4.1). Rather, building on the findings and conclusions of this doctoral 
thesis, the aim is to throw some more light on the regulation issue in an exploratory way. 
 
7.4.1 Private law literature versus the findings of this doctoral thesis 
 
The pertinence of the question on the need for some form of regulation of industry codes of 
conduct is emphasized by the following two comments that can be made as regards the 
‘juridification’ of these codes. First of all, Dutch civil case law fails to provide clarity as to 
how to determine the legal relevance of codes of conduct when the binding force or 
applicability of a code is a point of contention. Do codes have legal relevance in these cases? 
Secondly, it should be noted that industry codes also embody features that can be considered 
problematic from a legal perspective.1332 Going by the literature at this point, these problems 
generally arise in relation to three areas: ‘drafting process and competence’, ‘content and legal 
value’, and ‘supervision and accountability’.1333 The problems within the context of ‘drafting 
process and competence’ in essence relate to the fact that from a traditional legal point of 
view, codes of conduct can lack democratic legitimacy.1334 In concrete terms and translated to 
the topic of this doctoral thesis, this means that a code of conduct, drafted by private actors 
that were not democratically elected, can affect the (legal) position of the other party of the 
private actor that applies the code (e.g., consumers and industry peers) by granting ‘rights’ to 
that party or, very occasionally, imposing obligations on that party, without this other party 
having been involved in the regulatory process in any way whatsoever.1335 Following on from 
                                                
1331 Such as the questions on the criteria that must be applied to designate certain rules as ‘law’ (cf. Article 79 
RO) or as a source of law, the question on the relation between the different sources of law, and the question 
whether the place of private regulation as a source of law in the framework legislation–adjudication is to be an 
independent one or whether it will remain subject to legislation and adjudication in one way or another. 
1332 For a general overview of the advantages and disadvantages of private regulation, see, e.g., Baldwin, Cave & 
Lodge 2012, pp. 137-146; Ogus 1995, pp. 97-99; Buck-Heeb & Dieckmann 2010, pp. 217-240; Giesen 2007, pp. 
35-39 and Verdoodt 2007, pp. 29-51, all with further references. 
1333 See Vranken 2005, pp. 92, 97; Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2012, p. 139. 
1334 Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2012, pp. 141-142, 145-146; Buck-Heeb & Bachmann 2010, p. 237; Verdoodt 
2007, pp. 44-47; Vranken 2005, pp. 92, 97; Ogus 1995, pp. 98-99. For a detailed elaboration of the notion of 
legitimacy in the context of (transnational) private regulation, see for example Black 2008 and Casey & Scott 
2011. Cf. McHarg 2006 on the ‘constitutional dimension of self-regulation’.  
1335 Cf. Ogus 1995, pp. 98-99; Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2012, p. 141; Verdoodt 2007, p. 44. For the sake of 
completeness, it should be noted that the notion legitimacy embodies an internal and external dimension. Internal 
legitimacy concerns the relationship between the private regulator and the regulated actors, while external 
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this problematic feature, one can find legal objections to codes of conduct pertaining to the 
lack of (public) supervision and accountability of private regulators, i.e., to the fact that these 
regulators do not have to account for their regulatory activities through the usual public 
accountability mechanisms that apply to public regulators.1336 Another legal weakness of 
codes of conduct, according to the literature, is the lack of clarity on their legal value and 
binding force, which mostly results from the aforementioned lack of democratic 
legitimacy.1337 The problems related to ‘drafting process and competence’ can also negatively 
affect the quality of private rules. When the drafting process of a code is turned into a 
(predominantly) unilateral undertaking, there is a risk that the private rules serve only the 
industry’s own interests, at the expense of the interests of external stakeholders. In these 
cases, there is also a risk of cartel formation.1338 
 In Dutch private law literature, these partially overlapping comments regularly constitute 
the background against which legal scholars make a plea for the formulation of criteria for 
determining the legal relevance and quality of private regulation. In doing so, these scholars 
invariably put forward procedural and material criteria of a public law nature, such as 
representativeness, level of support, public consultation, supervision and accountability, 
accessibility, comprehensibility and durability of the rules.1339 However, for the time being, 
the option of laying down these criteria in a legal framework is generally considered to 
overstep the mark. Rather, Dutch scholars of private law are in favor of imposing criteria on 
private regulators in the form of non-binding guidelines.1340 The aforementioned type of 
public law criteria can indeed constitute an assessment framework for establishing the legal 
relevance and quality of industry codes of conduct and other forms of private regulation. 
However, the findings of this doctoral thesis show that in legal practice the issue is 
approached differently: the debate about industry codes conducted in case law is not at all of a 
public law nature. Dutch courts, like the CJEU, proceed in an entirely different way when 
assigning legal relevance to industry codes.1341 Moreover, the legal risks of industry codes to 
which the public law criteria relate do not come the fore in civil case law, except for the issue 
of legal status, which did appear to play a role in a few cases. These observations raise the 
question as to whether the legal relevance and quality of industry codes should be measured 
                                                                                                                                                   
legitimacy pertains to the relationship between the private actor that applies the code and its other parties. The 
way in which private rules can be rendered legitimate depends on whether internal or external legitimacy is at 
stake. See Cafaggi 2014, pp. 1-4. 
1336 Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2012, pp. 142-144; Curtin & Senden 2011; Ogus 1995, p. 98. Private actors can 
compensate for the lack of democratic legitimacy and accountability, for instance by allowing (all) external 
stakeholders to participate in the regulatory process, ensuring that the private regulator can be deemed 
sufficiently representative and setting up monitoring and complain handling mechanisms. See Scott 2012, pp. 
1337-1338; Akkermans 2012, pp. 513-514; Glinski 2014, p. 52. However, several scholars indicate, public 
consultation, representativeness and supervision are often lacking in private regulatory schemes. See Baldwin, 
Cave & Lodge 2012, pp. 142, 145-146; Vranken 2005, p. 97; Gunningham & Rees 1997, p. 370; Ogus 1995, pp. 
98-99. 
1337 Vranken 2005, pp. 92, 97; Verdoodt 2007, p. 45; Buck-Heeb & Dieckmann 2010, pp. 229-231. 
1338 Verdoodt 2007, pp. 41-42; Buck-Heeb & Dieckmann 2010, pp. 231-233. 
1339 Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009; Giesen 2007, pp. 138-142; Van Driel 1989, pp. 119-123. See also 
Akkermans 2011, pp. 513-514; Vranken 2005, pp. 97, 100. 
1340 Van Driel 1989, pp. 111, 119; Giesen 2007, pp. 134-136. 
1341 See section 7.2.1.3 of this chapter and, more extensively, Chapter 6, section 6.3.3. 
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against public law criteria. Can some other courses be pursued at this point or is there no 
escape from the further regulation of industry codes by means of public law criteria? 
 
7.4.2 Alternative avenues? An exploration 
 
In this section, I ascertain whether alternative avenues, i.e., ways other than the imposition of 
public law criteria, are available under Dutch private law to cope with the lack of clarity that 
still exists in respect of the legal relevance of industry codes in cases where the applicability 
of a code is disputed, and to meet possible problems concerning the quality of these codes. 
This discussion has the express character of an exploration, inspired by the private law 
literature, legislation and case law. I only touch upon some possibilities, without fully 
elaborating on them. In doing so, I will focus on three actors: the legislator, the judiciary and 
the private actors themselves.1342 The relationship between these actors resembles that of 
‘communicating vessels’: if one of the actors refrains from providing clarity, this task will be 
assigned to the other two. When these actors in turn also fail to take action, the status quo is 
maintained. 
 Before commencing my exploration, it is important to differentiate between the different 
reasons that can underlie the lack of consensus between the parties to the proceedings on the 
applicability of an industry code. Three scenarios can be distinguished. All three scenarios 
concern the legal relevance of industry codes in external1343 relationships, i.e., the 
(contractual) B2B or B2C relationship between the private actor applying the code and the 
other (‘third’)1344 party to that relationship. The first scenario is that in which the private actor 
that applies an industry code defends itself against the reliance of the other party on the code 
by claiming that the code lacks legal binding force in external relationships (e.g., because the 
rules only have internal effect, or because the rules are of an advisory nature). This scenario, 
which will hereafter be referred as the ‘internal effect only’ scenario, concerns cases in which 
the private actor that is called into account has subscribed to the industry code. Matters are 
different in the second situation, which covers cases in which a code of conduct is invoked 
against a private actor that is part of the branch of industry or profession within which the 
code is applied, yet has not subscribed to the code itself. This second scenario will hereafter 
be called the scenario of the ‘non-subscribing actor’. Whereas both the first and the second 
scenario concern industry codes that grant ‘rights’ to third parties, the third scenario pertains 
to cases in which industry codes impose obligations on the other party of the private actor that 
applies the code. It should be noted, however, that this scenario has thus far not been at issue 
in Dutch civil case law. This might remain the case: practice as reflected in the findings of the 
empirical study into the functions suggests that industry codes of conduct almost always only 
                                                
1342 For a similar exploration of the different possibilities to control general terms and conditions via the 
government, the judiciary and ‘the administrative route’, see Hondius 1978. 
1343 As opposed to the internal relationship between the private regulator and the regulated actor, i.e., the actor 
that has subscribed to the code and, accordingly, applies the code. 




grant ‘rights’ to these other parties. Nonetheless, I will take account of the third scenario in 
my exploration, which I will refer to as the ‘binding the other (third) party’ scenario. 
 
As the focus of my exploration lies on cases in which the legal relevance of industry codes of 
conduct has thus far remained unclear, I do not go into the scenario where clarity has been 
provided as to this relevance (consensus on the binding force or applicability of a code). From a 
private law perspective, it will not be particularly surprising that public law criteria do not play a 
part in this scenario. After all, consensus constitutes a legitimizing factor in private law.1345 
Moreover, every time this scenario played out it involved industry codes that granted ‘rights’ to 
the other party of the private actors applying the code. Accordingly, the from the perspective of 
this other party pertinent risk of one-sided rules played no role. From this perspective, industry 
codes require no regulation here.1346 
 
7.4.2.1 The legislator 
 
The legislator has several means at its disposal to provide more clarity on the legal relevance 
of industry codes of conduct and to safeguard the quality of these codes. The experiences with 
the legal regime on the Standard Regulation (standaardregeling, see Article 6:214 DCC), 
which to date (mid-2016) has never been used, show that the option of enacting a regulation 
should in any case not involve too many stringent formalities.1347  
 
 A statutory regulation after the example of the statutory provisions on general 
terms and conditions 
When considering possible actions from the side of the legislator, comparison with the 
statutory regulation of general terms and conditions (hereafter: general conditions) soon 
comes to mind. It is conceivable that the legislator links up with this regulation.1348 After the 
example of general conditions, the legal binding force of an industry code in the relationship 
between the private actor that applies the code and his other party could be made dependent 
on the consent of the other party on the applicability of the code (‘offer and acceptance’). The 
quality of the content of the code could be safeguarded by applying a test similar to the 
‘unreasonable onerousness test’ that applies to general conditions. In doing so, the risk of the 
rules being too one-sided and reflecting the interests of the regulated actors only can be 
overcome.1349 When formulating the viewpoints that can play a role in fleshing out the open 
                                                
1345 In these cases, consensus (in a broad sense) functions as a legitimization and as a factor for binding force, 
according to Giesen 2007, p. 66, footnote 76, with reference to G. Bachmann, ‘Privatrecht als 
Organisationsrecht’, in: Jahrbuch Junger Zivil-Rectswissenschaftler 2002, Stuttgart: Richard Boorberg Verlag, 
pp. 17-19. 
1346 Cf. Korthals Altes 2005, no. 29. 
1347 See also Menting & Vranken 2014, p. 8; Giesen 2007, pp. 21-22. Differently in the context of administrative 
law: Scheltema 2016, p. 120. 
1348 According to Vranken, the enactment of the statutory regulation of general conditions (Articles 6:231-247 
DCC) more or less solved the problems as to the legal value, legitimacy and quality of general terms and 
conditions. See Vranken 2005, p. 97. 
1349 Compiling a black or grey list in respect of industry codes will however prove a daunting task, considering 
the variety of industry codes. Nonetheless, in assessing a code of conduct, judges could link up with the statutory 
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norm of ‘unreasonable onerousness’, the legislator could tie in with the viewpoints already in 
place for general conditions (such as the way in which the conditions were drafted; 
unilaterally or on the basis of bilateral consultations).1350 Factors such as the involvement of 
the government with a code of conduct could equally play a role in this regard. A statutory 
regulation of this kind would offer the courts, which eventually have to assess compliance 
with the regulation, a framework on the basis of which they can establish the legal relevance 
of industry codes and assess the quality of the contents of these codes. As regards the three 
scenarios distinguished in the introduction to this section, it can be said that the statutory 
regulation would in any case produce a result for the third scenario (‘binding the other (third) 
party’).1351 Strictly speaking, it also provides clarity as to the first and the second scenario (the 
‘internal effect only’ scenario and the ‘non-subscribing actor’ scenario, respectively), in the 
sense that an industry code lacks legal relevance when there is no case of offer and 
acceptance. However, as set out in section 7.2.1.3 (under ‘taking stock’), case law suggests 
that a code can still assume legal relevance when this consent is absent, albeit that general 
criteria at this point are still lacking. Thus, the present option of enacting a statutory 
regulation cannot fully clarify the first and second scenario. Accordingly, this task is passed 
on to the judiciary (see section 7.4.2.2). 
 
 Regulation of the drafting process 
As a second option, the legislator could create a framework that regulates the process of 
drafting industry codes of conduct. The Collective Agreements Act (Wet op de collectieve 
arbeidsovereenkomst, hereafter: CAA), for instance, could serve as a template in this respect. 
The CAA lays down rules concerning, among other things, the authority to conclude 
collective agreements, the form in which these agreements are to be concluded and their 
binding force, and has as such provided clarity on the issue of authority as well as on the legal 
effects of collective agreements.1352 The legislator could adopt a similar regulation for 
industry codes, entailing requirements for the drafting process as well as rules pertaining to 
the binding force and legal effect of industry codes drawn up in accordance with the 
formation requirements. The task of supervising and enforcing the regulation could be 
undertaken by the legislator itself, but could also be assigned to the judiciary.1353 By thus 
regulating the drafting process, the legislator can throw some light on the legal relevance of 
                                                                                                                                                   
provisions at this point (Articles 6:236-237 DCC) with respect to code rules that resemble the clauses that are on 
these lists. 
1350 See article 6:233 DCC, which, insofar relevant, reads: “A stipulation in general conditions may be annulled 
(a) if it is unreasonably onerous to the other party, taking into consideration the nature and the further content of 
the contract, the manner in which the conditions have arisen, the mutually apparent interests of the parties and 
the other circumstances of the case”. Translation taken from Haanappel & Mackaay 1990, p. 333. 
1351 And would in effect codify the approach taken by Dutch lower courts in cases where consensus existed on 
the applicability of an industry code. 
1352 Hondius 1978, pp. 546-547, from which this option was derived.  
1353 Even though the legislator would thus not directly be concerned with the quality of the contents of industry 
codes, it can exert influence at this point via the requirements it sets on the drafting process. These requirements 
(e.g., in the shape of criteria tailored to the legal risks of industry codes, such as representativeness, level of 
support and public consultation) can play a role as preconditions for high quality codes. However, as Van Driel 
signals, these requirements do not constitute a necessary condition in this regard. See Van Driel 1989, p. 119. 
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industry codes in the first scenario (‘internal effect only’), in the sense that private actors that 
have subscribed to the code can no longer successfully resort to the argument that the code 
only has internal effect. However, the regulation would not provide a solution for the second 
(‘non-subscribing actor’) and third scenario (‘binding the other (third) party’), since it merely 
covers the drafting stages and as such only affects the subscribing actors. 
 
 Governmental approval of the result 
Another, far-reaching possibility is the creation of a regime that subjects industry codes to the 
approval of a government body, meaning that codes can only assume legal relevance when 
they have received a public stamp of approval. Unlike the option of regulating the drafting 
process, this regime would involve an assessment of both the drafting process and the content 
of an industry code.1354 Accordingly, substantive as well as formal, procedural criteria will 
have to be developed.1355 Tailoring the formal assessment criteria to the legal risks of industry 
codes is an obvious option and this would lead to the development of public law criteria such 
as representativeness, level of support and public consultation. The content of a code could be 
reviewed for conflicts with the applicable (mandatory) provisions, including competition law, 
and tested for, e.g., their durability, comprehensibility and accessibility.1356 The legislator 
could decide to declare universally binding codes of conduct that meet the procedural and 
substantive criteria. As a result, the binding effect of a code extends beyond the private actors 
that have subscribed to it, to all of the actors operating within the industry or profession 
concerned. Accordingly, the option of governmental approval can provide clarity on the legal 
relevance issue in the first scenario (‘internal effect only’) and, provided that the legislator has 
declared a code universally binding, in the second scenario (‘non-subscribing actor’). As this 
declaration by its nature only affects industry peers, it does not clarify matters in the third 
scenario (‘binding the other (third) party’). 
 
FACILITATING ROLE – The legislator could also take on a more ‘facilitating’ role. In this role, the 
legislator could focus on creating enabling conditions for the drawing up of high-quality industry 
codes of conduct, without, as was the case with the previous option, attaching formal legal 
consequences to the fact that a code meets these conditions. The legislator could for example 
develop a framework after the example of the Wbp, under which industry codes can, at the 
discretion of the private regulator, be submitted to a public law body for approval.1357 With a view 
to the successful institutionalization of the drafting process of general conditions within the 
Social and Economic Council (SER), the legislator could also choose to facilitate the drafting 
process of industry codes by bringing it under the auspices of an independent consultative body. 
                                                
1354 Cf. in the administrative law context, Scheltema 2016, pp. 116-133, who pleads for the development of a 
legal recogntion scheme for transnational private regulatory schemes on which the Dutch legislator wishes to 
rely. 
1355 In formulating these criteria, the legislator could for instance take account of the requirements that apply to 
codes that have been relied upon by the legislator as alternatives to regulation. The European requirements can 
be found in the Principles for Better Self- and Co-regulation, while the Dutch requirements are spread through 
general legislative policy. See Chapter 4, section 4.5. 
1356 Van Driel 1989, pp. 122-123. 




Although in both cases it is eventually up to the private actors themselves to provide clarity on 
the legal relevance of their codes, the legislator could rule that a declaration of approval or the 
fact that a code has been drawn up under the supervision of an independent body, lend industry 
codes a certain degree of legal value in legal proceedings.1358 
 
7.4.2.2 The judiciary 
 
Judges, in turn, can provide clarity on the legal relevance and standards for the substantive 
quality of industry codes of conduct by adopting a uniform approach, encompassing a fixed 
set of assessment criteria or viewpoints, in cases that are of a similar nature. If the criterion 
‘consensus = judicial application of the code’, used by Dutch lower courts, was to be applied 
strictly to the three scenarios distinguished for the purposes of this section, in all three 
scenarios codes of conduct would lack legal binding force in the relationship between the 
private actor applying the code and its other party.1359 This observation is also reflected in the 
case law of the lower courts, where industry codes were occasionally disregarded because the 
binding force or applicability of the code on the litigant against whom the code was invoked 
could not be established.1360 At the same time, however, several judgments suggest that a lack 
of consensus between parties to the proceedings on the applicability of a code does not always 
preclude industry codes from assuming legal relevance. Yet, for industry codes to actually 
assume legal relevance in cases where such consensus is absent (cf. the three scenarios), it is 
necessary that courts are willing to see beyond the private nature of these codes and refrain 
from using this nature as an argument to a priori preclude industry codes from having legal 
relevance, as seems to have occurred in a few judgments. 
 
 Open norms and custom 
In the first (‘internal effect only’) and second (‘non-subscribing actor’) scenario, courts could 
assign legal relevance to industry codes via one of the open norms that can be found 
throughout the Dutch Civil Code.1361 Then the line of argument would be that the importance, 
scope of application and weight of a code within the industry or profession are of such 
significance that the code has external legal binding force (first scenario) or is applicable to 
all members of the industry or the profession (‘radiating effect’,1362 second scenario), as, for 
instance, a further specification of a general duty of care under civil law, as a rule of 
                                                
1358 It is for instance conceivable that the legislator, after the example of general conditions, provides that 
industry codes drawn up on the basis of bilateral or multilateral consultations with external stakeholders, under 
the auspices of an independent body, are less likely to be considered unreasonably onerous. Private actors 
applying the code could benefit from this legal value when defending themselves by invoking their code in legal 
proceedings. This could provide an incentive for private parties to use these possibilities.  
1359 Cf. Giesen 2007, p. 66. 
1360 Chapter 6, section 6.3.2.1 briefly touched upon some of these lower court judgments.  
1361 It should be noted that codes of conduct can also permeate into the legal sphere through these open norms 
where there is consensus on the applicability of the code. Cf. Chapter 6 of this doctoral thesis as well as Giesen 
2007, pp. 68-75. 
1362 See also Chapter 6, section 6.3.3.3. 
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unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct (Article 6:162 DCC)1363 or as an expression 
of the prevailing juridical views in the Netherlands (Article 3:12 DCC). Furthermore, courts 
could find that given the importance and weight of the code within the industry the principles 
of reasonableness and fairness require application of the code.1364 In certain cases, one could 
also think of qualifying an industry code as ‘custom’.1365 In this way, courts could use open 
norms and custom to assign legal relevance to an industry code, and thus pass over the claim 
that the code has internal effect only (first scenario) or that the code is not binding on the non-
subscribing actor (second scenario).  
 However, the few judgments in which such an approach was taken, with varying 
outcomes, show that courts do not take matters lightly, at least not in the second scenario. The 
criteria that have to be applied in this regard are strict. Here onr could think of criteria such as 
the level of support, representativeness. However, case law rather seems to focus on the scope 
of application and the weight of the private rules within the industry.1366 That is not 
surprising: after all, without legislative or judicial interference, private regulation in principle 
only has binding force upon private actors that have consented to be bound by the rules.1367 
This observation signals that the option of using open norms and custom to assign legal 
relevance to an industry code of conduct will be of only limited use when the issue of binding 
the other (third) party to the code is at issue (third scenario). Under the present option, this 
‘third-party effect’ could only be achieved through a classification of a code as custom, which 
implies that strict criteria will have to be met.1368 Thus, in case law, the legal relevance of an 
                                                
1363 Cf. Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 24 December 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:9929, para 3.11, where it was 
held that in being widely supported, the Code of Conduct on Pharmaceutical Advertising could be used to flesh 
out this open norm (discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.11). 
1364 Cf. Hof Amsterdam 2 March 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BN1316, paras 4.3-4.10 (discussed in section 
6.3.1.5); Van Gerven & Lierman 2010, pp. 314-315; Giesen 2007, pp. 59, 70, 79. Which norms can eventually 
be used, depends on whether the legal dispute is of a contractual nature or concerns a wrongful act.  
1365 Cf. Giesen 2007, pp. 70-71; Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 10 July 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BA9210 (discussed in 
in Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.3). Differently: Hof Arnhem 11 September 2007, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2007:BB8620, 
where the fact that the guiding Rules for bankruptcy trustees put down in writing the customary rules of conduct 
within the profession was deemed insufficient to qualify the Rules as customary law. See Chapter 6, section 
6.3.2.2.3 
1366 The Amsterdam Court of Appeal for instance dismissed the argument that the Fire Insurance (Right of 
Recourse) Sectoral Regulations were also binding on an insurer that had not subscribed to the Regulations. The 
court, among other things, found that the recourse to the principle of reasonableness and fairness in this regard 
was of no avail, as the Regulations, in short, were not of such significance that insurers that had not subscribed 
to the code were under a legally enforceable obligation to apply the Regulations. Furthermore, the court of 
appeal held that the Regulations could not be considered customary law, as they were not generally accepted 
within the industry (subscription to the Regulations was optional). See Hof Amsterdam 2 March 2010, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BN1316, paras 4.3-4.10 (discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.5). The rules on 
pharmaceutical advertising of the Foundation for the Code for Pharmaceutical Advertising, by contrast, were 
applied to a private actor that had not subscribed to the rules. In doing so, the court referred to the fact that the 
rules constituted a further specification of the law, that the rules were repeatedly referred to in case law, that the 
validity of the rules was generally accepted in case law and that almost the entire industry was bound to the 
rules. See Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 26 July 2004, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2004:AQ5353, para 3.3 (discussed in Chapter 6, 
section 6.3.1.11).  
1367 See also Korthals Altes 2005, no. 26. 
1368 Cf. Hof Arnhem 11 September 2007, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2007:BB8620 (supra n 1365). The second and 
third scenario in essence concern the same issue: imposing a code on an actor that is not bound to that code. The 
difference between the two scenarios pertains to the fact that the second scenario is about imposing a code on an 
industry peer or professional colleague, whereas the third scenario concerns binding private actors that do not 
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industry code in the third scenario depends primarily on whether the code has been ‘offered’ 
to and ‘accepted’ by the other party.1369 
 
 A pragmatic approach 
As regards the cases in which the private actor that applies the code seeks to block judicial 
application of the code by arguing that it lacks external legal binding force (first scenario), the 
case law studied in Chapter 6 provides a basis for a more direct, pragmatic approach. This 
approach entails that the said internal nature of the code is brushed to one side and that 
account is taken of the fact that the code content-wise covers the external relationship 
between the private actor applying the code and the other party at issue. Under this approach, 
the consensus about the code that exists between the private regulator and the ‘subscribers’ to 
the code (i.e., the private actors applying the code, the regulated actors) constitutes the basis 
for assigning it legal relevance. Thus, the pragmatic approach entails courts extending the 
internal consensus on the code rules to legal relevance of the code in external relationships, 
with a view to the fact that the rules of the code cover the (legal) relationship at issue.1370 I 
deduced this pragmatic approach from the following judgments, in which this approach 
resounds. 
 The first two judgments that are reflective of a pragmatic approach are the Supreme 
Court judgments in Van der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan and Trombose. In these cases, the 
Supreme Court disregards the arguments pertaining to the advisory nature and the internal 
effect of the private rules, respectively, and assigns legal relevance to the private rules 
concerned with reference to the fact that the rules rest on consensus between the private 
regulators.1371 In a similar vein, the Court of Appeal of The Hague passed over the claim that 
the Fire Insurance (Right of Recourse) Sectoral Regulations had internal effect only. The 
court in this regard referred to the qualification that the Supreme Court had given to these 
Regulations, namely that the Regulations are of a general nature and extend to third parties 
that were not involved in the drafting process.1372 This led the court of appeal to conclude that 
the Regulations do apply to the external relation between the insurer and the other party.1373 
Considering that internal consensus on the private rules thus eventually constitutes the basis 
for external legal relevance under the pragmatic approach, it can be concluded that this 
approach cannot be used to assign legal relevance to industry codes in the second (‘non-
subscribing actor’) and third (‘binding the other (third) party’) scenario. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
belong to the same industry or profession (e.g., consumers). As regards the third scenario, this implies that if the 
other (third) party would be a non-subscribing industry peer, the aforementioned options could be used to bind 
said party to the code. 
1369 See also Korthals Altes, no. 26-29. 
1370 Cf. the theorethical reflections in Chapter 6, section 6.5.2. 
1371 As already indicated in section 7.2.1.3 of this chapter. 
1372 See HR 16 May 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF4621, NJ 2003/470, para 3.3.2 (discussed in Chapter 6, section 
6.3.1.5). 




 Substantive quality 
When it comes to an assessment of the (minimum) substantive quality of an industry code, 
judges can make use of several private law norms. However, given the fact that most industry 
codes are beneficial to third parties, it is likely that judges will only very occasionally, if at 
all, have to conduct such an assessment. Nonetheless, the starting point of the assessment 
would in all cases be that the rules of a code should not be contrary to the law, to good morals 
or to public order (Article 3:40 DCC). In case a code seeks to impose obligations on a third 
party, the key question, by analogy with general conditions, will be whether these obligations 
are not unreasonably onerous. The legal basis for this test can be found in the ‘unreasonable 
onerousness test’ that applies to general conditions (Article 6:233(a) DCC) or, more 
generally, in the restrictive operation of the principle of reasonableness and fairness (Article 
6:248(2) DCC).1374 
 
 Role of the functions 
In clarifying the issue of the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct, courts could also 
rely upon the functions of these codes.1375 The protective function and the policy instrument 
in particular can play a role in determining the importance and weight of an industry code. 
For instance, a plea that a code of conduct lacks external binding force (first scenario) will 
hardly catch on when the code has either or both of these functions, precisely because the 
functions are of an ‘external’ nature. These functions can be of equal value in cases revolving 
around the binding force of an industry code upon a ‘non-subscribing actor’ (second 
scenario). Courts could for example take into consideration, especially when the private rules 
function as an alternative or complement to public regulation, that limiting the scope of 
application of an industry code with a protective function to the subscribing actors could lead 
to an unequal level of consumer protection. Where industry codes have a policy instrument 
function, courts could argue that the tacit or express involvement of the government with the 
code implies that the code bears significance for the entire industry.1376 Furthermore, the 
policy instrument function can play a role in the assessment of the content of an industry 
code: as indicated above, the presence of an element of government involvement with the 
code could be a relevant factor in establishing that the rules are not unreasonably onerous.1377  
 
 Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court also has a vital role to play in throwing some light on the legal relevance 
of industry codes in Dutch private law. To begin with, when faced with questions pertaining 
to this issue, the Court will have to state the reasons for taking a code of conduct into 
                                                
1374 After all, it is up to the party entitled to choose the legal basis on which it wishes to found its claim. See HR 
14 June 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE0659, NJ 2003/112 (Bramer/Hofman Beheer). 
1375 See also Menting & Vranken 2014, p. 41. 
1376 This has the additional benefit of strengthening the policy instrument function. After all, the starting point 
that the scope of application of an industry code is in principle (i.e., without legislative or judicial interference) 
limited to the private actors that have subscribed to the code, also goes for codes that have a policy instrument 
function. Courts can extend the scope of the rules ex post so as to cover the entire industry or profession. 
1377 See section 7.4.2.1, under ‘A statutory regulation after the example…’. Cf., more generally, Scott 2012, pp. 
1334 et seq. on governmental involvement with private regulation as a legitimizing factor. 
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consideration and for assigning legal relevance to the code in an explicit, well-reasoned 
fashion, as it already did in Trombose and Achmea/Rijnberg.1378 However, the Supreme Court 
cannot limit itself to providing a more explicit, well-founded explanation of its approach. The 
unavoidable multi-layeredness of Dutch private law, the role of industry codes in the 
development of the law, the use of industry codes as a policy instrument and the legal 
uncertainty that still surrounds their legal relevance, urge that clarity and an unequivocal 
approach are provided and necessitate action from the side of the Court. This implies that the 
Supreme Court in its capacity as developer of the law must also indicate in general terms 
what room judges have to take into account industry codes and other forms of private 
regulation and thereby direct the lower courts.1379 In doing so, the Court will in any case have 
to give an (preferably positive) opinion on the approach of the lower courts as well as on what 
applies when there is a lack of consensus between litigants about the legal relevance of a code 
of conduct. As Vranken already indicated, at some time, in parallel with the development of 
industry codes into a source of law that I signaled earlier, the narrow conception of ‘law’ 
included in Article 79 RO will have to be reconsidered.1380 The fact that this time is yet to 
come, does not alter the fact that the Supreme Court cannot continue to hide behind this 
conception. However, all this does require the Court to be given the opportunity to rule on the 
matter, that is to say, it has to be presented with a case in which the legal relevance of a code 
of conduct is at issue. This is where the private actors, and their lawyers, enter the scene. 
 
7.4.2.3 Private actors 
 
Finally, private actors themselves, i.e., private regulators, private actors that apply an industry 
code of conduct and litigants, can contribute to the elucidation of the ambiguities surrounding 
the legal relevance and quality of industry codes. The most direct contribution of private 
actors in this respect would be the incorporation of (a reference to) an industry code in a 
contract or in the general terms and conditions applicable to the contract. Alternatively, 
private actors could explicitly declare their industry code applicable to the legal relationships 
that they enter into. Once the other party to this legal relationship has accepted, broadly 
speaking, the applicability of the code of conduct, the code assumes legal binding force. With 
the legal value of the code thus established a priori, i.e., before any legal proceedings are 
commenced, obscurities as to the legal relevance of the code are prevented from arising in 
court.1381 Private regulators, more specifically, can also influence the quality of the contents 
of their code of conduct. After all, it is eventually up to them to ensure that the private rules 
are not unreasonably onerous, that, at a minimum, mandatory legal provisions are respected 
                                                
1378 HR 2 March 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0377, NJ 2001/649 (Trombose) and HR 18 April 2014, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2014:942, NJ 2015/20 (Achmea/Rijnberg). Giesen 2008, pp. 790-791 is of a similar opinion. 
1379 Giesen also calls upon the Supreme Court to be more general and explicit in its reasoning as regards private 
regulation. See Giesen 2008, pp. 791-792.  
1380 Vranken 2005, p. 92. 
1381 Cf. Giesen 2007, pp. 62-66 on consensus as a basis for the legal binding force of private regulation. 
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and that the rules are in compliance with the law, good morals and public order.1382 
Additionally, private actors can play a more indirect role by explicitly raising the problems 
that might arise as regards the legal relevance and quality of a code of conduct in legal 
proceedings so that courts have to give a reasoned opinion on the matter.1383 However, private 
actors can equally decide not to do so and to leave the status quo intact, knowing that if they 
consent on the applicability of a code, it is at least in lower court proceedings likely that the 
code is assigned legal relevance, without there being a need to address any further problems. 
 Whether all this actually leads to legally binding, high-quality industry codes of conduct 
will however depend greatly on the interest that private regulators and the regulated industry 
actors take in applying such a code. For example, if a code has been drawn up with the aim of 
preventing public regulation, it is in the industry’s own interest to ensure that the code 
functions properly. By contrast, if a code has symbolic value only or seeks precisely to protect 




The exploration of the alternative avenues that might be available under Dutch private law 
shows that there is no need for public law criteria to determine the legal relevance and 
(substantive) quality of industry codes of conduct within the framework of Dutch private law, 
at least not when these issues are up for discussion in civil law proceedings.1384 Courts can 
use the rules of substantive private law to rule on these issues, to solve problems that might 
arise and to provide the necessary clarity, without having to seek recourse to public law 
criteria.1385 This implies that there is no need to take the course advocated by other scholars; 
that of employing public law criteria as preconditions that have to be met by an industry code 
before courts can assign it legal relevance.1386 Considering the fact that industry codes most 
often grant ‘rights’ to third parties, this would in my opinion in any case have been an 
undesirable course to take, as it could for instance lead to cases in which courts establish that 
consensus exists about the applicability of a code that grants ‘rights’ to a third party, yet still 
withhold legal relevance from the code because of a lack of representativeness. 
                                                
1382 To ensure that its code reflects all interests involved in a well-balanced fashion, a private regulator could for 
instance involve (representative organizations of) external stakeholders in the drafting process of the code. 
Worthy of mention in this regard are the various private meta-regulatory regimes that have been set up at the 
international level. These regimes set standards that regulate the drafting process of private regulation, with the 
aim of enhancing its legitimacy and effectiveness. Private regulators can join these regimes. Two well-known 
examples are ISEAL Alliance (concerning voluntary sustainability standards) and the European Advertising 
Standards Alliance (EASA, concerning European self-regulation of advertising). On the meta-regulation of 
private regulation, see, e.g., Cafaggi 2016 and Meuwese & Bomhoff 2011. 
1383 On the role of parties to the proceedings at this point, see also Giesen 2008, pp. 791-792. 
1384 The fact that the legislator will not be able to evade the application of public law criteria (except with regard 
to the option of enacting a regulation after the example of the statutory provisions on general conditions) is due 
to the timing of the legislator’s assessment. The legislator assesses the legal relevance and quality of industry 
codes ex ante, i.e., before the codes come to cover a specific (legal) relationship. Judicial assessment, by 
contrast, takes place at a later stage, namely when a specific dispute exists and the parties to the proceedings 
have already expressed their opinion on the applicability of the code. 
1385 Similarly: Korthals Altes 2005, nos. 26-29. 
1386 See Kristic, Van Tilburg & Verbruggen 2009. 
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 With the above, I am in fact already well on my way to providing an answer to the 
question on the need to regulate the use of industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law. In 
my opinion, neither the lack of clarity that still exists as to the legal relevance of industry 
codes nor the problems that might arise in respect of the quality of such codes necessitates the 
use of industry codes (in concrete legal relationships) being subjected to further requirements. 
Although the option of issuing a regulation on the drafting process and quality of industry 
codes has the advantage of being a relatively fast way of clarifying the remaining ambiguities 
as regards the legal relevance of these codes, it is questionable whether this is a workable 
option, given the quantity and diversity of industry codes in practice.1387 As empirical data on 
the actual opportunities and risks of industry codes are lacking, it is also difficult to ascertain 
whether such a regulation would produce the desired effect. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that none of the options available to the legislator can provide full clarity in respect of all 
three scenarios in which the legal relevance of industry codes remains unclear. The legislator 
cannot do without the judiciary at this point. Moreover, the introduction of public law 
requirements might make matters needlessly more complicated. After all, when viewed from 
the perspective of substantive private law, industry codes of conduct are not by definition a 
problematic phenomenon, as Dutch civil case law and my exploration in this section show. 
 Therefore, for now I give preference to a ‘growth model’ which charges the judiciary 
with the task of giving further shape to the legal role of industry codes of conduct on the basis 
of substantive private law or procedural law.1388 This means that courts will have to continue 
to engage with industry codes of conduct, preferably without being ruled by the private 
origins of these codes. With respect to the situations in which the legal relevance of industry 
codes is still unclear, the courts will have to develop an unequivocal approach which builds 
on fixed assessment criteria or fixed viewpoints. The model also expressly awards a role to 
the Supreme Court at this point. The Supreme Court has to take the lead and direct the lower 
courts. This implies that the Court will have to rule on the legal relevance of industry codes of 
conduct in a more explicit and more reasoned way than it has done so far (see section 7.4.2.2). 
A drawback of this growth model is that it can take some time before the legal relevance of 
industry codes fully crystalizes. In providing the necessary clarity, courts are after all 
dependent on the facts and arguments advanced by parties to the proceedings.1389 
Furthermore, for the ‘new’ judicial approach to settle in the case law of the lower courts, a 
number of judgments will be needed, which underlines the importance of the role of the 
Supreme Court. However, it is precisely this relatively slow pace that enables the judiciary to 
be flexible when responding to the developments in practice, which is an advantage given the 
relative lack of empirical data on the actual use of industry codes of conduct. Thus, through 
this model, the development of industry codes of conduct into a source of law can be 
                                                
1387 See also Giesen 2007, p. 136; Van Driel 1989, pp. 111, 119. 
1388 This model fits with the greater role the judiciary will play in the private law of the future, as expected by 
Smits 2015a, p. 528. It should be noted that the choice for a ‘judicial model’ does not imply that the legislator is 
fully sidelined. The legislator can, for instance, develop guidelines for codes of conduct or take on the 
facilitating role described in section 7.4.2.1. 
1389 As Vranken notes, “coincidence and financial wherewithal are factors” that play an important role in this 
regard. See Vranken 2006, p. 69. 
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gradually given shape.1390 The growth model at this point also involves a role for parties to 
the proceedings and their lawyers: they are the ones that will have to bring industry codes to 
the attention of the courts.1391 If, however, they decide to keep the codes outside the judicial 
sphere, their legal relevance will not further crystalize in case law, leaving intact the 
ambiguities that still exist at this point.  
 In sum, in my opinion, the preferred option to provide the necessary clarity on the legal 
relevance of industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law is that of a judicial growth model, 
which leaves intact the approach of the lower courts in the ‘binding force and consensus 
cases’, yet calls for a more express and unequivocal approach in cases where the legal 
relevance of industry codes has thus far remained unclear. Both the lower courts and the 
Supreme Court will have to give shape and substance to the legal role of industry codes on the 
basis of substantive private law and procedural law, whereby the Supreme Court will have to 
take the lead. 
 
The conclusion that there is no need to regulate industry codes from the perspective of the 
application of these codes in concrete legal relationships does not imply that further regulation by 
means of public law criteria cannot be useful in other respects. The fact that (the drafting process 
of) a code of conduct meets these criteria can have a positive effect on the (substantive) quality of 
the code and, as such, maybe on the code’s legal relevance as well.1392 In view of this possible 
quality impulse, there are no objections in this regard to linking up with the proposals made in 
private law literature to develop non-binding guidelines or models for codes of conduct,1393 so as 
to support the growth model described above. Additionally, it should be noted that the 
development of industry codes into a source of private law raises pertinent questions on the 
integration of this source in the framework legislation–adjudication, such as the question 
concerning the relation between legislation, case law and private regulation, which could throw 
new light on the question on the regulation of industry codes. Addressing these questions however 
requires a deeper understanding of the actual use of industry codes of conduct in private law and 
of the extent to which and the moments when the legal risks of industry codes actually materialize 




“Private law is not lacking any challenges”, said Smits in his reflections on the private law of 
the future.1394 Industry codes of conduct are one of these challenges. By now, private 
regulators are pervasively present in European and Dutch private law. Given the ever-
increasing process of globalization, these regulators are expected to claim their place in the 
private law legal order even more forcefully in future.1395 Hence, new and other 
                                                
1390 Also in another respect, case law can be an indicator for practice: from a very black-and-white perspective, 
the fact that certain cases are not submitted to the court can be said to imply that the use of industry codes in 
these cases does not lead to legal problems. 
1391 See also Giesen 2008, pp. 791-792 and Menting 2015, p. 111. 
1392 Giesen 2007, pp. 133-138; Van Driel 1989, pp. 111, 119. 
1393 Giesen 2007, pp. 133-140; Van Driel 1989, pp. 119-123.  
1394 Smits 2015a, p. 546 (summary). 
1395 Smits 2015a, pp. 536-538, 542-543. 
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confrontations between industry codes of conduct and private law lie in wait. These 
confrontations not only require a response from the side of the legislator and the judiciary, but 
also urge the topic of private regulation be given a more prominent place on the research 
agenda of private law scholars. 
 In view of the theoretical focus of the European and Dutch private law debate, the main 
research challenge would be that of collecting empirical data on the effectiveness, the 
opportunities and risks, and the actual use of industry codes of conduct. The opportunities and 
risks of codes of conduct, for example, are a much-discussed topic, yet in most cases this 
discussion is not based on systematic empirical research as to whether these opportunities and 
risks actually materialize and, if so, when and how.1396 The same observations apply when the 
use of industry codes is concerned: also at this point, there is very little empirical data. How 
do private actors themselves deal with industry codes in the B2B and B2C relationships 
covered by these codes?1397 What are the actual results of the European and Dutch legislative 
strategies to deploy alternative regulatory instruments? The answers to such empirical 
questions constitute an important basis to take yet another step ahead in the theoretical 
discussion on industry codes of conduct in private law.1398 The developments outlined in 
section 7.3 of this chapter show that scholars of private law will also have to face several 
theoretical and conceptual challenges. Considering these developments, building on empirical 
data and the developments that are already taking place in private-law practice, private law 
research will have to focus particularly on the implications of the regulatory role of industry 
codes for the formation of law within private law,1399 on the role of substantive private law in 
that regard and, eventually, on the fundamental question of the tenability of the traditional 
paradigm of the origins of legal norms: the framework of legislation and adjudication.1400 
 These conclusions lead us back to the quotation from Enschedé, stemming from 1984, 
with which this doctoral thesis started: 
 
“The legal order cannot function in the best possible way, unless it finds its proper place among 
other systems of norms, both internally, among the different national and international systems of 
norms, and externally.”1401 
 
                                                
1396 Exceptions in this regard include Cafaggi 2014 (report on the basis of 11 case studies on the legitimacy, 
quality, enforcement and effectiveness of transnational private regulation and the interrelatedness of these four 
elements) and Van Boom et al. 2009, followed by Van Boom et al. 2011 (empirical study into the factors for the 
success and failure of private regulation). Noticeable with a view to the design of empirical research into the 
effectiveness of private regulation: Scheltema 2014 and Cafaggi & Renda 2014. 
1397 In answering this question, one could link up with the empirical studies into the ways in which multinational 
companies deal with their rules on corporate social responsibility. See Vytopil 2015 and Peterková-Mitkidis 
2015. 
1398 Cf. Akkermans 2011, p. 514, footnote 51.  
1399 The multi-layered nature of private law for instance raises the question as to how to safeguard the 
consistency and quality of the law (cf. Smits 2015a, p. 523). For a discussion of this issue in relation to European 
private law, see Van Schagen 2013. 
1400 See also Akkermans 2011. On the framework legislation-adjudication, see Vranken 2005, pp. 79-86. 
1401 Enschedé 1984, p. 140 (my own translation). In Dutch: “De rechtsorde kan niet optimaal functioneren, tenzij 
zij zowel inwendig, tussen de onderscheiden nationale en internationale normenstelsels, als uitwending, ten 
opzichte van àndere normenstelsels haar positie juist bepaalt”. 
 
 283 
The findings of this doctoral thesis and the developments outlined in this chapter show that 
the call has lost none of its relevance, the more so indeed since the issues touched upon in this 
thesis are not limited to industry codes of conduct, but also come up in respect of other forms 
of private regulation, such as technical standards, binding corporate rules and corporate social 
responsibility codes.1402 The regulatory role of industry codes and other forms of private 
regulation on the international, the European and the national level, urge us once more to 
reconsider and reflect upon the very foundations of private law. The new perspectives on the 
legal relevance of industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law that this doctoral thesis has 


























                                                
1402 See, e.g., Schepel 2005 (technical standards); Moerel 2012 (Binding Corporate Rules); Beckers 2015 (CSR 











































Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
The object of my study in this doctoral thesis, industry codes of conduct, has assumed an 
important role in regulating private law B2B and B2C relationships on the global, the 
European and the national level, as have other forms of private regulation. Despite this 
regulatory significance, however, the phenomenon of private regulation has to date received 
only little attention from Dutch private law scholars. Furthermore, as follows on from Dutch 
private law literature that does address the subject, the Dutch legislator and Dutch civil courts 
have thus far not engaged extensively, or at least not unequivocally, with private regulation 
either. As a result, the legal relevance of private regulation in Dutch private law is still 
surrounded by ambiguities. However, considering the fact that private regulation seems to be 
making more headway in European private law – a development that will impact the legal 
relevance of private regulation in Dutch private law given the interrelatedness of the 
European and the Dutch legal orders – and the aforementioned regulatory relevance, future 
encounters between private regulation and Dutch private law are inevitable. This urges the 
legislator, civil courts and legal scholars to further contemplate the relationship between 
private regulation and Dutch private law. Against this backdrop, this doctoral thesis 
investigated the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct by addressing the following 
central research question: 
 
What is the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct in a multi-layered Dutch private 
law? 
 
I answered this question based on the findings under the three pillars on which the thesis was 
built: 
 
I. An empirical study into the functions of European and Dutch industry codes of 
conduct (Chapters 2 and 3) 
II. The approach of the European and Dutch legislators to industry codes of conduct 
(Chapter 4) 




In doing so, I took a more comprehensive approach than the ones hithero taken in Dutch 
private law literature and added four new perspectives to the Dutch private law debates on the 
legal relevance of private regulation: an empirical perspective, the functions of European and 
Dutch industry codes of conduct, the perspective of the legislator and the European 
perspective (including an assessment of the European influence on the legal relevance of 
industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law). Additionally, going beyond the scope of the 
central research question, in the final part of this thesis (Chapter 7, section 7.4), I threw some 
new light on a recurrent issue in Dutch private law literature: the need to regulate the use of 
industry codes of conduct. 
 
Chapter 2 - The empirical study: Research design and methodology 
 
The first part of this thesis, Chapters 2 and 3, centered upon the functions of European and 
Dutch industry codes of conduct. The functions were identified on the basis of an empirical 
study, which formed a continuation of an exploratory empirical inquiry into these functions 
that I conducted as part of my Master’s thesis (2011).1403 The aim of the study was to identify 
the possible functions of said codes of conduct as completely and specifically as possible.  
 The scene for the empirical study was set in Chapter 2 by explaining the design of the 
empirical study and the methodology applied to identify the functions. Firstly, the Chapter set 
out the different steps that were taken to compose the sample of European and Dutch industry 
codes of conduct. These steps eventually led to a sample of 80 industry codes of conduct (34 
European codes and 46 Dutch codes) that pertain to private law B2B and B2C 
relationships.1404 These codes were drawn from 6 pre-selected industry sectors1405 in a steered, 
at random way.1406 The steering element of the selection process first of all entailed the 
inclusion of 44 industry codes of conduct that I had already studied as part of the empirical 
study conducted in my Master’s thesis. Secondly, when applicable, it entailed the inclusion of 
Dutch equivalents of the selected European codes of conduct (4 in total), so as to, on the one 
hand, gain insight into the interaction between European and Dutch industry codes and, on the 
other hand, to facilitate a comparison of the functions of European and Dutch industry codes.  
 Secondly, I introduced the framework of analysis used to identify the functions of the 
selected European and Dutch industry codes of conduct. This purpose-built framework, which 
builds on the one I applied in my Master’s thesis, consists of seven core elements: drafters 
and target group; reason; aim; type, nature and binding force of the rules; enforcement; 
influence of the government; accessibility.  
  
                                                
1403 Menting 2011. 
1404 A list of the industry codes of conduct studied is included as Annex 1. 
1405 1) Manufacturing, 2) Wholesale and retail trade, 3) Information and Communication, 4) Financial 
institutions, 5) Consultancy, research and other specialized activities, and 6) Renting and leasing of tangible 
goods and other business support activities. 
1406 Industry codes of conduct solely concerned with technical standards, codes of conduct adopted by Dutch 
professional organizations designated as a regulatory authority drawn from the profession (publiekrechtelijke 
beroepsorganisaties) and private regulatory schemes that did not meet the working definition of an ‘industry 
code of conduct’ applied in this thesis were excluded from the sampling process. 
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Drafters 1. Who has drawn up the code of conduct? 
Target groups 2. Who is the target group? 
Scope 3. What is the scope of the code of conduct? 
Reason 4. What were the reasons for drawing up (and, if applicable, revising) the 
code of conduct? 
Aim 5. What is the aim of the code of conduct? 
Rules 
Type 6. What types of rules does the code of conduct contain? 
c. Rules of a concrete, substantive nature, or 
d. Rules of a moral/ethical nature, expressing aspirations 
Nature 7. What is the nature of these rules (specific or general)? 
Binding force 8. Does the code of conduct have binding force? 
Enforcement 
General 9. Does the code of conduct contain rules with respect to monitoring, 
compliance and enforcement? 
Monitoring actor 10. Is there a monitoring actor and, if so, is this actor independent? 
Complaint handling 11. Is there a system in place to handle complaints? 
Sanctions 12. In case of non-compliance, does the code of conduct provide for the 
possibility of imposing sanctions? 
13. Does the code provide an enforcement mechanism? 
Code, legislator and legislation 
Code - legislator 14. Has the European and/or the Dutch legislator influenced or been 
involved in drawing up and developing the code of conduct, i.e., what 
is/was the interaction between the legislator and the private actors? 
Code - legislation 15. Is there a relation/interaction between the code of conduct and 
European and/or Dutch legislation and regulations and, if so, what is 
the nature of said relation? 
Accessibility 16. Are explanatory notes provided, does the code contain provisions for 
review and amendment, is the code reviewed and revised on a regular 
basis and, if so, why, and can third parties easily access the code (e.g., 
for readability)?  
 
The questions were answered on the basis of the text of the industry code of conduct 
concerned and, where available, written information on the code of conduct derived from 
publicly available secondary sources. Although suitable to reach the aim of identifying the 
possible functions, this method of textual analysis comes with a two-fold caveat: it can 
involve an element of interpretation and it does not allow for insight into the actual objectives 
and effectiveness of the industry codes of conduct studied. Accordingly, the functions that 
were assigned to an industry code on the basis of the empirical study might differ from the 
actual functions of this code. 
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Chapter 3 - The functions of European and Dutch industry codes of conduct 
 
The functions of the selected European and Dutch industry codes of conduct were presented 
in Chapter 3. In identifying and assigning these functions, I drew on the answers to the 
questions included in the framework of analysis, whereby the functions of legislation and my 
own inventory of functions served as preliminary ‘sources of inspiration’. This analysis 
resulted in a general overview of 15 different, yet interconnected functions, which can be 
assigned to both European and Dutch industry codes.  
 
General overview of the functions 
 
General overview functions  
1. Corporate governance function 
2. Harmonization function 
3. Framework function 
4. Code of conduct as standard 
contract term 
5. Policy instrument function 
6. Alternative to public regulation 
7. Preventive function 
8. Complementary function 
9. Compliance function 
10. Safeguarding function 
11. Signaling function  
12. Image-building function 
13. Quality control function 
14. Quality mark function 
15. CSR function 
 
Source: My own empirical study 
 
I further categorized and detailed this general overview so as to reflect the interconnectedness 
of the functions and the role that ‘perspective’ proved to play in defining and assigning the 
functions.1407 More specifically, by adding three umbrella functions - the regulatory function, 













                                                
1407 I.e., the fact that the question about the functions of an industry code of conduct might be answered 
differently depending on whether we take the perspective of the private regulator (an organizational perspective) 




Multi-layered overview of the functions 
 
Overview functions: pillars, layers and connections 
1. Regulatory function  
1.1. Corporate governance function 
1.2. Harmonization function  
1.3. Framework function  
1.4. Code of conduct as standard contract term 
1.5. Preventive function 
§ Complementary function 
§ Compliance function 
1.6. Complementary function 
1.7. Compliance function 
1.8. Safeguarding function 
§ ‘Consolidating’ function (internal safeguarding function) 
§ Protective function (external safeguarding function) 
 
2. Governance function 
2.1. Policy instrument function 
§ Alternative to public regulation 
§ Complementary function 
§ Harmonization function 
§ Safeguarding function 
o ‘Consolidating’ function (internal safeguarding function) 
o Protective function (external safeguarding function) 
 
3. Signaling function 
3.1. Image-building function 
3.2. Quality mark function 
--- 
3.3. Quality control function* 
3.4. CSR function* 
 
* Although these functions are in effect situated at the interface of regulation and 
communication, I have placed them under the signaling function, as rules relating 
to quality control and CSR are often drawn up in response to societal pressure. 
 
A comparison between the functions resulting from the empirical study and the functions, 
objectives and motives of industry-level private regulation mentioned in the literature showed 
that, with the exception of the framework function, every function that I identified could be 
traced back in the literature. Conversely, however, not all functions listed in the literature 
studied came to the fore during the empirical study. Nonetheless, as these functions either did 
not pertain directly to the legal relevance of industry codes of conduct or could be subsumed 
under the functions that did follow on from the empirical study, I decided not to adapt my 
own overview of functions. Against this backdrop, I concluded that by putting together the 
different functions and highlighting the interconnectedness between them, my overview of 
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functions as presented in Chapter 3 is of a more comprehensive nature than those that can be 
found in the aforementioned literature.  
 
Chapter 4 – Industry codes of conduct in European and Dutch legislative policies 
 
In Chapter 4, the focus shifted to the approach of the European and Dutch legislators to 
industry codes of conduct in European and Dutch private law and the implications of these 
approaches for the legal relevance of such codes of conduct. In addressing these issues, a 
three-step-approach was adopted. 
 
 General legislative policies of the EU and the Netherlands 
As a first step, the place of alternative regulatory instruments, including self-regulation and 
co-regulation,1408 in the general legislative policies of the EU and the Netherlands was 
researched. 
 In EU legislative policy, the use of alternatives to legislation was given a kick-start at the 
beginning of the 2000s with the issuing of the White Paper on European Governance (2001) 
and the Better Regulation Action Plan (2002), and the conclusion of IIA 2003 between the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Council. Following the fundamental principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5 TEU, these policy documents 
explicitly emphasized and promoted the use of alternative regulatory instruments, such as 
self-regulation and co-regulation. Additionally, the IIA 2003 introduced a general framework 
for the use of self-regulation and co-regulation. Under the succeeding Smart Regulation 
Strategy (2010) and the REFIT program (2012), however, the use of alternative regulatory 
instruments was pushed into the background, albeit that the Impact Assessment Guidelines 
continued to require consideration of the use of such instruments during policy-making 
processes. This relative ‘dormancy’ was broken in May 2015 with the adoption of the Better 
Regulation Package, which seems to bring these instruments back to the forefront of the EU 
Better Regulation Strategy. Yet, with the IIA 2016 - which has replaced the IIA 2003 that 
prominently featured self-regulation and co-regulation - remaining entirely silent upon the use 
of alternative to legislation, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent these alternatives 
will actually return to the forefront. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the 
initial stages of the Better Regulation Strategy, which vigorously aimed at the use of 
alternative regulatory instruments, do not seem to have resulted in a great deal of self-
regulatory and co-regulatory initiatives. Thus, even though the use of alternatives to 
legislation constitutes one of the cornerstones of EU legislative policy, the ambivalent attitude 
towards such alternatives makes it difficult to predict what the future will hold for the use of 
self-regulation and co-regulation as regulatory alternatives in the European context.  
A similar picture emerged as regards the place of self-regulation and co-regulation in 
Dutch legislative policy. Following the emphasis put on self-regulation in the reports of the 
Geelhoed Committee (1984) and the Legislative Projects Review Committee (1987), 
                                                
1408 In order to avoid conceptual mix-ups, I followed the terminology used in the European and Dutch policy 
documents studied, i.e., self-regulation and co-regulation, in sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. 
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respectively, the government report ‘A view on legislation’ (1990) assigned alternative 
regulatory instruments a central role within Dutch legislative policy. Government reports that 
followed ‘A view on legislation’ affirmed this role and continued along the lines set out by 
that report. Accordingly, both the Legislative Drafting Instructions and the Integrated 
Framework for Policy Analysis and Legislation require that the Dutch legislator investigates 
the possibility of using alternative regulatory instruments, including self-regulation and co-
regulation, at several stages in the process of ex ante evaluation of legislative and policy 
initiatives. Nonetheless, there are only few cases in which the legislator explicitly and visibly 
considered the use of alternative policy options in this process. 
 
Private law references to codes of conduct 
By describing several examples of references to industry codes of conduct inside (i.e., 
references in legislation) and outside (i.e., references in policy documents or informal 
‘references’ in practice, such as a call upon an industry sector to self-regulate) private law 
legislation, the second step was to investigate how the European and Dutch legislators have 
employed such codes of conduct in European and Dutch private law. 
 At the European level, we can first of all find references to industry codes of conduct in 
several private law directives, covering a diverse range of topics, such as unfair commercial 
practices, consumer rights, audiovisual media services, e-commerce and the protection of 
personal data. Some of these references merely entail a call upon the Commission and/or the 
Member States to encourage the use of European-wide and national codes of conduct aimed at 
contributing to the attainment of the goals and the implementation of the directive concerned. 
The European legislator has however also referred to industry codes in a more direct, explicit 
fashion, namely by marking non-compliance with a code of conduct as a misleading 
commercial practice (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive), by imposing pre-contractual 
information duties in respect of codes of conduct (Directive on Timeshare, Consumer Rights 
Directive, E-Commerce Directive, Services Directive), by establishing a regime for the formal 
approval of codes of conduct, which approval lends a certain legal status to these codes (EU 
framework on personal data protection) and by designating codes of conduct as a yardstick to 
substantiate the open-ended legal norm of a ‘safe product’ (Product Safety Directive). 
Secondly, the European legislator has actively initiated the development of industry codes of 
conduct ‘outside’ legislation, resulting in several cases in which such codes function as a 
policy instrument within the field of European private law. 
 The Dutch legislator, by contrast, has thus far introduced very few direct references to 
industry codes of conduct: the vast majority of references to such codes in Dutch private law 
legislation have their origins in European directives. Like its European counterpart, the Dutch 
legislator has however on several occasions employed industry codes of conduct as a policy 
instrument, leaving regulation of certain private law issues wholly or partially in the hands of 







As a third step, I discussed the criteria that the European and Dutch legislators have imposed 
on the use of alternative regulatory instruments. At the European level, these criteria have 
been brought together in a general framework, which was initially – that is to say until the 
entering into force of the IIA 2016 - to be found in the IIA 2003. Currently, the Principles for 
Better Self- and Co-regulation seem to constitute the new framework for the use of self-
regulation and co-regulation within EU legislative policy. At the Dutch level, by contrast, 
such a general framework is lacking. Consequently, the conditions under which the Dutch 
legislator is allowed to seek recourse to self-regulatory or co-regulatory initiatives have to be 
inferred from different policy documents.  
 The European and Dutch criteria were found to bear close resemblance; at both levels, 
the use of self-regulation and co-regulation is subjected to more or less similar procedural and 
substantive requirements. Whereas the first type of requirements reflects principles of good 
governance (e.g., transparency, representativeness and accessibility), the latter type of 
requirements generally concerns compliance with European and national legislation and 
regulations. However, it remains shadowy as to whether and how compliance with these 
criteria is actually being monitored and assessed. 
 
Thus, the three-step-approach adopted in Chapter 4 showed that the use of alternatives to 
legislation, including industry codes of conduct, is one of the cornerstones of both European 
and Dutch legislative policies. In European and Dutch private law, this has resulted in the 
employment of industry codes as a policy instrument as well as in several, predominantly 
European direct references to such codes in private law legislation. Both practices affect the 
legal relevance of industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law. The reliance of the 
European and Dutch legislators on such codes - either as an alternative for or as a complement 
to public regulation - leads them to assume legal relevance as a policy instrument. The direct 
(EU) legislative references, in turn, reflecting the impact of the European legislative approach 
on Dutch private law, also result in industry codes of conduct gaining a certain legal status or 
even legal binding force in Dutch private law, as I summarized above, under ‘Private law 
references to codes of conduct’. 
 
Chapter 5 – The approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
In Chapter 5, I described how the CJEU has approached private regulation in its case law.1409 
Broadly speaking, European cases involving private regulation can be situated in two 
different settings: 1) the interpretation of European directives and regulations and 2) free 
movement and competition law. As my search for CJEU judgments involving private 
regulation yielded only two judgments situated in the first setting, the vast majority of 
confrontations between the CJEU and private regulation can be said to have thus far taken 
                                                
1409 As the case law of the CJEU has developed along the lines of several categories of private regulation, I 
decided to use the broader concept of ‘private regulation’, rather than the specific notion ‘industry codes of 
conduct’ in describing the Court’s case law. 
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place in the free movement and competition law context. However, contrary to what this 
observation suggests, the application of the rules on free movement and competition to 
private regulatory arrangements is not an obvious matter. After all, the TFEU is traditionally 
perceived to rest on a strict public-private divide: free-movement law is addressed to the 
Member States, while competition law covers the conduct of private economic actors. 
Abiding strictly to this divide implies that private regulation obstructing free movement and 
anti-competitive hybrid regulatory schemes fall outside the scope of free movement law and 
competition law, respectively. In subjecting private regulation to free movement and 
competition law scrutiny, the CJEU thus had to find its way around these conceptual barriers. 
The analysis of the Court’s case law in the field of free movement and competition showed 
that it proceeded as follows at this point. 
 
 Free movement law 
In the fields of the free movement of workers, the freedom of establishment and the freedom 
to provide services, the CJEU has brought several types of private action, including restrictive 
and discriminatory private collective regulation (cf. industry codes of conduct), within the 
scope of free movement law by attributing horizontal effect to the Treaty provisions 
concerning these freedoms (i.e., Articles, 45, 49 and 56 TFEU). In doing so, the Court has 
taken a functional approach, looking beyond the formal legal status of the private actor (cf. 
the traditional public-private divide) to the restrictive or discriminatory nature of the contested 
private measure.  
 In the field of the free movement of goods, by contrast, the CJEU has adopted a far more 
formal stance. It has repeatedly rejected arguments pertaining to the horizontal applicability 
of the rules in this field (Articles 34 and 35 TFEU) with reference to the fact that these rules 
concern public measures, rather than private actions. Nonetheless, private regulatory 
measures do not always fall outside the scope of Articles 34 and 35 TFEU. Firstly, the CJEU 
has extensively interpreted the concept of the ‘Member State’ included in these provisions so 
as to encompass semi-private bodies that have strong links to the State. Once the influence of 
the State on a body can be considered ‘considerable’, the activities of the body fall within the 
scope of Articles 34 and 35 TFEU. Secondly, in Fra.bo, the CJEU went beyond the formal 
personal scope of Article 34 TFEU, albeit in a rather case-specific way. It held that Article 34 
TFEU was applicable to the activities of a private law body, considering that this body de 
facto held the power to take regulatory decisions that restrict the free movement of goods in a 
State-like way. Thus, the formal approach of the CJEU in the field of goods does embody 
some functional elements.  
 
 Competition law 
As a result of the CJEU’s functional interpretation of the notion ‘association of undertakings’ 
included in Article 101(1) TFEU, industry-level private regulation restricting intra-
Community competition can in principle be subjected to competition law scrutiny. However, 
the Court did not go as far as bringing all private regulatory activities within the scope of EU 
competition law: in certain instances, co-regulatory regimes and regimes involving a public 
 
 294 
interest dimension can be excluded from this traditionally private scope. At this point, the 
formal elements of the CJEU’s functional approach under competition law come to the fore. 
 In cases in which the private regulator itself is held accountable, these formal elements 
follow on from the Court’s rulings in Wouters and related judgments. Here, the CJEU has 
held that a professional regulatory body that has ties with the State does not qualify as an 
‘association of undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU when 1) it is 
composed of a majority of representatives from public authorities and 2) it is required by 
national legislation to observe public-interest criteria. If these criteria - which have their 
origins in the Court’s effet utile doctrine - are met, the professional body is considered to act 
in the public interest and accordingly falls outside the ‘private’ reach of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
In a more or less similar vein, the CJEU in Wouters established that restrictive private 
regulatory measures can be justified when, in short, they pursue legitimate public interest 
objectives (Wouters test).  
 A similar observation applies when the State is called into account for public measures 
related to anti-competitive private activities. Following on from the effet utile doctrine, a State 
is - in brief - neither allowed to require or favor restrictive private conduct, or to reinforce the 
effects of such conduct, nor to deprive its legislation from its official character delegating 
regulatory authority to take decisions that affect the economic sphere. In establishing whether 
the first two scenarios (‘require of favor’ and ‘reinforce’) apply, it is relevant whether the 
private body in question can be considered an association of undertakings for the purposes of 
Article 101(1) TFEU. Here, the aforementioned composition requirement and the requirement 
of legal public interest criteria apply. As regards the delegation-scenario, whether the State 
has retained the power to supervise and control the private activities in last resort is relevant. 
When these public interest related criteria are met, the aforementioned scenarios do not 
materialize. Accordingly, the State does not incur competition law liability under the ‘private’ 
rules on competition. 
 
In sum, through its predominantly functional approach, the CJEU has brought private 
regulation (including industry codes of conduct) within the realm of free movement law and 
competition law. The significance of this approach for the legal relevance of industry codes of 
conduct and other forms of private regulation lies in the fact that the CJEU has accordingly 
created a European legal framework for private regulation. Private regulators will have to 
ensure that their regulatory activities do not hamper free movement or restrict intra-
Community competition, subject to sanctions under national private law. Furthermore, as 
others have argued in legal literature, the Court has subjected private regulatory schemes to 
certain good governance criteria. This has been held to result in the regulation of the use of 
private regulation: private regulators that meet these criteria can escape free movement and 
competition law liability. In Chapter 5, this meta-regulatory approach most visibly came to 
the fore in the competition law part of the chapter. In line with the argument advanced in legal 
literature at this point, this part showed that where co-regulatory regimes are concerned, 
private regulators (i.e., following Wouters and related judgments, at least professional bodies) 
and States (following the effet utile doctrine) can escape competition law liability when 
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certain procedural good governance requirements (i.e., the composition of the regulatory 
body, a legal obligation to observe public interest criteria and the presence of State 
supervision and control as a last resort) are met. 
 
Chapter 6 – The approach of the Dutch civil courts 
 
Chapter 6 focused on the ways in which the Dutch civil courts, that is to say district courts, 
courts of appeal and the Supreme Court, have dealt with industry codes of conduct. It 
proceeded on the basis of a case law analysis, which comprised both judgments mentioned in 
Dutch private law literature and judgments found through my own search for relevant case 
law.1410 
 
 Lower courts 
The analysis of the lower courts’ case law unveiled that Dutch district courts and appellate 
courts are generally willing to attribute legal relevance to industry codes of conduct when 
delivering their judgments, without being held back by the private, non-legal nature of such 
codes. To this end, the courts have used the following three ‘judicial techniques’: 1) using 
industry codes to substantiate open-ended legal standards, 2) transforming industry codes into 
existing private law concepts, and 3) referring to industry codes as a self-standing argument. 
There are also cases in which lower courts have refrained from taking account of the code of 
conduct relied upon by parties to the proceedings or assigned only limited relevance to this 
code. In some cases, this was self-evident, as the code in question was inapplicable. In other 
cases, however, this reticent stance appeared to center upon the private origins of the rule. 
 In taking account of industry codes, the lower courts proceed along the lines of what 
appears to be a more or less fixed approach, as followed on from the case law analysis: if the 
legal binding force of an industry code of conduct can be established or when there is 
consensus between the parties to the proceedings on the binding force or applicability of a 
code, the courts assign legal relevance to the code. From a procedural perspective, this 
approach is not particularly surprising, given that Article 149 of the Dutch Code of Civil 
Procedure obliges lower courts to establish facts and rights as given when not contested or 
insufficiently so. Conversely, however, in cases where there is no consensus between the 
parties about the binding force or applicability of the code, the exact approach of the courts 
remains unclear. Whereas in some judgments, codes were denied legal relevance with 
reference to either the lack of binding force or applicability of the code, or the private nature 
of the rules, they were assigned such relevance in others, in spite of the aforementioned lack 
of consensus.  
 
 Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court, in turn, has also been faced with cases involving industry codes of 
conduct. In some cases, the Court could limit itself to endorsing the use of an industry code 
                                                
1410 The sample of case law thus gathered comprised 30 Supreme Court rulings, 43 court of appeal rulings and 
112 district court decisions. 
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by the court of appeal. Other cases, however, did require the Court to rule upon the legal 
relevance of the industry code concerned. As regards the latter set of cases, it was observed 
that in all judgments, the Court did assign legal relevance to the private rules relied upon by 
the parties to the proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that industry codes do not qualify as 
law within the meaning of Article 79 RO. In fact, in Trombose and Achmea/Rijnberg, it 
dedicated more general considerations to the role and binding force of the private rules at 
issue. Nonetheless, the picture that emerges from the Court’s case law at this point is one of 
ambiguity. Judgments in which industry codes were assigned considerable legal weight (Van 
der Tuuk Adriani/Batelaan, Trombose, HBU/Groenendijk and Achmea/Rijnberg) alternate 
with judgments in which the Supreme Court keeps the private rules at a distance and mitigates 
their legal weight, seemingly because of their private nature. This ambiguity is also reflected 
in the fact that the Court still appears to decide upon the legal relevance of industry codes on 
the basis of a case-by-case- approach. 
 A possible explanation for this ambiguity in the Court’s case law concerning industry 
codes of conduct was found in the peculiar procedural context in which the Supreme Court 
has to maneuver. In this respect, I pointed at the limited number of cases involving such codes 
that reach the Supreme Court, at the fact that these cases tend to be the ‘problematic’ ones and 
at the procedural framework of Article 79 RO, which limits the degree of control that the 
Court can exert. Accordingly, establishing a fixed approach towards industry codes is more 
difficult for the Supreme Court than it is for the lower courts, which proceed in a different 
procedural environment. At the same time, however, I submitted that these procedural barriers 
do not derogate from the fact that, in its capacity of developer of the law, the Court can seize 
questions of law concerning industry codes of conduct as a possibility to rule on the legal 
relevance of such codes in general and express terms. The fact that the Supreme Court has 
thus far refrained from doing so and rather adopted a casuistic approach, has led to legal 
uncertainty as regards the legal relevance of industry codes in Dutch private law. For that 
reason, I expressly called upon the Supreme Court to clarify this issue in unequivocal and 
general terms.  
 
In sum, the case law analysis conducted in Chapter 6 unveiled that - the private nature of the 
rules notwithstanding - lower courts as well as the Supreme Court have assigned legal 
relevance to industry codes of conduct as a viewpoint, as an argument or as a standard for 
assessment in establishing civil law liability or, more generally, in deciding private law 
disputes. Contrary to what existing case law analyses suggest, rather than the Supreme 
Courts, it are the lower courts that have taken the lead in this regard by adopting a ‘consensus 
= legal application approach’ - as opposed to the Supreme Court which still proceeds on the 
basis of a case-by-case approach. This approach of the Dutch lower courts has not been 
identified in any previous private law research on the topic. 
 However, as the lower court approach does not cover cases in which there is no 
consensus between parties to the proceedings on the binding force or applicability of an 
industry code, it remains unclear how the legal relevance of industry codes is to be 
determined in these cases. The lower court decisions at this point differ: in some cases the 
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code concerned was assigned legal relevance, while in other cases the private rules at issue 
were – with the advancement of different arguments - denied such relevance. I submitted that 
a lead might be found in this respect in the Supreme Court rulings in Van der Tuuk 
Adriani/Batelaan and Trombose. These rulings seem to suggest that the ‘external’ legal 
relevance of an industry code of conduct in relationships between the regulated actor applying 
the code and the other party to that relationship is implicit in the ‘internal’ consensus about 
the industry code between the private regulator and the regulated actor. 
 
Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
 
 Central research question  
The answer to the central research question on the legal relevance of industry codes of 
conduct in a multi-layered Dutch private law was that industry codes have legal relevance in 
Dutch private law as a regulatory instrument, as a policy instrument and as a viewpoint, as an 
argument or as a standard for assessment in civil case law, in establishing liability under civil 
law or, more generally, in deciding private law disputes. As such, industry codes of conduct 
constitute an important manifestation of the increasingly multi-layered nature of Dutch 
private law. 
 Although this conclusion is in itself not a new one, as private regulation is usually taken 
to have legal relevance in Dutch private law literature on the topic, it does shed new light on 
the Dutch private law debate. The developments described in this doctoral thesis not only 
show that industry codes of conduct bear greater legal relevance in Dutch private law than is 
assumed in the literature, but also make clear that such relevance is being shaped by European 
developments and lines in the case law of Dutch lower courts that have thus far remained 
underexposed or undiscussed in the Dutch private law debate.  
 The functions were eventually not considered in answering the central research question. 
As the analysis of the case law of the Dutch lower courts showed that industry codes are 
already assigned legal relevance on the basis of a more or less fixed approach, there was no 
need to use the functions as a yardstick for determining the legal relevance of these codes, as 
was initially envisaged by the research design set out in Chapter 1. They did, however, play a 
role in addressing the question about the need for regulation of industry codes (see Chapter 7, 
section 7.4) 
 
 Broader perspective: Three future developments 
The answer to the research question revealed three related, fundamental developments within 
private law.  
 First of all, it underlines the unavoidability of the multi-layered nature of the European 
and Dutch private law legal orders. With industry codes of conduct playing a regulatory role 
in many different fields of private law, and the legislator and the judiciary at both the 
European and national level no longer keeping themselves aloof from private regulation, 
private rules are percolating through European and Dutch private law. The formation of 
private law (privaatrechtelijke rechtsvorming) in a multi-layered private law legal order to an 
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increasing extent also takes place through international, European and national forms of 
private regulation. 
 Secondly, the research findings of this doctoral thesis show that the development of 
private law is no longer the exclusive prerogative of the legislator and the judiciary: by now, 
industry codes of conduct also play their part in this respect. Considering the developments 
that are taking place in legal practice, I submitted it is all but unavoidable that the framework 
of legislation-adjudication, which still dominates thinking in Dutch private law, will have to 
give way to its exclusiveness at a certain point in time and that industry codes of conduct (and 
other forms of private regulation) will be given their own place as a source of law within that 
framework. 
 Thirdly, it was held that the growing regulatory and law-developing importance of 
industry codes of conduct will give rise to questions under substantive private law that have 
thus far not been raised in Dutch civil case law. This signifies a new role for the rules of 
substantive private law, which will retain their relevance in deciding upon these questions and 
in establishing the consequences of infringements of industry codes. 
 
 A need for regulation? 
In the final part of Chapter 7, i.e., section 7.4, I stepped outside the ambit of the central 
research question and, in an explorative fashion, addressed the question on the need for 
regulation of industry codes of conduct in Dutch private law. Several Dutch scholars of 
private law have already addressed this issue, arguing that public law criteria should be 
formulated for determining the legal relevance and quality of private regulation. However, the 
findings of this doctoral thesis show that the CJEU and Dutch civil courts do not apply public 
law criteria when assigning legal relevance to industry codes of conduct and that the problems 
to which the public law criteria are an answer do not come to the fore in civil law cases, 
except for the issue of non-legal status.  
 For that I reason, I explored whether alternative avenues, that is to say, ways other than 
the imposition of public law criteria, are available to the legislator, the judiciary and the 
private parties themselves under Dutch private law to cope with the lack of clarity about the 
legal relevance of industry codes in cases where there is no consensus between the parties to 
the proceedings on the applicability of a code of conduct, and to meet possible problems 
concerning the quality of these codes. In doing so, I distinguished between three scenarios in 
which there can be a lack of consensus - all of which concerned the legal relevance of 
industry codes in external (legal) relationships between the regulated actor and the other 
(third) party - and ascertained for each ‘alternative avenue’ whether it could provide clarity in 
respect these scenarios. The exploration showed that the legislator, the judiciary and the 
private actors themselves have several means at their disposal to elucidate the ambiguities 
surrounding the legal relevance and quality of industry codes of conduct. 
  Considering what my exploration found, I argued that there is neither a need for public 
law criteria to determine the legal relevance and quality of industry codes of conduct, nor for 
further regulation of the use of these codes. Rather, at this point in time, preference should be 
given to a ‘judicial growth model’, meaning that it is up to the judiciary to clarify the legal 
 
 299 
relevance of industry codes on the basis of substantive private law or procedural law. Within 
this model, the Supreme Court is to take on the leadership role. The Court will not only 
have to clarify its own approach to industry codes of conduct in a well-reasoned, explicit 
fashion, but, in its capacity as developer of the law, it will also have to indicate in general 




I concluded Chapter 7 with a call upon private law scholars to put the topic of private 
regulation more prominently on their research agendas. Empirical data on the effectiveness, 
the opportunities and risks, and the actual use of industry codes are much needed in order to 
address the theoretical and conceptual challenges that industry codes of conduct and other 
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HR 2 May 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1056, NJ 2014/250 (ABN Amro/J.) 








Court of Appeal (Hof) 
 
Hof Amsterdam 
Hof Amsterdam (Enterprise Division) 21 June 1979, NJ 1980/71 (Batco) 
Hof Amsterdam (Enterprise Division) 14 December 2005, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2005:AU8151 
(Versatel) 
Hof Amsterdam 18 January 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:BA5933 
Hof Amsterdam 26 January 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BO7591 
Hof Amsterdam 23 February 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BM9488 
Hof Amsterdam 24 July 2012, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BX9813 
Hof Amsterdam 26 March 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:944 
Hof Amsterdam 1 April 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:1135 
Hof Amsterdam 13 May 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:1690 
Hof Amsterdam 3 June 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:2410 
Hof Amsterdam 2 September 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:3704 
Hof Amsterdam 14 December 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:5228 
Hof Amsterdam 23 February 2016, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:635 
 
Hof Arnhem 
Hof Arnhem 11 September 2007, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2007:BB8620 
Hof Arnhem 7 February 2009, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2009:BK4834 
Hof Arnhem 11 August 2009, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2009:BJ5405 
Hof Arnhem 27 March 2012, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2012:BW0559 
Hof Arnhem 18 December 2012, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2012:BY6523 
 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 19 March 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:BZ4776 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 9 April 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:BZ6718 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 21 May 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:CA2662 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 5 November 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:8290 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 10 December 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:9404 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 24 December 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:9929 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 4 February 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:753 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 4 March 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:1698 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 26 March 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:2385 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 2 September 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:6792 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 17 February 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:1078 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 11 August 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:5952 
Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 12 April 2016, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2016:2876 






Hof ’s-Gravenhage 11 November 2008, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2008:BG8142 
Hof ’s-Gravenhage 16 November 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BO4175 
 
Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 
Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 21 September 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2010:BN9270 
Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 1 May 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BW4879 
Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 29 May 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BW7211 
Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 4 September 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BX9465 
Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 18 September 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BX7795 
Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 19 March 2013, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:BZ5106 
Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 15 July 2014, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2014:2143 
Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 15 December 2015, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2015:5258 
 
Hof Leeuwarden 
Hof Leeuwarden 26 June 2012, ECLI:NL:GHLEE:2012:BW9768 
 
District court (Rechtbank) 
 
Rechtbank Alkmaar 
Rb. Alkmaar 6 May 2010, ECLI:NL:RBALK:2010:BN1637 
 
Rechtbank Amsterdam 
Rb. Amsterdam 28 August 1986, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:1986:AH1325, KG 1986, 404 
Rb. Amsterdam 22 November 2006, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2006:AZ3700 
Rb. Amsterdam 13 December 2006, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2006:AZ5732 
Rb. Amsterdam 7 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2012:BV9330 
Rb. Amsterdam 11 April 2013, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:BZ7028 
Rb. Amsterdam 18 July 2013, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:5253 
Rb. Amsterdam 4 December 2013, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:9884 
Rb. Amsterdam 2 January 2014, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:10 
Rb. Amsterdam 8 January 2014, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:9 
Rb. Amsterdam 7 May 2014, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:3455 
Rb. Amsterdam 31 December 2014, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:9091 
Rb. Amsterdam 15 December 2015, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:8976 
 
Rechtbank Arnhem 
Rb. Arnhem 17 May 2006, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2006:AY0882 
Rb. Arnhem 26 March 2008, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2008:BC8904 
Rb. Arnhem 16 February 2011, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2011:BP6166 
Rb. Arnhem 11 April 2012, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2012:BW3674 
Rb. Arnhem 12 September 2012, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2012:BX8182 
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Vzr. Rb. Arnhem 2 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2012:BV5455 
 
Rechtbank Assen 
Rb. Assen 25 July 2007, ECLI:NL:RBASS:2007:BH6215 
Rb. Assen 16 November 2011, ECLI:NL:RBASS:2011:BU6547 
 
Rechtbank Breda 
Rb. Breda 7 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2011:BT7273 
Rb. Breda 7 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2012:BV8015 
 
Rechtbank Dordrecht 
Rb. Dordrecht 24 February 2010, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:2010:BL6070 
Rb. Dordrecht 27 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:2012:BY8127 
 
Rechtbank Gelderland 
Rb. Gelderland 3 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2014:5645 
Rb. Gelderland 9 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2014:6306 
Rb. Gelderland 10 June 2016, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2015:5231 
 
Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage/Den Haag 
Vzr. Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 24 July 2004, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2004:AQ5353 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 10 July 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BA9210 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 31 December 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BG8465 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 6 March 2009, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BH8906 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 20 July 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2010:BN2040 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 20 July 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BR0796 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 23 March 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BP9631 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 22 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BU3540 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 9 February 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV7111 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 1 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV9587 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 13 August 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BX7262 
Rb. Den Haag 24 July 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:9259 
Rb. Den Haag 23 October 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:14241 
Rb. Den Haag 5 March 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:3581 
Rb. Den Haag 25 May 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:5695 
 
Rechtbank Groningen 
Rb. Groningen 4 May 2006, ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2007:BA7177 
 
Rechtbank Haarlem 





Rb. ’s-Hertogenbosch 18 August 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSHE:2010:BN4531 
Rb. ’s-Hertogenbosch 17 July 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSHE:2012:BX3136 
 
Rechtbank Leeuwarden 
Rb. Leeuwarden 4 December 2002, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2002:AF2583 
Rb. Leeuwarden 11 February 2009, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2009:BH2709 
 
Rechtbank Limburg 
Rb. Limburg 26 February 2014, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2014:2557 
Rb. Limburg 10 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2014:7819 
Rb. Limburg 3 September 2015, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2015:7621 
 
Rechtbank Maastricht 
Rb. Maastricht 28 March 2011, ECLI:NL:RBMAA:2011:BP9762 
 
Rechtbank Middelburg 
Rb. Middelburg 29 September 2010, ECLI:NL:RBMID:2010:BO9418 
 
Rechtbank Midden-Nederland 
Vzr. Rb. Midden-Nederland 10 June 2013, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2013:CA3500 
Rb. Midden-Nederland 12 June 2013, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2013:CA3498 
Rb. Midden-Nederland 30 July 2014, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2014:3030 
Rb. Midden-Nederland 21 August 2014, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2014:3653 
 
Rechtbank Noord-Holland 
Rb. Noord-Holland 5 March 2014, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2014:1519 
Rb. Noord-Holland 23 April 2014, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2014:3627 
Rb. Noord-Holland 26 June 2014, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2014:5555  
Rb. Noord-Holland 22 January 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2015:876 
Rb. Noord-Holland 20 May 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2015:11544 
 
Rechtbank Noord-Nederland 
Rb. Noord-Nederland 29 November 2013, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2013:7307 
Rb. Noord-Nederland 26 November 2014, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2014:6661 
Rb. Noord-Nederland 4 March 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2015:1112 
Rb. Noord-Nederland 2 September 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2015:4185 
 
Rechtbank Oost-Brabant 
Rb. Oost-Brabant 22 May 2014, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2014:2701 





Rb. Oost-Nederland 21 March 2013, ECLI:NL:RBONE:2013:BZ5412 
 
Rechtbank Overijssel 
Rb. Overijssel 25 June 2014, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2014:3607 
Rb. Overijssel 13 November 2015, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2015:5020 
 
Rechtbank Roermond 
Rb. Roermond 1 September 2004, NJF 2004, 578 
Rb. Roermond 23 November 2011, ECLI:NL:RBROE:2011:BU5452 
Rechtbank Rotterdam 
Rb. Rotterdam 20 May 2005, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2005:AT8525 
Rb. Rotterdam 6 January 2010, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK9798 
Rb. Rotterdam 24 March 2010, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM2022 
Rb. Rotterdam 31 March 2010, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM0821 
Rb. Rotterdam 20 May 2010, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BM5231 
Rb. Rotterdam 3 November 2010, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BO9900 
Rb. Rotterdam 14 April 2011, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ1281 
Rb. Rotterdam 4 May 2011, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ3835 
Rb. Rotterdam 18 January 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BV1966 
Rb. Rotterdam 15 February 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BV9671 
Rb. Rotterdam 19 April 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BW3358 (Celldorado) 
Rb. Rotterdam 24 October 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BY3650 
Rb. Rotterdam 13 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BY6184 
Rb. Rotterdam 25 April 2013, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:BZ8775 
Rb. Rotterdam 28 May 2014, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:4578 
Rb. Rotterdam 28 May 2014, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:6171 
Rb. Rotterdam, 9 July 2014, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:5378 
Rb. Rotterdam 17 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:7637 
Rb. Rotterdam 26 November 2015, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:8642 
Rb. Rotterdam 11 April 2016, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:2802 
 
Rechtbank Utrecht 
Rb. Utrecht 10 January 2007, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2007:AZ6197 
Rb. Utrecht 16 July 2008, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2008:BF8825 
Rb. Utrecht 25 August 2010, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2010:BO1767 
Rb. Utrecht 17 November 2010, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2010:BO5222 
Rb. Utrecht 15 February 2012, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2012:BW0548 
Rb. Utrecht 29 February 2012, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2012:BV8187 






Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 14 January 2013, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2013:BY983 
Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 26 June 2013, ECL:NL:RBZWB:2013:7313 
Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 26 February 2014, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2014:313 
Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 16 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2014:6382 
 
Rechtbank Zutphen 
Rb. Zutphen 9 May 2007, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2007:BB1491 
Rb. Zutphen 7 November 2007, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2007:BB8032 
Rb. Zutphen 14 July 2009, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2009:BJ2559 
Rb. Zutphen 8 October 2009, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2009:BK4206 
Rb. Zutphen 12 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:2012:BY6138 
 
Rechtbank Zwolle-Lelystad 
Rb. Zwolle-Lelystad 19 August 2009, ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2009:BJ9081 
Rb. Zwolle-Lelystad 4 May 2011, ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2011:BV6594 
Rb. Zwolle-Lelystad 29 August 2012, ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2012:1648 
 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling 
bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) 
 
ABRvS 2 February 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BP2750 
ABRvS 25 May 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BQ5921 
 
Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven) 
 
CBb 19 July 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:69 
CBb 28 November 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:260 


















Annex 1 Overview of the European and Dutch industry 







The empirical study was conducted between March 2012 and July 2012. All codes of conduct 
were in force at that time.  
 
* = Code of conduct studied in the exploratory empirical study included in my Master’s thesis 
(Menting 2011). 





European codes of conduct (9) 
 
1. Code of Conduct on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Sugar Industry * 
2. UNESDA Code for the Labelling and Marketing of Energy Shots 
3. Code of Labour Practices for the Apparel Industry Including Sportswear * 
4. Code of Conduct European Co-Packers Association (ECPA) * 
5. Code of Conduct for the Paper Industry  
6. Code on the promotion of prescription-only medicines to, and interactions with, 
healthcare professionals (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations, EFPIA) * 
7. Code of Ethics European Diagnostic Manufacturers Association (EDMA) 
8. Code of Practice on HFCs Use in Aerosols  
9. Code of Conduct European Committee of Manufacturers of Domestic Equipment 
(CECED) 
 
Dutch codes of conduct (8) 
 
10. Gedragscode Mededingingsrecht Federatie Nederlandse Levensmiddelen Industrie (FNLI) 




12. Product Stewardship Gedragscode (Nederlandse Stichting voor Fytofarmacie, Nefyto) 
13. A Code of Conduct for the natural stone sector 
14. Gedragscode Farmaceutische Bedrijfstak 
15. Gedragscode Diagnostica-Industrie Diagned 
16. Gedragscode inzake het verwerken van persoonsgegevens farmaceutische industrie * 
17. Gedragscode Nederlandse Vereniging MuziekinstrumentMakers (NVMM) 
 
Wholesale and retail trade 
 
European codes of conduct (5) 
 
18. Code of Conduct in the relations with EU Institutions (European Ship Suppliers 
Organization, OCEAN) 
19. European Direct Selling Code of Conduct towards Consumers (European Direct Selling 
Association, Seldia) 
20. European Direct Selling Code of Conduct towards direct sellers, between direct sellers 
and between companies (Seldia) 
21. Convention on Cross Border Distance Selling (European Multi-Channel and Online Trade 
Association, EMOTA) * 
22. Code of Conduct European Federation of Parquet Importers (EFPI) 
 
Dutch codes of conduct (3) 
 
23. Gedragscode Erkend Leverancier FOCWA 
24. Gedragscode Thuiswinkelwaarborg (Thuiswinkel.org) * 
25. Gedragscode Consument en Energieleverancier (Energie-Nederland) * 
 
Information and communication 
 
European codes of conduct (3) 
 
26. Pan-European Game Information (PEGI) Code of Conduct * 
27. Code of Conduct for e-auctions (International confederation for printing and allied 
industries, Intergraf) * 
28. Code of Professional Practice European Association of Directory Publishers (EADP) 
 
Dutch codes of conduct (4) 
 
29. Gedragscode SMS-Dienstverlening * 
30. Gedragscode Abonnementen Nederlands Uitgeversverbond (NUV) * 
31. Gedragscode Notice-And-Take-Down * 





European codes of conduct (4) 
 
33. European Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement * 
34. A Code of Conduct for the European Investment Management Industry (European Fund 
and Asset Management Association, EFAMA) * 
35. Common Principles for Bank Account Switching 
36. Principles of Ethical Conduct European Federation of Financial Analyst Societies 
(EFFAS) 
 
Dutch codes of conduct (14) 
 
37. Principles of Fund Governance Dutch Fund and Asset Management Association 
(DUFAS) * 
38. Code of Ethics Vereniging van Institutionele Beleggers in Vastgoed Nederland (IVBN) 
39. Gedragscode verkoop (complexen) huurwoningen IVBN 
40. Gedragscode consumptief krediet Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (NVB) * 
41. Gedragscode consumptief krediet Vereniging van Financieringsondernemingen in 
Nederland (VFN) * 
42. Gedragscode Nederlandse Vereniging van Participatiemaatschappijen (NVP) 
43. Gedragscode Goed Zorgverzekeraarschap 
44. Gedragscode Verzekeraars * 
45. Governance Principes Verzekeraars 
46. Gedragscode Registermakelaar in Assurantiën 
47. Gedragscode VBA (Vereniging van BeleggingsAnalisten) Beleggingsprofessionals 
*/**1411 
48. Gedragscode Nederlandse Vereniging van Financieringsadviseurs (NVF) 
49. Adfiz Code of conduct on integrity and independent advice 
50. Gedragscode Verwerking Persoonsgegevens Financiële Instellingen * 
 
Consultancy, research and other specialized business services 
 
European codes of conduct (9) 
 
51. European Deontological Code for Providers of Architectural Services (Architects’ 
Council of Europe, ACE)* 
52. Code of Professional Conduct and Practice European Institute of Golf Course Architects 
(EIGCA) 
                                                
1411 European equivalent: EFFAS Principles of Ethical Conduct 
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53. Engineering Consultancy Code of Conduct (European Federation of Engineering 
Consultancy Associations, EFCA) 
54. Code of Conduct for European Surveyors (Council of European Geodetic Surveyors – 
Geometer Europas, CLGE – GE) 
55. IAB Europe EU Framework for Online Behavioural Advertising * 
56. List Council Code of Practice (Federation of European Direct and Interactive Marketing, 
FEDMA) 
57. Code of Ethics European Association of Communications Agencies (EACA) 
58. European Veterinary Code of Conduct (Federation of Veterinarians of Europe, FVE) * 
59. Code of Conduct European Public Affairs Consultancies Association (EPACA) 
 
Dutch codes of conduct (11) 
 
60. Gedragscode NLingenieurs **1412 
61. Gedragsregels Bond van Nederlandse Architecten (BNA) **1413 
62. Gedragsregels Nederlandse Vereniging voor Tuin- en Landschapsarchitectuur (NVTL) 
63. Gedragscode streetmarketing Dutch Dialogue Marketing Association (DDMA) * 
64. Gedragscode Geneesmiddelenreclame 
65. Nederlandse Reclame Code * 
66. Reclamecode Reisaanbiedingen * 
67. Reclamecode Voor Voedingsmiddelen * 
68. Gedragscode voor Onderzoek & Statistiek * 
69. Code voor de Dierenarts (Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Diergeneeskunde, 
KNMvD)**1414 
70. Erecode Vereniging Zelfstandige Vertalers (VZV) 
 
Renting and leasing of tangible goods and other business support services 
 
European codes of conduct (4) 
 
71. Eurociett Code of Conduct 
72. European Code of Ethics for Franchising (European Franchise Federation, EFF) * 
73. Code of Ethics European Mentoring & Coaching Council (EMCC) 






                                                
1412 European equivalent: Engineering Consultancy Code of Conduct (EFCA) 
1413 European equivalent: European Deontological Code for Providers of Architectural Services 
1414 European equivalent: FVE European Veterinary Code of Conduct 
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Dutch codes of conduct (6) 
 
75. Gedragsregels voor uitzendondernemingen (Algemene Bond Uitzendondernemingen, 
ABU) 
76. Ethische Gedragscode Nederlandse Orde van Beroepscoaches (NOBCO) 
77. Code Verantwoordelijk Marktgedrag Schoonmaal- en glazenwassersbranche 
78. Gedragscode voor duurzame eindgebruikers (Facility Management Nederland, FMN) 
79. Gedragscode CLC-VECTA Centrum voor Live Communication  
80. Privacygedragscode sector particuliere onderzoeksbureaus (Vereniging van Particuliere 











































































This Annex includes an overview of the functions that were assigned to each of the 80 
European and Dutch industry codes of conduct on the basis of the empirical study.1415 The 
industry codes that were not found to have a specific function reflecting their regulatory 
nature were assigned the general ‘regulatory function’. As indicated in Chapter 3, section 
3.3.3.2, this overview is of a general nature: it does not reflect the pillars and layers of the 
final overview (included as Figure 3.5 in Chapter 3) because these details were added 
afterwards on the basis of the insights gained through the empirical study (cf. the 
interconnectedness of the functions and the role of perspective). Finally, it should be re-
emphasized that the functions were assigned on the basis of my analysis and interpretation of 
both the text of the industry code of conduct concerned and the written information about this 
code following on from secondary sources (where available). Hence, it cannot be ruled out 
that in practice, an industry code of conduct has more or different functions than those 





1. Code of Conduct on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Sugar Industry 
Version studied: 2003/2004 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Compliance function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• CSR function 
                                                
1415 For each code, a paper copy of the version studied is on file with the author. These copies are available on 
request, as are the empirical data used to identify the functions, i.e., the answers to the questions included in the 
framework of analysis. 
1416 Cf. also Chapter 2, section 2.6. 
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2. UNESDA Code for the Labelling and Marketing of Energy Shots 
Version studied: May 2011 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Complementary function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
3. Code of Labour Practices for the Apparel Industry Including Sportswear 
Version studied: as available on the Clean Clothes Campaign website in May 2012 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Code of conduct as standard contract term 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• CSR function 
 
4. Code of Conduct European Co-Packers Association (ECPA) 
Version studied: as available on the ECPA website in May 2012 
  
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
 
5. Code of Conduct for the Paper Industry  
Version studied: 2005 
 
• Framework function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• CSR function 
 
6. Code on the promotion of prescription-only medicines to, and interactions with, 
healthcare professionals (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations, EFPIA) 
Version studied: 2011 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Framework function 
• Compliance function 
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• Complementary function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
7. Code of Ethics European Diagnostic Manufacturers Association (EDMA) 
Version studied: as available on the EDMA website in June 2012 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Framework function 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
8. Code of Practice on HFCs Use in Aerosols  
Version studied: 29 March 2011 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• CSR function 
 
9. Code of Conduct European Committee of Manufacturers of Domestic Equipment 
(CECED) 
Version studied: November 2005 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• CSR function 
 
10. Gedragscode Mededingingsrecht Federatie Nederlandse Levensmiddelen Industrie 
(FNLI) 
Version studied: July 2008 
 
• Compliance function 




11. Gedragscode ‘Verantwoord gewicht’ (Nederlandse Vereniging Frisdranken, Waters, 
Sappen, FWS) 
Version studied: as available on the FWS website in June 2012 
 
• Complementary function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
12. Product Stewardship Gedragscode (Nederlandse Stichting voor Fytofarmacie, 
Nefyto) 
Version studied: December 2011 
 
• Complementary function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• CSR function 
 
13. A Code of Conduct for the natural stone sector 
Version studied: November 2007 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality mark function 
• CSR function 
 
14. Gedragscode Farmaceutische Bedrijfstak 
Version studied: November 2002 
 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 
• CSR function 
 
15. Gedragscode Diagnostica-Industrie Diagned 
Version studied: 2003 
 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 




16. Gedragscode inzake het verwerken van persoonsgegevens farmaceutische industrie 
Version studied: 2009 
 
• Code of conduct as standard contract term 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
 
17. Gedragscode Nederlandse Vereniging MuziekinstrumentMakers (NVMM) 
Version studied: as available on the NVMM website in June 2012 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
 
Wholesale and retail trade 
 
18. Code of Conduct in the relations with EU Institutions (European Ship Suppliers 
Organization, OCEAN) 
Version studied: 4 November 2011 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
 
19. European Direct Selling Code of Conduct towards Consumers (European Direct 
Selling Association, Seldia) 
Version studied: 10 May 2011 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Framework function 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 





20. European Direct Selling Code of Conduct towards direct sellers, between direct 
sellers and between companies (Seldia) 
Version studied: 10 May 2011 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Framework function 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
21. Convention on Cross Border Distance Selling (European Multi-Channel and Online 
Trade Association, EMOTA) 
Version studied: 2005 
 
• Framework function 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality mark function 
 
22. Code of Conduct European Federation of Parquet Importers (EFPI) 
Version studied: 2009 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• CSR function 
 
23. Gedragscode Erkend Leverancier FOCWA 
Version studied: September 2006 
 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: ‘Consolidating’ function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 





24. Gedragscode Thuiswinkelwaarborg (Thuiswinkel.org) 
Version studied: 15 January 2009 
 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function; Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
25. Gedragscode Consument en Energieleverancier (Energie-Nederland) 
Version studied: 15 August 2011 
 
• Preventive function 
• Complementary function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
 
Information and communication 
 
26. Pan-European Game Information (PEGI) Code of Conduct 
Version studied: as available on the PEGI website in March 2012 
 
• Complementary function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality mark function 
 
27. Code of Conduct for e-auctions (International confederation for printing and allied 
industries, Intergraf) 
Version studied: March 2005 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Safeguarding function: ‘Consolidating’ function 
• Signaling function 




28. Code of Professional Practice European Association of Directory Publishers (EADP) 
Version studied: as available on the EADP website in March 2012 
 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
 
29. Gedragscode SMS-Dienstverlening 
Version studied: March 2012 
 
• Code of conduct as standard contract term 
• Complementary function 
• Preventive function  
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
30. Gedragscode Abonnementen Nederlands Uitgeversverbond (NUV) 
Version studied: 1 April 2007 
 
• Complementary function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
31. Gedragscode Notice-And-Take-Down 
Version studied: October 2008 
 
• Complementary function 
• Policy instrument function 
 
32. Gedragscode ICT~Office 
Version studied: as available on the ICT~Office website in March 2012 
 
• Safeguarding function: ‘Consolidating function’ 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 







33. European Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement 
Version studied: 2006 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Preventive function 
• Policy instrument function 
 
34. A Code of Conduct for the European Investment Management Industry (European 
Fund and Asset Management Association, EFAMA) 
Version studied: 12 January 2006 
 
• Corporate governance function 
• Framework function 
• Preventive function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
35. Common Principles for Bank Account Switching 
Version studied: 2008 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Framework function 
• Preventive function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
 
36. Principles of Ethical Conduct European Federation of Financial Analyst Societies 
(EFFAS) 
Version studied: 2011 
 
• Framework function 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 






37. Principles of Fund Governance Dutch Fund and Asset Management Association 
(DUFAS) 
Version studied: 2008 
 
• Corporate governance function 
• Framework function 
• Preventive function 
• Complementary function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
 
38. Code of Ethics Vereniging van Institutionele Beleggers in Vastgoed Nederland 
(IVBN) 
Version studied: July 2008 
 
• Framework function 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function (internal and external) 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
39. Gedragscode verkoop (complexen) huurwoningen IVBN 
Version studied: 2007 
 
• Code of conduct as standard contract term 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
40. Gedragscode consumptief krediet Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (NVB) 
Version studied: 1 April 2012 
 
• Complementary function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 





41. Gedragscode consumptief krediet Vereniging van Financieringsondernemingen in 
Nederland (VFN) 
Version studied: 1 January 2012 
 
• Complementary function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
42. Gedragscode Nederlandse Vereniging van Participatiemaatschappijen (NVP) 
Version studied: as available on the NVP website in May 2012 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
43. Gedragscode Goed Zorgverzekeraarschap 
Version studied: as available on the Zorgverzekeraars Nederland website in May 2012 
 
• Preventive function 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
44. Gedragscode Verzekeraars 
Version studied: June 2011 
 
• Framework function 
• Preventive function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
45. Governance Principes Verzekeraars 
Version studied: 2010/2011 
 
• Corporate governance function 
• Complementary function 
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• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
46. Gedragscode Registermakelaar in Assurantiën 
Version studied: as available on the RMiA website in May 2012 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
47. Gedragscode VBA (Vereniging van BeleggingsAnalisten) Beleggingsprofessionals 
Version studied: 11 January 2012 
 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
48. Gedragscode Nederlandse Vereniging van Financieringsadviseurs (NVF) 
Version studied: 2011 
 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function  
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
49. Adfiz Code of conduct on integrity and independent advice 
Version studied: as available on the Adfiz website in May 2012 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
50. Gedragscode Verwerking Persoonsgegevens Financiële Instellingen 
Version studied: May 2010 
 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
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• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
 
 
Consultancy, research and other specialized business services 
 
51. European Deontological Code for Providers of Architectural Services (Architects’ 
Council of Europe, ACE) 
Version studied: September 2009 
 
• Framework function 
• Compliance function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
 
52. Code of Professional Conduct and Practice European Institute of Golf Course 
Architects (EIGCA) 
Version studied: March 2010 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
 
53. Engineering Consultancy Code of Conduct (European Federation of Engineering 
Consultancy Associations, EFCA) 
Version studied: 26 May 2011 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Framework function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
54. Code of Conduct for European Surveyors (Council of European Geodetic Surveyors 
– Geometer Europas, CLGE – GE) 
Version studied: 12 September 2009 
 
• Framework function 
• Compliance function 
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• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control/safeguarding quality 
 
55. IAB Europe EU Framework for Online Behavioural Advertising 
Version studied: April 2011 
 
• Preventive function 
• Complementary function 
• Safeguarding function: Consolidating function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality mark function 
 
56. List Council Code of Practice (Federation of European Direct and Interactive 
Marketing, FEDMA) 
Version studied: as available on the FEDMA website in July 2012 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
 
57. Code of Ethics European Association of Communications Agencies (EACA) 
Version studied: as available on the EACA website in July 2012 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• CSR function 
 
58. European Veterinary Code of Conduct (Federation of Veterinarians of Europe, 
FVE) 
Version studied: as available on the FVE website in July 2012 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Framework function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 




• Quality control function 
• CSR function 
 
59. Code of Conduct European Public Affairs Consultancies Association (EPACA) 
Version studied: as available on the EPACA website in July 2012 
 
• Preventive function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
60. Gedragscode NLingenieurs 
Version studied: 24 June 2012 
 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
• CSR function 
 
61. Gedragsregels Bond van Nederlandse Architecten (BNA) 
Version studied: as available on the BNA website in July 2012 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality 
 
62. Gedragsregels Nederlandse Vereniging voor Tuin- en Landschapsarchitectuur 
(NVTL) 
Version studied: as available on the NVTL website in July 2012 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
• Quality mark function 
 
63. Gedragscode streetmarketing Dutch Dialogue Marketing Association (DDMA) 
Version studied: as available on the DDMA website in July 2012 
 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
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• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
64. Gedragscode Geneesmiddelenreclame 
Version studied: January 2012 
 
• Preventive function 
• Complementary function 
• Policy instrument fuction 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
65. Nederlandse Reclame Code 
Version studied: as available on the website of the Nederlandse Reclame Code in July 
2012 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Compliance function 
• Preventive function 
• Complementary function 
• Alternative to legislation (Policy instrument function) 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
66. Reclamecode Reisaanbiedingen 
Version studied: as available on the NRC website in July 2012 
 
• Complementary function 
• Alternative to legislation (Policy instrument function) 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
67. Reclamecode Voor Voedingsmiddelen 
Version studied: as available on the NRC website in July 2012 
 
• Preventive function 
• Alternative to legislation (Policy instrument function) 
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• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
 
68. Gedragscode voor Onderzoek & Statistiek 
Version studied: June 2010 
 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
 
69. Code voor de Dierenarts (Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij voor 
Diergeneeskunde, KNMvD) 
Version studied: 2010 
 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 
• CSR function 
 
70. Erecode Vereniging Zelfstandige Vertalers (VZV) 
Version studied: as available on the VZV website in July 2012 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
 
Renting and leasing of tangible goods and other business support services 
 
71. Eurociett Code of Conduct 
Version studied: as available on the Eurociett website in June 2012 
 
• Harmonization function 
• Framework function 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
 368 
72. European Code of Ethics for Franchising (European Franchise Federation, EFF) 
Version studied: 5 December 2003 
 
• Framework function 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
73. Code of Ethics European Mentoring & Coaching Council (EMCC) 
Version studied: December 2008 
 
• Compliance function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
 
74. Code of Conduct Resort Development Organisation (RDO) 
Version studied: January 2010 
 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function  
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
 
75. Gedragsregels voor uitzendondernemingen (Algemene Bond Uitzendondernemingen, 
ABU) 
Version studied: June 2011 
 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function  
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
• CSR function 
 
76. Ethische Gedragscode Nederlandse Orde van Beroepscoaches (NOBCO) 
Version studied: as available on the NOBCO website in June 2012 
 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
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• Image-building function 
• Quality control function 
 
77. Code Verantwoordelijk Marktgedrag Schoonmaal- en glazenwassersbranche 
Version studied: 25 May 2011 
 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Signaling function 
• Image-building function 
• CSR function 
 
78. Gedragscode voor duurzame eindgebruikers (Facility Management Nederland, 
FMN) 
Version studied: 2011 
 
• Regulatory function 
• Signaling function 
 
79. Gedragscode CLC-VECTA Centrum voor Live Communication  
Version studied: as included in the CLC-VECTA bylaws (dated 29 August 2010) 
 
• Regulatory function (internal) 
• Signaling function (internal) 
 
80. Privacygedragscode sector particuliere onderzoeksbureaus (Vereniging van 
Particuliere Beveilingsorganisaties, VPB) 
Version studied: 2009 
 
• Complementary function 
• Compliance function 
• Safeguarding function: Protective function 
• Policy instrument function 
• Signaling function 
• Quality control function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
